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This thesis provides a qualitative study of control of the labour process and its 
relationship to technology in Revenues and Benefits departments within local 
government. The study, from a Marxist analytical perspective, focuses on three 
aspects of Information Communication Technology (ICT) as a tool of control within 
the labour process. Firstly, why would management seek to control the labour 
process in a sector where the profit motive is absent? Secondly, having established 
a motive for control, how has ICT been utilized as a means to achieve it? Finally, 
how has the use of ICT affected workers’ capability to resist such control? The thesis 
seeks to place these aspects within the context of the state’s position within the 
capitalist system as an employer of labour and the relationship between central and 
local government. 
 Literature has been reviewed around the three aspects identified and feeds into the 
research. Research was carried out at two metropolitan authorities responsible for 
the administration of Revenues and Benefits. The components of this fieldwork were 
questionnaires, with the two-fold objective of gathering data on worker attitudes and 
as a means of interview selection, and a total of 35 interviews carried out with 
managers, workers and trade union officials to gauge views across a range of 
perspectives within the workplaces.  
The findings of the thesis locate the desire for control of the labour process in the 
public sector within its position as a component part of a capitalist system and within 
a dynamic relationship between central and local government. This has led to 
management seeking to use ICT as a tool of control to achieve an intensification 
and displacement of labour, and to a challenging environment for labour to exercise 
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resistance. However, the thesis still views the frontier of control as shifting and not 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to explore control and resistance within the labour process 
in local government Revenues and Benefits departments and how this has been 
affected by the implementation of ICT in these areas. Local government employees, 
for the purposes of this thesis, are those workers employed by local authorities 
largely under the National Agreement on Pay and Conditions of Service Council for 
Local Government Services (often referred to as the ‘Green Book’) (National Joint 
Council for Local Government Services, 2016). As such it does not cover those 
employed as teachers by local authorities. The thesis has three central issues. 
Firstly, why is control of the labour process seen within the areas of local 
government researched, secondly how has technology been utilized in attempt to 
exploit the fullest level of control possible, and finally, how has the utilization of ICT 
affected workers capability to resist management control. The thesis is conducted 
from a Marxist labour process theory perspective. A definition of this as it relates to 
the capitalist labour process is given below: 
“labour process theory is concerned with analysing how a workforce's labour 
power (its ability to work) is directed towards the production of commodities 
(goods and services) that can be sold at a profit. […] [M]anagers seek to 
control the way work is organized, the pace of work, and the duration of work 
because these are crucial to profitability. Labour process theorists are 
therefore particularly concerned with the social relations of production, and 




Much of the available literature in this area (for example, Marx K., 1990; Braverman, 
1998) can be seen to reflect the definition above. However, the researcher, as a 
past employee in Revenues and Benefits, and then latterly a union officer operating 
within local government, developed an interest in the application of labour process 
analysis within this area due to two specific aspects of concern. Firstly, the workers 
under investigation do not produce commodities but rather services and in this 
sense have been classified as non-productive, not in a pejorative sense, but in terms 
of their position within the analysis of the capitalist mode of production (Marx K., 
1990). Secondly, these services, when carried out in the public sector, are not 
performed as a means of profit creation. The initial question for this thesis to address 
given the above is why would the labour process within the public sector be 
subjected to management control? 
As the literature clearly points to profit being the motivation for control within the 
capitalist mode of production, the requirement for control of public sector labour 
would be expected to be found within the context of employment within the state 
sector. The thesis seeks to understand this motivation by considering the role of the 
state within the capitalist mode of production and also as an employer of labour in 
its own right. Central to this analysis is the work of Miliband (1969) and Gough 
(1975;1979).  However, this thesis is also interested to consider how this aspect of 
control differs between the private and public sectors. Whilst the profit motive in the 
former may be seen to lead to a position where management seek to intensify and 
maximise the effort of employees, which in turn will establish the dynamic of control 
and resistance between the two parties, the latter may be seen as potentially more 
complex than this. The workers in this study are employed by local government, 
which itself as part of the state, is formally subordinate to central government, 
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therefore introducing a more complex and changeable dynamic taking into account 
initiatives and legislation from the centre and how local authorities respond. The 
thesis is particularly keen to examine how these initiatives and legislative changes 
have affected any reasons behind the implementation of ICT and any subsequent 
utilization as a tool of labour control. 
With the establishment of motivation for control of the labour process within the 
public sector, the thesis goes on to examine the relationship between this control 
imperative and the use of ICT. In this respect the objectives of the designers or 
commissioners of the systems can be seen to be central and so the research was 
particularly interested to determine what the design process for the ICT systems 
was, the extent to which control was a conscious objective of management (Knights 
and Murray, 1994:16) and the extent to which any contestation could be seen.  
The thesis makes use of Edwards’ (1979) model of types of control, simple, 
technical and bureaucratic but without accepting an evolutionary view of these. 
However, it proves useful in linking types of control to the ICT systems implemented 
within the areas being researched and exploring when and why they became utilized 
as tools of management control and also how the technology allowed a technical 
form to be applied, by way of embedding rules and business processes to non-
production jobs in a way Edwards (1979) felt unachievable, but that Braverman 
(1998) foresaw. The thesis was also concerned to explore developments in ICT 
particularly around integration of systems that may make them distinct in developing 
an overarching panoptic system of control through monitoring and surveillance, not 
only subjecting workers but also certain managers to this (Thompson and Bannon, 
1985:107) in terms of whether they apply corporate or departmental rules and 
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policies (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:221) should workers breach behavioural or 
performance norms, so potentially altering this dynamic. 
 In exploring these aspects of control as exercised through ICT the thesis moves on 
to consider how the deployment and development of these ICT systems has 
impacted on how workers may respond to such management control in terms of the 
potential for resistance, and the debate between those who consider ICT has 
removed the possibility for resistance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Delbridge et al, 
1993) and those who consider this an overstatement (Bain and Taylor, 2000). In 
order to consider the issue of resistance the thesis seeks to arrive at a working 
definition but also accepts the same type of act can differ according to circumstance 
and intent as to whether it is resistant or not. This thesis seeks to examine the 
possibility technology can affect the resistance seen in that there may be “distinctive 
patterns of resistance to technologically facilitated forms of control” (Hall, 2010:167). 
The thesis also examines the extent to which the absence of worker resistance can 
be equated with the use of ICT as a means of control, or whether this is an overly 
simplistic correlation. This is an important aspect of the thesis inasmuch as 
technology may have been afforded a more effective role in the curtailing of 
resistance if other explanations for its absence can be shown, such as agreement 
with management forms of control, a belief in an essentially progressive nature of 
technology, or fear of consequences. If these explanations are valid then this would 
potentially point more to a lack of resistance being driven by a range of factors rather 
than solely a technologically facilitated constraint. As certain managers also become 
subject to control by monitoring and surveillance, as mentioned above, the thesis 
considers the extent to which they too may seek to resist more senior management 
and as such act as a heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous, group. Linked to 
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this debate is a point of interest for the research in considering whether, if ICT 
provides such a powerful control, management will seek any non-technological 
forms such as seeking to foster consent of workers. 
The contribution of this thesis can be seen in that it takes the motivation, control and 
conflict aspects of the capitalist labour process as detailed by Heery and Noon 
(2008:199) and extends this into the public sector by examining changes in labour 
management and shifts within the frontier of control between employers and 
workers. As such, the thesis can be seen to be distinctive in establishing linkages 
between control of the labour process within this specific area of local government, 
the technology implemented and developed as tools of control, and the environment 
created by the central/local government dynamic. The scope of the thesis is limited 
by the research being carried out at only two sites. However, links have been 
established between workers’ and management’s views in terms of their working 
experiences within the workplaces researched and the wider themes and issues 
arising from the literature. 
1.2 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 is the first of the chapters considering the literature relevant to the thesis 
and it deals with the motivation management have in seeking to control the labour 
process. It commences by detailing a Marxist perspective on how the employment 
relationship is made possible by the separation of conception and execution of tasks 
(Marx K., 1990:284; Braverman, 1998:35). It then goes on to explain the distinction 
between labour power and labour and the relationship of these concepts to the 
creation of profit within a capitalist system (Marx K., 1990) detailing the connection 
between this and capital’s requirement to control the labour process. The chapter 
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considers an alternative explanation as proposed by Foucault (1995) that sees the 
Marxist position as overly reductionist and that control is part of a wider system than 
seen in the workplace. Having considered this alternative view, the chapter 
proceeds with the view that the accumulation of profit is an adequate explanation 
for capital’s need to control labour in the capitalist mode of production. The chapter 
goes on then to consider why, in the absence of a profit motive, control of the labour 
process is seen in the public sector. To achieve this the chapter examines the role 
of the state as a collection of institutions that act as a defender and promoter of the 
interests of the dominant capitalist class (Miliband, 1969) and also as an employer 
with the assumption control of the labour process will be rooted in its role within and 
as a component of a capitalist system (Gough, 1975; 1979). Having considered the 
motivations of control of the labour process within the public sector and locating this 
within its role as a constituent of the capitalist system, the chapter, largely drawing 
on the work of Coffey and Thornley (2009), considers the debate on whether we are 
witnessing a continuity or disjuncture in terms of labour management within the 
sector arising from the election of a Conservative government in 1979 at a time of 
increasing utilization of ICT. 
Chapter 3 is the second of the chapters reviewing the literature relevant to this 
thesis. It follows on from the preceding chapter’s considerations on the first main 
theme of the thesis, namely why control of the labour process is seen in the public 
sector to consider the second main theme, the application of control through ICT 
itself. This chapter looks at the different types of control that may be exercised and 
how ICT may be used as a tool to achieve these. The chapter uses the work of 
Edwards (1979) to categorize types of control, namely simple and structural, with 
the latter divided into technical and bureaucratic forms. Although the thesis does not 
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accept a linear development of these forms of control, with technical control being 
developed as a response to the perceived weaknesses of simple control in large 
organizations, and bureaucratic control being developed as a solution to technical 
control being inappropriate for non-production workers such as those clerical and 
administrative jobs being researched here, these types of control provide a useful 
conceptual model when considering the control applied through ICT. The chapter 
goes on to consider a further type of control where management try and elicit the 
consent of workers. The chapter paid particular attention to this as from the point of 
view of the thesis it is of interest to determine whether if effective means of control 
can be achieved through the use of ICT other types may cease to be used. 
The chapter then moves on to consider aspects of design and implementation of 
technology particularly around the view that it is the motivations of the designer or 
commissioner that will be reflected in this process. As such, who exercises power 
over design and implementation of technology is crucial in terms of any utilization 
as a tool of control. Following consideration of design and implementation the 
chapter goes on to consider the actual use of ICT systems in delivering the types of 
control as highlighted by Edwards (1979) and discussed earlier in the chapter. The 
first area considered is how ICT can apply a form of simple control through the 
monitoring and surveillance of workers in what can be seen to be an electronic form 
of the panopticon (Berdayes, 2002:35) as proposed by Foucault (1995). Although 
Chapter 2 had challenged the Foucauldian view of workplace control being part of 
a wider system, the idea of the panopticon may be consistent with a Marxist 
perspective if the motivation for its application was intensification of effort from 
labour and providing a solution to the issues of simple control within large 
organizations. The chapter considers how this technique of control may address the 
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issues around the problems of effectiveness of simple forms of control in large 
organizations to the extent technology assumes control functions normally carried 
out by supervisors. The chapter then goes on to consider how ICT has been used 
to provide a technical form of control by embedding rules and regulations within the 
system itself and therefore subsumes a worker’s knowledge and removes autonomy 
(Hall, 2010:172-173). In this aspect, this relates to the argument advanced by 
Braverman (1998) that technology would extend technical control into the non-
productive area of clerical and administrative jobs, and it is particularly in this area 
the research seeks to consider its effects on skills. The chapter finally considers the 
development of ICT systems to apply bureaucratic forms of control (Rosen and 
Baroudi, 1992:215) as a means of controlling worker behaviour in relation to 
employer policies such as working time and absence and highlights how this has 
drawn management into the area of surveillance and monitoring where their 
response to worker transgressions may also be scrutinized. 
Following on from chapters considering the literature around why managers would 
seek to control the labour process and how they would use technology to achieve 
this, Chapter 4 examines the third main strand of the thesis, the issue of resistance 
to this control. The context of this chapter is around the debate as to whether the 
use and development of ICT as a tool of management control has rendered it 
absolute (Fernie and Metcalf (1998); Delbridge et al, (1993)) or whether as 
countered by Bain and Taylor (2000) that this view is overstating the position. The 
chapter explores this debate by considering actual and potential acts of resistance. 
Firstly, however, the chapter considers a working definition of resistance as the 
literature indicates some definitional variations in how this is dealt with. From here 
the chapter moves on to consider individual acts that may be consistent with this 
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definition. The approach of the thesis is that in considering whether resistance has 
been rendered impossible, it is not possible or required to analyse every individual 
act so as to judge its meaning. The apposite question is whether, in certain 
circumstances, it could be seen as resistant. If an act in any category cannot be 
prevented by ICT then it remains as a potential form of resistance that workers may 
choose to carry out as an act of resistance to management control.  The particular 
individual acts considered are sabotage, workers absenting themselves from the 
workplace and fiddling or deliberate falsification of performance data. The chapter 
then moves the debate around control and resistance from a simple binary position 
of management control and worker resistance by exploring the perception of a 
homogenous management group (Wardell, 1990; Hyman, 1987). The chapter 
examines the extent to which members of the management group may also be 
subject to monitoring and surveillance with ICT threatening the security or status of 
their employment and, therefore, members of this group may have motivations to 
resist the control of more senior managers. 
The chapter moves on to consider the area of collective resistance, particularly as 
exercised through trade unions by studying issues around policy and resistance 
from unions in the design and implementation stages of the process and 
distinguishing this from aspects of collective resistance to ICT that may be used 
following implementation. Indeed, the possibility is raised that if ICT does reduce the 
effectiveness or possibility of individual resistance, then recognition of the potential 
of collective resistance may occur (Bain and Taylor, 2000:13). The effect ICT has 
had on trade union organization is also considered in this chapter with particular 
attention paid to the potential geographical dispersal of workers and how this may 
be problematic for unions, particularly around communication with and between 
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members. However, the chapter also considers the extent to which ICT has a 
potential for it to be used as a tool of communication, organization and resistance 
for unions (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:126). 
The chapter finally considers whether an absence of resistance at a time of 
increasing ICT utilization necessarily indicates a causal link (Hyman, 1988:55). The 
chapter considers and examines potential reasons, some of which may be 
connected to ICT but without a direct causal link emanating from the technology 
itself. These are, cultural, particularly around the ubiquitous and perceived 
progressive nature of ICT (Burnes et al, 1988:7); fear, particularly of loss of 
employment (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:196); agreements may have been entered into 
with trade unions (Price, 1988:256); that the use of ICT as a tool of control is 
perceived as legitimate and fair by workers (Challykoff and Kochan, 1989:811); and 
lastly, resistance occurs but is missed or downplayed by academic literature (for 
example, Thompson, 1989:87).    
Following the exploration of the literature around control and resistance, Chapter 5 
moves on to consider the area the study is researching, namely local government, 
to place the thesis within the particular context of its environment. A particular aspect 
of this environment, and a strand running through this chapter, is the relationship 
between central and local government, with its party-political dynamic, and this can 
first be seen as the chapter opens by considering the external structure of local 
government. The chapter considers the changeable nature of local government 
structure and how this has changed over time due to legislative instruction from 
central government to which it is formally subordinate. The chapter moves on to 
discuss the internal structures in terms of how this affects the day to day running of 
authorities, with particular attention paid to the legislative changes that saw the end 
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of the committee system. The chapter explores how these external and internal 
structural changes have impacted on labour management, chiefly the extent to 
which they may have resulted in a change from a style of management best 
described as professional bureaucracy to one of a more specifically managerial 
focus on outputs rather than processes. The chapter also explores how services 
have not remained constant over time but how they change according to the 
objectives and expediencies of central government. There is also an exploration 
concerning how certain services may be transferred to the private sector, particularly 
since the advent of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) and Best Value (BV). 
The chapter examines these aspects in the context of how initiatives emanating from 
central government, such as these, have played a role in any changing aspects of 
managerial control within local government. However, the chapter is also keen to 
explore and acknowledge the role local government, as an institution of the state, 
plays in this process and not necessarily accept a position of it as a passive recipient 
of central government diktat. 
The chapter goes on to detail the system of local government finance, highlighting 
the two main funding streams of central government grants and local taxation. The 
ratios between these two streams will be considered and how these have changed 
over time according to the political objectives and expediencies of central 
government. There will also be an examination of the use of legislation to cap the 
amount of finance raised locally. The chapter seeks to establish any links between 
these aspects of finance and the effect this may have in terms of staffing levels and 
labour management, potentially in an environment of shrinking resources. 
 The chapter then details the legislative changes seen within the area of Revenues 
and Benefits. In terms of the Revenues function we have seen the abolition of 
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General Rates, the implementation and subsequent abolition of Community Charge 
and the implementation of Business Rates and Council Tax. Since 1990 and 1993 
in respect of Business Rates and Council Tax respectively there is a recognition of 
what appears a relatively stable regulatory framework, unlike within Benefits that 
appear to be subject to several regulatory changes. These aspects will be 
considered as particularly important to the extent they tie in with the issue of skills 
and how this may affect labour control and resistance as discussed in chapters three 
and four. 
The chapter discusses the relevant area of industrial relations within local 
government and again revisits the debate around a view of local government as 
relatively peaceful until 1979 (Kessler and Baylis, 1995) by examining evidence that, 
alternatively, it was a site of struggle and contestation between employers and 
labour (Coffey and Thornley, 2009; 2014). This debate is important to the thesis to 
the extent to whether we see a clear disjuncture between how local government 
operated as an employer prior to the election of the Thatcher government in 1979 
or a situation where strains were already apparent in the industrial relations 
environment, thus pointing more towards a continuity. Whilst the chapter examines 
a view of a problematic environment for unions, particularly from the 1980s onwards, 
it also considers the situation is not entirely negative. Trade unions still operate in 
the workplaces researched and still have a considerable membership (Coffey and 
Thornley, 2014:207).  
In terms of the thesis the examination of the use of ICT is established in this chapter 
exploring what had become a regular feature of local government in the late 1970s 
and as such coincides with many of the government policies highlighted in Chapter 
2, for example CCT and an increased requirement for performance indicators. The 
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chapter details the development of ICT within local government from the earliest 
computerized systems delivering back-office functions to more customer focussed 
systems arising from the growth of the internet and private ownership of computers. 
The chapter examines the role central government has played in encouraging local 
government to adopt ICT and the extent to which it has been specifically linked to 
financial savings (Local Government Association, 2014:13) and is therefore relevant 
to any consideration of resources and how this may link to issues of labour 
management. 
A particular concern of this chapter is the dynamic between central and local 
government and how the former has initiated and sought to impose changes on the 
latter. This is important in as much as it points to a more complex dynamic than may 
occur with an employer and employee and the relationship this has on labour 
management and control, resistance and the use of ICT. 
Chapter 6 considers the methodology and field research appropriate for a study 
around issues of control and resistance arising from the use of ICT within Revenues 
and Benefits departments. The chapter highlights the primarily deductive nature of 
the thesis. The chapter also details why a case study approach was taken that was 
broadly qualitative and why this was felt to be particularly suited to the field of 
employment research. The chapter goes on to discuss concerns of reliability and 
validity considered in the overall research design. 
The chapter details the research methods considered, those of interview, 
questionnaire, ethnographic study and documentary analysis. Ethnographic study 
was rejected as an option as whilst it was felt these studies have great value, it 
raised a number of major difficulties due to the intrusive nature of this method. Time 
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constraints were also felt to mitigate against this method. However, the chapter does 
detail the background of the researcher and considers this from the perspective of 
autoethnography and whilst recognizing aspects of this approach that are relevant 
here clearly places this thesis outside this perspective. The chapter details the 
unavailability of relevant documentary sources for the researcher. This left the two 
methods of interviews and questionnaires as the ones utilized in the study. In terms 
of the questionnaire the chapter details the view that the two sites were felt to be 
sufficiently homogenous that the same questionnaire could be used. The chapter 
details the design of the final questionnaire using a Likert scale format with a space 
for any comments participants may wish to make. The chapter discusses the 
weaknesses and limitations of this method in terms of it being a snap-shot and how 
low return rates may lead to no meaningful statistical procedures being performed. 
However, the chapter also details the main reason for its inclusion as a method as 
being a means to allow participants to volunteer for the interviews whilst also 
gleaning some potentially valuable information from the survey itself. The chapter 
details the decision in carrying out interviews of the semi-structured variety and why 
these were seen to offer an appropriate level of researcher control whilst also 
allowing interviewees the space to express their feelings. The chapter detailed some 
of the practical considerations in respect of interviews such as location, recording, 
transcription and piloting. The chapter highlights issues around any ethical concerns 
of the research project, particularly it may involve the potential for participants to 
divulge information concerning transgressive acts. Issues of confidentiality, 
anonymity and informed consent are detailed and the process of gaining ethical 
clearance from the university was explained. 
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The final aspect of the chapter was providing details of the two sites, including 
details of access. The chapter provides information on the sites, including their 
relative similarity of size, their structure and details of their political composition. 
There is also an overview of the industrial relations environment at the two sites. 
This takes into account the trade unions operating and union membership density 
within the authorities and workplaces being researched. The officer structure of the 
relevant unions is detailed along with any bargaining structures established within 
the two sites. 
Chapter 7 is the first of the two chapters dealing with the findings from the fieldwork 
and deals with the aspect of management control of the labour process through ICT. 
It commences with an examination of the design and implementation of the systems 
utilized within the Revenues and Benefits departments at the two research sites in 
terms of who designed or commissioned these systems and any other inputs or 
challenges that may have an effect on the interests reflected in the ICT. The chapter 
details the three main types of ICT system identified by the research as being core 
systems used for the administration of the functions, bureaucratic systems to 
enforce rules and regulations with particular relevance here to attendance and 
absence, and performance management systems. Within the chapter the types of 
control as highlighted in Chapter 3 (Edwards, 1979) are referenced in discussing 
these three varieties of ICT system and also how the implementation and utilization 
of these systems impacted on working practices, particularly to the extent it 
addresses Braverman’s (1998) view that computerization would lead to a technical 
form of control on non-productive workers. 
The chapter moves on to examine how ICT is used as a tool of monitoring and 
surveillance and links with the discussions in Chapter 3 on the establishment of an 
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electronic panopticon. The first use of ICT to monitor and surveille that the chapter 
examines is around performance monitoring and how and why this is utilized by 
management. The chapter considers the findings around whether the monitoring 
capabilities of the initial core system were utilized immediately following 
implementation or at a later stage, potentially illuminating issues around whether 
how ICT is used is a matter of choice or technological determinism. The chapter 
also explores the possible integration (Berdayes, 2002:35) of core and bureaucratic 
systems to implement a performance management system and the extent to which 
this may be perceived as an objective measure of performance. In examining this, 
the chapter seeks to explore the motivation in carrying out this form of control in 
order to determine whether the purpose is to provide meaningful data in relation to 
the rational administration of services or merely to increase the intensity of effort in 
line with an attempt to increase surplus labour. The chapter goes on to consider a 
further aspect of monitoring and surveillance performed using ICT that may also be 
linked to a requirement for management to increase the amount of labour performed 
by monitoring and maximizing attendance and activity and minimizing absence. The 
chapter also details how management themselves are drawn into the monitoring 
and surveillance process with their own actions in relation to performing in a required 
manner against transgressions of workers highlighted by ICT systems being 
scrutinized (Thompson and Bannon, 1985:107). We can see then the use of 
monitoring and surveillance as a tool of intensification of effort by ensuring 
attendance and an adequate level of performance whilst at work. The chapter seeks 
to address the issue of whether the use of ICT systems, particularly by integration, 
has led to an electronic panoptic form of control. In considering this the chapter 
explores the occurrence of homeworkers who are geographically dispersed with no 
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physical supervision but who are still subject to management control should the 
establishment of this panoptic level of control be established (Zuboff, 1988:322). 
The chapter moves on to consider the effect ICT has on control, not necessarily as 
a specific design but as a consequence of its use. This was seen to be particularly 
pertinent in the area of its effect on skills. The thesis accepting the view of Marx K. 
(1990) and Braverman (1998) that the absence of skill enhances the level of 
management control, sought to establish the effect ICT has on the workers being 
researched and whether the requirement for skills was reduced or enhanced and 
whether the result was uniform across different staff groups (Wilkinson, 1983:8). 
The chapter concludes by examining the role of control achieved through 
management eliciting a level of consent from workers. Whilst this in itself could be 
seen to be external to the issue of control exercised through ICT, the relevance is 
that if managers seek to use non-technological forms of control this may indicate a 
lack of effectiveness of control through ICT and vice-versa (Grint and Woolgar, 
1997:119). 
Chapter 8 is the second of the chapters dealing with the findings of the fieldwork 
and focusses on resistance, particularly in the context of its ongoing possibility 
(Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Delbridge et al, 1993; Bain and Taylor, 2000). The 
chapter considers acts from the potential for them to be classed as acts of resistance 
as defined in Chapter 4 and commences with an examination of individual actions 
that are potentially resistant. The chapter considers resistance to the technical 
aspects of control highlighted in Chapter 4, along with any evidence of deliberate 
falsification of performance monitoring data and, if present, may be linked to workers 
seeking to control or restrict effort expended and along with management’s 
response to this may demonstrate an ongoing and shifting frontier of control rather 
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than the achievement of total control for management via technology. The chapter 
also considers the extent managers may turn a blind eye to these forms of 
resistance (Zuboff, 1988:334-335) or accept plausible excuses as to why 
performance targets have not been met, which may indicate a potential for workers 
to subvert management control to some extent. An example of individual resistance, 
that of workers absenting themselves from the workplace (Edwards and Scullion, 
1982; 1984), highlighted in Chapter 4, is considered in this chapter, particularly in 
the context of monitoring and surveillance as discussed in chapters 3 and 7. 
The chapter considers management and the extent to which they may be 
considered a homogeneous group with a unified and coherent strategy (Wardell, 
1990; Hyman ,1987). Relevant to this is a consideration of how as individuals within 
this group they may have been impacted in terms of numbers, status and career 
paths. This is important in terms of resistance to management control as the thesis 
is also keen to establish if managers can also engage in acts of resistance, 
potentially due to identifying with the interests of those they manage, or as a result 
of individual interests, thus extending the dynamic from one of managers controlling 
and workers resisting to a more complex situation (Wardell, 1990:157). Following 
on from this, and also potentially of relevance to managers, is the effect ICT has 
had on skills and the chapter specifically seeks to link this to whether workers, or 
managers, could resist management control by quitting and transferring their labour 
to another employer. In doing this the chapter considers the debate around skills as 
raised in Chapter 3 and what this impact is and whether the effects have been 
uneven (Wilkinson, 1983:8) between those working in the Revenues and Benefits 
functions respectively and even if so whether any evidence exists to point a 
tendential aspect of deskilling (Thompson,1989:118).  
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The chapter moves on to consider collective resistance, particularly through trade 
unions, and explores policy and resistance at the stages of design and 
implementation of ICT and also performance monitoring. Again, this is of importance 
to the study in determining who’s interests and objectives are manifested within the 
technology (Wilkinson, 1983:21). A distinction is made in the chapter between 
resistance at the design and implementation stage and resistance post 
implementation around particular working practices, including whether pressure is 
applied by members on their unions. The chapter details research around industrial 
action in terms of its use and also how ICT may affect its effectiveness including its 
potential effects on union organization particularly due to any incidences of 
increasing geographical dispersion of workers. The chapter also considers, 
however, that ICT could actually be utilized by unions as a tool of resistance 
(Greenbaum,1998:139). 
The final consideration of this chapter relates the issues raised in Chapter 4 on 
potential alternative, non-technological, reasons for the absence of worker 
resistance, to the findings of the fieldwork. The chapter considers what the fieldwork 
indicates regarding the following potential explanations for the absence of 
resistance that may not stem directly from the properties of the technology itself. 
Firstly, workers may believe control exercised through ICT is fair and desirable 
(Challykoff and Kochan, 1989:811), secondly, ICT is progressive (Burnes et al, 
1988:7) and should, therefore, not be challenged, and finally, there is a level of fear 
relating to job losses (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:196) as a result of financial cuts. Whilst 
the reasons listed could be seen as being facilitated by ICT it may result in a situation 
where it does not translate into resistance against its use   
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Chapter 9 is the final chapter of the thesis, bringing together the theoretical 
considerations from the literature with the fieldwork findings to arrive at a view of the 
motivation for, and use of, ICT as a tool of management control and how this has 
affected workers’ capability to exercise resistance to this in the areas of local 
government being researched. Although the fieldwork was only carried out at two 
sites, this chapter places the findings of this research within the wider context of the 
local government environment raised within the literature. The findings would also 
indicate the areas being researched related to issues many of those participating in 
the research were cognizant of, and could clearly articulate their views on. Workers 
were often clear about how their day-to-day experiences relate to the wider issues 
raised, whilst managers were also clear on the motivations for seeking to control the 
labour process in the way they did and how this had changed over time. 
Some main themes that have become apparent in the thesis are detailed in this 
chapter around why control of the labour process is sought within the area of the 
public sector researched, how this is applied through the utilization of ICT and the 
effect this has had on workers’ attempts to resist this. An important issue is around 
the motivation for control of the labour process within this area of the non-profit 
making public sector and this is detailed. The chapter also highlights how the model 
of control types as advanced by Edwards (1979) can be applied to the control 
exercised through ICT but that the capabilities of the technology have also allowed 
for these types to be integrated into an overarching system of control. However, the 
chapter also details why the issue of control in this area should not be seen as 
technologically determined but is rather a matter of management choice and 
potentially contestation and also linked to the relationship between central and local 
government. This chapter also details the real and problematic effects the 
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development of ICT as a tool of control has on the actuality of resistance for workers 
seeking to counter management control of the labour process. The conclusion will, 





Chapter 2 – Why Are Workers Subjected to Control? 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to establish the reasons for employers to control the labour of 
their employees by taking a Marxist perspective of the labour process. Particular 
attention is paid to the work of Marx K. (1990) and Braverman (1998) and 
commences by exploring the human capacity for separation of the conception and 
execution elements of task performance. It is advanced that in this ability resides 
the potential for the establishment of an employment relationship between 
employers and employees. It is proposed this relationship is formed to meet the 
requirements of the employing party and explains how the potential for profit is the 
driving force within the capitalist mode of production. The chapter proceeds to 
highlight how the distinction between labour power and actual labour and also 
necessary and surplus labour are crucial to understanding how profit is derived from 
labour. The chapter also highlights how these aspects are not determined by the 
contract of employment which is usually indeterminate in nature. The chapter 
highlights the problem employers have in converting potential labour, as in labour 
power, into actual labour but also proposes the opportunities that may accrue to the 
capitalist employer if effective control of labour power can be achieved. The chapter, 
following the work of Braverman (1998), explains how it is not only ‘productive’ 
labour that can be exploited and controlled for profit but also ‘non-productive’ jobs, 
including all but the most senior managers. The chapter proceeds to explain the 
differing interest between employers and employees, and using the concept of a 
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‘frontier of control’ originally articulated by Goodrich (1975), expounds the view 
control is not merely accepted but can be subject to challenge and negotiation. 
The chapter then examines an alternative explanation for workplace control 
emanating from the work of Foucault (1995). This perspective offers a more 
subjective view of the employment relationship as opposed to the structuralist class-
based view of labour process theory previously explained. This allows for some 
consideration of the two positions, but the chapter concludes the Foucauldian 
position loses the specific character of control and resistance springing from the 
essentially antagonistic employment relationship. As such the Marxist Labour 
Process Theory (LPT) perspective clearly articulates the motive for control of the 
labour process. However, the work of Foucault (1995) and his discussions around 
surveillance and the panopticon were felt to be of interest and could be of relevance 
to a Marxist LPT perspective if motivated by a potential intensification of labour.  
The chapter then moves on to examine the first central aim of the thesis, why, in the 
absence of a profit motive, control of the labour process is sought in the public 
sector. In doing this, the chapter moves on to explore the state in its dual role as a 
collection of institutions and as employers of staff. In respect of its first role, the 
chapter draws on the work of Miliband (1969) in proposing that the state acts as an 
instrument of the dominant group in society and here we are talking about 
capitalists. In this role it is seen to act in the interests of the capitalist class, including 
combatting any challenge to this group from the working class. The chapter goes on 
to consider the role of the state, particularly local government, as an employer. This 
section draws on the work of Gough (1975;1979) in establishing an explanation for 
the control of labour in the public sector as a component part of the capitalist system 
that, through control of the labour process, can directly benefit the capitalist class. 
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As such it dismisses the view that the state saw its role as a ‘model employer’ and 
here draws on the work of Coffey and Thornley (2009;2014) and whilst it recognizes 
the change in approach following the election of the Thatcher government in 1979 
in terms of labour management, sees this as a continuity not a rupture. However, 
the chapter draws particularly on the work of Ironside and Seifert (2000) and Gill-
McLure (2014) to highlight the critique of the public sector that led to a tightening of 
management of the labour process, and in doing so lay the foundation for the 
following chapter which looks in detail at the types of control and technology’s role 
in their facilitation.   
2.2 Task Conception and Execution 
Prior to considering why employers would want to control the labour of others it is 
important to understand how one human being can employ another. Marx K. (1990) 
highlighted a distinction in the work humans and animals perform. 
 “We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human 
characteristic. A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a 
weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by 
construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst 
architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind 
before he builds it in wax” (Marx K., 1990:284).   
This highlights the point human labour is not simply instinctive but there is 
conception prior to any execution of a task, so by “the end of every labour process, 
a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, 
hence already existed ideally” (ibid:284). Although the conception must precede, 
there is no reason why the execution cannot be performed by a different person to 
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the individual who conceived of the required result. Human beings then, possess 
the potential for the “unity of conception and execution [to] be dissolved” 
(Braverman, 1998:35). As a result, it is possible for one human being to be employed 
by another (ibid:35). Indeed, it is also possible to divide functions resulting in a final 
execution of a conception by a number of individuals who need not be aware of the 
final conceived result (ibid:34). This would not be possible if human labour was 
purely instinctual, a “spider which weaves its web in accordance with a biological 
urge cannot depute this function to another spider” (ibid:34).  
There exists then a potential for a social relationship between an employer of human 
labour and an employee who performs the actual labour itself, this can be seen as 
a class relationship. This thesis is approaching the issue of control of labour through 
technology from a labour process theory perspective and it is important to state here 
it is not work in general terms that is of interest but rather to “locate working 
arrangements inside the wider system of production and class relations” 
(Thompson, 1989:4). Marx is clear it is the mode of production that shapes the 
labour process (Sakolsky, 1992:238). It is also true the distinction and ability to 
separate conception from execution existed prior to capitalism. Indeed, there is “an 
immense interval of time [that] separates the state of things in which a man brings 
his labour-power to the market for sale as a commodity from the situation when 
human labour had not cast off its first instinctive form” (Marx K. 1990:283). This is 
not in itself considered a sufficient explanation for control of the labour process 
within the state sector with its specific role within the capitalist mode of production, 




2.3 Labour-Power and Labour 
The previous section established the potential for one human being to be employed 
by another. Having done this, we can now move on to consider why, when such a 
relationship is established within a capitalist mode of production, the employing 
party would wish to control the labour of the employee. 
Once the employment relationship exists within the capitalist mode of production the 
employment of the worker sets “in motion the labor process, which, while it is in 
general a process for creating useful values, has now also become specifically a 
process for the expansion of capital, the creation of a profit” (Braverman, 1998:36). 
It is in the desire for profit from the capitalist employer that the motivation to employ 
another individual in this mode of production can be located. In determining how 
profit is realised from this employment relationship a number of factors need to be 
understood and these are also relevant when considering control of the labour 
process within the public sector. The first of these is the distinction between labour 
power and labour. 
What a worker sells on the market as a commodity is not labour but labour-power 
(Braverman, 1998:37; Edwards, 1979:11). Marx K. (1990) viewed the distinction as 
follows, “Man himself, viewed merely as the physical existence of labour power, is 
a natural object, a thing, although a living conscious thing, and labour is the physical 
manifestation of that power” (Marx K., 1990:310). The capitalist employer purchases 
this labour-power on the market. This can only occur if the owner of the labour-
power is prepared to sell it. To have the ability to sell this commodity on the market 
it is necessary for the individual to be able to dispose of it freely. In this process the 
seller of labour-power and the capitalist purchaser:  
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“meet in the market and enter into relations with each other on a footing of 
equality as owners of commodities, with the sole difference that one is a 
buyer, the other a seller; both are therefore equal in the eyes of the law. For 
this relation to continue, the proprietor of labour-power must always sell it for 
a limited period only, for if he were to sell it in a lump, once and for all, he 
would be selling himself, converting himself from a free man into a slave, from 
an owner of a commodity into a commodity” (ibid:271). 
The worker’s labour-power must always be treated in this way and it is handed over 
to the employer for a set period of time only and the ownership of it is never 
renounced (ibid:271).  
What is purchased, therefore, is not “an agreed amount of labor, but the power to 
labor over an agreed period of time” (Braverman, 1998:37). For this reason, 
whereas when buying tools or machines that can be evaluated precisely in terms of 
their place in the production process, labour cannot (Braverman, 1998:39) due to 
the indeterminate nature of the contract of employment (King, 1990:76) and the fact 
it is embodied within the workers themselves (Braverman, 1998:35). This can be 
understood in the distinction between going to work, which is related to the 
capitalist’s purchase of labour power, and actually working, where the labour power 
is transformed into actual labour. The ‘cash nexus’ in the form of wages does not 
guarantee this as it only achieves the worker’s presence at the workplace (Burawoy, 
1979:139).  
The second aspect relevant here to an understanding to how capitalist employers 
realise profit is in the distinction between necessary and surplus labour. The working 
day can be seen to be divided into these two elements (Marx K., 1990:325). 
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Necessary labour is the time required to produce the goods consumed by the worker 
and their family for a day and necessary for their reproduction. However, the “fact 
that half a day’s labour is necessary to keep the worker alive during 24 hours does 
not in any way prevent him from working a whole day” (ibid:300). The remainder 
comprises the latter part of the working day, surplus labour. In terms of the 
capitalist’s exploitation rate of labour we can see this is the ratio of surplus to 
necessary labour. The capitalist employer only pays for the necessary labour and, 
therefore, the surplus labour performed is unpaid (King, 1990:187). Although the 
worker has achieved what was needed for their subsistence for the day during the 
period of necessary labour and has been paid for this, during the period of surplus 
labour, labour is still carried out thus producing more than it consumes (Braverman, 
1998:38). However, this surplus labour does not create any value for the worker, but 
rather creates surplus value for the capitalist employer and is the employer’s legal 
property (Marx K., 1990:325; Thompson, 1989:40). In effect the capitalist is 
obtaining more labour from the worker than is being paid in wages (Gintis, 1987:69). 
So, all “other things being equal, the greater the intensity of labour the more surplus 
value (and hence the more profit) will accrue to the capitalist, per hour of labour 
power which is purchased” (King, 1990:82) or equally how long the working day 
could be prolonged past the point where necessary labour was completed (Marx K., 
1990:429). 
We can see from the position articulated above, motivation for control of the 
capitalist labour process is located in the quest for realisation of profit. It “is the 
struggle for profitability that impels capital to transform and control the labour 
process” (Thompson, 1989:23) and needs to be understood from this viewpoint as 
not merely a technical issue around a mode of labour (Braverman, 1998:37). The 
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capitalist will “take up every means of increasing the output of labor power he has 
purchased when he sets it to work as labor” (ibid:38-39).  This is so, as any surplus 
value produced belongs to the capitalist and not the supplier of labour power and 
as such the capitalist has an interest in directly controlling and subordinating the 
labour element in the production process to their objectives (Thompson, 1989:40-
41). Given this, the question arises as to why an employee would enter into such a 
relationship? A further condition of this relationship is that the seller of labour-power, 
“instead of being able to sell commodities in which his labour has been objectified, 
must rather be compelled [my italics] to offer for sale as a commodity that very 
labour-power which exists only in his living body” (Marx K., 1990:272). In other 
words, the seller of labour-power only has this to sell and the only access to the 
means of production is therefore to sell their labour-power to others (Braverman, 
1998:35-36). The answer to the question then, is a worker enters into this 
arrangement because of the absence of any other way to make a living (ibid:36).  
The process as described above can be seen as a system in which the realization 
of employees as individuals with their own interests is unimportant to the capitalist 
(Marx K., 1990:273; Grint,1998:21) but the appropriation of surplus value is 
paramount (Thompson, 1989:5). Herein lies the basis for control and conflict as 
employers try and control and impose their will, in areas such as pace, amount, time, 
conditions and pay, on workers who have no direct interest in the production process 
(Edwards, 1979:11-13) and are therefore alienated from production (Thompson, 
1989:72). 
The discussion above may raise concerns about the type of labour being performed 
and Marx K. (1990) made a distinction between productive and unproductive labour. 
With this distinction a factory worker would perform productive labour but domestic 
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servants would not. From this perspective, only productive labour creates surplus 
value and unproductive workers are effectively paid from expenditure from this 
(King, 1990:189). When looking at employers and the motivations for them 
attempting to control the labour process this may become an interesting point to 
consider. Whilst the discussion above may indeed appear to be only of relevance to 
material production in that the result of labour is “that a tangible, vendible object 
takes shape as a commodity” (Braverman, 1998:248), Braverman (1998) came to 
the view that the fact a person’s labour does not result in a material object only 
means the person’s labour is directly provided to the consumer resulting in a 
simultaneous occurrence of production and consumption. What happens in this 
case is “the useful effects of labor themselves become the commodity” (ibid:248). If 
this labour is not supplied directly to the user but is sold to a capitalist who re-sells 
it in the market, we have a “capitalist form of production in the field of services” 
(ibid:248). We can see in specific circumstances the labour of a worker in the service 
sector can be equally exploited within the capitalist system. Indeed, in terms of the 
modern capitalist system this form of labour that may have been considered 
unproductive is not seen in such pejorative terms, “but is rather, since it has been 
developed as a prime sense of profit, celebrated” (ibid:252). Ultimately then, as far 
as the capitalist is concerned it is not what a worker actually does that is of 
importance but the production of value and surplus value (ibid:284). 
In the early capitalist system, according to Braverman (1998), “unproductive labor 
employed in small quantities was generally speaking a favoured stratum, closely 
associated with the employer and the recipient of special privileges” (Braverman, 
1998:288). In this group could be included those who performed functions for the 
capitalist such as sales and accounts who were employed to guard and expand the 
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capitalist’s capital and “were in fact associates in the exploitation of productive 
workers, even if they themselves were only employees” (ibid:288). Braverman 
(1998) citing Marx K., made the distinction that due to the privileges this stratum of 
unproductive workers had, it was the productive workers in comparison who were 
the unfortunate ones (ibid:289). However, as capitalism has developed, these 
unproductive workers have expanded in numbers into divisions and departments 
within corporations and apart from those at the head of these, now “occupy positions 
akin to those workers in production” (ibid:289).  This situation is particularly pertinent 
to this thesis in terms of control of workers and the extent to which management can 
be seen as a homogenous entity or as a group having contrary interests to the 
employer (Wardell, 1990:157; Hyman, 1987:28). In effect, workers in whatever 
category were wage workers (Braverman, 1998:290). However, Braverman 
(1998:280) was clear those executives in high managerial positions, even though 
on the payroll, “are the rulers of industry […] and are themselves part of the class 
that personifies capital and employs labor”. The power “of management is not 
ownership as such but organisation” (Flanders, 1970:135). 
We have seen employers pursue profit and the employee’s interests are not part of 
any consideration within this process. It is therefore an antagonistic relationship in 
which workers may not voluntarily give of their best and hence the need for control 
of the labour process (Wilson, 1988:66-67). The idea of a ‘frontier of control’ 
advanced by Goodrich (1975) in the 1920s is felt to be useful in conceptualizing this 
structured antagonism. This frontier is fundamentally a matter of power relations 
within the workplace with management and workers potentially ceding a degree of 
control to the other depending on the cost and sanctions that can be applied by 
either (Batstone, 1988:223). It should also be noted here that power relations within 
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the management structure itself with managers seeking to further their own 
individual or sectional interests may make this a more complex dynamic (Hyman, 
1987:28). The frontier of control can be seen to be “a fluid and imprecise borderline 
between workshop autonomy and managerial control” (Hyman, 1975b:viii). This 
moves the debate on from a situation where managers control, to one of a contested 
line “shaped by the interaction between employer strategies and the particular 
strategies followed by workers” (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:273).  
The concept points to a line that, with conflicting interests, is not finally settled even 
with better wages and conditions but can be drawn at a particular time by such things 
as collective agreements, policies, rules and customary arrangements (Goodrich, 
1975:56). It is then, “neither static nor unidimensional” (Edwards and Scullion, 
1982:63). This ‘frontier of control’ has shifted and will continue to shift as long as 
worker resistance remains possible, influenced by market forces and other external 
pressures, such as legislation and government policy, but also as a result of struggle 
at the point of production (Edwards, 1990:144; Friedman, 1990:204; Batstone, 
1988:224). For the purposes of this thesis it is also important to be aware of the 
potential technology has in terms of it affecting workers ability to resist management 
control, either positively or negatively, and therefore, how it affects the frontier of 
control (Batstone, 1988:228).   
2.4 An Alternative Explanation 
Other perspectives, most prominently, the Foucauldian view have advanced 
criticisms of the Marxist labour process theory, that subjective aspects of the social 
relations in the workplace have been underplayed (Ackroyd and Thompson, 
1999:160). From this perspective, the position advanced within LPT is seen as 
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overly reductionist, simplistic and narrow, reducing “the complexity of social life into 
a polarisation where the ‘free’, expressive and creative actions of voluntary subjects 
are seen to be struggling against, or determined by […] oppressive forces” (Knights, 
1990:297). The Foucauldian view shifts the emphasis as advanced by the Marxist 
perspective “from structural class-based analysis of power” (Spicer and Bohm, 
2007:1670) where the labour process is determined by the mode of production 
(Sakolsky,1992:237-238) and which sees “economic class antagonisms” as the 
basis of control and resistance (Spicer and Bohm,2007:1670) to a position where 
the application of disciplinary technology is part of a wider system than the 
workplace (Martinez, 2011:202) and is “destined to spread throughout the social 
body” (Foucault, 1995:207), being embraced by institutions and organizations such 
as schools, hospitals, factories, and a range of other institutions (Martinez, 
2011:202).  
Hassard et al (2001:347) cited Knights (1990) and Willmott (1990) as writers from a 
Foucauldian perspective who saw the dominant aspect of the labour process as 
power rather than exploitation. From this perspective, “power is never monolithic, 
rather it is polyvalent and dispersed” (Sakolsky, 1992:236). Capitalism from this 
viewpoint is a “site” rather than the “source” of power (ibid:236). Foucault does not 
deny these technologies of disciplinary power are used by capital but that should 
not mean they should all be reduced to the mode of production (ibid:248). From this 
perspective capitalism could only happen because the “human body was already 
implicated in a network of power relations which both disciplined its unruly forces 
and increased its capacity for controlled productivity” (McNay, 1994:92). However, 
as Ackroyd and Thompson point out, from this perspective the workplace is treated 
“as just another terrain” (1999:164) whereas it needs to be understood “there are 
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conditions and struggles specific to the labour process and the employment 
relationship” (ibid:164). The workplace is based on the employment relationship in 
a capitalist mode of production. It is not simply another place where disciplinary 
power is exercised with a view to creating docile and obedient subjects but is 
focused on making a profit (Bain and Taylor, 2000:5).  
Even though power may not always simply be exercised through “techniques of 
repression or ideological inculcation but also through less visible strategies of 
normalization” (McNay, 1994:105), if the workplace is treated in the same fashion 
as disciplinary practices employed in institutions such as prisons “the specific 
character of employment relations in a capitalist society is lost” (Thompson and 
Ackroyd, 1995:625).  It also needs to be stated that where the relationship between 
employers and labour can be examined at the micro-level in terms of individual 
accommodation and consent, it is still within the context of a productive system 
based on the exploitation of labour by capital. However, this Foucauldian view is not 
necessarily a total rejection of the Marxist position (Schwan and Shapiro, 2011:39). 
In Foucault’s (1995) view, “as a force of production […] the body becomes a useful 
force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body” (Foucault, 1995:26). 
It has been suggested the debate around the labour process issue discussed here 
has become bogged down in arguments around hypotheses rather than the 
divergent views accepting the position that the workplace in capitalist societies are 
places of contest between capital and labour (Lewis, 2007:400). Surveillance, which 
as a management tool for achieving control is considered in the next chapter, and 
the idea of the panopticon which is a central concept in the Foucauldian perspective, 
in the view of this thesis still makes sense from a Marxist LPT perspective of 
employers seeking to gain control of the labour process. An employer seeking to 
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gain a more effective exploitation of labour, leading to greater profits, is in itself an 
adequate explanation for the existence of workplace domination of workers by 
employers (Hassard et al, 2001:347). However, it may also be fruitful to recognize 
ideas from the Foucauldian “branch of LPT can further guide exploration of the 
relationship of macro-level processes and local-level perceptions” (Nord and 
Doherty, 1996:208). 
In conclusion, the position taken in this thesis, whilst recognizing the issues 
discussed above, can be stated as:  
“core LPT holds that capitalist labour processes are characterized by capital’s 
need to control labour; a logic of accumulation that impels refinement in 
technology and administration; a fundamental structured antagonism 
between capital and labour; and because it is the place where labour is 
valorized, the labour process, the point of production, is privileged for 
analysis” (Jaros, 2010:71) 
This is felt to be an adequate explanation for the motivation of employers to control 
the labour of their employees within a capitalist mode of production. Having 
accepted the privileged status of the workplace as the site of control within the 
capitalist labour process the thesis moves on to examine how this may be applied 
to labour carried out in the public sector by examining the role of the state within a 
capitalist system and as an employer in its own right.  
2.5 The State 
We have seen in the previous sections an explanation advanced as to the motivation 
for the control of labour from a Marxist perspective and why this is seen as a more 
appropriate explanation when considering the workplace than the Foucauldian view. 
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The view has also been advanced that in the act of employing a person, the 
employer, in pursuing the greatest benefit from this relationship, seeks to control the 
labour process. Within a capitalist mode of production, the drive for profit has been 
put forward as the reason for employers of labour seeking to control the labour 
process. However, as this thesis is considering the control of workers within the 
public sector this explanation may be problematic. As public sector organizations 
are not profit making, there needs to be some analysis of the motivation for control 
by examining the role of the state. It should be noted whilst this form of labour may 
be categorized as unproductive, it does form a significant part of employment in the 
UK economy (Gough, 1979:82). In examining the role of the state, we look at how it 
operates from two angles. Firstly, how does the state act in its relationship to the 
capitalist mode of production and what relevance does this have for public sector 
employment. Secondly, and importantly for this thesis, how the state acts in its role 
as an employer and why it may have adopted practices of control over its employees 
in the same or similar ways to the private sector.  
2.5.1 The Role of the State in Capitalist Society 
In defining the state, we can say it can be viewed “in terms of the ‘idea’ of rule; a set 
of public institutions – government, parliament, armed forces, judiciary, 
administration; and a set of public functions – law making, maintaining order and 
security” (McGrew, 1992:68). Government is not the state but operates in “the name 
of the state and is formally invested with state power” (Miliband, 1969:47).  However, 
this does not mean it necessarily controls that power (ibid:47). The state has been 
seen by some as a neutral actor in its relations between employers and labour within 
the capitalist mode of production. However, this view is mistaken (Wedderburn, 
1995:32), as in practice the “state has historically served class interests” (Hyman, 
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1975a:121), and is rooted in the economic base (Carnoy, 1984:95). Institutions of 
the state support the dominant class in the social order and where necessary, 
suppress “acts of resistance and revolt by subordinate classes” (Hyman, 
1975a:121). Some writers view the state as an entity used by the dominant class in 
society and from this perspective can be seen as an instrument of control (Miliband, 
1969:23) although this has been highlighted as problematic by writers such as 
Jessop (1990) pointing to how this essentially indicates neutrality and having the 
capacity to be used “by any class or social force” (Jessop, 1990:27) and also 
encounters difficulties “where the economically dominant class does not actually fill 
the key positions in the state apparatus” (ibid:27). This potentially instrumental 
aspect of the state, however, can be seen to historically pre-date capitalism, for 
example the legal sanctioning of slavery (Craton et al, 1976). In other words, the 
state appears to act to support the currently existing dominant class.  
Where there are forms of democratic processes within the state this should not be 
read as control exercised from below. From this perspective, the electoral system in 
place in the UK, whilst appearing to place power in the hands of the people, is in 
effect a tool used by the ruling class to maintain control while at the same time 
legitimating the capitalist system with its superficially democratic nature (Miliband, 
1982:28;38). It should also be noted, elected representatives can act in a largely 
autonomous fashion once elected and therefore the electorate assume an inactive 
role between elections. Hyman notes a correspondence between this and “the 
managerial structure of control in the capitalist enterprise” (Hyman, 1975a:123). 
Even where, historically, there has been a tri-partite system in place between 
capital, labour and government, it should not be assumed this indicates neutrality 
on the part of the state. In essence, the co-option of powerful elements of labour is 
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in reality “the state [in] acting on behalf of capital, appreciates the real power of the 
labour movement and seeks to harness this power in the ultimate interests of the 
capitalist class” (Gough, 1979:147).  
The history of nations with a capitalist mode of production show even where 
governments have been elected under a socialist banner, they have never 
challenged the capitalist system and so there has been a de facto acceptance of the 
capitalist order (Miliband, 1969:65). Citing Lynd, Miliband (1969) makes the point 
that democracy “has never dared face the fact that industrial capitalism is an 
intensely coercive form of organisation of society that cumulatively constrains men 
and all of their institutions to work the will of the minority who hold and wield 
economic power” (ibid:68). Governments do have power but “given the degree of 
economic power which rests in the ‘business community’ […] any government with 
serious pretensions to radical reform must either seek to appropriate that power or 
find its room for radical action rigidly circumscribed by the requirements of business 
confidence” (ibid:137). The first option has never been taken up by Western 
governments (ibid:137). As an example, if we look at the election of a Labour 
government in 1945, whilst there may have been a public call for a radical 
transformation of society, in effect the response was measured and put in place by 
the more moderate wing of the Labour Party with consensus from the Conservative 
Party as a means of conceding only enough, whilst leaving in place a broad 
acceptance of free enterprise (Miliband, 1982:34). The setting up of the welfare state 
in this sense should not be seen in any way as a replacement for a capitalist system 




In societies where the capitalist class is dominant, state policy will be oriented 
towards providing the economic conditions to enable the capitalist economy to exist 
in a stable environment (Hyman, 1975a:125). From a Marxist perspective, the state 
exercises its coercive power to guarantee “social relations of production which are 
inherently repressive, adding the sanction of law to management prerogatives, 
forcibly resisting working-class challenges to the social order” (ibid:126). However, 
as well as the coercive function there is also the hegemonic nature of the capitalist 
state achieved by the “social, cultural and ideological dominance of a social group” 
(ibid:127) and relevant here is the state’s involvement in education, both in acting 
on individuals to subjugate them to the dominant ideology and also to equip them 
with the skills required by the capitalist class (Carnoy, 1984:94). We see then a role 
for the state in developing “consent given by the great masses of the population to 
the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” 
(Hyman, 1975a:127). It is important to note those who will go on to work in the public 
sector are also subject to this educational process (Carnoy, 1984:94). The view has 
been encouraged that the national interest is served by the efficient functioning of 
the capitalist system and in this sense, we can see why the state would side with 
business rather than labour (Miliband, 1969:69). This means even where economic 
or social problems would point to policy requirements opposing the interests of 
capital, these are unlikely to be forthcoming (ibid:71).  
It is also the case we are not talking here solely about the capitalist class within the 
geographical boundaries of the state itself. There is also a requirement for the state 
to take account of the external pressures from global capital and its firms and 
institutions, as capitalism is international in nature. As such, not only internal 
considerations are of importance to the office holders of the state and these in 
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themselves may actually become subordinate to the global interests of international 
capital (Miliband, 1969:137-138). 
From this instrumentalist perspective the state intervenes in the economy principally 
to aid capitalist interests (Miliband, 1969:72). The state does get involved in disputes 
between employers and labour but not from a neutral position. In industrial relations 
terms, the coercive power of the state is more often used against workers, for 
example, through strike breaking and incomes policies. The state may appear 
neutral in that workers may be granted rights but these are often intended to 
individualize workers thus lessening the likelihood of any class struggle (Carnoy, 
1984:99;116). Thus, the state actively seeks to hinder the effectiveness of organised 
labour (Miliband, 1969:74; Wedderburn, 1995:200) and this is a crucial point in that 
it is the state that has acted to detach workers from the wider class struggle as a 
result of this process of individualization (Carnoy, 1984:99). Ultimately the state has 
ensured “law displaces the class struggle from the economic to the political arena” 
(ibid:118) and therefore, designates where the struggle may legitimately take place.  
As a result of this we can see labour is placed in a weaker position than capital 
because of greater state support for the latter (Miliband, 1969:75). Workers’ 
struggles culminating in victories, for example in nineteenth century acts limiting the 
working day, may well be opposed by individual capitalists, but in this example 
reducing the sheer exhaustion of the labour force had benefits for capitalism overall 
(Gough, 1979:55). Individual capitalists may have opposed this, seeing it as a brake 
on their attempts to intensify the labour of workers. The state then, can be seen to 
act in the overall interests of capital in organizing it as a “power bloc” and not 
necessarily in the interests of individual capitalists, whilst simultaneously acting to 
disorganize labour (Hall, 2000:ix). Poulantzas (2000) also put forward this less 
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instrumentalist view, arguing the state “is rather the strategic site of organization of 
the dominant class in its relationship to the dominated classes” (Poulantzas, 
2000:148). Whether an instrumental view, as advanced by Miliband (1969) or a 
more structural view posited by Poulantzas (2000) is correct we can see the state is 
not neutral in terms of its support for the capitalist class and system. This includes 
how it deals with its own employees and it is to this employment relationship we now 
turn. 
2.5.2 The State as Employer 
This section considers why, given the absence of the profit motive, workers in the 
public sector are also subject to management control. It highlights changes in 
management of the public sector from 1979 onwards but places this in a context of 
continuity in terms of labour management within the sector. It also pays attention to 
the complex dynamic existing in this sector where, additional to the employer and 
worker, there is also the issue of central government priorities and policies to 
consider. The section shows there is a clear imperative for the labour process to be 
controlled in the public sector that may result in benefits within the capitalist sector 
itself. 
Section 2.3 raised the discussion around productive and unproductive labour, with 
only the former producing surplus value (Marx K., 1990; King, 1990). This raises the 
question as to why labour is controlled within the public sector where workers in a 
Marxist sense are classified as unproductive as they are not employed by capital 
and therefore do not produce surplus value (Gough, 1979:104; Braverman, 
1998:285). Local government can be seen as a “mechanism for effective 
administration and the delivery of services” (Byrne, 2000:156) and as such 
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management control of workers appointed to deliver these services (Fredman and 
Morris, 1989:29) can be understood for this reason in itself. However, a further 
motivation can be seen as whilst the services provided by the state are not 
necessarily purchased by individuals, they may be seen to “contribute to the daily 
and generational reproduction of the working class” (Gough, 1979:117) or 
necessary labour as detailed in Section 2.3 (Marx K., 1990:325). As such when 
calculating the labour necessary to reproduce workers and their families, labour 
from both the private and public sectors need to be included (Gough, 1979:117). 
This can be seen as relevant to the welfare state but we also see state provision of 
infrastructure with “public projects and services that increase the productivity of 
labour” (Gough, 1979:51) thereby benefitting the private sector. 
The cost of the public sector is paid for by taxation produced within the capitalist 
sector, and there is a view, therefore, the higher the cost of labour within the public 
sector the lower the surplus value available to the productive sector (Gough, 
1975:82). Gough (1979:119) addresses this argument by advancing the position 
that workers in the public sector will perform surplus labour. The service that is 
provided by the public sector, therefore, is what is paid for by taxation plus unpaid 
surplus labour performed by public sector workers. As such, any increases in 
productivity within the public sector benefit the capitalist sector due to a net flow 
from the public to private sectors if surplus labour is performed. This leads to a 
decreased tax requirement on capital and workers for the supply of necessary 
labour performed by the public sector, with the latter meaning a reduction in pre-tax 
wages is possible, with capital then able to appropriate a greater amount of surplus 
labour (Gough, 1975:83). The previous section detailed the state’s role in defending 
and promoting the interests of the capitalist class (Hyman, 1975a:121) and therefore 
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there is a clear interest in it seeking to control the labour process within the public 
sector. As Harvey and Hood stated, writing in 1958, “for the last hundred years the 
struggle has been one of trying to get the local authorities to be efficient [my italics] 
servants of the capitalist class” (Harvey and Hood, 1958:242). Related to this is 
“labor processes subjected to mechanization release masses of labor for 
exploitation in other, generally less mechanized, areas of capital accumulation” 
(Braverman, 1998:265) leading to the depressing of wage rates in these areas 
(ibid:265). This can be seen as relevant to labour employed within the public as well 
as private sectors and is particularly relevant when considering the adoption of ICT 
within the areas researched. 
Whilst workers in local government are employed by individual local authorities with 
potentially different political objectives there exists a central-local dynamic that 
influences labour management in this area (Gill-McLure, 2014). We have seen in 
the previous section the state plays a role in the maintenance of the capitalist system 
and in terms of local government we can see at work “two contradictory tendencies: 
an urgent need for a local state and an equally urgent need to ensure that the local 
state act[s] ultimately in the interests of the central administration” (ibid:367). 
Ultimately this means in the area of labour control the desires of the actual employer 
may be secondary to the central imperative due to the importance of the public 
sector because of its size and the impact it exerts over the whole economy (Allen, 
1960:88) and therefore we have seen opposition whenever local authorities have 
sought to become servants of the working class rather than of the capitalist class 
(Harvey and Hood, 1958:242). A historical example of this can be seen following the 
First World War when left-wing councillors in coalition with local unions attempted 
to increase low wages. When this was attempted by the London Borough of Poplar, 
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a council decision to implement a minimum wage for its employees was overturned 
by the House of Lords (Gill-McLure, 2014:371). When we consider, even following 
austerity measures, local government accounts for over a quarter of public spending 
and of this, 70% is taken by labour costs, we can understand the “central imperative 
to control labour management” (ibid:370) in line with the benefits to capital of 
increasing productivity within the sector. An example of this is that a “central aim of 
the 1974 local government reorganisation was the reform of labour management 
along private sector lines” (ibid:370). We can see in local government the control 
and resistance dialectic is not limited to employer and employee but intertwined with 
this is a central-local dynamic with local authorities always being susceptible to the 
priorities of central government (Gill-McLure, 2014:378; Ironside and Seifert, 
2000:43). 
Whilst writers such as Fredman and Morris (1989:1) have proposed the government 
perceived its own role as being a model employer with the rationale of providing an 
example for the private sector to follow (ibid:10) until the election of the Conservative 
government in 1979 (ibid:11), this thesis does not accept this view. The previous 
paragraph highlights the problems individual local authorities may have if they 
intended to operate as a model employer. Writing in the late nineteenth century the 
Webbs (1897), indicated little difference between the public and private sectors in 
terms of concentrating on lowering the “expense of production” (Webb and Webb, 
1897:819). Miliband (1969) believed the public sector was managed in a business-
like fashion and so could not be expected to lead to new standards in employment 
(Miliband, 1969:74). It would appear then any sense of the public sector being a 
‘model employer’ is rhetorical rather than real (Coffey and Thornley, 2009:93). We 
can see actual historical examples that would also lead to this conclusion. NALGO 
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(National and Local Government Officers Association) was formed in 1905 (Ironside 
and Seifert, 2000:36) in response to the situation where the “vast majority of workers 
[in local government] were low paid clerks […] subject to the tyranny of the town 
clerk” (ibid:37). In 1908 the local authority at East Ham sacked 22 workers and 
reduced the pay and increased the hours of those remaining (ibid:38). Around this 
time a borough accountant at Paddington cited by Spoor (1967) opined that “when 
‘economy’ was in the municipal air, attack was always directed first at the officer and 
his salary” (Spoor, 1967:26).  
Whilst NALGO persuaded the National Whitley Council to adopt equal pay into the 
first national pay scales achieved in 1945, unequal pay persisted (ibid:470-472). 
Whether national level collective bargaining was used in determining wages was 
largely dependent on the strength of labour in terms of its bargaining position (Coffey 
and Thornley, 2009:94). By the 1960s, economic problems led the government to 
seek pay restraint within the public sector and attention was focussed on controlling 
public sector pay and performance (Gill-McLure, 2014:371-372) and during this 
period, as earlier, the public sector was used to set an example to the private sector 
(Coffey and Thornley, 2009:99-100). During the period of the 1960s and 1970s we 
see increasing militancy of public sector workers including the professional 
bureaucrats (Gill-McLure, 2014:372). On a particular day in January 1979, 1.5 
million public sector workers were on strike (Coffey and Thornley, 2014:203). 
Historically, any concessions granted by the state were generally as a result of 
struggle by workers and unions and not the gift of a beneficent ‘model employer’ 
(ibid:202). Many aspects attributed to the Thatcher government as novel, such as 
cash limits and hostility to trade unions and collective bargaining were actually not 
new (ibid:204) but can be seen to be consistent with the role of the state in promoting 
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and defending the interests of the capitalist class. The foregoing does not seek to 
be a comprehensive history of labour management and relations in the public sector 
but does provide examples that would support the view there has not been a 
disjuncture from what was previously a ‘model employer’ following the election of 
the Conservative government in 1979, but rather we are seeing a continuity of 
objectives (ibid:204). 
Whilst this thesis rejects the view of a fundamental shift in the public sector moving 
from a pre-Thatcherite ‘model employer’ (Coffey and Thornley, 2014), governments 
from the late 1970s on clearly critiqued public services as a sector where the 
interests of the producers, the staff, came before the interests of the consumer 
(Kirkpatrick and Martinez Lucio, 1995:8). These ideological critiques led to:  
“a programme to tackle the perceived problems of British capitalism buoyed 
up by the rhetoric of laissez-faire free market economics. Private enterprise 
powered by the motor of profit, was viewed both as the sole source of wealth 
and as the best means of distributing that wealth throughout the population. 
Public spending was consequently seen as a drain on wealth creation.” 
(Thornley et al, 2000:140) 
Managers within local government, mainly consisting of professional bureaucrats, 
had also become increasingly militant and “were thus seen increasingly as part of 
the labour problem (that is to say, the problem of controlling pay, productivity and 
politicisation) rather than as a solution to it” (Gill-McLure, 2014:372).  
The solution to these issues from the government perspective was the adoption of 
New Public Management (NPM) which, although often definitionally ambiguous 
(Pollitt, 2007:110), is used here to signify policies that shifts the “focus from 
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processes to targeted outcomes” (Seifert, 2018:111) by way of introducing market 
type mechanisms of competition through competitive tendering; moving away from 
national terms and conditions and job security; adoption of flatter organizational 
structures; and an increased focus on performance by measurement of outputs 
(Pollitt, 2007:110; Gill-McLure, 2014:373), to curtail the powers of local councillors 
and staff in challenging central government (Gill-McLure, 2014:373).  
The profit motive in the private sector, explains its drive for efficiency. Whilst this 
section has posited why increased efficiency is sought, there is no equivalent 
indicator in the public sector (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:2), resulting in the 
government requirement for public sector organizations to produce performance 
indicators to measure performance against the set targets and objectives of service 
delivery (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:3; Pollitt, 1990:112). Thus, reforms to the public 
sector have sought to “emulate [the private sector] through the introductions of 
mechanisms that mimic private sector competition” (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:2). 
Performance indicators also formed part of New Labour’s modernization agenda, 
with the aim of raising the level of effectiveness of management within the public 
sector by way of measurement and increased control of workers (Hewison, 
2002:556-557; Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie, 1999:156). This has led to a 
proliferation of performance indicators, measurement and associated inspection 
regimes across the public sector (Kurunmaki and Miller, 2006:97; Martinez Lucio 
and MacKenzie, 1999:164-165).  
The labour process in the state sector is different from the capitalist sector “given 
that the raison d’etre is the provision of social needs, it is defined through political 
relations with the state rather than competition in the market” (Thompson, 
1990:110). The labour process within areas where management followed a 
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professional-bureaucratic line could be seen as delivering a “rational administration 
of bureaucratic systems, and professional expertise in control over the content of 
services” (Harris, 1998:843) and this difference is precisely why the Conservatives 
used reduction in cash, performance indicators and privatization to drive change 
(Thompson, 1990:110).  As a result of this, labour management practices in the 
public sector have been changed to be more akin to practices used in the private 
sector by the introduction of competition and regulation (Ironside and Seifert, 
2001:3). Managers in the public sector have become: 
“locked into a system that requires them both to minimise the cost of the 
workforce, and to maximise the effort of the workforce devoted to hitting 
performance-targets – they must manage labour as if they are running a 
profit-seeking private business” (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:4). 
In essence, we see central government seeking to ensure managers in the public 
sector behave in a way that will maximise surplus labour performed.   
The performance targets and indicators are underpinned by a regime of regulations 
and audits (Gill et al, 2003:261). Some writers have claimed these developments 
led to changes in the management of labour within the public sector that were 
Taylorist or neo-Taylorist in nature (Gill et al, 2003:262; Bolton, 2004:318; Pollitt, 
1990:168-169). In a practical sense this has meant using ICT as a means of 
achieving an: 
“emphasis on performance management, supported by an array of 
management information-gathering techniques through computers, video 
cameras and generally tighter supervision. The search for ‘best practice’ 
smacks of the worst forms of scientific management, as service delivery 
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becomes a set of technical issues driven by the stopwatch and the 
performance indicator rather than as a set of social, political and economic 
issues involving human beings” (Thornley et al, 2000:152). 
We can also see the development of a clearer division in conception and execution 
(Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie, 1999:165) where “what is new for the public 
services is a more rigid division of labour between those who decide how, when, 
and where work is done, and those who do the work” (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:12). 
We can see here a specific link between the development of work within the public 
services and the earlier discussion around the separation of conception and 
execution facilitating a greater control of the labour process. In effect we have seen 
a policy push, whereby the desired improvement of quality in public service delivery 
is linked to increased managerial control (Kirkpatrick and Martinez Lucio, 1995:8). 
We can see, therefore, a developing congruence between labour management 
practices in the private and public sectors with employment becoming “increasingly 
routine and controlled” (Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie, 1999:165). However, this is 
not to say private sector management techniques were unknown in the public 
sector, where according to Gough (1979:166) we have often seen the application of 
private sector management techniques and the influence of the dominant capitalist 
mode of production within this sector.  
The discussion above has shown public sector workers are also subject to control 
and why this is the case, namely an increase in surplus labour within the public 
sector is of benefit to the capitalist class. As such, this thesis takes the position that 
“the defining quality of being a worker is not being exploited for profit but having to 
sell your labour power” (Seifert, 2018:107). As such, a labour process approach is 
appropriate as it highlights “the degradation of professional work under this regime, 
50 
 
pointing to the deskilling associated with tightening performance management 
systems and increasingly centralised managerial control over work organisation” 
(Bach and Kessler, 2012:13). This should be seen as a historically ongoing process.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In explaining a motive for the control of labour, this chapter starts from a Marxist 
perspective in explaining how, because of the human capacity to separate task 
conception from execution, it is possible for one human being to be employed by 
another. It has proposed the reason for this employment is to satisfy a specific 
objective of the employer. In the capitalist mode of production, the employment 
relationship is entered into with the expectation the employer will generate profit 
from the labour of the employee and the chapter put forward the following 
explanation as to how this is achieved. Two main factors were identified in this 
process. Firstly, the chapter explained the distinction between labour power and 
labour. The capitalist purchases the former which is sold by the worker on the market 
for a set period of time. The distinction between the labour power purchased and 
actual labour is important as once the worker attends work the employer needs to 
convert the former into the required amount of the latter. The second aspect is the 
distinction between necessary and surplus labour. Necessary labour is the amount 
of labour required for the worker to achieve the required level of subsistence. This 
is the labour the capitalist pays for. However, the worker continues to work after this 
period as surplus labour. It is important to note this surplus labour creates no value 




It could be asked, given the above as to why workers would enter into such an 
arrangement. In effect workers have no other means to earn a living and only have 
their labour to sell. The contract of employment is generally indeterminate as far as 
the intensity of effort is concerned and this is, therefore, why the employer seeks to 
control the labour process. We can see here the different interests between 
employer and worker and this means the issue of labour control is neither simple or 
uncontested and within the employment relationship we can see a ‘frontier of control’ 
that shifts according to the relative strength of capital and labour (Hughes et al, 
2018:2). The chapter has also advanced the position that the above argument does 
not only apply to labour where physical marketable products are the result. Here the 
work of Braverman (1998) detailed how ‘unproductive’ workers, those who do not 
produce these marketable products, are included in the analysis. In effect their 
labour can also be exploited by the capitalist in the pursuit of profit. This includes 
managers at all but the most senior level.  
Whilst, as has been stated, this thesis takes a Marxist labour process view in 
establishing a motive for control of labour, the Foucauldian perspective, was also 
considered and whilst in general dismissed, provided some potentially useful 
insights. The Foucauldian view focusses on the subjective aspects of employment 
rather than accepting what is seen as the overly deterministic structural class-based 
analysis of the mode of production. The view from this perspective is it is power not 
exploitation that is the dominant quality in the employment relationship. This power 
may be used by capital but it cannot be reduced to the mode of production. From 
this point of view this power to discipline the recalcitrant is why capitalism exists 
rather than the motivation to control springing from capitalism itself. This thesis does 
not accept the view the workplace is just another site of power but rather, a place 
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where specific struggles occur due to the employment relationship and the 
structured antagonism springing from it. However, it has been noted and accepted 
Foucault was not totally dismissive of the Marxist position and accepted discipline 
was required to make the individual worker productive. The chapter also noted the 
centrality of the idea of surveillance and the panopticon in Foucault’s thinking and 
advanced the position that as a technological tool of control this would potentially 
lead to an intensification of labour and therefore, fits within a Marxist perspective of 
the labour process. The Foucauldian view may also have some value in ensuring 
structural forces are considered from the way they play out at a local level. 
The chapter has advanced the view that the motivation for control of the labour 
process within the capitalist mode of production can be explained by the drive for 
profit. However, this thesis is examining control within local government where no 
such profit motive exists and so attention was turned to the role of the state, 
including crucially, as an employer of labour itself. However, the explanation here 
firmly located the basis for labour control in the public sector due to its role within, 
and as a component of, a capitalist system, where although not subject to a profit 
motive itself could be seen to be beneficial to the capitalist class overall. 
The state from a Marxist perspective is not impartial but serves the interests of the 
dominant class. Even governments coming from a left-wing perspective have, in the 
UK, accepted the notion of free enterprise. The state plays a coercive role in 
ensuring any working-class challenge to the dominant class is resisted. Along with 
these coercive aspects it is also the case it has a role in maintaining the hegemonic 
status of the capitalist mode of production by promoting a cultural and social backing 
for this. Included in this is the education system which public sector workers are also 
exposed to. Whether, as some have believed, the state is an instrument for those in 
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the dominant class to use or whether it is more structural in providing a more 
strategic support for the interests of the capitalist class in general, either way it can 
be seen to defend capital over the interests of labour. 
Workers within the public sector are subject to management control in order to 
ensure the effective administration of services. The chapter has also posited, largely 
by utilizing the work of Gough (1975;1979), a further reason behind this control. The 
state sector needs to be recognized as being an element of a capitalist system. 
Workers in the public sector provide services that can be seen to contribute towards 
both greater productivity within the private sector and the reproduction of the 
working class. Whilst this is paid for from taxation extracted from capital and labour, 
workers in the public sector can and do perform surplus labour meaning the services 
provided are greater than that paid for in taxation. This ultimately results in a benefit 
to the capitalist class where any increase in the productivity of the public sector 
leads to a potentially greater appropriation of surplus labour by capitalists within the 
private sector. Employees within local government, although employed by individual 
local authorities, may often find, regardless of any motives of their employers, their 
employment conditions largely determined by central government policy in seeking 
to maintain or increase productivity in the public sector for the reasons detailed 
above. The employment dynamic in this sector is, therefore, more complex than with 
a simple employer/employee relationship. 
 This thesis resists the ‘model employer’ view of local government and historical 
examples have been provided to highlight the fallacy of this position. Even where 
local authorities may wish to follow such a model there are examples of central 
government blocking such initiatives and again this can be understood by the 
explanation regarding the benefits of increased public sector productivity within the 
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private sector. It also needs to be recognized workers within the public and private 
sector are not hermetic and there is movement between the two sectors. Given the 
points made regarding the imperative for control within the public sector it would be 
unlikely for employees to be treated significantly more favourably than those in the 
private sector. However, it is also clear there was a highly unfavourable critique of 
the public sector from governments from the 1979 Thatcher government onwards. 
This led to the adoption of techniques from NPM such as privatization, including 
through CCT, a clearer focus on performance by way of targets and performance 
indicators. As part of this we can see the importation of private sector management 
techniques and an increased focus on management control of labour assisted by 
the adoption of ICT. As such we can see management of labour in the public sector 
is increasingly akin to the profit-making private sector. The position advanced by 
this thesis is it is the fact of being an employee that such control is applied, given 
there is a clear motivation from the viewpoint of the capitalist class to increase 
productivity in both sectors. The labour process, including the control of workers, 
will reflect the objectives of the management, including where external pressure may 
have been instrumental in shaping these, and as such may have been seen to have 
changed in the areas under research over time. The research considers the extent 
to which technology has played a role in this within local government, whether by 
facilitation or implementation for this purpose.  
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Chapter 3 – Forms of Control and Delivery Through ICT Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous chapter that examined the reason employers would 
seek to control the labour process, including the relevance of this for the public 
sector, we now move on to discuss the literature around the second main theme of 
the thesis, namely how this is pursued in terms of the forms this may take and how 
this affects the design, implementation and use of ICT systems. 
The chapter commences by drawing on the work of Edwards (1979) with an 
examination of different forms of control applicable to the workplace. Firstly, is what 
could be termed simple control. This form of control is utilized in situations where 
the owner of a business, or a small group of employed managers, directly and 
personally control the workforce. The chapter considers the applicability of this form 
of control, particularly from the point of view of large-scale organizations such as the 
ones being researched. It is acknowledged there are problems in employing this 
form of personal control with a large workforce delivering complex products or 
services, particularly around the expansion of the supervisory function required for 
a large number of employees. As such, different structural forms of control, namely 
technical and bureaucratic may be implemented. The former, initially felt to be 
applicable only to production jobs, is considered in terms of how control may be 
sought through the physical and technological settings of the organization. The 
chapter considers how organizational rules may be embedded within the machinery 
utilized by the organization, thus limiting or removing the autonomy workers may 
have had prior to this method. The second structural form of control, bureaucratic, 
is considered, particularly as advanced as a means that was developed due to the 
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inapplicability of technical control for non-production jobs. The chapter considers the 
way organizational rules and policies are formally adopted, hence making this a 
structural rather than personal form of control. The final form of control considered 
is where management seek to foster the consent, cooperation and participation of 
workers. It considers this in the context of whether this form would be sought by 
managers if technology alone could perfect control.  
The chapter moves on to discuss issues around the design and implementation of 
ICT systems. Of interest is why ICT is designed in the way it is. It argues technology 
is not deterministic but is designed with the interests of the dominant group in mind. 
This is not to necessarily say this is done without challenge, and the chapter 
examines the issue around the extent to which outcomes in design, implementation 
and use are negotiated and contested between and within groups. Following 
consideration of the design and implementation phase the chapter goes on to 
consider how the ICT systems are used in respect of the control imperative in 
practice. The first aspect considered is monitoring and surveillance and the extent 
to which ICT systems have achieved the implementation of an electronic 
panopticon. It considers the effect this may have on the management of the labour 
process from both the point of view of the workers subject to it and managers, who 
as well as administering this form of control also appear to be increasingly subjected 
to this. Monitoring and surveillance in the workplace is also considered in a historical 
context, including the role technology has played in this and the extent to which ICT 
may have improved the effectiveness of such methods. 
Technical control has been seen as a means of controlling labour through the 
technology of production. The chapter considers the potential that ICT provides in 
extending this form of control from production to non-production jobs through the 
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embedding of rules and regulations into the systems used. The issue of the impact 
this may have on skills and how this may affect control is also considered here. The 
final aspect of control considered, in terms of ICT facilitation, is bureaucratic control 
implemented through peripheral systems, that whilst not involved in the delivery of 
the actual product or service, do contain personnel policies and organizational rules, 
such as attendance and timekeeping management and performance targets and 
norms. These systems then integrate with other systems in allowing management 
to make judgements on behaviour and performance. The chapter shows the 
adoption of the forms of control discussed do not happen exclusively, but it is the 
extent to which ICT systems can integrate effectively these forms that is of interest 
when we move onto the next chapter on resistance. 
 3.2 Simple Control 
The first type of control considered is control in its simple form. Edwards (1979) put 
forward the view systems of control in firms developed over time in “response to 
changes in the firm’s size, operation and environment” (Edwards, 1979:18). Small 
businesses, often with a single owner and possibly a small number of managers 
and/or foremen controlled the firm directly (ibid18-19). The owners of the firms “had 
a direct stake in translating labor power into labor” (ibid:19) and this was often 
achieved by bullying and threats (ibid:19). This simple form of control persisted, and 
persists, in small firms and businesses (ibid:19;34) with direct control exercised 
personally by intervention in the labour process with direction of work tasks, 
performance monitoring and discipline (ibid:19). This form of control was achievable 
given the small number of workers working in close proximity, requiring a limited 
level of close supervision. Due to their numbers, workers would have had difficulty 
in resisting this form of control (ibid:19). However, growth in the size of firms, both 
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in terms of employees and product complexity may render ineffective these simple 
forms of control (ibid:19). Maintaining a simple form of control, given the increased 
space between the growing number of employees and capitalist employers, would 
require an increasing number of foremen and supervisors (ibid:19). An example of 
this was seen at US Steel who by 1910 employed 4,000 supervisors, resulting in 
tiers of supervisors with supervision of supervisors, not necessarily with interests 
matching those of the employer (ibid:54-55). Growth in the size of firms also 
increased the likelihood of collective organization of workers (ibid:19). Edwards 
(1979) believed a crisis of effective control using this method led to employers in 
larger organizations moving away from simple forms of control towards more 
structural ones acting on the physical and social structures of the labour process. In 
effect a development where employers moved to a technical form and then to a 
bureaucratic form of control, and it is to these structural forms we now turn. 
3.3 Structural Forms of Control 
Edwards (1979) argued there were two possibilities in delivering structural control. 
Firstly, “the control mechanism could be embedded in the technological structure of 
the firm” (ibid:110), that is a technical form of control, or “it could be embedded in 
the firm’s social-organizational structure” (ibid:110), that is a bureaucratic form of 
control. These are considered here. 
3.3.1 Technical Control 
As organizations increase in size, often accompanied by an increasing workforce 
that may become spatially dispersed, along with a potentially more diverse range of 
processes, simple control would require an ever-expanding supervisory tier. A 
potential solution for management to this problem is to implement technical forms 
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of control, effectively attempting to gain control of the labour process through its 
physical structures. Technical control is applied through the introduction of modern 
technology (Dawson, 1988:120) which assumes a central role in the labour process 
and the organization of work (Hall, 2010:171). In essence, technical control can be 
seen to be where technology and/or the layout of the plant sets the pace and directs 
the labour process (Edwards, 1979:113; Littler, 1990:60). Marx K. (1990) articulated 
the shift in how technology has developed to a stage where it controls the worker: 
“In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool, in the 
factory the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the 
instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the 
machine that he must follow” (Marx K., 1990:548). 
In respect of the control element achieved by technical control it can be seen, 
therefore, machinery is designed in such a way that it, the machinery, and not the 
worker determines how the work is carried out and its pace (Frenkel et al, 1999:14; 
Mackenzie 1982:81). An example of the solution to this problem was mill owners 
approaching Richard Roberts, an engineer, to design a fully automated mule, thus 
leading to the employment of what was perceived as a more docile female 
workforce. In this example we can see technology being designed for a social 
purpose leading to technical control with fewer overseers (Daunton, 1995:183). 
Technical control should not be confused with mechanization, which may increase 
labour’s productivity without altering the elements of control. Edwards (1979) gives 
the example of a manual versus electric typewriter to illustrate the point. In this 
example the latter technology allows the operator to perform at a higher speed but 
does not control how the job is performed. However, mechanization and technology 
may bring technical control if it means the worker loses control of the work process 
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in terms of pace and when or how tasks are performed, and this tends to be because 
of design of the technology rather than its intrinsic character (ibid:112). It was 
Edwards (1979) view that technical control applied to production workers only and 
other structural forms, specifically bureaucratic control “originated in employers’ 
attempts to subject non-production workers to more strict control” (ibid:121).  
One of the advantages for employers in moving to a technical mode of control is it 
provides the potential for a reduction in the requirement for direct supervision and 
also the implementation provides a physical situation where any direct supervision 
of workers becomes easier. An example here could be that of the production line, 
where control is achieved “through technical means which are built into the physical 
structure of the labour process” (Dawson, 1988:140 n1). In this case there is an 
assumption the line, or technology, assumes some of the control functions 
(Edwards, 1979:119) with the result there is a reduction in the requirement for the 
presence of a disciplinary figure as workflow techniques themselves provide the 
necessary discipline (Belanger and Thuderoz, 2010:141). We can also see the 
‘tying’ of workers to a machine, or desk for those working on computers, has the 
effect of reducing the social interaction workers may have with each other. It follows 
from this whilst the machine itself may contain aspects of control, this tendency for 
workers to be static may also make simple control through physical supervision 
easier (Bradley et al, 2000:106). Here is an example of technology not only having 
a direct controlling effect on workers but also influencing other forms of control. This 
adds weight to the view that these forms of control may exist in conjunction with one 
another rather than being part of an evolutionary process (Thompson, 1989:152). 
Indeed, the extent of technical control that can be achieved may be overstated. As 
an example to illustrate this point, the production line at Ford’s in the 1920s where 
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work was moved to the workers rather than vice-versa (Murray, 1989:39) was 
certainly an example of the use of technical control, in that the line and not the 
worker determined what work was done, as well as the order and pace (Edwards, 
1979:145), but it should also be remembered other mechanisms were employed, 
including high wages (Allen, 1992:234) and company welfare schemes and the 
threat of their removal should the worker be deemed to be behaving in an 
unacceptable way (Edwards, 1990:142-143). It is the case employers are not only 
interested in control whilst at work but may need to consider other aspects such as 
high labour turnover and absenteeism resulting from the application of technical 
control (Murray, 1989:40). Indeed, one of the areas of interest in the research 
carried out for this thesis is the extent to which control exercised through ICT means 
employers no longer need to rely on anything other than technological systems to 
maintain effective levels of control and whether it allows management to fully 
incorporate control of labour supervision “into technical systems of control” 
(Dawson, 1988:121). 
There can be seen to be a potential link between the utilization of technical control 
and its effect on skills. As is seen below, there is even the possibility new 
technological innovations and processes may at first appear to replace or enhance 
existing skills. Technical control transfers decision making concerning the labour 
process and how it is to be conducted from the worker to the machinery employed. 
This is considered with specific regard to ICT when we discuss this in relation to the 
technical control employed by computerized systems in Section 3.6.2 but historically 
examples can be seen, with technology clearly playing a role (Crompton and Reid, 
1982:167). Production jobs have historically been subject to deskilling via 
technology, for example the development of jigs, gauges and single use machine 
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tools allowing unskilled workers to turn out uniform parts (Allen, 1992:232). A further 
example was seen in the textile industry in the early capitalist period with technology 
introduced with the intention of removing skills seen as the monopoly of disruptive 
groups of workers (Armstrong, 1988:144). 
A central plank of labour process theory is related to the role of deskilling as a means 
of cheapening and ensuring tighter control of labour (Elger, 1982:26). The 
requirement for management rather than labour to control the labour process, has 
been discussed in terms of the indeterminate nature of the employment contract 
(Burawoy, 1979:139; Gintis, 1987:75). We can see, therefore, why management 
would seek to remove the requirement for skills by subsuming them into the 
technical fabric of the work environment. It is the case if skill was solely in the hands 
of the workers, they “could and did […] obstruct capitalist innovation and 
rationalization” (Wood and Kelly, 1982:75). It is, therefore, the case where skill is a 
requirement of the job and this is possessed by the worker this can be an 
impediment to the employer in terms of utilization of labour and deskilling and 
simplification of the work tasks would remove or reduce that impediment (Knights 
and Willmott, 1990:11; Bosquet, 1980:374). This led Braverman (1998) to the 
conclusion equating management control of the capitalist labour process with a 
“degradation of work and decline in worker skill” (Sturdy et al, 2010:113). Without 
skills being present in the job it becomes easier for managers to impose their will on 
the activities of workers (Wilkinson, 1983:13). The fragmentation of tasks and “the 
technical division of labour” we see as part of this process is one element of how 
managers extend control of the labour process and effectively expropriate the 
knowledge of the worker (Giddens, 1982:39).  
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Another way deskilling has been said to facilitate management control is not due to 
the reduction or removal of skill technology has played a part in but the result of that 
process. In effect the reduction in the skill requirement has made workers’ position 
in the workplace more precarious and this has led to a situation where the worker 
may choose to behave in a way management desire rather than mount any 
resistance. The fear of unemployment is effectively “a sword held at the throat of 
labour” (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:196) as the bargaining power of employers increases 
as its level rises (Goodrich, 1975:72). A component of this power can be due to the 
ease of locating substitutes now skill is less of a requirement for the performance of 
the task (Edwards, 1979:126).  
The above discussion is premised on the view that deskilling is the inevitable 
outcome of using technology in the way described (Grugulis and Lloyd, 2010:91). 
There is, of course, a contradictory view that just because some skills have been 
lost does not necessarily preclude the possibility other skills will have replaced or 
enhanced them. This is particularly pertinent to the issue of ICT and is, therefore 
considered in greater detail in this respect later in this chapter. However, it may be 
valuable to articulate here a more nuanced view between the two polarized points 
of a loss of skill on the one hand and replacement and/or enhancement on the other. 
That is, there is a tendency to deskill, but “the emergence of new forms of expertise 
around specific phases of technical innovation may, for example, be tolerated by 
capital […] predominantly on the basis of increasing productiveness” (Elger, 
1982:45-46). Braverman (1998:119) accepts a new process of production may 
mean “new crafts and skills and technical specialties which are at first [my italics] 
the province of labour rather than management”. What we appear to see in terms of 
deskilling then is not necessarily uniform (Wilkinson, 1983:8) in terms of how it 
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affects or is experienced by individuals (Thompson and Bannon, 1985:111). 
However, those claiming the presence of new skills disproves Braverman’s thesis 
concerning the inevitability of deskilling would only be correct if the class as a whole 
could be seen to have achieved unvarying or increased levels of skill. The 
discussion above appears to fit in with an overall tendency for deskilling within 
capitalist economies (Armstrong, 1988:146-147). It could certainly be said even 
where enhanced skills may have occurred as part of an uneven and polarized 
process, these new skills will, over time, themselves become subject to deskilling 
as this is “the major tendential presence within the development of the capitalist 
labour process” (Thompson, 1989:118). The tendency has been articulately 
described by Gorz (1976): 
“As a whole the history of capitalist technology can be read as the history of 
the dequalification of the direct producers. The dequalification process is 
certainly not linear: at the beginning of each technical revolution it seems 
partially inverted. But the general tendency immediately reasserts itself: the 
new qualifications demanded by new techniques are redecomposed. The 
most qualified production workers’ professional skills are carved up into sub 
specializations shorn of autonomy.” (Gorz, 1976:57) 
3.3.2 Bureaucratic Control 
Edwards (1979) believed bureaucratic control was part of an evolution of control 
techniques developed to allow management to obtain control of non-production 
staff. However, there has also been some criticism of this approach, highlighting the 
view these forms of control do not necessarily supersede one another and are often 
found in combination (Thompson, 1989:152).  
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Bureaucratic control can be seen as “a form of structural control achieved through 
bureaucratic means” (Dawson, 1988:140n1). These bureaucratic means are sets of 
rules and procedures that become a formal part of the social and organizational 
structure of the organization. These may include personnel policies, disciplinary 
procedures, work rules, grading and wage scales, and job descriptions among 
others (Dawson, 1988:120&140n1; Edwards 1979:131). Whilst Edwards (1979) 
viewed the development of bureaucratic forms of control as a solution to the 
deficiencies in attaining technical control for non-production jobs, examples can be 
found historically, and would, therefore appear to not simply be a development in 
response to deficiencies in technical control. Bureaucratic rules can be found in 
Ancient Egypt with the use of work rotas on public projects (Ezzamel, 2004:509), 
accounting and administrative techniques in workplace discipline (ibid:532) and 
hierarchical pay structures (Carmona and Ezzamel, 2007:192). Medieval craft guilds 
exercised control on workers within them by making a condition of membership the 
adoption of rules of the guild (Kieser, 1989:547). We can see bureaucratic control 
has existed for some time and certainly pre-date capitalist modes of production. This 
form of control can be viewed as impersonal and less visible to the employee as it 
is the company rule or policy that forms the basis of authority rather than what they 
may perceive as the arbitrary actions of a supervisor or manager under simple 
control (Dawson, 1988:120; Edwards, 1979:131). In this form of control then, the 
rule of the company replaces the rule of the supervisor (Greenbaum, 1998:132). 
In terms of management attempting to gain control of the labour process, however, 
it should be clear there is a distinction between different types of bureaucratic rules. 
Littler (1982), citing Crozier (1964) makes the point there “is an important distinction 
to be made between rules prescribing the way a task must be performed and rules 
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prescribing the way people should be chosen, trained and promoted for various 
jobs” (Littler, 1982:45). However, in terms of the research carried out a further 
aspect is considered in that some policies and rules may not fit into either of these 
categories but may have an impact on control of the labour process. Such policies 
may include attendance management policies intended to maximise the amount of 
time an individual is performing their tasks and remove absenting themselves from 
the workplace as an optional means of resistance from employees.  
3.4 Control Through Consent and Participation 
The research carried out has been interested in the extent to which forms of control 
other than those utilising technology may be used by employers and managers. One 
of the reasons for this is the view that if control has been made absolute by the use 
of ICT then why would other forms of control be used (Grint and Woolgar, 
1997:119)? The employment relationship according to some may not just be a place 
of conflict and resistance but also of “co-operation and consent” (Gaines and 
Domagalski, 1996:182). This section looks at how employers and managers may 
seek to gain control of the labour process by obtaining the consent and participation 
of the workforce. This view has, therefore, extended the issue of control from one of 
purely coercive measures, which has been considered by the Marxist perspective 
as the only way to increase the effort of the worker (Burawoy, 1979:27) to a point 
where the labour process “must be understood in terms of the specific combinations 
of force and consent that elicit co-operation (my italics) in the pursuit of profit” 
(Burawoy, 1979:30) and that surplus value can be achieved through means other 
than direct coercive control (Sturdy et al, 2010:5).   This element of building consent 
has been posited as a means of obscuring the true nature of the exploitative 
relationship between employer and employee (Burawoy, 1979:135). This can be 
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seen to be a normative form of control that is not directly coercive but rather is 
achieved through “indoctrination of shared corporate beliefs and values” (Sturdy et 
al, 2010:116). Management participation schemes are a form of this type of control 
(Dyer-Witheford, 1999:223) and the research has been keen to establish whether 
these are present in the workplace and how they may have been used over time, 
particularly has any change in methods of control employing ICT affected their use. 
The techniques of eliciting worker consent and participation should not be read as 
a diminution of management control and to be understood, need to be viewed from 
within the framework of the capitalist mode of production (Burawoy, 1979:4; Frenkel 
et al, 1999:135). Within the framework of obtaining consent it may also be the case 
employers seek to provide benefits to workers that are only maintained by 
compliance with management requirements. An example of this was seen at Ford’s 
with the ‘five-dollar day’ policy which effectively doubled the pay of some workers 
(Allen, 1992:234). Historically we can see manipulation of the working environment 
can have a powerful effect on whether workers consent to their exploitation. Where 
the alternative may be considerably worse, as was the case for example in the 
workhouse system, workers may consent through the fear of alternatives 
(Thompson, 1980:295). In this sense workers are free to consent or not, however 
what this may mean is “the freedom to starve” (Marglin, 1976:37). 
One of the ways a satisfactory level of consent and co-operation is achieved is 
through organizing the activities of workers in such a way they appear to give the 
worker an element of choice, even if this choice is severely constrained it is the 
“participation in choosing that generates consent” (Burawoy, 1979:27). 
Participation, in this sense can be seen to be a tactic of management to incorporate 
labour (Ramsay, 1980:382), and effectively restoring management authority and 
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recruiting workers into the cause of increasing productivity and efficiency by 
participating in the rationalization of the labour process (ibid:390). The research 
addresses this by considering the extent to which workers have been included in 
any design and implementation of technology and its use in labour control. This level 
of ‘responsible autonomy’ could be seen as treating workers as if they are not 
alienated by the labour process and is focussed on them recognizing a unity of 
purpose with the employer (Friedman, 1990:178). However, even where these 
aspects of participation and consent are seen, these still need to be viewed from the 
perspective of a “work process, the transformation of people issuing from the same 
capitalist need as the transformation of other production inputs” (Lewis, 2007:402). 
Management participation schemes need to be seen in the context of managers 
exercising power and indeed could be viewed as totalizing in as much as they seek 
to involve workers in their own control rather than simply imposing control upon them 
(Dyer-Witheford, 1999:224).  
  In terms of the attempt to engender consent from employees the view of a move 
from coercive to more consensual and participatory strategies have been put 
forward. However, there is also a view economic recession has “seen employers 
use new economic and technical conditions to restructure the labour process and 
attack shop-floor organization” (Thompson, 1990:97) thus heralding a new era of 
more despotic forms of management control (ibid:118).  
3.5 Design and Implementation of ICT Systems 
Having looked at the main types of control identified above, we now turn to how 
technology, and specifically ICT is used in terms of its application as a tool of control. 
If control of labour, through any of the forms discussed in the previous sections is 
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an intention of the use of these systems then it follows this will be addressed in 
terms of the design and implementation of the systems employed. This section 
examines these two aspects of design and implementation in terms of the inputs, 
interests and negotiations that may inform them (Noble, 1979:19).  
If we consider computerised systems, these can be designed either in-house or 
externally. Generic provision of software developed externally for sale to several 
organizations means a shift in the balance of work with internal IT departments 
increasingly concerned with “upgrading, amending and customising existing or 
acquired applications” (Beirne et al, 1998:151). Should the systems be procured 
from external software suppliers it is not uncommon for the systems to then be re-
written and adapted by the users (ibid:151). The design process may inform not only 
whether technology is specifically designed with the intention of achieving greater 
levels of control but also whether employees involved in such design and 
development may achieve some level of resistance, thus subverting management 
intentions, at the design stage. It may be the case that “software specification, 
design and implementation are all matters of contestation between different 
individual and group interests” (Beirne et al, 1998:157).  
However, systems are designed and implemented, it will be with the aim of meeting 
the requirements of the employers or managers procuring them, and “such 
requirements generally reflect the organisational philosophy and objectives of upper 
management” (Greenbaum, 1998:124). Even so, there is always more than one best 
way of designing, implementing and utilising technology (Wilkinson, 1983:18). 
Technology in this sense then can be seen to be “an objectification of the intentions 
and expectations of its creators and managerial sponsors” (Rosen and Baroudi, 
1992:221) and implementation follows management decisions as to how work 
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should be organized (Baldry et al, 1998:169) and so can be seen to be conforming 
to a technical form of control.  
It should be noted here though that managers may not be a homogenous group 
and, in this sense, may have interests of their own and be in positions where they 
can mediate between “potential” and “actual” technology (Wilkinson, 1983:19). In 
this sense then it may be too simplistic to view design and implementation of 
technology as simply a decision management take but should rather be seen as “an 
outcome which has been chosen and negotiated” (Wilkinson, 1983:20).  
The motivation for installation of technology may not be concerned with any control 
aspect, but genuinely as the best tools available to do the job (Garson, 1989:208) 
although the control aspect may be inherent in this. In the private sector, employers 
may effectively be forced into using specific technologies in order to remain 
competitive (Wilkinson, 1983:9) a situation not naturally apparent in the public 
sector. A systems approach that may be relevant for both private and public sectors 
views technology as a solution to problems, that is as a purely technical issue 
(Knights and Murray, 1994:12). The opposite may also be true, however, in that 
efficiency or purely technical solutions to problems may not be the main 
consideration in design and implementation of information and communication, or 
any other, technology. It may be more effective control of labour is the driving 
motive, in which case this will be reflected in the design of the technology and how 
it is used once implemented (Wilkinson, 1983:21). The view has been advanced that 
microelectronics, by its nature is inherently already in the form required by 
employers to allow control and domination of the labour force (Robins and Webster, 
1985:37). However, in terms of the motivation for the design and implementation of 
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technology it should be borne in mind it only makes things possible and it is the 
mode of production that determines why it is deployed in the way it is (Noble, 
1979:36-37). From this point of view, it is the interests of dominant groups and the 
social relations of production that shape technology rather than technology 
autonomously shaping society (Knights and Murray, 1994:24; Noble,1979:18; Dyer-
Witheford, 1999:40). However, there is also a need to “explore the accidental, 
unintended and often contradictory nature of the global context within which 
particular organisational and technological changes take place” (Knights and 
Murray, 1994:24).  
Labour process theory highlights the political nature of implementing technology and 
the results of this implementation are largely influenced, if not determined, by the 
main actors here, labour and management. From this perspective management 
implements technology to achieve greater control over the labour process which 
may include replacing labour, the separation of conception and execution of tasks, 
as a means of performance monitoring, or to weaken trade unions, or indeed any 
combination of these (Hall, 2010:160-161).  However, we can see in terms of design 
and implementation of technology there may be a complex set of contestations and 
relationships going into decisions relating to this. “These encompass both relations 
between systems suppliers and users and shifting alliances within user 
organisations that include managerial, trade union and shopfloor actors” (Knights 
and Murray, 1994:25). Even where the positions of labour and management may be 
considered rigid and determined, the outcome of the struggles are not (Hall, 
2010:161). Labour process theory holds technology is part of the labour process 
and how it may be deployed, implemented and designed by management will be 
used in organising work in their interests, but given the potential contestation and 
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uncertain outcomes this does not indicate a narrow technological determinism in 
that the technology itself does not determine the labour process but rather how it is 
set up and used will vary according to struggle and accommodation between the 
various actors involved (Hall, 2010:164). It is clear then technology is not neutral in 
its design or implementation (Dyer-Witheford, 2015:29) it is always as a result of 
choices from a range of potential outcomes (Noble, 1979:18-19; Wilkinson, 
1983:18). However, it also needs to be recognized that in choosing to implement 
certain ICT systems managers may be making the decisions on “whimsical grounds 
[…] with little understanding of the technical issues involved” (Hyman, 1987:37). The 
thesis, recognizing how technology is used is a matter of choice, however arrived 
at, and potential contestation, now turns to consider how it may be used as a tool of 
control.  
3.6 Control Through ICT 
This section considers the main ways ICT is used as a tool of control. The first 
aspect to consider is how it is used to monitor and surveille staff. It examines this in 
the context of the concept of the, oft used by those of a Foucauldian perspective, 
panopticon and whether this view is compatible with the Marxist analysis of the 
labour process. The second part of the section considers how ICT is used as a 
means to direct the labour process itself by removing or curtailing worker decision 
making or appropriating within the systems the knowledge required to perform the 
tasks. The section relates these aspects to the forms of control discussed in 
previous sections in this chapter. However, whilst this section considers the types 
of control that may be delivered via ICT systems, it should also be borne in mind 
ICT has now developed away from individual personal computers to integrated 
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packages and networked systems (Garson, 1989:214-215; Beirne et al, 1998:159; 
Taylor and Bain, 1999:102)  
3.6.1 Monitoring and Surveillance – The Electronic Panopticon and Simple 
Control 
In considering the capability of ICT systems to monitor and surveille workers the 
concept of the panopticon is used, including how some writers have advanced the 
view that new technology has effectively created an electronic version of this. Some 
writers have put forward a Foucauldian perspective as an alternative to what they 
see as the narrow determinist Marxist view of why management seek to control the 
labour process as discussed in the previous chapter. Even though the panopticon 
was only a small part of what Foucault wrote it has been an area which those utilizing 
a Foucauldian perspective have concentrated on to provide an explanation of 
control in the workplace (Sewell, 1998:404). The panopticon was conceived as a 
structure of incarceration. It was designed to have a central viewing tower 
surrounded by cells that can be seen into but whose inmates cannot see into the 
central tower. The inmates are thus permanently visible (McNay, 1994:93; Akella, 
2003:48; Desai, 2010:797). However, this only needs to be permanent in as much 
as the surveilled are aware they can be potentially observed at any time (Sakolsky, 
1992:238), thus understanding “the impossibility of avoiding the supervisory gaze of 
an all-seeing, but unseen, observer” (Doolin, 2004:345). So even though the 
observer cannot be seen, the subject must assume observation is taking place and 
therefore their behaviour must conform to the expected norms due to the 
psychological effects of presumed observation (Jacobs and Heracleous, 2001:126; 
Zuboff, 1988:321). In this way observation does not need to be constant but its 
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effects will be permanent (Foucault, 1995:201) and therefore “organizational control 
will become less apparent and more powerful” (Barker, 1993:435). Foucault 
believed the panopticon was not to be “understood as a dream building [but rather 
as] a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific 
use” (Foucault, 1995:205). The issue for this thesis, however, is whether the concept 
of a panopticon is useful in terms of the control of labour for the very specific 
requirements of the workplace and as such is not detached.  
Workers being subjected to observation is not new. In pre-capitalist times we can 
see the use of overseers for slaves (Garson, 1989:215) and there are “accounts of 
mill owners in the early 1900s using telescopes to watch workers arriving at their 
factories” (Bradley et al, 2000:105). Babbage (1832) had a clear admiration for 
machines providing a check on the performance of individual workers. An example 
of this was a machine called a ‘tell-tale’ where a night-watchman had to pull strings 
from machines placed at various points on his rounds, thus showing he had 
completed them at set times (Babbage, 1832:67). The idea of surveillance can also 
be linked to Taylorism and Taylor’s view that left to their own devices workers would 
naturally shirk (Jacobs and Heracleous, 2001:123). However, these earlier methods 
were constrained by technology available at the time and has been noted in why 
employers may have had problems using a simple form of control with an expanding 
and dispersed workforce.  
It is now the case “IT has provided a set of tools for surveillance in contemporary 
workplaces that […] significantly increase the power of the watcher” (Bradley et al, 
2000:105). ICT can be seen to satisfy the principles of how the panopticon works 
(Sewell, 1998:404) and the architectural design of the panopticon is mimicked by 
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this technology (Berdayes, 2002:35). An advantage from a managerial point of view 
is, “electronic monitoring doesn’t interfere with the workflow. Statistics are collected 
unobtrusively, seemingly as a by-product of the work” (Garson, 1989:223). It can be 
seen the more effective the panoptic regime, the lower the numbers of managers 
required and the higher the number of people subject to management power 
(Foucault, 1995:206; St. Pierre and Holmes, 2008:355) and consequently the lower 
the cost to the employer (Foucault, 1995:218-219).    
Whilst the previous paragraph has argued the use of computerized systems, in 
terms of their surveillance capability, can be seen to mirror the panopticon, there is 
an argument to say it extends this in that there is no need for the simultaneous 
presence of the observer and the observed (Zuboff, 1988:322). To achieve the level 
of surveillance made possible by ICT “the company would have had to hire a full-
time foreman for every worker” (Garson, 1989:223) and would, therefore, be costly 
and intrusive, hence the problematic nature of simple control. ICT provides for the 
potential to utilize this form of control at a level that would be unrealistic in terms of 
its application through simple human observation.  
 It can also be seen whilst the panopticon could be said to work due to the potential 
for the individual to be observed, ICT systems mean “monitoring is performed 
automatically through a computerized system; hence the actual occurrence of 
monitoring is certain” (Hunton et al, 2008:1555). ICT systems in conjunction with 
telecommunications technology give managers the potential to carry out remote 
monitoring of employees (Taylor, 1998:93; Shaiken, 1985:9) and means the 
technology can “decentre work from a single physical site and open up working to 
any space” (Thompson and Smith, 2010:21). This means there is now the potential 
76 
 
for workers to work from home despite there being a spatial separation from their 
supervisors, one of the problems identified with simple control, with supervision 
being applied from a distance, thus solving the problem for managers of not being 
able to control and motivate remote workers (Baruch, 2000:38; Castells, 1992:208).  
When we look at why employers would seek to monitor and surveille their 
employees, two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, reasons have been given. 
There is a distinction in whether management may use surveillance and monitoring 
punitively, due to lack of trust in employees or whether management use monitoring 
to move towards an environment where employees can be encouraged to learn and 
develop, and managers may make better decisions (Frenkel et al, 1999:142-143; 
Zuboff, 1988:317; Sewell, 1998:407). However, managers may highlight this 
feedback potential of surveillance in an attempt to gloss over its use as a coercive 
tool of control (Chalykoff and Kochan, 1989:809).   
Management have made the argument “that electronic surveillance and monitoring 
leads to increased employee productivity” (Oz et al, 1999:168). This is because 
machines in this type of monitoring regime can be seen to be carrying out a form of 
performance appraisal resulting in an intensification of work (Bradley et al, 
2000:105-106). Indeed, systems for electronic surveillance are positively marketed 
on the capability of the system to produce exact measures of output and cut costs 
by reducing the time workers are idle (Kidwell and Sprague, 2009:196; Garson, 
1989:214-215). However, it should also be noted here that a survey shows workers 
in the public sector often do not believe their work can be easily measured (Marsden 
and French, 1998:9). Modern information technology has the capacity for detailed 
surveillance of all aspects of a worker’s work (Salaman, 1992:367) at a minute level 
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including entries onto the system, keystrokes, customer service interaction and 
interception, email communications, unproductive periods and breaks (Oz et al, 
1999:167; Kolb and Aiello, 1996:408). However, it should be made clear here it is 
not only visibility that achieves the required behavior from employees, it also 
requires assessment and judgement in respect of norms set by management 
(McNay, 1994:95).  
Whilst it has been suggested the fact monitoring is taking place may increase 
performance due to the worker perceiving the work as important due to it being 
monitored, it is generally assumed to be effective it must be accompanied by other 
managerial actions with consequences for the employee (Larson and Callahan, 
1990:530). Whilst deployment of ICT systems may lead to an intensification of work 
and a reduction in the requirement for managers, it should not be assumed the 
requirement for human supervision has disappeared. “Where IT is used to monitor 
employees’ output the data is still required to be interpreted by supervisors and line 
managers and utilized in disciplinary and other ways ‘to encourage others’” (Baldry 
et al, 1998:174). There is a requirement for norms and targets for workers to be set 
and revised (ibid:173) and where the work performance is considered to be sub-
standard the usual methods of direct control would be used (Edwards, 1979:121), 
namely punishment and reward (ibid:126). A further aspect of performance 
monitoring has been employers choosing to share performance information, 
perceived as legitimated by being system generated, with other members of the 
team thus exerting peer pressure on those deemed to be performing poorly (Sewell, 
1998:420). Some managers may try and avoid the possible confrontation arising 
from performance monitoring by allowing workers to continue to shirk, so there may 
be observation but no action (Zuboff, 1988:334-335; Hyman, 1987:41). However, if 
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no action is taken workers may ignore the fact of surveillance completely (Sewell, 
1998:425). If workers feel the need to avoid sanction then evidence would show 
increasing monitoring will have the effect of curbing behavior management deem 
inappropriate (Hunton et al, 2008:1555). However, this brings us on to the possibility 
managers themselves are now subject to surveillance, monitoring and control by 
technology (Thompson and Bannon, 1985:107) to ensure that, given the potentially 
different interests within the management group, senior management policy is more 
effectively transmitted downwards through the managerial hierarchy (Hyman, 
1987:41), and the extent to which this may alter the dynamic between manager and 
worker. Managers may have shared interests with subordinates because both 
groups are subject to decisions of more senior managers. However, “in other 
respects they do not [as their] interests are driven by their ability to meet […] their 
performance targets by controlling the work of others” (Edwards, 2010:34).  The 
dynamic here can be seen to be management “as control […] [and] subject to 
controls” (Thompson and van den Broek, 2010:3) 
This section has discussed the use of technology in respect of surveillance and 
monitoring of employees. It has noted the use of the concept of the panopticon as 
advanced by writers from a Foucauldian perspective. However, the view 
surveillance has the effect of increasing the intensity of effort means it is consistent 
with the Marxist Labour Process view of the employer seeking to gain tighter control 
of the labour process to increase surplus labour. The surveillance of workers is not 
new, either by direct observation or via technology, but the use of ICT can be seen 
to fit with and indeed extend the panoptic regime of employers and management. 
There may also be a cost benefit to employers as the use of ICT in surveillance may 
reduce the numerical requirement for managers whilst increasing the number of 
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workers subject to management. It was also felt the dynamic between managers 
and subordinates may be affected as managers themselves may begin to be 
monitored by the technology concerned. Whilst the use of this type of monitoring 
may also be viewed as a way of attaining a learning environment it was felt the 
control element was central. 
3.6.2 Technical Control by Embedding Rules and Regulations in ICT Systems 
Whilst Edwards (1979) viewed bureaucratic control as being developed to achieve 
control over non-production staff, where technical control was deemed problematic 
due to the nature of their work, Braverman advanced the view that computers would 
provide the technical control of clerical and administrative workers the production 
line provided for manual workers (Thompson, 1989:80).  
One way of implementing technical control is to design the system to embed rules, 
regulations and procedures within it. An example of this could be the embedding of 
rules, regulations and procedures such as scripted responses that must be followed 
by call centre operatives (Hall, 2010:167) or systems allocating work to individual 
employees (Button et al, 2003:54-57). Control is therefore achieved using ICT 
systems by removing options in terms of what can be input by the employee. In this 
way “business processes are embedded within the routines” (Hall, 2010:172-173). 
What this means in effect is there is a requirement for standardized information input 
or response. The information must be input in a specific format required by, or 
respond according to the diktat supplied by, the computer system. Workers are, 
therefore, to be subject to technical control when ICT is designed in this manner, as 
the machinery, in effect, becomes home to the actual decision-making process 
(Crompton and Reid, 1982:171). As such it could be said what is shaping the labour 
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process in many organizations is ICT rather than production technologies such as 
production lines and this has facilitated technical control moving into the services 
sector (Hall, 2010:167). This may result in a decreased need for direct supervision 
but cannot be seen to lead to an increased level of worker autonomy as this is strictly 
curtailed by the pre-programmed parameters set by management during 
implementation and its subsequent use (Glenn and Feldberg, 1979:57; Rosen and 
Baroudi, 1992:225). We can see here the autonomy of managers can now be 
replaced by computer algorithms designed to dictate how work must be carried out 
(Grugulis and Lloyd, 2010:105). The effect of this form of control is it also 
standardizes behavior without the need for any explicit organizational rules, which 
even though not necessarily recognized by the worker, are integral to the system 
itself (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:215). In effect it increases control by reducing or 
eliminating any worker discretion (ibid:223-224).  
The link between deskilling and technology has been introduced in Section 3.3.1 on 
technical forms of control. Prior to the implementation of ICT systems there was a 
view deskilling through technical control was generally not applicable to non-
production jobs. However, this is no longer seen to be the case as the “same 
principles that transformed craftsmen into factory hands are now being applied to 
make white-collar workers cheaper to train, easier to replace, less skilled [and] less 
expensive” (Garson, 1989:11). Information technology has enabled what were once 
non-routine jobs to be routinized through the embedding of rules and processes into 
ICT systems, leading to a reduction in skill and a centralization of management 
control (Crompton and Reid, 1982:173). Data and information can now be stored 
and processed by electronic information systems with their embedded rules, 
regulations and procedures, previously the domain of professionals (Rosen and 
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Baroudi, 1992:227; Crompton and Reid, 1982:173) “thus facilitating the erosion of 
professional autonomy and authority” (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:227-228). “If a 
worker is empowered by the knowledge and skill they possess, then expert systems, 
by codifying this knowledge, may facilitate the disempowering of workers” (ibid:228) 
and consequently increasing the power of management. We are now seeing ICT 
affect jobs, in terms of the control of labour, once felt to be outside its influence. In 
effect skilled operatives have been transformed into a “minder of technology” 
(Wilkinson, 1983:7). 
ICT when used as a means of technical control has not resulted in more skilled and 
satisfying work but it has been in effect, “another extension of Taylorist authority” 
(Dyer-Witheford, 1999:49). ICT is seen here as achieving a sharper separation of 
“conception from execution, diluting skills and transferring them to a combination of 
non-specialists and machines” (Beirne et al 1998:146). There have been criticisms 
of this view, particularly around the implementation of ICT mirroring the discussion 
in Section 3.3.1. In essence this criticism is whilst some skills have indeed 
disappeared as a result of ICT they have been replaced by others and what we have 
actually seen is the appearance and requirement for new skills and what could be 
classed as ‘upskilling’. This view contends that from the 1980s onwards we have 
witnessed a move away from rigid bureaucratic structures to more flexible patterns 
of work facilitated by ICT which has led to upskilling and a reunification of conception 
and execution (Greenbaum, 1998:135; Grugulis and Lloyd, 2010:91; Hyman, 
1988:49). As new technology allows for production with an instantaneous response 
to the demand for new products, the view has been advanced that control systems 
have moved away from Taylorist solutions and bureaucratic regulations as neither 
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management or workers will know a solution to any given problem in advance 
(Negrelli, 1988:90).  
We have discussed in relation to skills, there may be a less polarizing view and 
consideration is required around the differential effects ICT may have on the skills 
required from different groups of workers (Grugulis and Lloyd, 2010:94). It may be 
the case the implementation of ICT requires a new and different set of skills. 
However, these skills may be easier to acquire and be more generic than those they 
replace. As such, upskilling may be an inaccurate description of what is in effect a 
net loss of skill (Hall, 2010:164-166; Glenn and Feldberg, 1979:61) and therefore 
would still accord with Thompson’s view (1989:118) of a tendential aspect of 
deskilling. It should also be borne in mind within this debate management will still 
decide on the selection and implementation of technology and therefore emphasis 
will still be on managerial objectives and not autonomous workers (Wood, 1988:119-
120). 
3.6.3 Peripheral Bureaucratic ICT Systems 
We have seen how bureaucratic control can cover such areas as personnel policies, 
disciplinary procedures and work rules such as attendance policies and 
performance norms (Edwards, 1979:131). This section notes how ICT has become 
involved in the operation of this method and “has proved to be an unusually powerful 
tool in exercising bureaucratic control” (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:215). Centralized 
ICT systems have assumed an increasing role in administering these bureaucratic 
rules and policies as part of an integrated ‘enterprise resource planning system’ 
(Hall, 2010:174) and “fits well with centralized bureaucratic processes” 
(Greenbaum, 1998:134) and its use in implementing these. These peripheral 
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systems involved in the delivery of bureaucratic systems of control can be seen as 
separate to the core systems delivering the actual service, in this case the 
administration of Revenues and Benefits. 
One aspect to be considered is if simple or technical control can ensure 
standardized behaviour within non-production jobs, does there remain a 
requirement for explicit bureaucratic rules (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:223) or does 
the extension of this form into ICT based systems extend the level and range of 
control that can be applied?   
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the issue of control and how technology, particularly 
ICT, has been used by employers and management seeking to achieve this. The 
chapter commenced by examining different forms of control and why certain ones 
may be used over others, before moving on to the issue of design and 
implementation of ICT systems and how this is related to control. Finally, the chapter 
considered ways in which ICT systems were used in terms of delivering control, 
including how they may relate to the typology of control discussed. 
The first form of control considered was simple control. This is where there is usually 
a direct personal relationship between the owner of a company and the workers and 
the control is applied directly. It may often be arbitrary in nature according to the 
whim of the owner or a small coterie of managers and so can be inconsistently 
applied from worker to worker. This form of control may be effective for small 
organizations but problematic as the size of an organization increases. The increase 
in size results in a requirement to raise the number of supervisors until this becomes 
84 
 
impractical. Because of this, larger organizations may implement structural forms of 
control, particularly technical and bureaucratic in nature. 
Technical control is embedded in the technological and physical structures of an 
organization. Workers must follow the requirements of the machine and as such 
there will no longer be several ways to complete a job. The employee, therefore, 
loses control of the execution of the task. This form of control was initially deemed 
applicable only to production jobs. There is a clear link between technical control 
and skills and where a reduction of skills can be seen to follow its implementation 
there is also a reduction in worker control over the labour process. A reduction in 
skills also potentially increases the substitutability of workers making jobs more 
precarious, and because of the fear this may engender may make control easier for 
managers. The chapter has considered the argument that, particularly with the 
implementation of ICT, there has been an initial requirement for upskilling, as new 
skills are required. There may be a polarization of skills required and lost between 
groups of workers. However, it is likely any new skills will become subject to 
deskilling over time as this appears to be the tendency within the capitalist mode of 
production. 
The problem of applying a technical form of control to non-production staff was a 
reason given for the second form of structural control considered, that of 
bureaucratic control. This form is where rules and procedures are adopted formally 
as part of the organizational structure. Examples of these relevant to this thesis are 
personnel policies covering areas such as attendance management, disciplinary 
procedures and work rules. The view was advanced in the thesis that it could not be 
simply assumed there has been an evolutionary development in terms of forms of 
control. None of the forms considered could be seen to be new as historical 
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examples were given of their use. It is also the case, far from one form replacing 
another these often coexist. 
The chapter went on to consider the view advanced that control may not be applied 
by purely coercive means. Management may seek to maintain control by fostering 
consent, co-operation and participation among its workforce. This may not simply 
be a replacement for coercive forms, however, but may be used in conjunction. It 
was the view this should not be considered a reduction in managerial control or an 
increase in worker autonomy and often may be a means of obscuring the true nature 
of the exploitation existing within the employment relationship. A question was 
posed to be considered in the research, if the effectiveness of control has been 
increased by ICT, including by subsequent displacement of labour, does this mean 
management’s desire for consent is superfluous? 
The chapter then moved on to consider the issue of control within the design and 
implementation of ICT systems. The design of ICT systems can be carried out in-
house or externally and where it is the latter this reduces the input of workers, at this 
stage, who will use the systems. Technology is designed to reflect the motivations 
of those who commission it and therefore control would be designed into the 
systems and not determined by the technology itself. Its design and use as a tool of 
control will be subject to negotiation and contestation, with and between managers 
and workers, and the outcomes may vary according to conditions at the time and 
will reflect the desires and motivations of the dominant group. Technology cannot 
be considered neutral in either its design or its use, but neither can it be considered 
inevitable, and so the chapter turned to the issue of how technology is used. 
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The first area examined was how ICT has been utilized to mimic the panopticon in 
an electronic format. It was also detailed that observation of workers is not a new 
phenomenon and the difference here is in the capability of the technology used. ICT 
has reduced the need for the physical presence of supervisors with geographical 
separation of them from workers becoming less problematic than it would be under 
a non-technological simple form of control. In terms of workers being subject to 
observation it can be seen to be more of a simple rather than technical form of 
control as it does not in itself determine how the job must be performed. As a tool of 
monitoring and managing performance it would appear to intensify the effort of 
workers if consequences exist for failing to perform satisfactorily or transgressing 
organizational rules. This means, therefore, human supervision cannot be 
dispensed with altogether. Indeed, managers are now subject to monitoring and 
surveillance to ensure they are delivering these consequences and it may then 
follow managers at certain levels may feel they have more in common with workers 
than with more senior managers. There are aspects of structural, bureaucratic 
control in that the monitoring measures performance and behaviour against 
managerially set targets and norms. 
ICT was also felt to provide a level of technical control by requiring a standardization 
of input and response, thus extending this form into non-production jobs. A 
consequence of this was a reduction in the requirement for supervisors but no 
increase in worker autonomy. As the rules of the organization are embedded in the 
ICT systems it may also be workers do not recognize them as such. The embedding 
of rules and regulations was felt to have a negative impact on skills as jobs become 
routinized, cheaper and workers more easily replaced with a subsequent reduction 
in the bargaining power of labour. The view ICT has replaced, or enhanced skills 
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was considered with the conclusion again being that even where this was so, there 
was a tendential process of deskilling present. 
The chapter finally examined the issue of ICT systems that could be viewed as 
bureaucratic and peripheral to the core systems delivering the actual product or 
service, but may be linked to them, raising the possibility of different forms of control 
being utilized in an integrated manner. Whilst the forms of control discussed have 
been seen to be present in conjunction historically, the consideration in this thesis 
is whether ICT systems can now provide an overarching network of systems with 
control capabilities designed in, including control of managers themselves. The 
following chapter considers the literature around whether these developments in 




Chapter 4 – Resistance to Management Control 
4.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous chapter’s consideration of management control, this 
chapter examines worker resistance to this. As one of the central concerns of this 
thesis is the extent to which ICT may render resistance impossible or ineffective, it 
is necessary to define what resistance is. This is particularly so as various terms are 
used, sometimes interchangeably, in literature around this subject. Once this has 
been considered, the chapter moves onto examining the forms resistance may take. 
The previous chapter contained a discussion on the issue of skills and whether 
technology in general and ICT in particular, can be seen to have had a deskilling or 
upskilling effect. As such there is little need to restate the argument here around an 
increase in management control resulting from a reduction in worker resistance as 
skills are removed from the work carried out. Issues around skills are raised 
however, where pertinent and are considered from both a management control and 
worker resistance perspective in the later findings chapters. 
The chapter considers aspects of individual acts of resistance. It notes and 
discusses the problems in revealing this form of resistance. This is particularly so 
due to the, often invisible, nature of such resistant acts. Individual resistance is also 
considered in terms of the difficulty in categorising acts as such due to the potentially 
differing meanings attached to the same act. However, as this thesis is concerned, 
in terms of resistance, as to whether ICT has rendered management control 
impervious to such action, an explanation is given in as much as it is the potential 
for the category of an act, for example absence or unsatisfactory performance, to 
be potentially an act of resistance and it is whether ICT can prevent it, that is being 
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judged. In exploring individual resistance this chapter also advances the view that 
the position of management control versus worker resistance is overly simplistic and 
highlights the issue of management being a potentially heterogenous group, 
members of which may engage in acts subverting the control of other managers. 
Collective resistance is the next aspect to be considered in this chapter. Formal 
collective responses through trade unions is a particular focus. The chapter explores 
claims trade unions have, when it comes to ICT, lacked policies on resisting 
implementation and involving themselves at the design stage. As such, as far as 
ICT is concerned they appear to have largely accepted management prerogative. 
However, the chapter raises historical examples of resistance towards previous 
technologies. Consideration is given to how unions approach ICT once implemented 
as it does appear any formal collective resistance is more apparent post hoc. 
However, the chapter also notes the possibility strong union organization may have 
the effect of tempering management behaviour prior to any action taking place. The 
chapter notes the potential for ICT to increase geographical dispersion of workers 
and the potential problems this may have for collective action and organization but 
also considers how the very technology itself may be used by unions as a tool of 
communication and resistance. 
Finally, the chapter considers the absence of resistance and posits this may not be 
due to the essential properties of technology but other reasons may explain its non-
appearance. However, recognition is given to the influence technology may have in 
creating an environment where the absence of resistance has been identified even 




4.2 What is Resistance?   
This section seeks to explore a working definition of resistance, as there is not 
necessarily an agreed terminology when considering oppositional practices to 
management. As well as resistance (Collinson, 1994), the following terms have 
been used, misbehaviour (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Thompson and Ackroyd, 
1995), deviance (Robinson and Bennett, 1995) and conflict (Edwards and Scullion, 
1982). At times these terms are used interchangeably. Some consideration should 
therefore, be given to how the concept of resistance is to be used as different labels 
indicates “differences of view about the relevant terminology and how the field 
should be defined” (Belanger and Thuderoz, 2010:143). Firstly, there needs to be 
discussion on how the different terms have been used and any criticism of how they 
are applied or assumptions that may stem from them, before concluding on how 
resistance is treated within this thesis.  
The first term considered is misbehaviour (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; 
Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995). Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) include a range of 
behaviours including failure to work, or not working very hard, restricting output, 
absenteeism and sabotage as examples of misbehaviour and posit workers can, by 
engaging in these acts, achieve some control over their work (ibid:23). Their position 
is misbehaviour can be classified as any action at work where a worker does 
something they are not supposed to (ibid:1-2).  If management is trying to impose 
control on the behaviour of workers then this concept of misbehaviour could be seen 
to apply to acts of resistance that are by nature, outside of the required behaviour 
from a management perspective. However, a criticism has been made that there 
can develop a tendency to equate every act of misbehaviour with resistance 
(Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 1997:64; Belanger and Thuderoz, 2010:138) although 
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Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) accept there is a distinction in that some acts of 
misbehaviour may not constitute resistance (ibid:165) although these are not 
specified.  However, we can see there appears to be a view that not every act of 
misbehaviour, in the sense of workers acting in ways which they are not supposed 
to, is an act of resistance to management control of the labour process. 
Misbehaviour has proved problematic for some as it appears to privilege subjective 
individual responses and conflict over the collective (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 
1997:65) and this term has led to an “absence of labour and the collective worker 
[that] has been assumed within key studies” (ibid:50). Whilst there may be some 
truth in this concern, the significance of individual acts of resistance should not be 
played down or necessarily seen as unorganized (Collinson, 1994:55; Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982:275). A solution to this proposed by Martinez Lucio and Stewart 
(1997) is a “recognition of the relative autonomy of the employee, an individual with 
his or her own speciﬁc agendas, sometimes of class, sometimes of a whole host of 
other structural and non-structural determinants” (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 
1997:52). Whilst workers have a choice in what actions they take, it needs to be 
recognized this “occurs in the context of constraints” (Edwards and Scullion, 
1982:280) such as, for example, labour market conditions (ibid:280). This chapter 
considers individual and collective action although the distinction between the two 
may not be as clear as one may assume. For example, collective forms of resistance 
may occur for a multitude of different, sometimes individualistic reasons (Collinson, 
1994:55). Likewise acts carried out by individuals may have a collective aspect to 
them (Taylor and Bain, 1999:112). 
Another term appearing in the literature is deviance. Robinson and Bennett 
(1995:556) define deviance in the workplace as voluntary behaviour that “violates 
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organizational norms”. They divide deviance into two types. Firstly, property 
deviance which relates to the damaging or stealing of an employer’s property. 
Secondly, production deviance which is “violating organizational norms regarding 
the quality and quantity of work performed” (ibid:557). The deviant behaviour is 
voluntary to the extent “that employees either lack the motivation to conform to 
normative expectations [or] become motivated to violate those expectations” 
(ibid:556). Within this term failing to perform an act, particularly within production 
deviance, may be seen as deviant. Property deviance would almost certainly be a 
criminal act, for example stealing, however the relevant consideration for this thesis 
is whether an act can be classified as resistance to management control of the 
labour process.  Some forms of property deviance such as sabotage may be carried 
out with the purpose of disrupting management control and would clearly fall within 
this remit (ibid:565). 
The term conflict is used by some writers in this area, as workers seeking to resist 
management control would be engaging in a conflictual situation (Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982). From a Marxian perspective “conflict is structured into the labour 
process, that is the process in which labour power is translated into effort” (ibid:4). 
The “process of production involves continuous conflict over the terms on which 
employers extract effort from workers” (ibid:5). The employment contract does not 
generally determine the level of effort and with different interests being present, this 
struggle over the effort bargain is played out within the workplace. Examples such 
as absenteeism, when seen from this perspective, may be a rational attempt to 
address the effort and wage imbalance from the view of the worker, rather than as 
a negative behaviour (ibid:7). 
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Other writers use the term resistance and locate actions of workers in this respect 
as a response to management control (Collinson, 1994:26). From this perspective 
resistance is something generated by management control (ibid:51) and is “always 
inextricably linked to organizational discipline, control and power” (ibid:50). We can 
see here a circular process where resistance is a response to control which may 
then lead to changes in control strategies from management and further resistant 
acts with control and resistance becoming “intertwined” (ibid:51). Thompson and 
Smith (2010:19) have criticised this reactive view of resistance, highlighting the 
potential for positive action carried out by workers to gain a degree of autonomy 
over their work. However, it does seem logical that resistance implies something to 
be resistant to. A more plausible view is it should not be read as a simple response 
determined by management ideas and action but rather is conditioned by the 
individual’s experience within the particular workplace, (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 
1997:62) manifested over a range of actions (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995:615) 
and is not necessarily devoid of strategy (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:273). 
However, to be classed as an act of resistance it does not necessarily have to be 
“fundamentally subversive” (Collinson, 1994:50) and individuals carrying out these 
acts may not “recognize their actions as explicitly oppositional” (ibid:51).  
We now turn to how, for the purposes of this thesis, resistance is to be determined 
in judging the extent of its potential or otherwise. In defining an act as resistance 
there needs to be an examination of the act itself. To illustrate this point, we can 
take the example of absence as the most common action resulting in disciplinary 
sanctions applied to individual workers (Edwards and Whitston, 1989:3). An 
employee absenting themselves from the workplace may be considered an act of 
resistance, unless there is a reason such as illness sufficiently serious to warrant 
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the absence, in which case it would not then be considered so (Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982:2; Edwards and Scullion, 1984:556). Likewise, an individual falling 
short of a required output or performance may be deliberately restricting effort as a 
challenge to management or may genuinely be unable to meet the targets set and 
is, therefore, not subversive (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:9). It is the individual 
performing the act that attaches meaning to it (Edwards and Whitston, 1989:3; 
Giddens, 1982:29) and so the same action may be considered an act of resistance 
or not, with the intention being far from clear. It can be problematic, therefore, “to 
explain specific behaviour in terms of resistance […] without exploring the 
relationship between the behaviour and its context” (Edwards and Scullion, 
1982:257). Specifically, that resistance “implies some attempt to alter the terms on 
which effort is expended” (ibid:258). 
The motivation for the action may be explicitly to achieve control of the labour 
process with a direct challenge to managerial authority. In “its most extreme form to 
establish workers’ control, or in milder variants merely to give the workers temporary 
control over a specific situation, control wrested from others” (Taylor and Walton, 
1971:234-235). Other actions may not seek to achieve this, however, and a number 
of motivations have been described for acts of resistance (Taylor and Walton, 1971). 
Although this thesis takes a Marxist view of the labour process, workers may not 
see their resistance as transformative in the sense of directing it at the “relations of 
production” (Thompson, 1990:119) but it still may have the effect of challenging 
management control of the labour process. This is not to ignore the relevance of 
class in respect of resistance, as whilst acts of resistance may not be borne of class 
consciousness, they “can still be seen as an aspect of class relations, that is, in 
terms of the relationship between workers as sellers of labour power and employers 
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as users of that power in the labour process” (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:281) with 
their separate interests (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:21). Workers may resent 
being controlled but this does not necessarily mean they wish to take control and so 
acts of resistance do not necessarily stem from this motivation (Goodrich, 1975:34). 
Acts may not be motivated by a desire to redistribute power; they may not actually 
make work any easier; they are often not a direct challenge to authority but are 
performed to alleviate stress and tension; and may often have an element of 
spontaneity. Behaviour can, therefore, sometimes appear as being without meaning 
and thus fail to be recognized as resistance (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:226-227). 
Likewise, some actions directly challenging management authority may be 
motivated by a desire to improve work practice and so may not be recognized as 
resistance by the worker (Edwards, 2010:39). An example of this may be workers’ 
superior knowledge of the technology used meaning they can adjust it to achieve a 
faster or easier work process but deviate from management’s instructions or diktat 
(Taylor and Walton, 1971:232-233).  
The way in which acts of resistance by workers have been portrayed has often been 
to place them within a framework of being “aberrant, deviant and unjustifiable” 
(Collinson, 1994:58) as opposed to management control, which is portrayed as 
“normal and legitimate” (ibid:58). This has led to the portrayal of the potentially 
resistant act as one of ‘wrongness’ or ‘badness’ (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 
1997:63). This has meant much of the literature around resistance has been in 
respect of a problem to be remedied (Edwards and Scullion, 1984:547-548; Knights 
and Murray, 1994:4). This thesis does not attempt to engage with this pejorative 
view of oppositional behaviour and seeks to place these actions in respect of their 
relationship within an overall structure of control (Edwards and Scullion, 1984:566; 
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Edwards and Whitston, 1989:23) and recognize it is management who promote the 
view that it is the workers’ response to their direction requiring change and not vice-
versa (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:12). In terms of the labour process this thesis 
takes the position that management is not a “neutral technique” and workers’ 
resistance should not be seen as “irrational or misguided” (Thompson and Bannon, 
1985:2).   Rather, the consideration here is not an ethical one but one of whether an 
act carried out by a worker or group of workers has the potential to be defined as 
resistance to managerial control of the labour process or not (Robinson and Bennett, 
1995:556). 
The situation in terms of judging resistance may be further complicated by the 
following considerations. Whilst some acts of resistance may consist of overt actions 
or demands, for example in strikes or work-to-rules (Taylor and Walton, 1971:221), 
others may be covert (Collinson, 1994:52; Hall, 2010:167). They may also not be 
actions as such, as discussed, the oppositional practice may be a failure to do 
something. For example, if the motive for management control is accepted as an 
attempt to increase the effort of workers, failure to achieve this may potentially be 
evidence of resistance exercised by the worker (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:90). 
In these cases, it may be management control has been subverted without 
managers recognizing resistance has taken place. It is not as simple as gauging 
acts as resistance by comparing them to other eras or actions. The intertwining of 
control and resistance (Collinson, 1994:51) results in the repertoire of employee 
resistance changing as technologies and management control strategies change 
(Belanger and Thuderoz, 2010:153).  
To conclude this section there is an attempt to clarify how this thesis deals with the 
concept of resistance to management control of the labour process. As we have 
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seen there are a range of actions, behaviours and terms, that may or may not 
constitute resistance. This section has highlighted that it may not necessarily be 
simple to classify an action as resistance from the act itself. In determining whether 
an action can be classed as an act of resistance towards management control there 
is a need, given the above discussion on terms, meanings to individuals, and the 
effect and effectiveness of actions, to identify the object of oppositional behaviour in 
practice. The question here is whether that object is “the regime of managerial 
controls over the labour process” (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:47). In other 
words, in terms of resistance there is concurrence with Edwards and Scullion 
(1982:274) that actions carried out by workers need to be related to the frontier of 
control between management and employers on the one hand and workers on the 
other. In defining an act as an act of resistance for the purpose of this thesis, it needs 
to threaten or influence employer or management control of the labour process at 
least to some extent (Jaros, 2010:74). As Chapter 2 highlighted, the motivation for 
control of the labour process within local government as part of the public sector 
operating as a component of the capitalist system is the maximization of effort and 
surplus labour and the rational administration of services. As such, this thesis takes 
the position that resistance is an act that challenges, prevents or diminishes 
management control in these areas, including by an employee removing themselves 
from the employment relationship completely. However, as the same type of act, for 
example, absenteeism, may in certain circumstances be an act of resistance and in 
other cases not, the very fact that, using this example, absence takes place at all 





4.3 Forms of Resistance 
The previous section located resistance in terms of actions that challenged or 
subverted management control of the labour process. This section moves on to 
consider the forms resistance may take. As detailed in the previous section, similar 
or the same actions can be deemed either resistance or not depending on the 
context and circumstances underlying them. As this thesis is attempting to examine 
the extent to which ICT has curtailed resistance, the issue is not assessing whether 
individual acts constitute resistance or not but rather that the category of acts may 
potentially be considered resistant have been rendered more difficult or impossible 
by ICT. In doing this we firstly examine individual forms of resistance from the 
perspective of workers subject to management control. Whilst the debates around 
control and resistance often take the form of a dichotomy between managers and 
workers, it is the view of this thesis managers cannot be simply assumed to 
constitute a homogenous group. Prior to going onto consider collective resistance 
from a worker perspective, this chapter considers how, far from acting as a group 
with a unified strategy and purpose, managers themselves may engage in acts that 
may be considered resistant.  
4.3.1 Individual Worker Resistance 
This section considers different types of individual worker resistance that may occur 
(Sale, 1996:270) as opposed to resistance taking organized collective forms. 
Individual resistance generally does not seek to change management behavior but 
rather to escape it (Knights and McCabe, 1998) and as such does not challenge 
management practice (Lukacs, 1971b:193). However, this section also addresses 
the issue that individual action can at times have some collective characteristics 
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(Collinson, 1994:55).  Not all individual resistance is necessarily visible, and “can 
assume nondirected or covert forms and hence be difficult to detect, particularly in 
front-line work settings” (Frenkel et al, 1999:162). It may be difficult to obtain a true 
picture as workers may not be inclined to admit to carrying out acts that, by their 
nature, would be outside of what management would consider acceptable (Taylor 
and Walton, 1971:220; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:3). This section should not be 
considered, and does not require to be, a comprehensive list of all individual 
behaviours that may be considered acts of resistance. This is partly because it is 
the case that acts of resistance may be specific to the particular technological 
systems and regimes of control employed (Hall, 2010), but also because the issue 
to which the thesis addresses itself, in terms of resistance, is whether the use of ICT 
has rendered resistance impossible (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Delbridge et al, 
1993), and as such it is not whether an act in itself can be determined resistant but 
rather whether, in certain circumstances, it may have the potential to be, as defined 
in the previous section. Some broad themes have been identified where specific 
individual behaviours may be categorized as resistance. These are sabotage, 
absenteeism, output or effort restriction and falsification or what may be colloquially 
termed as fiddling. It also needs to be recognised these categories are not 
necessarily discrete, and behaviours may fit into one or more of them. 
The term sabotage has been quite broadly defined by some to include any acts that 
are intentional and “which result in the reduction in the quantity or quality of the 
product; this includes absenteeism […] and even voluntary unemployment as well 
as destruction” (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:152). However, this would appear to 
be too wide a definition and a more useful one would be to use the term “to refer to 
deliberate behaviour leading to the destruction of, or damage to, the company’s 
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property” (ibid:154), destroying existing work or non-destructive action such as 
deliberately producing poor work (ibid:154). Discrete sabotage consisting of what 
may appear accidental breakages or production of sub-standard products (Bosquet, 
1980:370) and breakdowns that “are in fact consciously contrived ‘break-times’” 
(Taylor and Walton, 1971:220) to restrict output or effort, may make this form of 
resistance difficult to identify. The particular act of sabotage may be encouraged or 
discouraged by the technology employed (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:166). One 
possibility is sabotage may be enacted simply because it is enjoyable to, or relieves 
the boredom of, the worker (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:25). Therefore, whilst it 
may not be an attempt for workers to assume control of the labour process, it is 
clearly opposed to management control at least in terms of the aspect that the 
sabotage is aimed at and is therefore a potentially resistant act. 
We now turn to absenteeism as a form of individual resistance. A worker absenting 
themselves from work can have an array of meanings and reasons (Edwards and 
Scullion, 1984:550; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:25), and only the workers 
concerned will know if the absence can be placed in the context of manager-worker 
relations in the workplace (Edwards and Scullion, 1984:449-451). The recorded 
levels of absence may be problematic in judging incidences of it in terms of 
resistance. For example, some absence may be unavoidable due to illness 
(ibid:556). Absenteeism will also be unrecorded if it is not linked to sick leave but 
occurs as workers absent themselves from work surreptitiously during the working 
day. A study found in one British factory, “workers had established a system 
whereby they took it in turns to leave the factory for a few hours without their being 
recorded as absent. The absence figures do not, therefore, measure the 'true' extent 
of absenteeism in the sense of the number of workers not at work” (ibid:553). As a 
101 
 
form of resistance, it may be absenteeism is an escape mechanism from the 
intensity of management control (ibid:553). However, it also needs to be recognized 
the opposite may also be true as absence may also occur as a result of failure of 
management to exercise control, meaning workers believe they can get away with 
absenting themselves from the workplace (ibid:563). A further aspect of 
absenteeism outside of any unauthorised absence is where an individual quits their 
job. This could be seen as a way of resisting management control (ibid:562) but 
would again require investigation into the motivation for the act. However, again the 
point is made that whilst it may be problematic in terms of research to attribute 
individual acts as resistant, the fact it may potentially be used as a means of 
regulating the effort expended by workers or removing themselves from the 
relationship with that particular employer or manager, is relevant to the question of 
whether ICT has rendered resistance impossible (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998, 
Delbridge et al, 1993). In other words, has ICT prevented workers from indulging in 
these activities? 
If, as has been discussed, management seek to control the labour process to 
intensify the effort of the worker, it would seem plausible that in resisting 
intensification, workers may seek to restrict their effort or output. We have seen that 
employers engage in surveillance and monitoring of workers, setting normative 
levels of output. It may be output norms are not met for reasons of deliberate 
subversion but is due to the inability of the worker to achieve this (Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1999:9). However, limiting work output and effort may be a way of 
employees gaining or regaining some form of control over the labour process 
(ibid:26). Again, with this type of behaviour the motivation behind it would need to 
be determined if classification of resistance is required. Workers’ responses to the 
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use of technological and technical control systems has been to develop increasingly 
sophisticated ways to defeat them (Taylor and Walton, 1971:242; Thompson and 
Smith, 2010:16). This is not a new phenomenon, for example, Taylor and Walton 
(1971), give an example from their research where they had “been told by 
Woolworth’s sales girls how they clank half a dozen buttons on the till 
simultaneously to win a few minutes rest from ‘ringing up’” (Taylor and Walton, 
1971:219) thus effectively providing some control over the effort expended. 
Workers’ “interventions to defeat monitoring functions have been recognised for 
some time” (Beirne et al, 1998:157). For example, in a call-centre, in spite “of the 
existence of intense monitoring, a number of interviewees […] reported to being 
able, albeit to a limited extent, to disengage the waiting queue of calls” (Taylor and 
Bain, 1999:112). Other examples have been noted in call centres where workers 
may “work their way round surveillance by manipulating measures by dialling 
through call lists, leaving lines open after customers [have] hung up, pretending to 
talk on the phone, providing a minimal response to customer queries and misleading 
customers” (Ball, 2010:94). These actions may not be an overt challenge to 
management authority but could certainly be classed as acts of defiance in the face 
of management control systems (Knights and McCabe, 1998:182). The question 
again, is not whether each individual act can be classified as resistant but whether 
ICT has precluded such activities from taking place. 
Some of the actions noted above may be seen as involving falsification. Others are 
clearly in this category in as much as figures from surveillance or monitoring are 
falsified or fiddled. In a paper by Knights and McCabe (1998) the issue of whether 
increased levels of statistical information increased management control, it was 
reported figures could be fiddled (Knights and McCabe, 1998:183). We can see here 
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that workers could exercise some form of output restriction by fiddling the figures 
management receive (Edwards, 1988:190). In terms of how this may be achieved, 
there is the possibility, in terms of the job and how long it may take to complete, or 
the technology used to perform the job, the employee is in possession of more 
knowledge than the manager (Collinson, 1994:34-35; Ditton, 1979:162-163) and so 
as one member of staff reported by Knights and McCabe stated regarding the 
manager, “you can blind her with science, as to what you are doing” (Knights and 
McCabe, 1998:183). What this shows is whilst there may exist a high level of 
technological control, worker resistance still remains possible even when 
surveillance through technology is performed at the level it is in many workplaces 
(Belanger and Thuderoz, 2010:138). 
This section has discussed the problems that may occur in classifying an act carried 
out by an individual as resistance or not and given examples to illustrate this. 
Whether an individual act is in itself resistance or not, does not necessarily pose a 
problem for this thesis where the issue is whether ICT has precluded resistance 
from happening. The relevant question, therefore, is whether ICT has effectively 
prevented these potentially resistant acts from being an option for workers. The 
point also needs to be made that these individual acts of resistance may, in 
themselves, only involve one person but may involve significant numbers of 
employees (Taylor and Walton, 1971:219). The case given by Edwards and Scullion 
(1984) where workers collude to take time off during the working day would be an 
example of this. The situation can arise, therefore, where “individual oppositional 
practices are deeply embedded in particular workplace culture and are supported, 
shared or emulated by other disaffected workers, they adopt a quasi-collective form” 
(Taylor and Bain, 1999:112).  
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The chapter now moves on from discussing individual worker resistance to discuss 
the potentiality for acts of resistance from individual managers. 
4.3.2 Management and Resistance 
There can be a tendency when looking at the control of the labour process to 
assume a coherent strategy on behalf of management. This strategy is only 
coherent, however, if middle managers pursue the same strategy as those more 
senior (Friedman, 1990:182). This may not be so and Chapter 3 noted managers 
themselves may be subject to control through ICT. It may be assumed therefore, 
managers themselves may be resistant to the policies and control of more senior 
managers (Thompson and Bannon, 1985:107) and as Hyman (1987:30) points out 
the “problem of discipline and control may well be far greater in the case of 
managerial labour than with routine employees”. Much of the discussion around 
control and resistance locates managers as carrying out a control function. Whilst 
this is the case, it should not be assumed management is necessarily a 
homogenous group. Managers, in certain circumstances, may have shared interests 
with subordinates as both groups are subject to decisions of more senior managers 
and have to sell their labour (Wardell, 1990:157). However, the fact they are 
employed to control the work of others and this is how they may be performance 
managed and judged, means their interests can be viewed as separate to those 
they manage (Edwards, 2010:34), hence the distinction in this chapter. Managers 
strategies and behaviours cannot be simply assumed by referring to the structural 
features of an organization (Friedman, 1990:180). Rather, they are “individuals with 
their own goals and needs” and whilst these may be separate from those they 
manage, this may threaten the operation of the control regime (Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1999:80). There may also be a disjuncture between senior and middle 
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managers where the latter’s personal values conflict with the managerial control 
methods they are expected to follow (Friedman, 1990:185). As well as playing a role 
in the control function then, it may also be the case managers can indulge in 
resisting more senior management authority too (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:9). 
In terms of what ICT systems are implemented and how they are used, these 
decisions are “mediated by management choice and often quite intense struggles 
between and amongst various factions of management” (Hall, 2010:173). It has 
been stated that “one of the supposed benefits of computerization was to thin out 
[…] costly middle managers as personal computers gave a reduced number of 
higher executives digital access to vital command and control data” (Dyer-Witheford, 
2015:140). It may be managers see themselves as threatened by this technology 
resulting in a motivation for some form of resistance. We can see then the potential 
for a more nuanced picture of resistance than a simple view of management versus 
workers. Managers’ interests may not be limited to those as defined by their 
organizational function and so should not be simply assumed as such (Salaman, 
1982:60). The argument workers can no longer resist the level of management 
control ICT affords (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998) assumes management functionaries 
are united in their values and goals but does not afford the same view to workers 
which are seen as “passive, cowed, acquiescent” (Salaman, 1982:61). Either 
position seems questionable and the research examined these views. 
Management resistance may take the same characteristics as the individual forms 
of resistance highlighted in the previous section. One of these is middle managers 
may manipulate information accessed by more senior managers, thus 
communicating an unjustified message of competence, particularly given the 
potentially competitive nature of management politics (Knights and Murray, 
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1994:31-33). It may also take the form of omitting to perform the control functions 
expected of them. Section 3.6.1 highlighted the situation where managers employed 
in a supervisory function may take no action against workers who fail to perform to 
a managerially set performance target (Zuboff, 1988:334-335) thus subverting the 
system of control. 
4.3.3 Collective Resistance  
Whilst individual acts of resistance cannot be identified with the institutions of 
organized labour (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 1997:74), “the potential clearly exists 
for the manifestation to be channelled into the more effective forms of trade union 
organization and action” (Taylor and Bain, 1999:112-113) and given collective 
expression (ibid:103). Whilst individual actions can have a collective dimension, it is 
also the case collective action can also be carried out, or not, for a multitude of 
different, sometimes individualistic reasons (Collinson, 1994:55). This section 
considers features of collective resistance, particularly those more formal aspects 
carried out by trade unions. It also considers the view unions may seek to foster 
compliance rather than resistance in respect of the implementation and use of new 
technology. This research examines this collective aspect of how workers may or 
may not respond to the imposition of control through technology regimes. 
It has been argued unions lack policy on, and generally fail to resist electronic 
workplace surveillance (Garson, 1989:219). Unions tend not to be involved in design 
or deployment and so technology will not reflect their interests (Noble, 1979:45) and 
they rarely conclude new technology agreements but even when they do it is not 
common for these to exclude technology for monitoring purposes (Thompson and 
Bannon, 1985:130-131). The trade union view has generally been they 
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acknowledge this type of technology as inevitable and, therefore, accept its 
implementation but try and impose limitations and conditions on how it is used 
(Robins and Webster, 1985:29). It is the case unions do not necessarily promote 
resistance in this area and may promote compliance (Thompson and Bannon, 
1985:102), feeling the future interests of their members depend on accepting these 
technological innovations (Goodrich, 1975:186). In this sense trade unions may play 
a role in marginalizing dissent of those subjected to these new technologies in the 
workplace (Robins and Webster, 1985:33).  It is also unusual for unions to initiate 
the implementation of technology (Bamber, 1988:206). How technology will be 
deployed depends on the relative strength of the parties involved and here union 
membership density is of importance (Ball, 2010:89). “If there is an abundant supply 
of labor and low unionization, close monitoring is likely to meet with less opposition 
and resistance” (ibid:96). As unions have tended to refrain from resistance around 
design and implementation of technology there has, in effect, been little challenge 
to management prerogative in these areas (Noble, 1979:49; Thompson and 
Bannon, 1985:132; Wilkinson, 1983:85). An explanation for this has been put 
forward as, “trade unions […] became involved in technical change only to the extent 
the change impinged on traditional collective bargaining issues” (Wilkinson, 
1983:85). The pace of technological innovation and technical aspects of design and 
implementation of technology may also make it difficult for unions to respond at 
those stages in the process (Bamber, 1988:216). 
Whilst the above has highlighted what appears a lack of collective resistance in 
terms of the design and implementation of ICT, historically there have been 
examples of such resistance to technology in the workplace which at that time will 
have been new. One example was the rise of Luddism in the early nineteenth 
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century, mainly in Lancashire, Yorkshire and the Midlands, and consisting of 
destroying power looms and shearing frames in response to changes in technology 
in the framework-knitting industry (Thompson, 1980:529). Luddite bodies, collective 
in nature, largely grew out of workshops and communities (ibid:537). There is 
evidence they were highly organised (ibid:636) with their opposition based on the 
ability of capitalists to use machinery, factories and competition to destroy customs 
of trades, force down wages and reduce standards of craftsmanship (ibid:600). As 
such it was not blind opposition but rather “a violent eruption of feeling against 
unrestrained capitalism.” (ibid:601) To unfavourably compare, as some have, 
Luddism with modern collective bargaining rather misses the point. Luddism can be 
seen as working people who mobilized, using whatever strategies appeared 
appropriate and were available at the time (Landes, 2003:498). A more recent 
example can be seen in the introduction of Fordist factory systems where workers 
were treated as though they were part of the machines they operated (Murray, 
1989:40; King, 1990:67) and there was a high turnover of workers and resistance 
including strikes (Murray, 1989:40).  This also showed an example of technology 
potentially aiding collective resistance with “production concentrated in large 
factories [where employers] were […] vulnerable to the new ‘mass worker’ they had 
created.” (ibid:40). 
Whilst the above shows historically there are examples of collective resistance to 
the implementation of technology, there appears to be little opposition to ICT prior 
to implementation. However, there is still  potential for resistance and negotiation 
from unions post hoc,  such as using existing Health and Safety legislation to impose 
some control over effort, for example BIFU using regulations to enforce risk 
assessments building in regular rest breaks for staff (Taylor and Bain, 1999:114) as 
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a response to rising stress levels (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 1997:74) and 
carrying out representational work in disciplinary cases brought about as a result of 
these regimes (Taylor, 2013:71). Unions may also be reactive in that they need 
issues to be raised with them by workers before instigating any form of resistant 
action (Tullney, 2010:43). Research has shown the perception of some employees 
is their workplace representative shows little commitment in challenging workplace 
surveillance. This does not mean challenges cannot be made to management 
control and the CWU, for example, have negotiated a code of practice covering 
monitoring and surveillance, which whilst not eliminating it, does impose some 
controls on how it is carried out (Taylor and Bain, 1999:114). 
Unions collectively challenging the implementation of technology challenges 
management prerogative (Wilkinson, 1983:99) in a way individual resistance 
cannot. However, the surveillance regimes set up to collect data for performance 
management processes have not usually been implemented following any form of 
collective bargaining (Ball, 2010:89). Nationally, however, there are examples, albeit 
rarely, of unions placing performance management regimes on the national 
bargaining agenda and threatening industrial action over their use (Taylor, 2013:70). 
To challenge issues around technology prior to implementation, particularly around 
the effects this will have on job content and skills would require these to be a 
component of the bargaining background (Wilkinson, 1983:93) as any technology 
emerges “into established bargaining environments” (Price 1988:256). Post hoc, the 
challenge for unions in this area is how to collectivize individual grievances (Taylor, 
2013:74). It may be easier for employers to deal with individual acts of resistance 
via disciplinary means but this becomes harder for them if dealing with groups of 
workers acting collectively (Edwards, 1979:57). Whilst the previous chapter 
110 
 
highlighted the control motivation in employers seeking to deskill jobs with 
technology particularly around using it to expropriate the knowledge held by workers 
(Giddens, 1982:39), this may have contrary effects in terms of collective resistance. 
Whilst the level of collective resistance, particularly prior to implementation, may 
appear low, we also have to consider the view that employees in non-union 
workplaces are typically subject to regimes showing little restraint from managers. 
Of relevance here is the effect unions may have had in shaping an organization and 
its bargaining, negotiating and consultation procedures prior to the implementation 
of technology and so may be able to exert some influence on how technology is 
utilized (Scott, 2004:3). The presence of a trade union may result in some curb on 
management prerogative and behaviour without overt resistance being required to 
occur (Taylor, 2013:78; Edwards and Scullion, 1984:567-568).  
In examining aspects of collective resistance, it is clear there is a distinction between 
resistance to the implementation of technology and resistance to how it is used 
following this. Once technology has been implemented the technology itself may 
influence the type and occurrence of collective resistance depending on how it 
impacts on the physical work environment and what acts may be effective. 
Historically the advent of the factory mode of production meant the implementation 
of machinery had the effect of altering the physical environment of work, including 
for example, some workers becoming geographically static within the workplace and 
this may have meant less communication between workers, with less sharing of 
common grievances (Edwards, 1979:113-115). However, it seems unlikely 
employers could totally isolate workers from one another and prevent all 
communication either within, or between, workplaces and it would seem to be the 
case that the “experiences of individual employees working together, whether 
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spatially contiguous or not, ensure, in addition to individual meanings, that these 
experiences can lead to a spectrum of collectively held orientations and narratives” 
(Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 1997:69). ICT on the other hand may have the effect 
of dispersing workers as the potential for them to work from home is realized. This 
may have a detrimental effect on how collective action can be organized as 
communication becomes more problematic (Orlikowski,1988:33). 
However, the same technology having the effect of creating an increasingly 
atomized workforce may be used as a tool of collective resistance as workers use 
ICT to communicate with each other (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:126), particularly as 
many employees have now been trained to use it effectively (ibid:84). The dual 
properties of ICT have been highlighted: 
“The communicative and co-operative aspects of the technology that is used 
in workplaces […] can be seen as a double-edged sword: for just as it gives 
management the ability to put the pieces together, it also gives people in their 
roles as workers […] the chance to communicate with each other about what 
they are experiencing and what they think could be done about it” 
(Greenbaum, 1998:139) 
An example of this is a strike at Honda called and kept solid by use of text messages 
(Dyer-Witheford, 2015:156). New technology can also be used by employees “using 
counter-institutional websites which are away from internal corporate networks” 
(Ball, 2010:99). There exists a potential for informal networks and communication 
between workers as a tool for organizations such as trade unions and political 
parties to disseminate information. Increasingly, “cyberspace is important as a 
political arena” (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:128). 
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Technology may also have an effect on a union’s decision to organize a withdrawal 
of labour through strikes. Certain technologies may make this less effective as a 
means of resistance. With automated processes and procedures, including those 
facilitated through ICT, a requirement for less skilled workers may mean other 
workers could be brought in or work transferred to a non-strike area (Shaiken, 
1985:247-248) or certain computerized processes carry on regardless of any action. 
However, the opposite could be true and technology may provide unions with 
opportunities to launch effective strike action if it affords workers the opportunity to 
“paralyze highly integrated operations” (ibid:248).  It has been argued that when 
production became concentrated into large factories, employers became vulnerable 
to the creation of the “mass worker” (Murray, 1989:40) and so it may be the case 
that technology facilitated conditions for collective resistance in this environment 
that are not so appropriate with other technological applications. We can see then 
the implementation of technology may not have a unitary effect in terms of 
resistance and the form of collective action taken may be contingent on the use of 
technology within specific circumstances.  
4.4 The Absence of Resistance 
Following on from considering the forms of resistance that may take place in 
response to management control, we now move on to consider potential 
explanations for any absence of resistance. One of the areas of research has been 
to examine the view ICT, particularly in respect of its use in monitoring and 
surveillance of staff, has rendered any form of resistance impossible and has placed 
workers in a position where they have no alternative but to submit to management 
authority (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998). In other words, the absence of resistance is 
directly attributable to the ICT systems used. However, consideration needs to be 
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given to alternative explanations that may not be directly attributable to the 
technology used as a tool of control.  It also needs to be recognised workers may 
not be prepared to admit to researchers that they engage in acts of resistance, thus 
giving a false picture of compliance and that writers and researchers are guilty of 
downplaying the phenomenon of worker resistance, preferring instead to accept a 
narrative of omnipotent management control. This section, in turn considers 
arguments that absence of resistance is directly attributable to ICT, then considers 
alternative explanations, before finally considering the view that it has been 
downplayed in the academic literature.  
There has been a debate regarding whether ICT systems used as a tool of 
management control has effectively ended worker resistance. If true this would be 
a sufficient argument for any absence of resistance and it is this position being 
considered here. An argument has been put forward that a supervisor’s power has 
been made total by the use of “the computer monitoring screen” (Fernie and Metcalf, 
1998:9). Citing the work of Sewell and Wilkinson (1992), Bain and Taylor (2000:4) 
give an example of a concurrence with this view in that “worker resistance whether 
expressed individually or collectively, has all but disappeared”. Delbridge et al 
(1993) agree with this position in that “worker counter-control is effectively 
eliminated” (Delbridge et al, 1993:105). The argument advanced by Delbridge et al 
(1993) is there has been a shift in the frontier of control (ibid:97), whilst Fernie and 
Metcalf (1998) highlight what they see as a qualitative difference between new 
technology, as in ICT systems employed in call centres, and previous forms of 
control. According to them the “possibilities for monitoring behaviour and measuring 
output are amazing to behold – the “tyranny of the assembly line” is but a Sunday 
school picnic compared with the control that management can exercise in computer 
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telephony” (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998:2). From this perspective, the panopticon, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, has been realized (ibid:2). There is some 
agreement that technology used in call centres integrates telephony and 
computerised systems and this “takes the measurement of white-collar output to 
new levels” (Taylor and Bain, 1999:107) and allows for technical control through 
automatic allocation of work (ibid:107). The systems also allow for the technology 
to report on discrepancies, such as between work rates and schedules (ibid:108). 
However, it is important to note there are still aspects of human supervision with 
interpretation of data and intervention with workers. In other words, control is 
exercised through a combination of technology and human supervision (ibid:108). 
Whilst Taylor and Bain (1999) accept there has been an increase in the Taylorization 
of white-collar work (Taylor and Bain, 1999:108) as proposed by Braverman 
(1998:217-218) this should not assume the fulfilment of total managerial control. 
Bain and Taylor (2000) criticise Fernie and Metcalf (1998) in that they provide a 
“simplistic and false model which ignores the complexities of the employment 
relationship and the labour process, they have committed an equally serious error 
in underestimating, even eliminating, the potential for, and actuality of worker 
resistance” (Bain and Taylor, 2000:3). Quoting a union official from the MSF union, 
Bain and Taylor (2000) give a view from a union perspective, “call centres are not 
prisons and […] trade unions are capable of organising within them” (ibid:3). Fernie 
and Metcalf (1998) are therefore criticised for neglecting how effective trade unions 
may be (Bain and Taylor, 2000:7). Citing McKinlay and Taylor’s (1996) research in 
the electronics industry, they highlight the view worker resistance does happen on 
a daily basis but operates at “differing levels of consciousness, effectiveness and 
strength across a workplace and over time” (Bain and Taylor, 2000:5). Indeed, the 
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commitment of resources in dealing with the data output from this monitoring is 
“hardly illustrative of a management confident in its authority. Rather, it indicates a 
perpetual struggle for control over the workforce where control is ultimately 
dependent on successful human supervisory intervention” (ibid:12). 
The view that management have achieved absolute control through technology is 
difficult to support and even Fernie and Metcalf (1998) admit in a somewhat 
contradictory fashion, that workers “still find ways of avoiding work” (Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1998:9). There also needs to be recognition that the potential exists for a 
“mismatch between technical expertise and hierarchical authority” (Hyman, 
1987:28). The panopticon does not operate perfectly within the workplace where 
workers are “able to exploit both gaps in the system’s functioning and supervisory 
inconsistency” (Bain and Taylor, 2000:13). Workers interpret any “ambiguous job 
controls and work situations [to find] spaces when necessary [to] escape 
management’s more overt forms of control” (Knights and McCabe, 1998:186). Even 
with increased surveillance, this in itself cannot reveal if “employees are cheating 
the system” (ibid:187). The limitation to the potential of resistance to the level of 
individuals has also been criticised. Case studies have shown organising from 
unions can be successful where they offer a “multi-faceted appeal, tapping differing 
sources of discontent amongst the workforce” (Bain and Taylor, 2000:13). Individual 
workers may also come to recognise the importance of collective organization 
should they become singled out for management action (ibid:13). It is also important 
to note in terms of resistance that workplaces may start from different points in terms 
of existing union organization and activity (ibid:14).  
Interestingly, the view that technology renders workers powerless is not new. 
Quoting Babbage’s statement from 1832, “when capital enlists science in her 
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service, the refractory hand of labour will always be taught docility” (Burnes et al, 
1988:4). This view can be seen to be erroneous given the levels of resistance seen 
in workplaces in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is clear, for example, the 
factory system did not mean employers were able to achieve total control over their 
workforce. It was always part of negotiation and conflict (Daunton, 1995:185). It 
should also not be taken as a given, that the frontier of control, if static at this 
moment in time, will not shift in the future (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:288). Given 
previous technologies did not achieve a level of total control, the question arises 
then, is the use of ICT qualitatively different than previous technologies to the extent 
to which it can provide an irresistible level of management control by itself or in 
conjunction with other management techniques (Townsend, 2005:47)? Whilst it may 
be the case that we have witnessed declining levels of industrial conflict during a 
time of increased use of new technology, Hyman (1988:55) argues that it is wrong 
to take the correlation and assume this is simply an effect of the use of ICT as a tool 
of control. 
Due to this potentially erroneous correlation we now move on to consider alternative 
explanations where resistance may be absent. The first aspect considered are 
cultural factors. Computers are now an integral part of our culture, thus making 
resistance to their use appear irrational (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:222). There is 
also a discourse in the media, education and the workplace, which positively links 
ICT with progress (Burnes et al, 1988:7). Much of the response to ICT has seen a 
technologically determinist stance in which it has been accepted as progressive 
without considering its use, particularly where the results of this use are negative 
from the viewpoint of worker interests.  In effect it has been isolated from its social 
and organizational impacts (ibid:2-3). This view of science and technology being 
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progressive is not something born with the advent of ICT. Taylor (1947) believed his 
system of scientific management would be accepted because of its supposed 
scientific basis (Rose, 1988:28-29; Taylor, 1947:40-41). There is a historical thread 
in how opponents of technology are portrayed in a negative way, with those who 
seek to challenge the use of technology being accused of displaying “nineteenth-
century Luddism” (Bamber, 1988:204). Whilst it has been shown Luddism was in 
fact a highly organized resistance to detrimental effects to employment (Thompson, 
1980:529;600-601), the predominant view remains that of wanton vandalism and 
backwardness (Bamber, 1988). We can see therefore, how the absence of overt 
resistance may spring from a desire not be seen as backward or irrational in respect 
of perceived technological progress.  
Fear of the consequences of resistance, such as lay-offs and redundancy, may also 
encourage workers to comply with management control (Jaros, 2001:35) as it is 
management that hold the power of these consequences (Dyer-Witheford, 
1999:196). The fear of job loss in particular, may have become more acute in local 
government due to significant job losses (Office for National Statistics, 2018) 
resulting from budget cuts imposed by central government particularly since 2010 
(Local Government Association, 2018a:2). An absence of resistance may be 
perceived as acceptance rather than as result of fear of sanction (Kidwell and 
Sprague, 2009:197). Workers may be seen to “respond to the real-life contexts they 
find themselves in” (Dundon and Dobbins, 2015:17). In any situation there is a 
possibility workers may perceive the balance of their interests best served by co-
operation rather than resistance (ibid:2). In this sense workers may recognize the 
exploitative nature of the employment relationship but not necessarily seek to 
transcend this but rather “develop strategies and responses within the confines of 
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the system in which they labour” (ibid:17). As such conflict may arise in some 
circumstances and not in others (ibid:2). Labour market conditions, which can be 
affected by technology and its effects on skills or automation, can affect job security 
which may then influence the decision workers make in terms of resistance 
(Edwards, 1979:126). In this sense, the technology has a role to play in how workers 
may become fearful, without it being the technology in itself that prevents resistance.  
It should also be noted technology may have been implemented and utilized 
following an existing bargaining procedure (Price, 1988:256). This may explain a 
lack of resistance if collectively, trade unions have agreed to the implementation or 
particular use of technology. Whilst the absence of resistance does not necessarily 
indicate successful bargaining, union involvement may have the effect of curtailing 
future resistance from workers. In case studies quoted by Price (1988) no unions 
“had challenged management’s right to set the parameters of the debate about new 
technology or posed clear-cut alternatives to management’s proposals” (Price, 
1988:257) and whilst the process was modified by consultation “the outcomes were 
all within the bounds of managerially defined ‘acceptability’” (ibid:257).  
Managers may seek to obtain consent from workers in respect of the control 
regimes, including those of surveillance using ICT systems, with the outcome that 
resistance may be curtailed to the “extent that power and control can be made 
invisible in the structure of work itself” (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:214). The fact 
workers are paid may lead some to see monitoring of their work to be a legitimate 
management practice (Oz et al, 1999:167). Challykoff and Kochan (1989) highlight 
the prevalence of workers who concur “with management’s assessment on the 
general need for monitoring” (Challykoff and Kochan, 1989:811). Employees may 
also have a different perception of electronic monitoring if it is used to inform feed-
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back and provide training rather than as a purely controlling or punitive tool (Kidwell 
and Achey-Kidwell,1996:9). An employee’s view of fairness has led to the assertion 
that “[t]echnical, hardware-based solutions are preferable to supervision […]. 
Machines are cheaper, more reliable and fairer than managers. […] Employees 
accept performance evaluation from an impartial system more readily than from a 
superior” (Marx G.T., 1990:13). The issue of whether workers resist monitoring, 
therefore, may be affected by whether they consider it fair or not and whether it is 
“thorough and accurate” (Stanton, 2000:132). An advantage of electronic 
performance monitoring is it is consistent in its application unless it is programmed 
to treat individuals differently (ibid:135). We can see therefore, the presence or 
absence of resistance may not be due to technology per se but rather how it is used 
(Challykoff and Kochan, 1989:812). There is also a view that electronic surveillance 
is not always conflicting with the interests of the worker due to the possibility it may 
provide objective evidence to support their claims regarding performance (Findlay 
and McKinlay, 2003:306) and this is another reason why workers may consent in 
this area.  
Where alternative explanations have been posited that do not require technology to 
have eliminated the possibility of resistance, we are seeing in essence a situation 
where workers are not necessarily prevented from acting in a resistant manner but 
rather may actively choose not to. In this sense workers may be judging their 
interests are served by accepting the situation even though their interests clearly 
differ from management (Dundon and Dobbins, 2015:2).  
Finally, we turn to the debate that the view of absence of resistance is related to the 
mistreatment of this aspect by academics. A criticism of Braverman (1998) and other 
writers from a labour process theory perspective is the neglect of the effects of 
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worker resistance on technology and work organisation (Thompson, 1989:87). 
Braverman (1998) was criticised for failing to fully consider worker resistance and 
acting as though management was “omnipotent and omniscient” (Knights, 2001:68; 
see also Thompson, 1989:87; Elger,1982:24; Lewis, 2007:400; Hyman, 1987:34).  
A criticism of Braverman (1998) is whilst the working class is an object of capital, it 
is wrong to assume this indicates passivity. Workers are active agents (Elger, 
1982:24). What we may be witnessing is not so much an absence of resistance, but 
a failure to recognize and take account of it (Thompson, 1989:187). A view has been 
advanced that technology is used solely for the benefit of the dominant class and its 
hegemonic control (Orlikowski, 1988:21-22). However, this view may be seen as too 
one-dimensional in that it does not consider the “contradictions, countervailing 
tendencies, resistance and even transcendence” and therefore neglects the role of 
workers and premises a view that managers determine a system, without 
opposition, that must achieve control to facilitate effective extraction of surplus value 
(ibid:24). The direction of technology should not be seen as inevitable due to 
resistance workers can, and do, carry out (ibid:41). 
4.5 Conclusion 
In arriving at a working definition of resistance it has been recognized the literature 
uses different terms such as misbehaviour, deviance, conflict and resistance itself, 
when discussing actions that may be perceived as resistant to management control. 
The terms themselves, whilst at times being used interchangeably, may privilege 
certain aspects of behaviour. Hence, for example, misbehaviour has been seen to 
be linked to individual actions and underplay collective forms. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, resistance is classed as an action that is resistant 
to, and generated by management control seeking to determine how work is 
performed and increase the intensity of labour but is not determined by it. It contains 
actions that may be included in the terms highlighted above that may fit into this 
definition. Whilst certain specific acts, particularly around formal collective action 
and overt destructive sabotage may be clearly seen to fit a definition of resistance, 
others can be more difficult to categorize without determining the reason attached 
to it by the individual. This has been recognized as problematic when researching 
this area due to the possibility workers may be unwilling to admit to acts of 
resistance. However, this thesis is concerned with the extent to which ICT may have 
rendered resistance unachievable and so the question is whether an act, for 
example a worker absenting themselves from the workplace, in certain 
circumstances could be an act of resistance generated by management control and 
whether ICT has removed this as an option for workers. As such each individual act 
does not necessarily have to be defined as resistant or not, but whether in certain 
circumstances it could be so. 
It is difficult to provide a comprehensive list of individual behaviours that may 
constitute resistance due to the number of different ICT systems in use and such 
actions potentially being unique to each one. It is also the case that by their nature, 
many of these actions will be covert and difficult to detect. Acts of sabotage may 
appear accidental, absence may be for reasons of genuine illness or as a means of 
restricting effort. Failure to meet managerially set performance norms may be due 
to inability or deliberate output restriction. In other words, actions that may 
potentially be deemed resistant may have more than one possible explanation. 
However, as explained above, the fact they could, in certain circumstances, be seen 
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as resistant, is adequate to judge whether ICT has precluded them from occurring, 
therefore excluding them as an option for workers. 
This thesis has taken the position that managers controlling and workers resisting 
is overly simplistic, and assuming management behaviour from a structural chart 
may lead to a false assessment. This position would only be this simple if 
management was a homogenous group with identical interests and a coherent 
control strategy. This would appear not to be the case and it is true certain managers 
and levels of management are now subject to control by monitoring via ICT systems 
themselves, with the same attendant threats experienced by subordinate workers, 
and so it would be likely given this they may also, as with individual workers, engage 
in actions resistant to more senior management control. As individuals, managers 
may have different interests to both the workers they are responsible for controlling 
and more senior managers. There is also a possibility existing systems of control 
may be inconsistent with their personal values. In general, the position advanced is 
opportunities and motivations may exist for managers as well as workers to subvert 
management control of the labour process. 
In terms of collective resistance, this chapter has considered formal action taken by 
organized labour, particularly through trade unions. It also, however, acknowledges 
individual acts of resistance can take on a collective character as behaviours 
become part of a workplace culture and workers may collude in certain actions 
outside of formal processes. The chapter points to a lack of action and policy in 
terms of union involvement with ICT at the stage of design and implementation of 
these systems and a culture of assuming an inevitability around new technology has 
become usual, resulting in compliance with management prerogative. This leads to 
the conclusion that these aspects of ICT will not reflect the interests of workers. 
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Historically however, this has not always been the case and examples of collective 
sabotage has been given. Unions have engaged in what may be seen as resistance 
post implementation, including using existing legislation to make their case. Post 
hoc resistance may be influenced in terms of its effectiveness by the relative 
strength of unions, including the density of members within the overall workforce. It 
is also important to recognize in situations such as local government, unions have 
a national role that may overtake any local action. 
The presence of trade unions may also temper what management may seek to 
achieve and therefore a lack of overtly resistant action may not be indicative of a 
lack of collective strength, particularly given existing bargaining structures. The 
chapter has also considered how unions may use the very technology used in 
controlling workers, to communicate and organize, what in some workplaces is 
becoming a more diffused workforce. As such the technology itself may adopt 
controlling or resisting properties depending on who is using it. It is also the case 
that ICT itself whilst making some previously effective forms of resistance less so, 
may also be vulnerable due to its highly integrated nature, to potential paralysis.  
The thesis pays particular attention to the extent ICT has rendered resistance to 
management control unachievable. This chapter concludes that ICT may have had 
the effect of an increasing Taylorization of work but this does not necessarily result 
in an absence or potential of and for resistance. It is also the conclusion that an 
absence of resistance at a time of increasing use of ICT does not necessarily imply 
a causal effect. Historically there has been a view that technology leads to a docile 
workforce and this was plainly not the case then and the view has been expressed 
that it is also not true now. Other explanations have been considered for an absence 
of resistance that are cultural, stem from a fear of consequence, that workers may 
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agree with the control methods employed, that union organization may be poor or 
absent or paradoxically union organizational strength may mean action is not 
required. However, whilst these reasons may not be directly attributable to 
technology, an indirect relationship may exist due to the implications of its use rather 
than its innate qualities. Examples of these may be the ubiquitous nature of the 
technology or the increased potential for the displacement of labour.   
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Chapter 5 - A Contextual Overview of Local Government 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to place local government within the context of the environment 
in which it exists and operates. How labour is controlled and managed, and what 
technology is implemented and how it is used is contingent within this setting and is 
considered in the light of the central considerations of the thesis, namely motivation 
for, and method of, control and how and whether resistance to such control as 
exercised through ICT is possible. As detailed in the introduction, this thesis is 
concerned with the employment relationship in local government, but excludes 
teachers and covers those workers employed under ‘Green Book’ terms and 
conditions (National Joint Council for Local Government Services, 2016). 
The first aspect considered is the structure of local government and how this has 
changed over time. Attention is paid to the dynamic between central and local 
government in examining why and how these structural changes occur. The chapter 
moves on to examine how the services local government provide have changed 
over time and how these changes, in terms of services lost and gained, reflect 
central government priorities. The view is advanced, as well as deciding which 
services are provided, central government has also increasingly played a role in 
deciding on what terms they will allow individual local authorities to provide specific 
services, or if still provided may be performed within the private sector. 
The chapter moves on to consider how local government is financed. To this end 
the relationship between central grants and local taxation is highlighted, including 
how a reduction in the former may lead to an increase in the latter and how central 
government has increasingly sought to curtail the ability of local government to 
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implement such increases. This aspect is examined to show how this can lead to a 
reduction in financial resources that results in changes to management practices, 
labour displacement and intensification of labour, and the role technology has 
played in this. The areas under research, namely the Revenues and Benefits 
functions, are considered, particularly in respect of the comparative complexity of 
their administration. Central government regulatory changes are explored and 
considered in the context of complexity and skills, how this affects labour 
management and the use and implementation of technology. 
The chapter proceeds to consider the industrial relations model operating in local 
government. It looks at the adoption of the Whitley model, how this came about and 
the extent to which this led to industrial peace within the sector, by highlighting the 
struggle to achieve it, and examples of disputes and industrial action that have 
transpired whilst it has been in place. The chapter considers the extent to which this 
system has remained intact or broken down and been decentred following central 
government policies, including those of pay restraint, CCT and BV. Throughout this 
chapter the dynamic of central government, local government and labour is borne 
in mind in considering how this plays a role in the outcomes affecting labour 
management and the use and implementation of technology.     
5.2 Local Government Structure – A Historical Development 
The term local government relates to local councils as organizations administering 
public affairs within a specific geographical locality (Byrne, 2000:2; Wilson and 
Game, 2006:10). In essence local authorities are multi-functional bodies with a 
“variety of social, political and economic objectives” (Wilson and Game, 2006:10) 
that can be directly provided or funded by the authority (ibid:10). Councils are made 
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up of democratically elected representatives accountable to the electorate (Jones 
and Stewart, 1985:5; Beetham, 1996:35). However, even given this democratic 
legitimacy, local authorities are subordinate to central government (Wilson and 
Game, 2006:3) and “can exert only the powers explicitly assigned to them by an act 
of parliament” (Wollmann, 2000:34). To do otherwise would be acting ultra vires or 
beyond its powers (Wilson and Game, 2006:27). As such how it operates, is to a 
large extent, shaped by central government (Goldsmith, 1990:33).  
The formation of modern local government can be traced to the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1835 (Hay and Martin, 2014:228) and the creation of corporate 
boroughs with directly elected representatives (Wilson and Game, 2006:52). The 
“freedoms of local corporations were severely restricted” (Travers and Esposito, 
2003:20) due to concern from central government around control of these authorities 
(ibid:20). However, in terms of administration there was “little direct supervision by 
central government” (John, 2014:690). The 1835 Act was followed by the 
establishment of elected county councils and county borough councils with the Local 
Government Act 1888 and district councils with the Local Government Act 1894 
(Sandford 2017:16). The structure of local government was reorganized into a two-
tier system with the Local Government Act 1972 with county councils, including six 
metropolitan counties and the Greater London Council (GLC), a reduced number of 
counties, and 36 metropolitan district councils forming the lower tier (Sandford, 
2017:16; Wilson and Game, 2006:52). 
Further structural changes have occurred since the 1970’s.  The Local Government 
Act 1985 abolished the six metropolitan counties and the GLC, with some of their 
functions passing to metropolitan borough councils (Sandford, 2017:17; Wilson and 
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Game, 2006:52). All these authorities abolished by a Conservative government 
were Labour controlled, highlighting a clear party-political dynamic in central 
government decisions on local government (Wilson and Game, 2006:61; Byrne, 
2000:52-53). Whilst often described as unitary councils, as they now formed a 
single-tier in the metropolitan areas, functions transferred from the abolished 
metropolitan counties, such as passenger transport, police, fire and civil defence, 
were controlled by non-elected joint boards often populated with appointed 
councillors from the constituent authorities, meaning “elected local government 
[was] now weaker and more fragmented than before 1986 [with] indirectly elected 
and appointed bodies [becoming] increasingly numerous and important” (Wilson 
and Game, 2006:62-63).  
46 new unitary authorities were brought into existence between 1995 and 1998 and 
were added to the already existing 36 metropolitan districts (Wilson and Game, 
2006:66). The current structure in England is a first tier of 36 metropolitan district 
councils, 46 unitary councils, and 34 non-metropolitan county councils with a second 
tier for these authorities consisting of 238 non-metropolitan district councils (ibid:78). 
As a result of the restructuring of local government there is a situation where the 
responsibilities and services provided by authorities that no longer exist may not be 
easily transferable to new or existing authorities and whilst some services are 
controlled by directly elected councils, others are administered by appointed or 
indirectly elected bodies such as joint boards, joint committees or contracting and 




After considering external local government structures we now turn to those internal 
to councils and how they run their day-to-day business (Wilson and Game, 
2006:64). When multi-functional local authorities came into being in the nineteenth 
century, the structural model adopted in terms of their running was the committee 
system. Whilst committees, made up of elected councillors, did not take decisions, 
they reported to full council where the decisions were taken (ibid:94). In practice this 
was often ratification of conclusions reached by committees (Byrne, 2000:240-243). 
The committees convened were the choice of individual authorities, laid down in 
standing orders (ibid:243), with the exception of certain statutory ones, for example, 
education and social services (Wilson and Game, 2006:94). The committee system 
was flexible in that committee structures were easily responsive to changes in 
powers and services allocated to, or taken away from, local authorities (John, 
2014:689). Interacting with this committee system, were council employees and 
officers staffing departments often mirroring the committee structure, with each one 
headed by a chief officer or director, who would normally be a qualified professional 
or practitioner within the discipline covered by the department (Wilson and Game, 
2006:96). 
This system prevailed until changes in this area were delivered by the Local 
Government Act 2000 brought in by the then Labour government (Wilson and 
Game, 2006:98). A number of concerns had been advanced regarding the 
committee structure where councillors were felt to be diverted from their 
representational work due to the time spent on committee responsibilities, with the 
two roles becoming confused (ibid:100). The Act effectively forced local authorities 
to choose one of three specific executive models (ibid:101). The first option was that 
of a directly elected mayor who would then appoint a cabinet. The second option 
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was an executive leader, elected by the full council, normally the leader of the largest 
political party, with a cabinet appointed by them. Finally, a directly elected mayor 
with an appointed council officer acting as a day-to-day manager (ibid:102). Most 
councils adopted the second option (John, 2014:696). These changes were “an 
overthrow of almost two centuries of committee-based decision making” (Wilson and 
Game, 2006:93), leading within most authorities to a radically reduced number of 
directorates, “combining together several departments with linked interests” 
(ibid:96). As a result, most officers now heading directorates “will have been 
appointed primarily for their managerial skills and experience” rather than as a 
practitioner (ibid:96).  
This section has considered structural changes within local government over time. 
It is clear central government, often acting to advance their own economic or political 
interests, have changed structures, that in turn have affected how services are 
delivered and managed. The size and breadth of departments in particular have 
impacted on the forms of management within them and this is something the 
research considers, including how this may affect the technology adopted and how 
it is utilized. It is to the provision of services we now turn. 
5.3 Local Government Services – Provision and Management 
Local authorities currently deliver or commission a range of services. These services 
may cover, for example, social services, education, highways, leisure and culture, 
finance and treasury services, environmental services and consumer services 
among others (Wilson and Game, 2006:31). Some of these services are provided 
for the public within its constituency, whilst others, for example accountancy and 
audit, are internal for the administration of the authority itself. This section does not 
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seek to identify and detail these services but rather looks at how services delivered 
by local authorities have been subject to change over time and also how the 
management and administration of these services may change. 
The formation of local authorities can be seen as a response to issues arising from 
increasing industrialization and urbanization (Wollmann, 2000:36). Their creation 
“produced an entity that could potentially run a range of local services in an 
integrated fashion” (John, 2014:689). Local government developed because of the 
requirement to produce ‘public goods’ that could be seen to be of benefit to all but 
were not likely to be produced by the private sector (Travers and Esposito, 2003:27). 
However, services provided by local authorities have not remained static over time. 
For example, by the 1950’s, local authorities ceased to provide electricity, gas, or 
roads, all of which moved into central control. Likewise, by the 1970’s water, 
sewerage and local health services had been reallocated to the centre (ibid:31). 
Other services, such as social services became more of a requirement for local 
authorities. At any time, local government will have a wide-ranging array of services 
and responsibilities to discharge (Wilson and Game, 2006:5). The view of local 
authorities as major service providers is based on the situation where, from “the late 
nineteenth century and most of the twentieth, national governments passed 
legislation requiring or permitting the provision of all kinds of public services, mainly 
through the auspices of other bodies – and most significant by far of these other 
bodies were local authorities” (ibid:22). 
One of the central planks in the post-1979 Conservative government’s policy 
agenda was the introduction of CCT (Wilson and Game, 2006:354). This was 
introduced and extended over time to various services provided by local government 
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with the Local Government Act 1980 with building and road services, followed by 
further acts in 1988 and 1992 extending CCT to services such as catering and refuse 
collection and finally white-collar roles (Byrne, 2000:556). CCT compared the costs 
of in-house provision of specific services with interested private sector bidders. The 
lowest bid won and local authorities could not impose conditions, for example, on 
trade union rights or employee terms and conditions that could be seen to distort 
competition (Wilson and Game, 2006:354). Whilst between 75 and 80% of in-house 
bids won contracts (Stoker, 1991:221) it is important to note even where councils 
were successful, the service exposed to tendering became a Direct Services 
Organisation (DSO) and was “obliged to maintain separate trading accounts, which 
had to make a specified percentage surplus” (Wilson and Game, 2006:355). 
Therefore, we can see patterns of management would change even with retained 
in-house services (ibid:356) with managers having to operate within the budget 
quoted (Stoker, 1991:218). Whilst some councils embraced this policy and 
voluntarily contracted out, the majority did not (ibid:220). The policy had an effect 
on the services individual local authorities provide and the manner in which services 
were provided and managed. 
The election of a New Labour government in 1997 saw the revocation of CCT to be 
replaced in April 2000 with Best Value (BV). BV required each authority to 
implement a Best Value Performance Plan to achieve continuous improvement. 
Every service provided by the local authority was required to be subject to this as 
part of a rolling five-year inspection regime carried out by the Audit Commission’s 
Best Value Inspectorate. In effect what we see here is a centralized performance 
management system with the Secretary of State having considerable powers to 
intervene if inspectors deemed an authority was not delivering a best value service 
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(Wollmann, 2004:645). Part of the BV regime were “dozens of Best Value 
Performance Indicators (BVPIs). These BVPIs [were] mainly produced by central 
government departments, and each year councils [had] to publish locally […] their 
audited performance measures against these indicators” (Wilson and Game, 
2006:183). As there is no performance indicator of profit within the public sector this 
regime was meant to provide a measurement in terms of whether required service 
objectives are achieved (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:3). There were in effect, threats 
to “underperforming” or “failing” councils (Orr, 2005:377) with service provision 
becoming contingent on compliance with central government instruction (Rose and 
Lawton, 2001:21).  This can be seen as “every bit as centrally prescriptive and 
potentially more interventionist” (Wilson and Game, 2006:364) than CCT and that 
“BV […] can be seen as just another move of central government to impose on local 
authorities a degree of centralist guidance and control” (Wollmann, 2004:646). 
Essentially, New Labour continued with the trend of centralized regulation of local 
authorities (Wollmann, 2000:39). 
This section has detailed some aspects of service provision by local authorities. 
Again, and relevant to this thesis, is how services provided by local authorities are 
not fixed but have been subject to change over time depending on the requirements 
of central government. The point made by Coffey and Thornley (2014) that “it is 
inappropriate to suppose that job security say, has ever been anything other than 
partly dependent upon the equally contingent issue of what is provided publicly and 
what is provided privately and what is not provided at all” (Coffey and Thornley, 
2014:204), is particularly pertinent to this thesis when considering how workers’ 
behaviour may be affected by their own sense of security.   
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5.4 Local Government Finance 
This section examines local government finance in relation to how local authorities 
are funded. It pays particular attention to two distinct but related elements of funding, 
firstly from central government grants and secondly from sources of local taxation, 
namely council tax and business rates (also known as National Non-Domestic Rates 
(NNDR)) and how these have developed over time. Although grants and local 
taxation are distinct forms of funding they need to be considered together as they 
collectively form the total spending amount for local authorities. It is seen that central 
government does not just have control over the level of grants but has also wielded 
considerable control over how local taxation may be raised.  
Local authorities can generally choose how to spend their income, unless ring-
fenced. However, some central government grants are ring-fenced, for example the 
Public Health Grant (Sandford, 2017:13). The levels of grants from central 
government are decided annually via the Local Government Finance Settlement and 
is “consistent with overall public (state) spending plans” (Byrne, 2000:374). Local 
government spending can be one of two types, revenue or capital expenditure. The 
former is made up of grants and locally raised taxes and the latter by grants and 
borrowing (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2017:4). 
Prior to the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, local corporations were funded solely 
from local sources. The act introduced the first grant revenues from central 
government (Travers and Esposito, 2003:10). In effect these were a reimbursement 
to councils for expenditure relating to national policies where services became 
statutory in nature (ibid:22-23). The local element of funding was initially raised via 
locally set up rates systems, in effect a local tax on property by way of valuations 
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carried out by local authorities. The Rating and Valuation Act 1925 established one 
national rates system with local authorities performing property valuations. Local 
authorities’ autonomy in valuation and rate setting effectively gave them control over 
the raising of revenue. However, some Labour controlled authorities used this 
autonomy to increase rates to provide greater levels of poor relief than was 
prescribed, drawing protests from the middle classes and a recognition from central 
government that the autonomy of local government may represent a problem in 
respect of national policies (ibid:30). In 1948 the power to carry out valuations was 
removed from local authorities, becoming centralized with the Inland Revenue. 
Effectively this meant local authorities could only control income from local taxation 
by setting different rate poundages (ibid:11). However, it can still be seen, whilst it 
may be subordinate to central government in the aspects detailed above, local 
authorities still had an amount of fiscal autonomy due to the local element of tax 
raising (Hay and Martin, 2014:228). 
The 1950’s and 1960’s witnessed an increase in the demand for local authority 
services (Travers and Esposito, 2003:39) as a result of the formation of the welfare 
state (Wollmann, 2000:37). As a consequence, local government expenditure went 
from 6.5% of GDP in 1955 to 8.8% in 1963 (Travers and Esposito, 2003:39). Real 
terms expenditure increased by 300% between 1955 and 1975 (Hay and Martin, 
2014:228). The consequences of this resulted in increasing rate charges and rising 
unpopularity. However, the system was not changed due to perceived administrative 
simplicity and central government responded by increasing the level of central grant 
funding (Travers and Esposito, 2003:39-41). By 1976, 47% of local government 
expenditure came from central government grants, compared to 25% in the mid 
1930’s and 35% in 1953 (Hay and Martin, 2014:228). 
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The Thatcher government’s programme of “free market non-interventionist policies” 
(Travers and Esposito, 2003:50) was believed to be threatened by the financial 
autonomy and power of local authorities (Wollmann, 2000:37). One means of 
alleviating this threat was the reduction in public spending, including by local 
authorities where grants were reduced to 41% by 1989 (Travers and Esposito, 
2003:50). The effect of this reduction was an increase in rates to make up the short-
fall, leading to financial penalties from central government resulting in further 
increases in rates (ibid:51). The government response to this upward spiral was to 
prevent the issuing of supplementary rates with the Local Government Finance Act 
1982 and the introduction of rate capping giving ministers the power to limit rates 
charged with the Rates Act 1984 (Hay and Martin, 2014:229). This effectively meant, 
with no powers over valuation, local authorities “no longer had any real revenue 
raising powers at all” (Travers and Esposito, 2003:52) and the result was “what 
started out as a truly local system of taxation was gradually reduced to a sham, with 
central government having almost total control over local authority rating” (ibid:12). 
The domestic rates system was abolished by the Local Government Finance Act 
1988, replaced by the Community Charge (Hay and Martin, 2014:229). What 
became known as the Poll Tax, gave local authorities autonomy to raise extra 
finances locally, with a Government view that this would provide a public focus on 
the link between local decisions and poll-tax levels (Travers and Esposito, 2003:12).  
At the same time, the Government implemented NNDR. This was collected by 
authorities for the Exchequer but set nationally with a certain amount being returned 
as a central grant to local authorities from a central pool (Pope and Waters, 
2016:36). The result of the changes overall was whereas councils had controlled 
around half of their income via local taxation this was now reduced to around 25% 
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(Travers and Esposito, 2003:55). The result of this was any desired increase in 
spending would need to come from the taxation element local authorities could 
control, hence an increase in the levels of Poll Tax bills, public disquiet and the 
extremely unpopular tax being scrapped (ibid:12). 
The Community Charge was replaced by Council Tax by the Local Government 
Finance Act 1992. This was a form of property tax with properties placed in bands 
by the Valuation Office Agency. Local authorities set their own council tax levels 
(Sandford, 2017:13), with the ratio between rates for the different bands being set 
by central government. However, capping limits were set by central government 
giving them significant direct control of local authority expenditure (Hay and Martin, 
2014:229).  Following the election of a Labour government in 1997, powers were 
retained to limit council tax rises but with large increases in central government 
grants during their first two terms in office meaning around 66% of income was 
supplied centrally (ibid:230). The financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent election 
of a Conservative/Liberal Democrat government in 2010 led to severe public 
spending cuts with the “deepest cuts to local authority budgets in three decades” 
(Wilks-Heeg, 2011:636). 
From 2011 until 2016, grants as a percentage of local authorities’ total income saw 
a decrease from 64% to 52% (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2017:7). This trend is likely to continue with cuts of £2.7 billion in central funding 
between 2018 and 2020 planned (Local Government Association, 2018a:2) and 
local authorities having to “find billions more in savings to plug ever widening funding 
gaps” (ibid:3). There is a view that there is a party-political element here, in that 
Labour controlled councils have generally had greater central grant reductions than 
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their Conservative counterparts (Wilks-Heeg, 2011:639).  Simultaneously, we have 
seen local authorities’ ability to raise money through local taxation limited by having 
to hold a referendum should an increase in Council Tax of 5% or more be proposed 
(Sandford, 2017:13). The effect of these funding cuts and ongoing privatization on 
employment in local government has seen reductions in staff employed as shown 
in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 – Local Government Employment 2012 – 2017 (England and Wales) 
Year Head Count Full-time Equivalent 
2012 1,743,300 1,339,200 
2013 1,783,500 1,250,400 
2014 1,710,000 1,207,300 
2015 1,640,800 1,169,000 
2016 1,564,800 1,119,600 
2017 1,476,600 1,064,700 
(Local Government Association 2018b) 
There are clear implications for labour management and the adoption of technology 
here, as managers try and maintain service provision within a reducing resource 





5.5 The Revenues and Benefits Functions 
This section gives an overview of the two areas, namely Revenues and Benefits, 
being researched in this thesis in terms of the operational aspects of their 
administration. The purpose of this is two-fold. Firstly, it gives a general view as to 
the work carried out within the areas and secondly, and leading on from this, it gives 
a relative view of the complexities within the two areas. This latter aspect is of 
importance to this thesis when considering labour management and the use of ICT, 
particularly if one area can be seen as considerably more complex and requiring a 
greater level of skill than the other. However, this section cannot give a detailed 
account of functions subject to a considerable body of regulatory requirements.  
We first consider the Revenues function which relates to the collection of income for 
the local authority. The first of these income streams is Council Tax which was 
introduced in 1993 (Murphy et al, 2014:731). Council Tax is a property-based tax 
(Pope and Waters, 2016:32) with each domestic property within the local authority 
placed into one of eight bands (A to H) established by central government, by a 
valuation based on a market value established by the Valuation Office Agency, an 
agency of central government (Sandford, 2017:13; Pope and Waters, 2016:33). 
Central government set a ratio between the eight bands, with Band D set at a value 
of one, with all the other bands set as a proportion of this (for example Band A is set 
at two thirds of Band D and Band H at twice the value of Band D) (Pope and Waters, 
2016:33). Although the ratio is set by central government, each local authority set 
their own levels of council tax, within the constraints highlighted in Section 5.4, and 
keep all the money raised through this levy (Sandford, 2017:13).  
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All unitary and district councils, including the authorities being researched, are billing 
authorities responsible for issuing lawful, that is correct, council tax bills calculated 
as detailed above (Sandford, 2018:6). The bill also contains precepts from other 
bodies, such as fire and police authorities, forming the total council tax liability and 
will normally be paid over 10 monthly instalments (Sandford, 2018:6; National 
Archives, 2018). In calculating the bill, authorities also have to determine any 
requirement to take into account any reliefs and exemptions, for example a 25% 
discount if only one person occupies the property or up to 100% for unoccupied or 
vacant properties at the discretion of each council (Pope and Waters, 2016:34). This 
list is not exhaustive but illustrative of the aspects officers dealing with this tax have 
to take into account. The local authority is responsible for administering and 
collecting this tax, keeping up to date records of variations in liability due to changes 
in occupation and entitlements to discounts or exemptions throughout the year. The 
authority is also legally responsible for the collection of the tax by issuing reminders 
and potentially court summonses to recover unpaid amounts liable (National 
Archives, 2018). 
Business Rates collection also forms part of the Revenues function. Whereas 
Council Tax relates to domestic properties, Business Rates taxes non-residential 
properties and was introduced in 1990 at the same time as the Community Charge. 
Each commercial property within the Authority area is allocated a rateable value by 
the Valuation Office Agency based on market rental value. The rate is based on a 
proportion of this value. It is calculated on a sliding scale and so the smallest 
properties within a local authority may have zero liability (Pope and Waters, 
2016:34).  Various other reductions and exemptions may be applied, for example 
charitable relief. Local authorities administering this tax may give discretionary relief 
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for any purpose at their discretion but have no powers to increase the charge 
(ibid:35). Unlike Council Tax, any monies collected are paid into a central pool and 
redistributed back to local authorities in the form of central government grants 
(ibid:36). 
With respect to Benefits functions the current system of Housing and Council Tax 
benefits are income related and designed to help people with rent and Council Tax 
payments respectively (politics.co.uk, 2018). Housing Benefit administration 
transferred from central to local government, partially in 1982, and fully by 1989 
(Murphy et al, 2014:731). Welfare and benefits is an area of political contestation 
and different governments have implemented differing policies in these areas and 
consequently “the arrangements grew to be highly complex” (politics.co.uk, 2018). 
Local authority officers therefore, “apply a complex set of deductions and premiums 
to calculate entitlements” (ibid). Examples of  changes resulting from policy 
initiatives are the Housing Act 1988 and the deregulation of the private rented 
sector; changes to flat rate payments for private tenants in receipt of benefits in 
2002;  the commencement of the austerity programme requiring a reduction in 
Housing Benefit costs with regulation changes up-rating deductions applied to 
benefit entitlements, a cap on mortgage interest payments payable and an overall 
benefit cap to limit the maximum amount of benefit paid; in recent years we have 
also seen the roll out of Universal Credit and the implementation of what has 
become known as the Bedroom tax, making deductions from benefits if claimants 
are deemed to rent a property in the social housing sector with more bedrooms than 
they require (Harris and Rutledge, 2013:12). The extent of the complexity of this 
area can be seen by taking a single year as an example. In 1999 there were “85 
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government-inspired regulation changes [requiring] new computer software and a 
reorganisation of how claims were processed” (Salman, 2001). 
 The complexity of the system has led to issues around administration. In 2002-2003 
new claims on average were taking 48 days to complete. The government target 
was 14 days. However, some councils were taking around 150 days (politics.co.uk, 
2018). The administration of claims is now subject to performance indicators under 
the government’s Comprehensive Performance Assessment, with claims being 
handled in less than 30 days classed as excellent, 30-36 days good, 37-48 days 
meeting minimum standards and over 48 days not meeting minimum standards 
(Murphy et al, 2014:740). 
This section has given a broad overview of the work carried out within the Revenues 
and Benefits functions respectively. The overall position shows Revenues has had 
a relatively unchanged regulatory framework, with Council Tax relatively unchanged 
since 1993 and NNDR from 1990 respectively. In contrast Benefits have been 
subject to several regulatory changes.  
5.6 Industrial Relations in Local Government 
This section considers the industrial relations environment within local government. 
It takes a chronological approach to show the situation has not been, as some have 
described, a relatively peaceful industrial relations landscape until the early 1970s 
(Kessler and Bayliss, 1995:129). The section highlights that developments in the 
industrial relations environment are the result of struggle and negotiation between 
employers, workers and central government. This section is particularly relevant in 
terms of considering how contested issues between employers and labour may be 
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dealt with and again highlights how central government plays a role here in 
influencing outcomes. 
The historical examination for the purposes of this section commences at the start 
of the twentieth century. What was to become the dominant union for white-collar 
local government staff, NALGO, was formed in 1905 (Spoor, 1967:17-18). NALGO, 
from inception had struggled to achieve national terms and conditions, along the 
lines of what became the Whitley model, for local government staff (Gill-McLure, 
2014:369). The Whitley committee (1916) was not set up for public sector workers 
but was rather to report generally on improving relations between employers and 
workers. Importantly, however, the government position was its adoption was 
voluntary and so could be applied in local government (Spoor, 1967:81). A central 
plank of the proposals was that the best form of regulation of industrial relations was 
where pay and terms and conditions are determined jointly by employers’ and 
workers’ organizations collectively bargaining through joint national industrial 
councils (Fredman and Morris, 1989:144; Ironside and Seifert, 2000:15-16). 
Pressure from NALGO, but with resistance from employers wishing to maintain 
autonomy over employment matters, achieved its goal of establishing national terms 
and conditions with the formation of a Whitley National Joint Council (NJC) in 1943 
(Gill-McLure, 2014:369; Ironside and Seifert, 2000:16; Spoor, 1967:80).   
The Whitley system operated “codified national agreements […] supplemented by 
bargaining at regional and employer levels” (Ironside and Seifert, 2000:16) and 
“would transform local government from a congeries of separate employments into 
the single national service […] which NALGO had been aiming [for]” (Spoor, 
1967:81). What was known as the Purple Book codified pay and conditions (Ironside 
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and Seifert, 2000:53). This left little room for local negotiations which were generally 
limited to how national agreement should be applied within local environments 
(Ironside and Seifert, 2000:53; Gill et al, 2003:260).  
As a result of the adoption of this system there was a view that industrial relations, 
up to the early 1970’s was generally calm (Kessler and Bayliss, 1995:129). 
However, a criticism of this position has been advanced by Ironside and Seifert 
(2000) as, 
 “limited by the pluralist preoccupation with collective bargaining as an 
integrative solution to temporary disagreements between the potentially 
equal two sides of industry […]. Rather it brings about temporary outbreaks 
of peace between the parties to a fundamentally unequal employment 
relationship” (Ironside and Seifert, 2000:52). 
As with the debate around local government as a model employer, discussed in 
Chapter 2, this thesis approaches the historical context in terms of a continuity of 
struggle, negotiation and accommodation that did not commence in 1979 but has 
its roots in the formation of local government. As we have seen, the adoption of the 
Whitley system was only achieved following a process of pressure and resistance. 
Further illustrative examples are as follows. A refusal for a claim for better gradings 
saw a strike in Glasgow in 1964 (Spoor, 1967:531). Two public sector strikes 
occurred in response to the Heath government’s Industrial Relations Act 1971 
(Ironside and Seifert, 2000:45). 1974 saw industrial action in the form of overtime 
bans and one-day strikes as pressure for pay increases grew and employers 
refused to negotiate (Ironside and Seifert, 2000:46; Newman, 1982:436). Between 
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1977 and 1978 “nearly 250 cases of industrial action went to [NALGO’s] Emergency 
Committee” (Ironside and Seifert, 2000:47). 
Whitleyism in 1979 was “the dominant model of public-sector industrial relations” 
(Ironside and Seifert, 2000:16). However, by this stage we were seeing an increase 
in the size of employment units as detailed when considering structural 
developments, and new technology was starting to affect job classifications and a 
more central role for personnel officers meaning the Whitley model was starting to 
look less stable. Pressure was also building from the union membership who began 
to perceive the national bargaining system as being unable to prevent cuts to pay, 
and in some quarters began to exhort the leadership to take collective action. 
However, at this stage there was an expectation this model would continue (ibid:56). 
The reforms carried out by the Conservative governments of Thatcher (1979-1990) 
and Major (1990-1997) “were made in the name of free-market competition, rooted 
in neo-classical economic theory” (Ironside and Seifert, 2000:7) and their critique of 
the public sector as detailed in Chapter 2 (Kirkpatrick and Martinez Lucio, 1995:8). 
One of the central policies implemented, CCT, resulted in the decentralization of 
industrial relations in the areas subjected to it, to the level of the cost-centre at a 
sub-departmental level (Gill et al, 2003:261). However, public sector managers are 
constrained in the range of responses available. In essence, these are limited to 
cutting labour costs and will not have the option of reducing wages which will 
normally be set by national collective bargaining (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:3-4) as 
detailed above. This leaves them with the following options, reducing the number of 
staff employed; intensifying work rates; reducing the number of staff on higher 
grades; introduce flexible work schedules; and use agency staff to ensure utilisation 
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of labour only when required (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:3-4; Kessler and Bayliss, 
1995:129). To achieve these changes there will almost certainly be requirement for 
the weakening of “the capacity and the resolve of trade union representatives to 
resist” (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:4). It should also be stated here that changes in 
work organization can often be achieved without the requirement for contractual 
change (ibid:5). The changes implemented by managers in the public sector can be 
seen as tactical rather than strategic in that they find themselves in an environment 
that severely constrains their discretion (Hyman, 1987:29). 
Whilst there is collective bargaining at national level, the extent of financial control 
exercised by central government, as discussed in Section 5.4, means it can exercise 
a great deal of influence on local government terms and conditions, particularly pay. 
During the 1980’s we saw a relative decline in local government pay in relation to 
the private sector resulting from the tight control central government exerted over 
local government expenditure (Kessler and Bayliss, 1995:130). It is the case at this 
time “many Conservative authorities were unenthusiastic, if not openly hostile, to 
the Government’s policy towards local government” and this coupled with Labour 
control in most other authorities meant central government sought direct control via 
control of income and a push towards privatization (ibid:132). The election of New 
Labour in 1997 “continued to support a policy that all public sector pay increases 
must be funded from within existing budgets through efficiency or other savings” 
(Corby and White, 1999:20). We can see here although a collective bargaining 
system exists the outcome of any such bargaining can be fundamentally influenced 
by central government policy and intervention. Historically we have seen 
governments openly intervening in pay, for example, with outcomes influenced by 
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the government financial policy of the time and not simply as a collective bargain 
between employer and employee (Ironside and Seifert, 2000:56-57).  
The “organizational capacity of trade unions to protect the interests of their members 
has undoubtedly been threatened by public service reforms” (Bach and Winchester, 
2003:308) as, no doubt, was the Government’s intention (Brown et al, 1997:74). 
Whilst, the decline of strike action seen in the 1980’s continued into the 1990’s, 
industrial action has not been eliminated (ibid:77). There has been a move from a 
centralized system of collective bargaining towards a more fragmented environment 
with a change in how unions need to respond to this, considering the inconsistent 
nature of trade union workplace organization that has resulted (Bach and 
Winchester, 2003:309). Reductions in numbers of employees classed as employed 
by local government increased from the mid 1980’s to 1997 although many of these 
remained in employment having been transferred to the private sector (Corby and 
White, 1999:13). Outsourcing had the effect of placing increasing numbers of 
workers outside collective agreements and diminishing the bargaining position of 
those remaining (Coffey and Thornley, 2014:201). An issue with the fragmentation 
of local government service provision as a result of privatization is the situation 
where staff transfer to a new employer. Whilst the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE), may protect the terms and 
conditions of those transferring, at least for a limited time, these protections would 
not necessarily be afforded new employees. The situation may arise where there is 
a two-tier workforce, meaning those “who join private contractors after a transfer 
has occurred, and who are thus protected neither by public sector collective 
agreements nor TUPE, could be employed on worse conditions of employment from 
day one of their contract” (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:5). It would also appear terms 
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and conditions for the staff transferring will deteriorate over time (ibid:8). As 
discussed, even the staff who remain under local authority employment have been 
affected by the reforms considered, particularly due to changes in labour 
management practices and there is evidence from unions supporting the view that 
their terms and conditions have worsened, particularly for those on the lowest 
salaries (ibid:8).  
The picture is not entirely negative, even accepting the detrimental outcome for 
workers due to Government policy as detailed. Trade unions have not been totally 
undermined in local government. Evidence shows “union activity reduced the 
incidence of contracting out and that unions overwhelmingly took the view that 
keeping services public was in the interests of the union, its members and the 
service users” (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:7). Coffey and Thornley (2014) point to a 
certain “resilience” in public-sector trade union membership since the end of 
Thatcher’s premiership (Coffey and Thornley, 2014:207). There are also examples 
of industrial action being successfully utilized in the public-sector in defence of 
members, a particular example being where NALGO used selective strike action in 
1989 to achieve an increased pay offer from 6% to 8.8% and succeeded in getting 
the employer to remove conditions attached to the original offer, including a proposal 
for performance related pay and local negotiations to be allowed to variations in the 
national agreement on working time and pay for weekend working (Kessler and 
Bayliss, 1995:131). Industrial action has been seen in local government in more 
recent times including the following which is not comprehensive but illustrative: 
national strike action by a number of local authority unions  in 2006 over changes to 
the local government pension scheme (Lyddon, 2015:737); strike action by a 
number of local authority unions in 2014 over pay (Lyddon, 2015:738); and a 
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number of more localized disputes, for example strikes at Bristol City Council over 
shift patterns for library workers (UNISON, 2016) in 2016; Glasgow City Council 
over equal pay (UNISON, 2018a), strike action at Bath and North East Somerset 
Council over pay cuts for care workers (UNISON, 2018b) and at Dacorum Council 
over job losses and cuts to redundancy compensation (UNISON, 2018c), all in 2018. 
There has been, according to Coffey and Thornley (2014) a tendency for some to 
overstate the decline in collective industrial relations in the public sector. It still plays 
an important part and we still see national collective bargaining being largely 
protected by unions and employers (Coffey and Thornley, 2014:207; Gill-McLure, 
2014:373). Whilst the earlier discussion has pointed to the transfer of workers from 
the public to the private sectors it is still important to recognize the state is still a 
considerable employer (Coffey and Thornley, 2014:207). 
After looking at the chronological development of industrial relations within local 
government we now examine the current situation. The recognized unions currently 
operating in local government are UNISON (created from a merger of NUPE, 
COHSE and the aforementioned NALGO), GMB and Unite, and along with the 
employers, form the National Joint Council (NJC) (National Joint Council for Local 
Government Services, 2016:1). The functions of the NJC are set down as the 
negotiation of collective agreements on pay and conditions and anything the two 
sides agree to negotiate on; to encourage the application of national agreements by 
all sides; to promote co-operation between employers and recognized unions; as an 
advisory body; as the final arbiter of differences unresolvable at a local or provincial 
level; and to assist in the resolving of disputes (ibid:8). The employers have 
remained largely committed to the national framework of bargaining but persisted 
with pressure to achieve flexibility locally within it (Kessler and Bayliss, 1995:131-
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132; Fredman and Morris, 1989:28) resulting in the Single Status agreement of 1997 
(Bach and Winchester, 2003:303). This extant agreement effectively integrated 
manual and administrative, professional, technical and clerical (APT&C) workers. 
Both categories of worker have been placed onto a single pay spine by a job 
evaluation scheme, jointly agreed by employers and staff sides, covering all staff 
and the agreement also harmonized terms and conditions, such as working time 
and holidays (ibid:304). Although the agreement was made in 1997, implementation 
has been slow with the integration of manual and APT&C groups proving 
problematic. It should also be noted there was no funding from central government 
to facilitate the implementation of the agreement (ibid:304).    
The agreement is laid down in what is known as the Green Book, which consists of 
four parts. Part 1 lays down the principles, the most important one being “to reach 
agreement […] on a national scheme for pay and conditions for local application 
throughout England” (National Joint Council for Local Government Services, 
2016:5).  Part 2 contains “national provisions which are for application by all local 
authorities to all employees covered by the NJC” (ibid:5). Part 3, covers other 
“national provisions which may be modified by local negotiation” (ibid:6), therefore 
some local flexibility has been conceded by the staff side. Part 4 contains agreed 
guidance, most importantly the operation of the jointly agreed, but not compulsory, 
job evaluation scheme (ibid:41). 
5.7 Technology in Local Government 
This section examines the use of technology within local government from a 
historical perspective from the first implementation of computerised technologies. 
Whilst this was not the first technology to be used in local government, we could 
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also point to the use of telephones and type writers for example, (Local Government 
Association, 2014:6), the main focus of this research is with the use of ICT. As such, 
the section starts from the 1970s and concludes with technologies being applied in 
local government at the time of writing. 
Councils made the first widespread and regular use of computers in the 1970s. This 
use tended to be “focussed on running individual back-office systems such as 
finance” (Local Government Association, 2014:12). There was little use of 
computers for customer services as such at this time, partly due to the lack of access 
the general public had to this type of technology and during this period computerized 
systems were, therefore, utilized more for internal interactions than with citizens 
(King and Cotterill, 2007:337). An independent research organization, The 
Foundation for Information in Local Government (FITLOG), was set up in the 1980s 
to advise on the use of ICT for the purpose of service improvement. During the same 
period the Society of Information Technology Managers (Socitm) mostly made up 
of local authority IT managers was formed. We can see then at this stage there was 
information regarding technology being shared among local authorities (Local 
Government Association, 2014:12) with an agenda starting to develop recognizing 
the potential for ICT to be used in the provision of services to the public. 
Moving into the 1990s the major developments were the rise of the internet and a 
growth in the number of people having access to personal computing within the 
home (King and Cotterill, 2007:337). The Labour government’s BV regime led to 
strong pressure for councils to become more user-focussed (Beynon-Davies and 
Martin, 2004:216) and this period saw developments in telephony, including its use 
in call centres (King and Cotterill, 2007:342). The use of ICT during this period was 
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articulated as a way of improving services to customers, advancing the agenda 
proposed in the previous paragraph. There is a major development here, in contrast 
to the first use of computerized systems, in that the technology now changed the 
way councils communicated and interacted with citizens (Local Government 
Association, 2014:12). We also see organisational performance as measured in 
terms of BV can be dependent on how data is handled, measured and dealt with 
and “much of the information they need is likely to be dealt with more effectively 
through electronic media than by conventional paper-based or manual information 
systems” (Beynon-Davies and Martin, 2004:217). 
 The Labour government in 1999 set up the Cabinet Office’s Office of the e-Envoy, 
with the aim of improving service delivery in the public sector, along with significant 
cost savings (Local Government Association, 2014:13). The somewhat naïve target 
was for 100% of all government services, including local government, to be available 
electronically by 2005 (Local Government Association, 2014:13; King and Cotterill, 
2007:337). However, this does illustrate the direction of travel the Government 
required from local government. Central government also provided £670 million 
between 2000 and 2005 for the Local Government Online project (LGOL), set up to 
aid councils in exploiting technology to improve service delivery and “realise 
quantifiable savings” (Local Government Association, 2014:13). LGOL supported 
councils in using technology for customer contact centres and customer relationship 
management systems, setting up websites and on using technology in priority 
services, one of which was Benefits (ibid:13). There was a financial inducement for 
councils when in 2001 central government invited them to report on how they would 
meet the 2005 target. Those who submitted satisfactory statements were allocated 
extra funding (Beynon-Davies and Martin, 2004:220). Up to this point there was a 
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view that in terms of ICT, councils demonstrated “a general reluctance […] to 
contemplate fundamental changes in business processes” (ibid:222). 
By the end of the period of LGOL in 2005, councils were moving to two-way contact 
via the internet and phone. Technology at this time was considered transformative 
in terms of customer relations supporting such initiatives as ‘Tell Us Once’, where 
customers were able to inform the council of a particular event and technology would 
then contact all other relevant areas of the council and external agencies, rather 
than a member of the public having to contact individual departments separately. 
This has cut down on the requirement for back office processing by integrating it 
with front office systems (Local Government Association, 2014:15-16; King and 
Cotterill, 2007:343) and has seen a rise in one-stop shop type facilities (King and 
Cotterill, 2007:342). By 2014, more than two thirds of over 600 million contacts to 
councils from the public came through on-line and digital channels and 24% of visits 
to local authority websites are being made to conduct transactions (Local 
Government Association, 2014:22).  We can see developments allowing local 
authorities and external agencies to link systems that would have once been 
deployed and utilized within separate councils, partially due to the problems of data 
security.  
There is a recognition that financial cuts imposed on local government “have 
accelerated the drive in councils towards using technology and digital tools” 
(ibid:17). However, the target of having 100% of all local government services 
available electronically is not feasible due to a recognition that some services “can 
only be delivered using specialist expertise or customised approaches” (ibid:17).  
However, even some of these areas may be impacted by technological 
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developments in the future. “Artificial intelligence and robotics are becoming 
commonplace in local government […]. There are already councils using virtual 
customer service assistants to handle basic queries” (Sivarajah and Irani, 2018:1). 
We have also seen the development of distributed ledger technology (blockchain) 
effectively recording when tasks have been completed by workers or contractors 
that allow citizens to register issues through the ledger to be automatically forwarded 
to the worker or contractor for resolution rather than have to go through the more 
traditional reporting channels (ibid:1-2). There is a recognition from Sivarajah and 
Irani (2018:2), that these artificial intelligence and robotic technologies, in particular, 
could threaten jobs to the extent an estimated 250,000 public sector jobs are at risk 
from these technologies over the next decade. 
The research considers the motivation for the implementation of these systems over 
the period of their development and the effect this has had on the labour process in 
terms of control of staff. The developments seen in computerised systems, includes 
greater integration of systems and agencies, automating customer relationships and 
functions, and increasing statistical data allowing for greater levels of information to 
meet government target monitoring requirements and employer surveillance and 
performance management of employees. We have also seen a specific view of ICT 
as being linked with financial savings potentially facilitated by intensification and 
displacement of labour. This section has highlighted central government exerting 
pressure on local government in respect of its use of ICT.  
5.8 Central and Local Government Relations 
A common theme occurring in all sections of this chapter is the extent to which 
central government can decide or influence the actions of local government. Gill-
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McLure (2014) has proposed a dialectical relationship of control and resistance 
between central and local government and this is felt to be useful in terms of the 
position of this thesis. However, this relationship is additionally complicated by 
“other organisations [that] cut across the relationship, including […] trade unions” 
(Stoker, 1991:146) and also that local government has a “tenuous constitutional 
status” (Gill-McLure, 2014:366). Additionally, it needs to be recognized that the 
national system of local government is also influenced by individual local authorities 
as a “source of ideas and values” (Stoker, 1991:147). Therefore, substantive policy 
changes and initiatives may spring from local authorities themselves and do not 
necessarily originate from central government (ibid:147). This thesis takes the 
position that it is “oversimplistic to see local government as a creature of the centre: 
it should be seen rather as an active participant to a process of ‘political negotiation’” 
(Gill-McLure, 2014:369). It is the case “one can discern identifiable historical periods 
during which the centre’s predisposition to exercise formal controls has varied” 
(ibid:369) and this thesis does take the view from the election of the 1979 
Conservative government, the centre “increased the intensity and strength of its 
interventions” (Stoker, 1991:149).  However, whilst the Thatcher years could be 
seen as a period of confrontation and control (Wilson and Game, 2006:174), this 
should not be read that local authorities did not seek, and indeed on occasions were 
able, to resist as witnessed by an increase in the use of judicial review (Gill-McLure, 
2014:369). Other eras were characterised by consultation, corporatism and 
conciliation according to the variable political imperatives of the time (Wilson and 
Game, 2006:174). The years following the Thatcher government including those of 
New Labour, did not see a reduction in the level of “central control and direction to 
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which local authorities were subject” (ibid:174-175) and ultimately the local is 
formally subordinate to the centre (ibid:3). 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the environment local government operates in and notes 
the relevance of issues within this to labour control. To this end the chapter has 
taken a chronological overview of the following areas, the structure of local 
government from both an external and internal perspective, the services it provides 
and has provided, the way local government is financed, the operation of the 
Revenues and Benefits functions and how these have changed over time, and 
technology used in local government, particularly the use of ICT. The chapter shows 
these elements are not static and all highlighted above have in common that they 
change and develop within an environment influenced and shaped by the 
relationship between central and local government and other agencies including 
trade unions. In this sense technology is not deterministic in nature, but rather its 
adoption, implementation and use will not be determined by the technology itself but 
within the outcomes of the dynamic detailed above. 
Local government, in the absence of any codified constitution, is subordinate to 
central government. Any powers it has will have been granted by central 
government. The chapter has considered the structural changes within local 
government throughout its history. The first aspect of structural changes to be 
considered was in the national structure of local government. We have seen 
examples of this restructuring including mergers and the complete abolition of 
bodies. The general trend over this time has been structural changes leading to an 
increase in size of employment units with consequent implications for the 
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management of labour and technology used. The second structural aspect 
considered imposed by central government are internal, in particular the change 
from the committee system and the resultant reduction in directorates and 
increasingly meaning a shift from a professional bureaucratic form of management, 
as the services provided by each department become more diverse, to a more 
managerial approach focussed on people management.  
The services provided by local government are those specifically required or 
permitted to be carried out by central government. We have seen this has not 
remained static and is subject to change. Of particular interest has been central 
government policies since 1979 including CCT requiring tendering of services where 
even services not transferred to the private sector resulted increasingly in private 
sector management techniques and the implementation of technological solutions 
to allow public sector organizations to compete with the private sector; and BV with 
its plethora of performance indicators and tighter control of performance, both 
facilitated by the use and development of technology. 
The chapter detailed the relationship between central grants and local taxation in 
terms of the financing of local authorities. Again, the economic and political priorities 
of central government were highlighted in explaining the shifting levels of grants. 
The level of local taxation desired will be dependent on the political priorities and 
statutory requirements of the local authority. However, this may clash with the 
political and economic priorities of central government. As a result of these tensions 
the chapter has highlighted the legislative initiatives from central government limiting 
the ability of local authorities to raise local taxes beyond a certain point. This, in 
conjunction with cuts to public spending, including the level of central grants, has 
clear implications for local government service provision. Employers attempting to 
158 
 
provide a certain level of service with a reducing level of resources has clear 
implications for labour management and technology, with options available limited 
to the displacement and intensification of labour, in alleviating the effect of cuts and 
placing employees in a more precarious position vis-à-vis their employment status. 
The chapter gave an overview of the Revenues and Benefits functions within local 
government. The common theme within this chapter of central government 
intervention also arose here. Changes in local government taxation were noted 
along with the political motivations that led to them. In operational terms there has 
been stability of regulations for around 25 years relating to Council Tax and longer 
for NNDR. Benefits administration, however, has been subject to continuous 
regulatory changes as governmental policies on welfare and benefits have changed. 
This administrative complexity coupled with a greater level of monitoring in terms of 
meeting of government targets has been an important area of the research in terms 
of how it may affect labour management and difficulty in applying technological 
solutions with potentially deskilling being less rapid in the Benefits function.  
The chapter has examined the industrial relations environment within local 
government and dismissed the view that this was peaceful until the arrival of the 
1979 Conservative government. Whilst the Whitley National Joint Council, with 
codified national agreements had been achieved in the 1940s, this was following a 
period of struggle where the employers had resisted, perceiving it as limiting their 
autonomy in employment matters. The view that industrial relations was peaceful 
until the 1970s ignores what came before the setting up of the NJC and also during 
the period many examples of industrial unrest can be found. Strains within the 
system had started to show before 1979 with periods of central government pay 
restraint and changes to the structure of local government highlighting the limitations 
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of employers and unions to conduct effective collective bargaining. It is true to say, 
however, tensions within the system accelerated post 1979 as a result of central 
government policies, including the implementation of CCT having the effect of 
decentring industrial relations as rigid national agreements limited employers’ 
options in dealing with this. Whilst this thesis accepts the position that unions have 
been organizationally weakened by the post 1979 reforms, this has clearly not been 
fatal. Membership, whilst reduced is still considerable. It is also the view that the 
decline in collective industrial relations can be overstated. This is still the dominant 
industrial relations model within the sector and has been protected by unions and 
employers. It is true employers have continued to push for a more flexible approach 
and this was partly conceded by the unions with the Single Status agreement but 
this is within the context of an overall national mechanism. 
Certain forms of technology have been used in local government since its inception. 
However, computerised systems did not become regularly used until the 1970s and 
it is this particular form of technology this thesis focusses on with questions of 
qualitative differences to other technologies in terms of labour control being to the 
fore. Whilst the initial computerized systems were used for what is known as back-
office administration, once personal computers became more widely owned and the 
internet became commonplace, ICT became increasingly used for communication 
and service delivery. The potential for work to become geographically dispersed and 
greater automation of processes resulting from these developments has 
implications for labour management and control, including how the technology itself 
provides solutions to monitoring performance. Throughout the development of ICT 
use within local government, central government have encouraged its use as a 
means of improving customer service delivery whilst also stressing cost savings. 
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The research also considered the extent to which technology has been used by local 
authorities as a response to central government initiatives that resulted in cuts in 
resources and an increased requirement for statistics to show levels of performance, 
and how these have affected labour management and control. 
The chapter has shown in the local government environment we are not looking at 
a simple relationship between employer and worker. A recurrent theme in this 
chapter has been the shifting dialectical relationship of control and resistance 
characterising the central-local relationship. This is further complicated by the fact 
within this national local government system, including the still existing and 
important area of national collective bargaining and industrial relations, individual 
employers do not necessarily hold the same views or act in a uniform manner. This 
indicates a complex dynamic of central, local and worker interests and imperatives 
that may collide and combine, including in the area of technology implementation 




Chapter 6 - Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the process of designing a research strategy to address the 
research aims around the control of labour through the use of ICT and resistance to 
this. As such the chapter details the methods selected and why they were felt to be 
the best suited to effectively address these research aims. The chapter details why, 
given a primarily deductive approach, both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods were chosen within the boundaries of a case study over two sites and why 
this was deemed the most appropriate way to approach the research. A particular 
advantage of a case study approach was felt to be the ability within it to utilize more 
than one research method. Before the research method selection is discussed, the 
chapter goes on to consider aspects of reliability and validity within the research that 
informs how it was conducted and information gained dealt with in coming to any 
conclusion. The chapter highlights the research methods considered, ethnographic 
study, interviews, questionnaires and documentary research and explains why the 
first of these was rejected as not appropriate for this study particularly around 
operational aspects leading to concerns over reliability and validity but highlights 
why the researcher’s background whilst not making this an autoethnographic study 
may have certain benefits in this respect, and why the last one was not rejected but 
proved unachievable. 
The chapter then moves on to detail the two methods selected. Firstly, 
questionnaires are discussed in terms of strengths and weaknesses and how the 
latter may be addressed. The operational aspects of the questionnaire process are 
explained, including how the use of this type of survey linked to the second choice 
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of method by allowing participants to self-select for follow up interviews. The 
information from questionnaires was seen as supplementary evidence for the 
second method, the interview, and the chapter details how the results from the 
questionnaire are utilized. It was decided the semi-structured format of interview 
would be deployed and reasons around the balance of researcher control and 
participant expression are discussed. Again, the operational aspects of this process 
are explained. The chapter highlights how the two methods chosen can be seen to 
complement one another in terms of the qualitative nature of the interviews allowing 
an in-depth exploration of workers’ experiences that the quantitative method 
exclusively would be unable to achieve. The chapter goes on to consider ethical 
aspects that need to be addressed in both of these methods. This is particularly 
around the protection of those taking part, especially due to the nature of the 
research around resistance to management control. The chapter explains the formal 
procedure required in this area that had to be completed prior to commencement of 
research. Finally, the chapter gives information on the two sites selected, including 
issues around access.    
6.2 Research Aims and Methodological Aspects 
This section looks at the aims of this research project within the context of aspects 
of methodology which informed the design of the research carried out discussed in 
the following sections. The overall aim is to explore the use of ICT as a tool of labour 
control within the Revenues and Benefits functions of local government. The broad 
themes within this overall aim are to consider the motivation for control within these 
areas, how, given this motivation, techniques of control are implemented, and how 
workers seek to resist, accommodate or accept these. 
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Before moving on to look at these broad themes in closer detail it will be useful 
consider the aims of the research in the context of the two major different 
methodological approaches adopted by researchers, the deductive and inductive. 
The deductive approach seeks to test established theory, whereas the inductive 
approach is concerned with the generation of theory (Ruane, 2005:49; Strauss and 
Whitfield, 1998:9). It can be seen that the deductive approach starts with, and the 
inductive approach ends with, theory (Ruane, 2005:49). This distinction is of 
importance as whilst it is common, it is not necessarily exclusively the case, that 
researchers approaching a subject from a deductive position adopt a quantitative 
approach and those tackling a subject from an inductive standpoint adopt a 
qualitative approach (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:9-10).  
This thesis clearly commences from a Marxist labour process theory position and 
also can be seen to seek the validity, or otherwise, of certain theoretical positions 
such as Fernie and Metcalf’s (1998) view that management control when exercised 
through ICT eliminates the possibility of worker resistance. As such the thesis can 
be seen to adopt a primarily deductive approach starting as it does with well-defined 
theoretical positions (Saunders et al, 2009:41) arrived at from the relevant literature 
(ibid:61). This would often indicate the use of quantitative methods. However, it also 
needs to be considered that qualitative methods may also have value here, 
particularly when considering the day to day actions and perspectives of workers 
with potentially different perceptions, experiences and interests that may differ over 
time, where purely quantitative methods may be deficient in fully exploring and 
explaining these aspects.  Section 6.3.3 considers the selection of research 
methods within the context detailed above. 
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In terms of the motivation for the control of labour within this sector, the starting point 
was the absence of the profit motive within local government (Ironside and Seifert, 
2001:2). The research, therefore, sought to establish what motivations would 
explain the control of labour within local government and how these may have 
changed over time. In considering this, the research needed to explore changes in 
aspects of control that may have occurred over time and relate these chronologically 
to the implementation of ICT systems. As such, a view can be formed as to whether 
these control techniques could be attributed to the development of technology and 
could be seen as deterministic in nature, or whether exogenous factors, particularly 
around central government policies, provided the necessary motivation or drive for 
the adoption of certain control techniques, potentially facilitated by existing 
technology, may provide a more satisfactory explanation.  Once a motivation can 
be identified the research aim goes on to ascertain how actual control techniques 
using ICT are applied. A specific aim of the research was to examine if ICT is used 
as a tool of control in establishing the intensification and control of labour through 
means of surveillance and monitoring, paying particular attention to its panoptic 
capabilities; how it may institute a technological form of control by limiting or 
curtailing worker discretion; and how ICT may impact on skills and to what extent 
this may correspond or diverge from the deskilling aspect of labour process theory 
that would subsequently also allow for tighter control.  
Following on from the control aspect, a further aim of the research was to explore 
the issue of resistance against the implementation of management control through 
technology, paying particular attention to the debate around whether new 
technology has effectively ended labour’s capacity to resist (Fernie and Metcalf, 
1998; Bain and Taylor, 2000). Resistance was considered from an individual and 
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collective, particularly as exercised through trade unions, perspective, as an aim 
was to ascertain whether ICT had resulted in different potentials for resistance in 
these areas as a result of its implementation or use. A further research aim was to 
determine the extent to which the use of ICT as a tool of management control 
impacts on managers themselves and whether the effects have been consistent 
across the group. The research, therefore, in the light of the decline in professional 
bureaucracy in local government, and the potential for ICT to provide an increased 
monitoring facility, sought to ascertain whether it could be possible that individual 
managers feel threatened by this form of technology and it is, therefore, not as 
simple as considering management as one homogenous group in a necessarily 
antagonistic relationship with labour (Zuboff, 1988) with the implications for 
resistance this would entail. Finally, in terms of the potential for resistance, the 
research looked at where resistance may be absent and why this was the case. The 
research was keen to explore reasons why workers may choose to comply, or make 
accommodation with, the type and use of technology used in the workplace 
(Bamber, 1988; Collinson, 2003). To this end, the research sought to examine 
whether the absence of resistance could necessarily be equated with the level of 
control facilitated by, or the essential qualities of, ICT or whether other explanations 
may be present.  
6.3 Research Design 
6.3.1 The Case Study Approach 
In designing a means of research to address the aims and issues highlighted in the 
previous section, it was felt a narrative was required to be constructed from the 
perspective and insights of workers, managers and trade unions in studying the 
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motivation and techniques of control and resistance. To achieve this the researcher 
decided to adopt a qualitative case study approach. A qualitative approach was felt 
to be particularly suited to this study which has adopted a Marxist Labour Process 
Theory perspective. Certain assumptions have been made, including those being 
researched have “material or class interests” (Morrow, 1994:52) which are best 
addressed by a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. The study itself took 
the form of two case studies giving what was felt to be a more robust study than with 
a single site.  This was felt to be appropriate in researching issues within the 
employment relationship and labour process, which is made up of complex 
processes where unequivocal objectivity is difficult to apply in situations where those 
being researched may construct their own meanings (Whipp, 1998:51-52).  
Adopting a case study approach, with participants at all levels of the organizations 
would allow the gathering of rich detail from those working in the area which would 
lead to a qualitative interpretation (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008:59).   Although there 
is some definitional confusion as to what constitutes a case study (Gerring, 
2004:342; Kitay and Callus, 1998:101), a definition used here, is a study focussing 
on some form of individual unit and it is this “demarcation of the unit’s boundaries” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011:301) that designates it as such and not the methods adopted (Bell, 
2005:10). A case study approach allows the researcher to study a particular activity 
or process (Cresswell, 2003:15), and has been widely used within industrial 
relations research “to provide explanations and an understanding of complex social 
phenomena” (Kitay and Callus, 1998:101) and so was felt to be particularly suited 
to studying the issue of control and resistance within the workplace. Case studies 
are not research methods in themselves and do not necessarily require limiting to 
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one particular method. Indeed, one of the reasons this approach was taken is it 
would allow the researcher to use a number of methods concurrently (ibid:102-103). 
There was no reason why multiple methods could not be used to address the same 
questions (Yin, 2009:63). Case studies were felt to be well suited to produce 
“context-dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2011:303), meaning the real-life 
historical context and environment the organization being studied in, had to be 
considered in the final analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2011:301; Yin, 2009:18). It was felt, 
therefore, by pursuing a case study the “holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events” would be retained in the research findings (Yin, 2009:4). One 
concern was this attention to context may mean any knowledge produced is unable 
to be generalized. However, this does not mean it is valueless if the case study is 
carried out in sufficient depth (ibid:18) and the objects of study are studied at close 
proximity (Flyvbjerg, 2011:303). Whilst not totally solving the issue of generalisation, 
it was mitigated by the decision to conduct case studies over two sites. The analysis 
of evidence from case studies often does not rely on analysing statistically (Yin, 
2009:34) and this is the case here due to the relatively small number of participants 
covered by this research and why a qualitative approach was felt to be appropriate. 
Given the nature of what is being studied here, it was also felt a descriptive case 
study approach would have value in respect of the knowledge produced (Flyvbjerg, 
2011:305). Whilst it is the case results may not be generalizable it is possible a case 
study can show a proposition to be false, for example, in this research the presence 
of resistance would confirm its possibility in those specific circumstances rather than 




6.3.2 Reliability and Validity 
Before moving on to discuss the methods selected and rejected for this research, 
this section considers the issues of reliability and validity that were considered within 
that design. Reliability can be defined as “the extent to which a test or procedure 
produces similar results under constant conditions on all occasions” (Bell, 
2005:117). In terms of reliability, a “good guideline [is to] conduct the research so 
that an auditor could in principle repeat the procedures and arrive at the same 
results” (Yin, 2009:45). Validity can be seen as a more complex issue than reliability, 
as the issue here is whether the questions and the research measure what needs 
to be measured and when the results are interpreted the correct conclusions are 
made (Bell, 2005:118). It should be clear that if “an item is unreliable, then it must 
also lack validity” but just because reliability has been shown does not necessarily 
make the research valid, as it may not actually measure what it sets out to do 
(ibid:118). There are a number of aspects in relation to validity that were considered. 
The first of these was a consideration of internal validity relating to whether any 
causal relationships can be correctly established (Yin, 2009:40). Where information 
is uncovered that does not seem to fit, this should not be excluded but needs to be 
considered and explained. Rival explanations, if considered and addressed, can 
strengthen this aspect of internal validity (Cresswell, 2003:196; Yin, 2009:41). The 
aspect of external validity relates to whether the results can be generalised beyond 
the site being studied or attempting to generalise the findings to a particular 
theoretical position (Yin, 2009:43), in this case around the use of technology as 
means of achieving control of labour and the ability of workers to resist this.  
In this study, the question considered was whether both sites would lead to findings 
that were able to generalise to this theoretical position (ibid:44)? As the research 
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being carried out here is qualitative and not quantitative it may be validity is more 
difficult to check and so it was seen as the task of the researcher to convince an 
audience that the research has been conducted properly and any interpretations are 
correct (Whitfield and Strauss, 1998:291-292). At all points of the research it was 
clear to the researcher that cognizance regarding the potential bias they may bring 
to the study needed to be recognized (Cresswell, 2003:196) and they needed to 
strive to conduct the research in a neutral manner (Brown, 1998:269). These issues 
of reliability and validity are important aspects when designing the methods to be 
utilized in a research study and it is to those methods we now turn. 
6.3.3 Research Methods – Selection 
The potential methods considered in designing the research for this study were 
interviews, questionnaire surveys, ethnographic study and documentary analysis. 
The methods chosen were questionnaires and semi-structured interviews and these 
are discussed in the following sub-sections. The method considered and rejected, 
ethnographic study, had some positive aspects that were recognized. Ethnographic 
studies are a popular method in the field of employment research (Whipp, 1998:55) 
and have “played a critical role in the study of work” (Friedman and McDaniel, 
1998:114). This form of research involves the direct observation and study of the 
participants, with the researcher observing the people actually performing their jobs 
and interacting with others in the workplace (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998:115; 
Bell, 2005:16). This brings to the foreground of the study “the words, interpretations, 
and experiences of the people studied” (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998:116).  
The benefits of this type of research are “broadly similar to those of interviewing” 
(Whipp, 1998:55) but also allow the researcher to be party to the experiences of 
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workers in the workplace (Bell, 2005:17).  Ethnography can be seen as particularly 
valuable where it may be useful to open up new research questions or “new avenues 
of enquiry” (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998:118). Having considered the strengths 
of this type of research, the main reasons it was not felt to be an appropriate method 
was it was not clear what could be observed in terms of staff carrying out actions on 
a computer without this being highly intrusive. The presence of the researcher was 
also felt to be problematic due to the potential for interference with the research 
resulting from subjects amending their behaviour in response to this, particularly in 
respect to acts of resistance. Without this level of intrusion and potential 
interference, issues of reliability and validity would arise in terms of any information 
gathered. It is also a very time-consuming form of investigation and would have 
raised problems in gaining permission for access to the sites for this particular type 
of research (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998:121; Bell, 2005:17). 
It should be noted that the researcher had been employed in the field of Revenues 
and Benefits for over two decades and also had experience as a trade union 
representative for much of this time. Following this the researcher also had the role 
of a trade union officer dealing with issues raised within this thesis. Therefore, the 
potential for the experiences of the researcher within the field of research may also 
need some clarification here with its conceivable links to the field of 
autoethnography. “Autoethnography is an approach to research and writing that 
seeks to describe and systematically analyze […] personal experience […] in order 
to understand cultural experience” (Ellis et al, 2011:273). As such it may be seen as 
a combination of autobiography and ethnography (ibid:275) that allows the 
researcher to go beyond the data available from other methods (Denshire, 2014:5). 
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Whilst there is a recognition that personal experience will influence the research 
process, including who and what is being researched (Ellis et al, 2011:274). 
The researcher has at all times attempted to maintain a “neutral, impersonal and 
objective stance” (ibid:274). Having said this, it is felt that the researcher’s 
experience and background was valuable, not in the sense of using it as data but 
rather in terms of a confirmatory facility, adding to the likelihood that the research is 
true and coherent and therefore increasing reliability and validity within the thesis 
(ibid:282). It is the case then that the presence of the self, in terms of the 
researcher’s experience should not be viewed as “a contaminant” (Wall, 2006:147) 
as the researcher has sought to limit the extent to which they are part of the study 
itself (Wall, 2016:2). 
 It should be clear therefore, this is not an ethnographic study, however it should 
also be noted the researcher had been employed in the areas under consideration 
for over two decades. As such some of the benefits of ethnographic study, such as 
insight into the perceptions of those being studied may exist.  
The research method of documentary analysis was not rejected but no relevant 
documentation was able to be supplied from either research site. Two main reasons 
were given for this in that historical documents that related to the initial 
implementation of computerized systems in the 1980s either no longer existed or 
could not be located and any more recent documentation relating to control systems 
would not be specific to this subject and so identification of such documentation 
would be problematic (Patmore, 1998:219-220). Even if some of this documentation 
could have been located or identified it would almost certainly have been incomplete 
(ibid:221). This lack of documentary evidence may be seen as problematic in terms 
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of reliability and validity discussed in the previous section. However, the researchers 
background was useful here in being able to contact and interview a retired head 
officer who was responsible for the implementation of the first computerized 
Revenues and Benefits system who could recall relevant and valuable information 
from this time. It also needs to be recognized that the presence of documentary 
evidence in itself needs to be treated with a level of caution due to the potential bias 
of researchers and a number of potential interpretations being possible (ibid:219-
220). The chapter can now move on to discuss the methods that were selected and 
utilized. 
6.3.3.1 Questionnaires 
The first of the methods to be chosen was that of questionnaires. Questionnaires 
are considered a good method of researching worker attitudes (Strauss and 
Whitfield, 1998:25) and due to the primarily quantitative nature of the data produced 
can be seen as appropriate from the perspective of the predominantly deductive 
approach taken in this thesis (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:10). In surveying groups 
of workers below the level of Team Leader, as was done, a questionnaire was felt 
to be an appropriate method as it focussed on, and was completed by, the employee 
themselves without input from management or trade unions (Hartley and Barling, 
1998:163). It was felt a survey would be a useful tool as the groups, although 
employed at different authorities, were homogenous enough to be asked the same 
questions (Millward et al, 1998:145-146) and so the same questionnaire was used 
for workers at both sites. This issue of potential incompatibility of the samples 
(Whitfield et al, 1998:197) was recognized but it was felt to be the case that the two 
groups were similar in terms of the work they carry out and the technology they use 
to do this and so this was not considered problematic. An advantage of this method 
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is in terms of time taken per person, information can be gathered more quickly using 
a questionnaire than with an interview (Millward et al, 1998:139) and so was seen 
as an efficient way of gathering information (Ruane, 2005:123). The numbers of staff 
at each site meant no sampling was required as questionnaires were issued to all 
staff within the group. Individuals within this group were not able to be identified 
unless they wished to be so and were willing to take part in follow-up interviews 
(Cresswell, 2003:156).  
A decision was taken as to what form this questionnaire would take (see Appendix 
1) and it was decided the most frequently used and popular form of questionnaire, 
a self-completed, fixed question and fixed format answer, Likert scale, questionnaire 
(Hartley and Barling, 1998:159), would be utilized, with the respondents having “pre-
determined (fixed) response alternatives […] to use when answering the question” 
(Ruane, 2005:131). Likert scales were felt to be good in analysing the strength of 
feeling respondents may have, but it also needs to be recognised attaching 
numerical values to these was considered problematic and the categories in the 
questionnaire were, therefore, indicative of the strength of feeling of the respondent 
and were not given any statistical weight (Bell, 2005:142). For this reason, allocating 
a numerical value was not considered to be helpful as the questions to be used in 
this questionnaire are largely qualitative in that they are categorical rather than 
numerical (Yin, 2009:19). A closed-ended questionnaire was also felt to encourage 
a higher return rate due to its simplicity of use as opposed to when open-ended 
questions are used (Ruane, 2005:131). Another advantage of this approach was its 
administrative simplicity and relatively low cost (Hartley and Barling, 1998:159).  
There were weaknesses and areas of concern considered and recognised in the 
design and use of questionnaires. Firstly, they can be seen as a snap-shot at a 
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particular time (Whipp, 1998:57) and so the research considered whether either site 
was going through any changes, for example reorganization or downsizing, that 
would need to be considered when interpreting any results. There was also a 
concern using what was, to a certain extent, a quantitative method with an overall 
qualitative study. However, this combination was not felt to be necessarily excluded 
within a case study (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008:115) and it is also accepted that 
research projects are often not purely deductive or inductive but have elements of 
both (Saunders et al, 2009:127; Grix, 2004:114). As such, it was also decided to 
allow participants to be able to contribute any comments they wished in a free-
format box at the end of the questionnaire, thus giving an additional qualitative 
element to the survey. 
A potential problem considered in the use of questionnaires was that of low return 
rates (Millward et al, 1998:139; Ruane, 2005:124-125). This was considered 
particularly when inferring anything regarding the group being researched (Whitfield, 
1998:65) and it was recognised and considered those who chose not to respond 
may possess significantly different views than those who do (Ruane, 2005:125). 
It is good practice in respect of questionnaires to pilot them with a view to ironing 
out any problems and this was done. Piloting was used to ascertain how long the 
questionnaire would take to complete, ensure the questions or statements were 
clear, whether anyone answering the questionnaire may have objections to certain 
questions, whether there were any omissions and whether the layout of the 
questionnaire caused any difficulties (Bell, 2005:147-148). This did not raise any 
problems, but if it had done any issues would have been corrected prior to issue, 
ensuring the highest possible return rate. This element was deemed crucial as 
reliability could not be tested for by re-running the questionnaire (ibid:117). 
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Distribution of the questionnaire was arranged by the contacts through the internal 
mail systems of the sites concerned (ibid:148). These were not addressed to 
individuals but were distributed to all staff employed within the relevant group and 
contained a letter detailing the project and how the returned questionnaire would be 
dealt with (ibid:149). To enable as high a return rate as possible, pre-paid return 
envelopes were included with all the questionnaires distributed (ibid:149).  
161 questionnaires were sent out in 2014 for Authority A and 183 in 2015 for 
Authority B, with a return rate of 24% and 20% respectively. The number of 
questionnaires issued and the return rates achieved meant there were effectively 
no meaningful statistical procedures that could be carried out with the data obtained. 
However, questionnaire results were felt to be useful as they did not preclude the 
highlighting of possible similarities or differences within and between the groups 
being researched and could also indicate particular patterns (Bell, 2005:203). 
Related to the issue of return rates is how the questions on the questionnaire are 
framed. These were designed to be unambiguous, aiding with the reliability issues 
raised in Section 6.3.2, and not overly complex (Hartley and Barling, 1998:167; 
Ruane, 2005:127) and as far as possible were neutral in terms of language used 
(Ruane, 2005:128). Staff also needed to be confident any response they made was 
confidential and this was made clear to them in order for them to complete and 
return the questionnaire (Hartley and Barling, 1998:169). Those workers receiving 
the questionnaire were informed that when completed they would be held securely 
and these along with the analysis of the returned surveys would be retained by the 
researcher until the completion of the project for any audit and reliability purposes 
(see Appendix 2) (Yin, 2009:43). 
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Whilst on balance it was felt the information acquired from this method was of limited 
value, it was beneficial in a number of ways. Firstly, it provided some information 
that could be used qualitatively. Secondly, quantitatively it could provide instances 
where information gained from the interviews may particularly confirm views 
articulated in them or be significantly different from the general views expressed. As 
such it could be seen to aid reliability and, including where theoretical positions are 
being considered within this primarily deductive study, validity. Thirdly, the 
questionnaire was designed with a blank section at the end where respondents 
could make any comments they wished and so provide valuable information not 
gained from the questions themselves. Finally, and most importantly, one of the 
main reasons for carrying out this questionnaire survey was to design it to include a 
section where respondents could give their contact details if they were willing to be 
interviewed. This meant this process assisted in gaining access to interviewees that 
could be questioned at greater length at a later date (Burgess, 1984:161) and 
effectively meant the interviewees were self-selecting rather than selected by 
management or the researcher. Particularly in this latter aspect the questionnaire 
was felt to be of considerable value.  
6.3.3.2 Interviews 
An issue of concern with questionnaires, was whilst in themselves they can provide 
information about specific behaviours, attitudes, opinions and beliefs (Ruane, 
2005:124) and fitted in with the primarily deductive nature of the study, they may be 
somewhat inflexible (Whipp, 1998:55). However, this concern, particularly around 
capturing the potentially subjective view of workers and managers that may not have 
been successfully obtained by a purely quantitative approach was somewhat 
alleviated by the use of the second method selected for the case studies, the semi-
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structured interview with the questionnaire results being a useful supplement to 
information gained from them (Hartley and Barling, 1998:166; Whipp, 1998:54). A 
total of 33 interviews were carried out over the two sites over 2015 and 2016 (see 
Appendix 3). The breakdown of this is as follows: 











Authority A 3 2 9 2 
Authority B 2 2 12 1 
 
The following interviews were also carried out during this period. An interview was 
secured with a senior manager of a major software supplier to Revenues and 
Benefits departments to gain evidence on why computerized systems were 
designed in the way they were. An interview was also conducted with a retired Chief 
Rating Officer from Authority A, who had been responsible for the implementation 
of the first computerized system of its kind within a Revenues environment. As such 
this was felt to provide a valuable insight into the motivation of implementation and 
use at that stage. It is also worth noting here the value of the researcher’s 
background in the area being researched and how this helped in facilitating these 
interviews. In total then, 35 interviews were carried out, and of these 21 were self-
selected from the questionnaire process. From this perspective the decision to carry 
out a questionnaire survey was felt to be correct and successful.   
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 Whilst questionnaires can be effective in gathering a large amount of information, 
the interviews allowed a more flexible approach to the gathering of subjective 
information from the participants. Interviews were felt to “provide in-depth 
information pertaining to participant’s experiences and viewpoints of a particular 
topic” (Turner, 2010:754) and those participating were those directly involved in the 
events being researched (Yin, 2009:11). Many interviews are pitched at some point 
between being completely structured and completely unstructured (Bell, 2005:161) 
and this was felt to be the best option here. This semi-structured approach was felt 
to be the correct method as whilst it gave the researcher the opportunity to guide 
the interview thus enabling a focus on reliability and validity with the research aims, 
it also gave the participant the freedom to articulate their responses (ibid:161-162). 
Responses could then be followed up allowing for new avenues of enquiry to be 
opened up by the researcher in reaction to an answer given (Whipp, 1998:54; 
Turner, 2010:755). This meant there was a certain level of researcher control in the 
direction the interview took (Cresswell, 2003:186) and the “more abstruse facts” 
could be given expression (Brown and Wright, 1994:155). A totally unstructured 
format was not seen as satisfactory within a deductive format due to potential 
inconsistencies between participants and the information given which may have led 
to issues of unreliability (Turner, 2010:755).  
Interviews were also felt to be a way of establishing a certain level of trust between 
the researcher and the interviewee and this would be particularly valuable when 
researching resistance to management control which may be viewed as illicit 
behaviour (Whipp, 1998:56). Interviews were also felt to be effective in bringing out 
historical issues (Cresswell, 2003:186) which were deemed to be more problematic 
when using other forms of research (Whipp, 1998:57). However, when discussing 
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events in the past, it was recognized interviewees are recalling events from memory 
and so may not be entirely accurate. For this reason, it was important as many 
interviews as possible should be carried out to highlight potential inconsistencies 
and divergences (Patmore, 1998:222-223). 
In deciding how to structure the questions within the interview, it was felt to be 
beneficial to keep them as open ended as feasible, as this would encourage the 
participants to give as full a response as possible (Turner, 2010:756). As with the 
questionnaire, a pilot interview was carried out to gauge the responses to the initial 
questions (ibid:757) and was designed to ensure unambiguity and aid reliability 
(Hartley and Barling, 1998:167; Bell, 2005:117). However, it was recognized, due to 
the semi-structured nature of the interviews, pertinent follow-up questions could be 
different for different participants. Even taking this into account, piloting was felt to 
be a worthwhile exercise. 
 In comparison with questionnaires, interviews can be seen as somewhat 
burdensome in terms of extracting the information contained in them. However, this 
was carefully done with full transcriptions carried out to guard against potential 
researcher bias and also to mitigate against unreliability (Turner, 2010:756) and, 
along with interview schedules, provide the necessary research records required 
(Yin, 2009:43). The transcription process also allowed the interviewees actual words 
to be quoted, thus making any interpretation transparent as far as any reader is 
concerned (Cresswell, 2003:196). The transcription process was also seen to be a 
factor in achieving a level of validity (Cresswell, 2003:196; Yin, 2009:141), as it 
makes it more unlikely aspects that do not fit into a preconceived view would be 
overlooked. It needs to be recognised in this research that the researcher at the time 
of the interviews was a trade union officer and so bias was always considered and 
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addressed in how the research was conducted and how the analysis of the findings 
was dealt with (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:26; Kitay and Callus, 1998:111) by 
ensuring questions were not leading and were as neutral and open, with as clear 
wording as possible (Turner, 2010:757). Whilst the use of jargon may be seen as 
problematic (ibid:757) the researcher’s background in the area of Revenues and 
Benefits was beneficial as they would be seen to be able to both understand and 
effectively use jargon in ways that would clarify rather than obscure (ibid:758). 
There were certain practical considerations taken into account in preparation for the 
interviews. Firstly, the contacts were approached to provide potential interviewees 
at various management levels and along with individuals who had indicated 
willingness to be interviewed on the returned questionnaire forms, interviews were 
scheduled with the participants. Secondly, the interview setting was considered and 
in all cases a place that did not suffer from interruptions was allocated (Turner, 
2010:757). The researcher sought, and gained, the permission of the employers 
concerned to hold the interviews in the workplace. However, even though this was 
granted, it was felt appropriate to offer participants the option of being interviewed 
elsewhere, should they wish although none took up the offer of alternative locations. 
The only exceptions were those of the trade union officers, retired Chief Rating 
Officer and Software Manager interviews. These exceptions were carried out in 
union offices, a private side room at a town hall, and the interviewee’s private office, 
respectively. It was made clear that the time of the interview was the choice of the 
participant and their schedule needs would be respected (Yin, 2009:85).  
The purpose of the interview was made clear to all participants who were supplied 
with information sheets (see Appendix 5) and also verbally as an overview at the 
start of the interview. The issue of confidentiality (Turner, 2010:757) was addressed 
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in the information sheet, including the format the interview would take and the 
expected length of time for the interview (ibid:757) (see Appendix 5). Whilst the 
selection of interview participants is important (ibid:757) this was only of minimal 
concern to the researcher here as for the staff it was self-selecting by volunteers 
from those completing the questionnaire sheets, and for those at management and 
supervisory level there were relatively few to pick from, meaning there was very little 
researcher input in terms of selection. However, the researcher was also attentive 
to the potential that self-selection may also introduce a particular bias into the 
research. Following the interviews this became less of a concern due to the different 
views expressed within them.  It was decided where participants were agreeable, 
interviews would be taped (ibid:759) so the fullest possible record was made 
(Friedman and McDaniel, 1998:124; Burgess, 1984:107). However, in some cases, 
agreement was not given and the researcher fully respected these wishes and the 
relevant points made as fully as possible by taking contemporaneous notes 
(Patmore, 1998:221; Ruane, 2005:161). Reliance purely on memory in these cases 
was not felt to be a good idea (Turner, 2010:759). Whilst transcriptions of interviews 
did not necessarily capture the non-verbal aspects of a face-to-face interview it was 
felt this was an easier way to work and analyse the information gained from 
interviews (Patmore, 1998:222; Ruane, 2005:162). Whilst it needs to be recognised 
transcription was a very time-consuming process (Burgess, 1984:121) it was felt to 
be of great value when analysing the findings of the research. 
Whilst the use of semi-structured interviews was felt to be an appropriate method of 
conducting the research there were some limitations recognized within this method. 
The implementation of ICT systems in the areas under research initially took place 
in the early 1980s and as such many of the participants were not working in these 
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areas at this time. As such they could offer no insight into issues around the 
management of labour prior to, or immediately following implementation other than 
from an anecdotal perspective. As part of the research was considering the effect 
the implementation of this technology had on the control of labour and debates 
around the extent to which the public sector could be seen as a model employer 
(Coffey and Thornley, 2009; 2014) this could be seen as somewhat problematic. 
However, a small number of the interviewees were working in the area at the time 
and so a certain amount of information was available and because of this it was felt 
the research would not be unduly affected. Again, changes that may have occurred 
during the process of carrying out the interviews were considered as this may have 
led to issues with reliability due to different answers being given (Bell, 2005:117), 
but no such issues were identified. However, there was still the possibility 
interviewees would not give truthful answers and this was carefully considered in 
the final analysis including by comparing the various responses. It was also felt 
issues, such as the ensuring of anonymity and confidentiality, as detailed in the 
following section, would assist in obtaining truthful responses. 
6.4 Ethical Considerations 
In designing the research, specific ethical considerations of each method detailed 
above were a priority along the lines of “how do I protect the participants?” (Yin, 
2009:73) No research was carried out and no potential participants were contacted 
until ethical clearance had been received from the University’s ethics committee 
(see Appendix 8) (Bell, 2005:48). It was not the case research commenced on the 
assumption this would be granted (ibid:148). Part of this process was to identify the 
risks to the participants and how they may be protected (Burgess, 1984:188). It is 
important to realise with research into industrial relations, such as with this project, 
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what is being explored is a potentially hostile or adversarial relationship between 
labour and management and this was considered (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:26).  
It is also the case that in this research project the permission of someone in authority 
for the research to go ahead in the particular workplace was sought and gained 
(Cresswell, 2003:65). In this study the process of ethical clearance involved the 
drafting of information sheets, for interviewees, and letters accompanying the 
questionnaire, explaining how the research would be conducted and guaranteeing 
anonymity in the final thesis (Bell, 2005:48-49) (see Appendices 2 and 5). The 
consent forms to be completed by interviewees (see Appendices 6 and 7) and an 
indicative interview schedule (see Appendix 4) were drafted and cleared by the 
University’s Ethics Committee.  
It is important to show informed consent of the participants has been received 
(Burgess, 1984:200; Bell, 2005:45) and a form was designed to detail what 
interviewees were consenting to (Appendices 6 and 7) (Cresswell, 2003:64) and this 
was signed by both the researcher and the interviewee with a copy being retained 
by both parties (ibid:65). In respect of the questionnaire, it was stated on the form 
(see Appendix 1), and felt to be adequate, that consent would be assumed if the 
form was completed. In order to achieve this consent, it is necessary to ensure the 
research is never misrepresented in terms of what it is and how it will be carried out 
(Burgess, 1984:197) and that the nature of the research should be made clear. In 
essence, participants should understand what they are consenting to and the 
research should not deviate from this (Bell, 2005:45). In terms of ethics, the stance 
the researcher took was to “make no promises that cannot be honoured” (ibid:55). 
No external funding of the research project was in place and this was made clear in 
the information sheet sent out to potential participants (Cresswell, 2003:64). It was 
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also the case that it was kept in mind ethical considerations should be a constant 
concern throughout the research and may need re-evaluating during the process 
(Burgess, 1984:207). Even though ethical clearance had taken place, it was still 
recognized as the responsibility of the researcher to consider potential harm to those 
taking place. This may be particularly important when dealing with an issue such as 
resistance to management, as in this study, where participants may divulge 
transgressions (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:28). Participants were informed it was 
entirely their free-choice as to whether they participated in the research, that they 
could refuse to answer any questions they chose and they could withdraw from the 
process at any time without the need to justify their decision or give any reasons to 
the researcher (Bell, 2005:45). This was made clear in the information sheet 
provided to all interviewees prior to the interview. This information sheet was 
provided some days before the interview to allow the participant to read and ask any 
questions they may have prior to the interview taking place (ibid:45). 
6.5 Research Sites 
This section of the chapter gives some general information about the two research 
sites, information relevant to the industrial relations environment, why they were 
selected and pertinent issues around access. 
Both research sites are unitary authorities created in 1974 following the Local 
Government Act 1972 and as such are both classed as billing authorities, 
responsible for the billing, administration and collection of Council Tax and Business 
Rates. Both authorities are also responsible for the administration of Council Tax 
and Housing benefit and the functions are performed in-house with, in the main, 
directly employed staff. As such both authorities were appropriate for this study. As 
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can be seen from the comparison between the two sites given below, they are of 
comparable size and this was felt to be useful in that any differences between the 
two could not be put down to relative size. 
Authority A has a population of around 300,000 and has approximately 130,000 
liable Council Tax payers. The authority politically has no overall control at the time 
of writing, and regularly changes control between Conservative and Labour 
administrations. Authority A has adopted the leader and cabinet mode of executive. 
In 1990 Authority A had a structure of eight directorates and this has reduced over 
time to currently consist of three. At the time of Community Charge (1990) the 
Revenues function employed around 140 staff. This has reduced to around 70 at 
the present time. The Benefits function employed around 160 staff in 1990 and this 
has reduced to around 90 at the present time. These reductions have been achieved 
over time by natural wastage.  The structure of the Revenues function is as follows. 
There are two teams split along geographical lines dealing with issues of record 
keeping and billing; a single NNDR team; a recovery team dealing with debt 
collection; and a scanning and indexing team scanning all incoming mail and 
documentation received at the various counters, thus creating a digital copy that is 
forwarded to the relevant team. The Benefits function is split into two geographical 
teams, a single quality checking department and a single team dealing with the 
recovery of overpayments.  
Authority B has a population of around 309,000 and has approximately 134,000 
liable Council Tax payers. The authority politically has been Labour controlled for all 
but one of the years since its inception. Authority B has adopted the leader and 
cabinet mode of executive. In 1990 Authority B had a structure of eight directorates 
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and this has reduced over time to currently consist of two. At the time of Community 
Charge (1990) the Revenues function employed around 170 staff. This has reduced 
to around 90 at the present time. The Benefits function employed approximately 170 
staff in 1990 and currently employs around 100. These reductions have been 
achieved over time by natural wastage. Authority B’s structure is based on a 
geographical split into two teams. Whilst there is a unified Revenues and Benefits 
function there is a certain specialization within the teams in dealing with Council Tax 
Billing, recovery, Benefits administration and NNDR. The scanning and indexing 
function has been outsourced and is carried out at a remote location to the Authority.  
Both research sites are unionised and the relative densities are detailed here with 
the information provided by the UNISON Branch Secretaries (Interview 15; Interview 
33). Authority A has a union density of around 50% in its Revenues Department and 
45% in Benefits made up almost entirely of UNISON members but with three 
members of Unite. There are two UNISON stewards operating covering both 
Revenues and Benefits but no Unite stewards. Corporately, Authority A had a union 
density of approximately 47% in 2016, falling from 51% in 2010. Corporately, 
UNISON has around 56%, GMB 41% and Unite 3%, of members across Authority 
A respectively. Authority B has a combined Revenues and Benefits function and the 
union density here is around 90% shared equally between UNISON and GMB. 
UNISON have three stewards operating here and GMB have two. Corporately, 
Authority B had a union density of approximately 62% in 2016, with a very small 
marginal fall from 2010. Corporately, UNISON has around 60%, GMB 35% and 
Unite 5% of members across Authority B respectively. Historically Authority B have 
had a higher union density across the whole authority compared to Authority A. 
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Neither Branch Secretary could provide a specific reason for this difference which 
appears to have been present for several years. 
The interviews with the respective Branch Secretaries (Interview 15; Interview 33) 
detailed a similar branch officer structure. For UNISON, Authority A had two joint 
Branch Secretaries in post, a Branch Chair and Vice-Chair (both vacant at the time 
of writing), a Branch Health and Safety Officer (vacant at the time of writing) and a 
Branch Treasurer. Authority B UNISON had a Branch Secretary, an Assistant 
Branch Secretary and all the other posts as detailed at Authority A, with all positions 
filled. Both branches officer positions were subject to annual election. The GMB 
branch at Authority B had the same officer structure as UNISON with the exception 
of an Assistant Branch Secretary. These officer positions were subject to election 
every three years. 
 The bargaining and consultation structures, as detailed by the Branch Secretaries 
(Interview 15; Interview 33) were as follows. Both Authorities followed broadly the 
same system and had a corporate consultation committee made up of the Lead 
Elected Member with responsibility for HR, Heads of the Directorates, Senior HR 
representative, and representatives, usually the Branch Secretaries, from the 
recognized unions. Issues at both authorities relating to individual directorates are 
brought before joint director and union meetings, with unions represented by senior 
representatives within the directorates concerned. Likewise, there are departmental 
meetings at both authorities composed of managers and departmental 
representatives of recognized unions. Issues that cannot be resolved at meetings 
are escalated to the relevant meeting at the next level, culminating in the corporate 
group. There is an agreement currently in place between Authority B and the 
recognized unions that there will be no compulsory redundancies across the 
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Authority, although there is an acceptance staff may need to be transferred to other 
roles. No such agreement is in place at Authority A. 
Access is a crucial aspect to the process as if it cannot be gained there will be a 
limited amount of research that can be conducted (Burgess, 1984:45). In terms of 
the selection, the two sites were approached for the reasons detailed above and 
also because of the ease the researcher would have in conducting research over 
time at the two sites, particularly as interviews would require being conducted at 
each site over a number of days (ibid:61). Access was arranged through what 
Burgess (1984) refers to as a gatekeeper, defined as “those individuals in an 
organisation that have the power to grant or withhold access to people or situations 
for the purposes of research” (ibid:48). An advantage for the researcher in this 
respect was that they had worked in this area for several years and so was known 
to the managers approached as gatekeepers who were helpful and cooperative. It 
was also the case that the researcher had been active within one of the recognized 
trade unions in this area at all levels of the union and so would also be known to 
union activists within the sites. This familiarity then was perceived as a particular 
advantage in terms of access (ibid:46). 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has given a summary of the research aims of the study, around the 
use of ICT as a tool of management control within local government and how this 
may have affected resistance from the workers subjected to it. These research aims 
were paramount when designing the research strategy. The thesis, preceding from 
a Marxist labour process perspective and seeking to test theoretical positions, 
including around the potential for worker resistance following the implementation of 
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ICT as a tool of management control can be seen to be primarily deductive.  The 
decision was taken to take a case study approach as this was well suited to industrial 
relations research and had been used before in this area and was felt to be 
particularly apposite when dealing with the complex social relationships in the 
workplace. A further advantage of this method was that it allowed for both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods to be used within the same study. 
The main research methods considered were ethnographic study, questionnaires, 
interviews and documentary analysis. Whilst advantages could be seen in the first 
method, it was rejected as it was not considered appropriate for the type of study 
being undertaken although the researcher’s background in this area, whilst not 
making this an autoethnographic study, was considered advantageous from this 
perspective. The option of documentary analysis was not rejected per se but proved 
unachievable due to the unavailability of relevant documentary sources. The options 
chosen as methods of research, therefore, were questionnaires and interviews. 
Questionnaires were recognized to have some points of concern around inflexibility 
and the relatively low numbers meaning there were no statistical conclusions that 
could be drawn. However, they were utilized due to the advantages associated with 
them particularly in terms of the amount of information that could be gathered in a 
relatively short period of time and within a primarily deductive study would provide 
valuable quantitative data. It was a particular motivation in using this method that it 
could also be used as a means of contacting individuals and allowing them to 
indicate whether they would be willing to take part in a follow up interview. This 
aspect was felt to be particularly successful.  The questionnaire was felt to provide 
useful supplementary information to the second method chosen, that of interviews. 
The interviews were of the semi-structured variety as it was felt this allowed the 
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researcher to exercise a certain amount of control over the process whilst allowing 
the participant to express themselves and provide detailed information around their 
experiences that may have proved difficult to obtain by purely quantitative methods.  
Case studies using these methods raise issues around reliability and validity. To a 
certain extent the issues around reliability were addressed by ensuring the wording 
of the questionnaire and interviews were unambiguous and to this end piloting of 
both methods was used. By the nature of a limited number of case studies external 
validity may be an issue here but the careful use of wording and the use of direct 
quotations from interviewees make the process more transparent and would 
hopefully allow the reader to make a judgement on any conclusion reached by the 
researcher. This chapter has also detailed considerations around the ethical 
concerns a study of this type raises, particularly as it is examining what potentially 
can be an antagonistic relationship between workers and management. In 
particular, aspects of anonymity were considered and addressed. The final aspect 
of the chapter was to provide some descriptive information around the sites chosen 
so a comparative perspective could be given. The issue of access was also 




Chapter 7 - Findings 1: Control 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of two chapters examining the findings of the research and 
considers management control of workers and the labour process and the 
relationship ICT has to this within the two sites. In researching the way technology 
has been designed, implemented and utilized, which directly addresses the second 
main aim of the thesis and the literature in Chapter 3, of how technology is used as 
a tool of labour control, also leads to a view around the first central aim of the thesis, 
namely the motivation behind the control of the labour process as discussed in 
Chapter 2, which advanced the view that as well as ensuring effective administration 
of services, as a component of the capitalist system control of the labour process 
within the public sector could lead to benefits for the capitalist class if it achieves an 
increase in surplus labour (Gough 1975;1979). This can be seen to be of relevance 
to Revenues and Benefits staff with the latter having a role to play in the reproduction 
of the working class, and the former providing a service in collection of taxes 
enabling the functioning of local government services. As both are funded from 
taxation of capital and labour the greater the extraction of surplus labour, the greater 
the benefit to the capitalist class, as detailed in Chapter 2. 
The chapter commences by considering the issues around the design and use of 
the ICT being utilized. The thesis takes the view that the motives and interests of 
those who design or commission technology is important as it will be their interests 
reflected within it (Greenbaum, 1998:124). The chapter, therefore, sought to reach 
a conclusion as to who designed the systems in use, what the objectives were and 
whether, and to what extent, design and implementation could be challenged so 
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affecting the final result and how this may have changed over time, particularly in 
relation to material changes experienced within local government. The chapter 
explains why the resultant conclusion is that technology, in terms of its design, 
reflects the interests and objectives of local government management and excludes 
those of workers who will go on to use the systems (Braverman, 1998:34-35).  
The chapter identifies three different types of systems used, firstly those considered 
as core to the administration of the Revenues and Benefits functions, namely RBCA 
(Revenues and Benefits Collection and Administration) and EDM (Electronic 
Document Management) systems, secondly bureaucratic systems and finally 
performance management systems. Following an examination of design and 
implementation of these, the chapter goes on to detail the way the systems, 
specifically those identified as core to the administration of Revenues and Benefits, 
have resulted in changes to the work practices and how this relates to control, 
particularly of a technical form, of the labour process. The chapter goes on to explore 
how the use of the systems identified are used as a tool of control by utilizing them 
to perform monitoring and surveillance on employees. The chapter identifies 
monitoring of performance and attendance. The changes in work practices and level 
of monitoring and surveillance demonstrates how ICT is utilized to achieve technical, 
bureaucratic and aspects of simple control respectively and then the chapter goes 
on to explore how ICT has developed to allow integration of these systems and 
forms of control into one overarching network (Berdayes, 2002:35).  
The chapter goes on to consider consequences of the technology, planned or 
otherwise, for the skills required to do the jobs within Revenues and Benefits. It 
points to a concurrence with the view advanced by Braverman (1998:89-90) and 
Thompson (1989:118) that within the capitalist labour process, there is an overall 
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tendency towards deskilling, although this may be uneven between groups and over 
time. This aspect is important in the overall examination of control due to the 
proposition from Braverman (1998) that worker possession of skills makes control 
more problematic for managers and so they have a motive to remove them from the 
process as far as possible to maximise the level of control that can be achieved. 
The final aspect considered is linked to one of the central questions of the thesis, in 
that if control exercised through technology had been rendered absolute, would we 
still see other forms of control being used? The research explored this issue by 
examining whether management may have attempted to control the labour process 
by encouraging worker consent through participation (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:223) 
within the areas of ICT design, implementation and use, and whether this strategy, 
if used, had changed over time. This also addressed the view from some, for 
example Burawoy (1979:30) and Sturdy et al (2010:116) that LPT focussed solely 
on the coercive aspect of the employment relationship to the exclusion of more 
participatory forms. 
7.2 ICT Systems Design and Implementation 
This section considers the design and implementation of ICT within the Revenues 
and Benefits functions and how this relates to issues of control of employees. A 
central question in this section is whether workplace ICT has been designed with 
control of the labour process in mind or whether it is intrinsic to the technology itself 
and, following implementation, whether it is used for this purpose (Edwards, 
1979:112). As such the research was concerned with who designed the various 
systems and why. The section considers three types of system used and integrated, 
namely: the two distinct core systems, an RBCA system to administer Revenues 
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and Benefits, and an EDM system to process incoming mail, forms and 
documentation; a bureaucratic system that records working time and absence and 
is, therefore, not concerned with the performance of the job itself (Littler, 1982:45); 
and lastly, performance management systems that measure output.  
This thesis considers whether ICT, given its capability for integration, is qualitatively 
different in bringing management a significantly increased, if not total, level of control 
where resistance becomes highly problematic if not impossible, as proposed by 
Fernie and Metcalf (1998) and Delbridge et al (1993). The issue of design is 
considered particularly important as the thesis takes the view that within this is 
reflected the objectives and intentions conceived of by those designing or 
commissioning the systems, which the findings show is management rather than 
the workers using them (Braverman, 1998:34-35). 
7.2.1 Core Systems 
The core systems are ICT systems with the primary function of administering 
collection and recovery of revenue, and assessment and awarding of benefits. 
There are two types of core systems used simultaneously, one to administer 
collection of revenues and awarding of benefits and used from the 1980s and 
referred to here as an RBCA system; and an EDM system to process incoming 
correspondence and forms and first deployed in local authorities from the late 
1990s. 
 Initially there seems to have been little thought as to the use the original 
computerised RBCA system would be put to. An informative account was given by 
a retired Chief Rating Officer from Authority A (interview 35) who was in charge of 
the Revenues and Benefits functions at the time of design and implementation of 
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what was the first computerised General Rates system in the U.K. It seems unclear 
as to the motive for the introduction of this technology (Hyman, 1987:37), apart from 
that the Authority had purchased a large main-frame computer and needed to 
decide what to do with it. When asked about the motivation behind the 
implementation of a computerised Rating system in the early 1980s he said: 
“When I started [at Authority A] in 1975, the first thing that happened was [the 
IT Manager] said, ‘Right we’re having a computer, a super main-frame’. It 
didn’t mean anything to me and we started chatting, ‘it seems the most 
appropriate thing to use it for is Rates’ because Rates produces loads of data 
and so, ‘what can this new computer do?’ And so, he and I said, ‘perhaps we 
should get a small group together’. That was all the brief we had.” (Retired 
Chief Rating Officer, Interview 35). 
Whilst the initial motivation for implementing the computerized system is unclear, it 
would appear to be the case those designing it were free to design a system that 
would, as Greenbaum (1998:124) stated, achieve the objectives desired by the 
designers: 
 “[In terms of controlling staff] our primary target was to get the system up 
and running by 1st April 1980, and we worked on the basis of what has it got 
to do, not how it could affect staff.” (Retired Chief Rating Officer, Interview 
35). 
The first RBCA system of its kind to be implemented was, superficially, designed 
without any objective for control of the workforce being considered and was only 
concerned with the components of effective and correct billing, collection, and 
assessing of claims, as consistent with the provision of a rational administration of 
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the functions researched (Harris, 1998:843),  and therefore it is safe to assume 
these were the primary objectives of the designers (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:221; 
Baldry et al, 1998:169). This was also the case at Authority B: 
“When it was brought in, it hadn’t got anything to do with control or monitoring 
of staff, it was to do with a more accurate way of doing things.” (Operations 
and Improvement Manager, Authority B, Interview 28) 
There is however, a technical aspect of control that appears to have been 
overlooked by interviewees, in that the RBCA system has rules embedded within it 
and inherent with this type of system (Robins and Webster, 1985:37) even though 
it may only be recognized as a way to achieve a technical solution in providing a 
more effective and accurate way of performing the work (Garson, 1989:208; Knights 
and Murray, 1994:12). Revenues and Benefits are rule and regulation driven and 
these systems are seen as ensuring accuracy and compliance with these aspects 
by proscribing employees’ actions via the embedding of rules within the system 
(Marx K., 1990:548; Hall, 2010:172-173). Whilst it cannot exercise control over the 
pace of work, it instils technical control by determining how work must be performed 
(Frenkel et al, 1999:14; Mackenzie, 1982:81). Aspects of decision-making shift from 
the worker to the ICT system designed by management (Crompton and Reid, 
1982:171) and so cannot be viewed as simply a form of mechanization without any 
control element (Edwards, 1979:112). The computerized systems in question would 
also show, contrary to Edwards view (1979:21), this form of control could be applied 
to non-production workers. 
The research showed even though the system’s control capabilities were quickly 
recognized in terms of monitoring staff, as it could electronically log work completed 
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on the system (Retired Chief Rating Officer, Interview 35), individual monitoring was 
not initially carried out post-implementation (Retired Chief Rating Officer, Interview 
35; Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18; Head of Revenues, 
Authority A, Interview 14) and as the Retired Chief Rating Officer (Interview 35) 
confirmed, implementation did not result in a reduction in supervisory staff even 
though the technology could be expected to assume some of the control (Edwards, 
1979:119; Belanger and Thuderoz, 2010:141).  
The system designed by Authority A was sold to a major software company to be 
developed into one that could be sold to other authorities (Retired Chief Rating 
Officer, Interview 35) and from this point in-house design of these systems became 
rare. There is nothing to preclude in-house design (Beirne et al, 1998:151), but cost 
benefits of not having to design and maintain the systems mitigate against this. A 
system will only have to be designed once and any software developments will be 
applied to numerous client sites simultaneously: 
“Because the legislation changes regularly, not so much in Revenues but 
definitely in Benefits, the overheads of maintaining the system for yourself 
are not cost effective, you would need teams and teams of people whereas 
there are a few core suppliers that supply the majority of councils. I doubt if 
there are any in-house Benefits [or] Revenues systems now." (Head of 
Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1). 
Whilst authorities and employees can potentially adapt systems once purchased, as 
detailed by Beirne et al (1998:151) this is not something normally be done as it may 
cause problems with future supplier software updates and potential withdrawal of 
support (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1). Whilst 59% of questionnaire 
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respondents from Authority A and 48% from Authority B felt they could adapt 
systems to their own way of working, interviews showed this only extended to the 
extent of the size of text and the number of windows that could be open at any one 
time rather than anything related to the actual working of the system. 
As the above indicates, employees who are to use these systems are excluded from 
their design and as such their interests will not be reflected, with an increasingly 
strict division of labour between those who design the systems and those who carry 
out the work (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:12). A number of RBCA systems have been 
used at both authorities due to legislative changes abolishing and instituting local 
taxes, and technological developments resulting in the move from mainframe 
computers to web-based servers. The functions carried out, however, are the same. 
With the procurement of the latest RBCA systems, employees from both authorities 
were involved in their selection. Both sites identified systems on the market 
delivering solutions for Revenues and Benefits functions. All these systems were 
already in existence: 
“There were about four systems that were available on the market. We went 
into a procurement exercise and involved a wide range of staff in that.” 
(Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18) 
and: 
“We looked at the players in the marketplace and did lots of site visits. We 
did demonstrations for staff and did questionnaires and asked for their 
comments on the usability of the system, [this] was part of the evaluation 
criteria.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1) 
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From the above it was clear the staff were not involved in anything other than their 
views on the ‘usability’ of already existing systems. This may be advantageous to 
management as external procurement may remove any meaningful element of 
control from employees: 
“the driver was to improve performance and service to the public. One of the 
reasons was poor systems performance. Poor service, ironically from our 
internal IT department, a decision was made to seek external support and 
assistance. Contractually we’re in a better position to hold suppliers to 
account.” (Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18) 
As a supplier, any software company will have to design a system that can be sold 
to customers and so the final system will be shaped by this requirement (Knights 
and Murray, 1994:25). Both the research sites use the same system for the 
collection of revenues and the administration of Housing and Council Tax Benefits. 
There is input from senior management at design and enhancement stages 
achieved by user groups instigated by the developers: 
“it’s part of a national user group where every enhancement has to be agreed 
by the group and you go through those mechanisms to achieve any change.” 
(Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18) 
and: 
“there is the user group element to this. It’s off the shelf but this process does 
enable the product to be changed from within.” (Head of Revenues, Authority 
A, Interview 14)  
The EDM system adopted by both authorities was designed externally by the same 
software provider supplying the RBCA system. This system is designed specifically 
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to process incoming mail, forms and documentation and can be seen to be an 
administrative tool. The main motives in implementing these systems was to 
facilitate space saving by converting paper documents into an electronic format, to 
reduce time in locating documents, and to provide a greater level of control in the 
allocation of work (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1; Revenues and 
Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18; External Software Development 
Manager, Interview 34). We can see, therefore, an element of technical control 
(Dawson, 1988:120) has been designed into this system. In terms of employee 
involvement with the design and use of the EDM systems, the same points are 
relevant here as with the RBCA systems, namely they are excluded in any 
meaningful way from the design process and there is no possibility in adapting the 
system other than in the most basic manner. Management, however, do have an 
input into design of the EDM system through the process of user groups in the same 
manner as described with the RBCA system.     
Whilst Wilkinson (1983:18-20) considered it simplistic to view design as a decision 
purely taken by management and highlighted the range of options within the 
process, there is little evidence to show workers using the systems detailed above 
have any significant input into this. However, the research has considered, whether 
individuals or groups of managers have their own interests and may not be a 
homogenous, coherent group and some contestation around design and 
implementation is possible (Knights and Murray, 1994:11). So, whilst Beirne et al 
(1998:157) highlighted contestation between groups and individuals in shaping the 
design of technology, this does not appear to be applicable to workers at the sites 
researched. Management contestation did not appear to be an issue in terms of the 
core systems but is highlighted when discussing the use of peripheral systems 
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designed for performance management and is also considered in greater detail in 
the following chapter on worker resistance. 
7.2.2 Bureaucratic Systems 
As we have seen in the previous section the design and implementation of the core 
systems appear to reflect management objectives as no worker involvement can be 
seen here. The second type of system to be considered in these terms is an off the 
shelf system that monitors and records workers’ attendance at the workplace both 
in terms of time worked and absences including sickness, and implemented by 
Authority B in 2009 (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27) and 
Authority A around 2011 (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14).  It is 
deemed a bureaucratic system due to it seeking to control workers by monitoring 
compliance with certain rules and policies of the organization (Edwards, 1979:131). 
These rules have nothing to do with the way work is performed but rather aspects 
such as compliance with annual and flexi leave entitlement, sick leave and working 
time (Littler, 1982:45).   
How the system is used is considered when discussing how various systems are 
utilized as tools of control but suffice to say, these systems are designed to monitor 
specific aspects of employees’ behaviour and have no input from the workers within 
the sites researched in terms of design or how they are used. The system seeks to 
facilitate management control by firstly, integrating with other systems for 
performance monitoring. Secondly, this system automatically triggers procedures 
managers must follow to comply with internal policies on time-keeping and 
attendance (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27; UNISON 
Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15) and  this removal of discretion means 
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this totally accords not only with Greenbaum’s (1998:132) view that the policy of the 
organization replaces the rule of the supervisor, but also that it has become a 
powerful control tool (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:215). According to Edwards (1979) 
the development of bureaucratic control related to deficiencies of technical control 
and was an alternative control strategy for non-production staff. However, the 
research indicates this form of control exists in conjunction with others and is, 
therefore, consistent with Hall’s (2010:171) view that ICT has the capability to 
simultaneously integrate both simple and structural forms of control strategies and 
is not part of an evolutionary process of control methods (Thompson, 1989:152) and 
would suggest even with effective technical control the bureaucratic form would not 
necessarily disappear, as posited by Rosen and Baroudi (1992:223), if delivered 
through ICT but would be potentially integrated with other forms. 
7.2.3 Performance Management Systems 
The third type of system, performance management systems are designed to extract 
and manipulate data from the core and bureaucratic systems for performance 
monitoring purposes. Although not part of the initial design brief within core systems, 
over time the performance monitoring element has been specifically developed, 
including as a separate module which is considered here. A Software Development 
Manager (Interview 34) explained the process his company had undertaken in 
developing a system considered “performance management software”. His 
company had taken over another that had developed what was, in essence, a 
spreadsheet where staff detailed what they were doing in terms of ‘processing’ 




“What clicked when we went to see what they were doing was we could do 
much more within our software. So, we designed Performance Management 
and Quality Assurance [PMQA] because without quality it doesn’t matter how 
fast you are working if you put in rubbish it ends up creating more work. We 
ended up with a module called PMQA, which has three elements to it” 
(Software Development Manager, Interview 34). 
If we discount the quality element, which is not part of the system as it involves 
manual checks of a percentage of work completed for accuracy, the other two 
elements are an electronic timesheet activated by a worker having to electronically 
sign in, extracted from a bureaucratic system as described in the previous section, 
and an electronic log of work completed, referred to as ‘events’, extracted from the 
core system, with a points weighting for each type of ‘event’  allowing the PMQA 
package to allocate a performance score of points per hour for individual workers. 
This module appears to have been purchased by a large number of authorities: 
“The unitaries, metropolitans and London Boroughs, the majority of those 
have got it, the bigger authorities, the majority.” (Software Development 
Manager, Interview 34) 
The control function provided by this system could either be something the suppliers 
have developed proactively to sell as a beneficial function, or it could be they have 
responded to a demand from the employers. When interviewing the Head of 
Benefits at Authority A (interview 1), she was of the view the software providers were 
responding to, rather than creating demand for, this control element. Either way, this 
system is designed and marketed as a control tool by the software suppliers (Kidwell 
and Sprague, 2009:196; Garson, 1989:214-215). Where an authority purchases 
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externally designed modules to monitor its employees this would appear, again, to 
leave no room for employees to intervene at the design stage. There is the option 
to include employees at any design stage should the control module be designed 
in-house. 
In terms of design, implementation and use of monitoring systems, there were clear 
differences in approach between the two authorities. The details of how monitoring 
takes place is considered Section 7.4, but suffice to say here in terms of design and 
implementation, Authority A did not design or purchase a separate performance 
management system and as such no employee input was present in terms of design 
or procurement. Authority B, whilst not purchasing the PMQA module, designed 
their own performance management module along similar lines. The details of how 
this is used is considered in the next section but in essence it is a system that 
weights certain functions according the time they take to complete, so individual 
employees are scored against a normative, managerially set and assessed, output 
expectation (McNay, 1994:95). Employees were consulted on the implementation 
of the system but only to the extent that they had some input on the timings for types 
of work items. We can see, therefore, at both sites the decision on monitoring 
performance and how this would be performed was purely a management decision 
and as such would solely reflect their interests. 
7.3 Implementation of ICT Systems and Changes to the Work Process 
Before the chapter moves on to an examination of the techniques of control 
exercised through the currently deployed ICT systems there needs to be some 
description of the way the design and implementation of these core systems detailed 
in 7.2 has affected the work process. This section details what happens in terms of 
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items of work being received by the authorities and how this is allocated to 
employees. Both authorities deal with this workflow in broadly similar ways but 
relevant differences are detailed.  
Prior to any implementation of ICT systems, letters and claims would generally be 
received by authorities in paper form. These would be dealt with by relevant teams 
after sorting by clerical staff. Officers responsible for dealing with correspondence 
would be expected to act on these items on receipt and the required calculations 
and alterations to records and accounts would be manually completed within the 
Revenues and Benefits sections respectively: 
“We had about 80 ledgers for the collection of rates and they were originally 
written by hand. The rest was done by manual calculation and entered in 
manually, the same with Rates demands. The name and address was put on 
by plates and the amount to pay by hand.” (Retired Chief Rating Officer, 
Interview 35) 
Payments and benefit entitlements would be manually entered onto an individual’s 
account. Letters or bills to individuals would be manually typed and posted. The 
recovery of debts via reminders and/or summonses would be completed by officers 
checking ledgers and determining which accounts required recovery action. 
Authority A implemented their first RBCA system in 1980 (Retired Chief Rating 
Officer, Interview 35), with Authority B following suit around five years later 
(Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18). This therefore 
occurred within the period in which computerisation was becoming a regular 
occurrence in local government (Local Government Association, 2014:12). The 
Retired Chief Rating Officer (Interview 35) and Revenues and Benefits Manager 
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(Authority B, Interview 18) concurred with the changes to the work practices 
following initial computerization. Computers initially did not alter the way the work 
entered the authorities. This was still paper based with no system of allocation of 
work and officers still selecting items to be completed. The difference between non-
computerised and RBCA computerised methods was mainly in terms of the 
calculations, now carried out by computer, and bills, now automatically generated 
with account records updated and held on computer rather than ledgers, and an 
electronic interface allocating benefits. Payments would be automatically posted 
onto accounts. Any recovery action for non-payments would now be dealt with via 
parameters on the computerised system with reminders and summonses produced 
automatically. We can, therefore, see some erosion of worker autonomy and 
increase in management control of the labour process in these changes with 
technical control implemented by embedding rules and business processes, shifting 
decision making from the worker to the ICT system (Hall, 2010:172-173; Crompton 
and Reid, 1982:171), concurring with Marx K.  (1990:548) that workers must follow 
requirements of the machine rather than vice-versa and exercising a clear distinction 
between conception and execution (Braverman, 1998:35). 
Paper-based systems of correspondence and forms continued after 
computerisation at both authorities until the implementation of EDM, seen in some 
local authorities from the late 1990s and implemented in both sites here shortly after 
2000. Following this, all items of work are electronically scanned and indexed by the 
Scanning and Indexing Section and entered into the EDM system: 
“The post is opened, scanned into the system and there is a record of that 
there forever.” (Deputy Revenues Manager, Authority A, Interview 2). 
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Phone calls from the public at both sites are currently dealt with by call-centres, an 
electronic form completed and passed to the teams via the Scanning and Indexing 
team entering it into the EDM system. Following the implementation of EDM at no 
stage in the current work process is there a paper letter, claim or enquiry form 
passed to individual members of staff. The allocation of work can be performed by 
the EDM system (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27; 
Assistant Benefits Officer, Authority A, Interview 3) further extending technical 
control seen with the RBCA systems by removing autonomy in work selection giving 
weight to Braverman’s (1998) view that computerization would provide the control 
for clerical and administrative staff that the production-line had for production 
workers (Thompson, 1989:80; Button et al, 2003:54-57).   
Since the implementation of EDM items of work are no longer physically held in the 
workplace but are transformed into electronic copies allocated to individual 
electronic in-trays. A further aspect of EDM is certain incoming forms that may have 
required manual input or amendment on the RBCA system, are now automated 
(Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27). For example, a claim 
form for a particular type of discount can be dealt with by EDM using, Optical 
Character Recognition and Optical Mark Recognition that update the RBCA system 
without human intervention: 
“We use a system that automatically takes data from claim forms, formats it 
to squirt it back into the [RBCA] system. It’s indexed automatically against 
the register of people on our system and squirted back so it’s set up without 
manual intervention” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1). 
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 In respect of these tasks, human intervention has been eliminated. This aspect in 
the development of ICT is increasing: 
“Last year in May and June, which is the big tax credit change period, we did 
56% automatically, this year we did 71% automatically.” (Head of Benefits, 
Authority A, Interview 5)  
We can see in the discussion regarding moving from pre-computerised to 
computerised methods of work there was a change in how the work was done, with 
the computer taking over much of the calculation and applying the rules and 
regulations for administration of Revenues and Benefits. The inputting of data onto 
the computer system was carried out by individual employees. However, some 
functions, such as billing generation and recovery of debts had been taken over by 
the computer system. This has continued but with an increasing amount of the work 
of inputting data now having been automated too, resulting in a potential 
displacement of labour. We have also seen ICT systems implemented with the 
capability of allocating work to individual workers, thus potentially removing a 
worker’s autonomy in work selection.  
The core systems (RBCA and EDM) have affected the work process and initiated a 
level of technical control absent before their utilization within Revenues and 
Benefits. The other systems, bureaucratic and performance management, have not 
altered the work process as they are not concerned with the actual administration 
of the functions. However, as detailed in the next section, the changes in working 
practices have affected how the other types of systems have been integrated into 




7.4 Monitoring and Surveillance 
Following on from considering how design and implementation of the systems 
utilized can be seen to privilege management not worker interests and how the 
changes in work practices following computerization led to a level of technical 
control being implemented, we now examine when, why and how ICT became used 
for the purpose of management control of performance and behaviour through 
monitoring and surveillance. The argument here is this is carried out to achieve 
intensification of effort from workers as a necessary response to central government 
policy initiatives and budgetary reductions and not necessarily as a proactive 
decision taken by local government management or employers (Ironside and 
Seifert, 2001; Gill-McLure, 2014). This section considers the way ICT is used as a 
tool for monitoring, firstly for performance, and secondly attendance, and how these 
two elements have been integrated to achieve an overarching network of control. 
From this stems the proposal that these ICT systems are being utilized to achieve 
a level of panoptic capability allowing employers to maintain control regardless of 
the geographical location of the worker. It is worth noting, however, initially following 
computerization in Revenues and Benefits the main focus was a system of 
supervisors whose physical presence provided control in a simple form and the 
technology should therefore not be considered deterministic (Edwards, 1979): 
“You had supervisors who each had a small team, eight or so, who if people 
were chatting too much would make it clear, ‘that’s enough now get your 
heads down and get some work done’.  And of course, there was a half-yearly 
balance so senior management knew everything was being done correctly 
and in time. They also knew who was in or on holiday or sick and monitored 
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and signed off timesheets so it was up to them to keep everything running” 
(Retired Chief Rating Officer, Interview 35) 
and: 
“I remember managers would start to [interviewee taps desk with a pen] do 
that and people would stop talking. The main view was you would soon 
realise if work wasn’t being done, or wasn’t being done correctly because the 
public would let you know. I’m not sure it always worked but that was how 
workers were managed” (Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, 
Interview 18). 
7.4.1 Monitoring of Performance 
Although neither site were subjected to CCT the policy did impact on them (Wilson 
and Game, 2006:355) with research indicating close individual monitoring was not 
something staff were subjected to until the early 1990s, following authorities being 
subjected to a regime of government performance indicators (Wilson and Game, 
2006:183) and potentially being drawn in to the CCT process (Revenues and 
Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18; Head of Revenues, Authority A, 
Interview 14; Byrne, 2000:556). This was confirmed by the Operations and 
Improvement Manager (Authority B, Interview 28) in that “we never used to monitor 
what people did anyway”, and: 
“For individuals it wasn’t like they do now, ‘this is how many pieces of work 
you will do in a day and if you don’t do it we want to know why, and if you 
continue not to do it you will be in trouble’. That never happened” (Retired 
Chief Rating Officer, Interview 35) 
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 A view was put forward by the Retired Chief Rating Officer regarding central 
government policy, concurring with Ironside and Seifert (2001:4) regarding these 
issues: 
“I do think there was a qualitative shift from the mid to late 80s in terms of the 
government introducing performance indicators, CCT and targets and as you 
are seeing now, in an extreme form, starting to squeeze the money that was 
going in and to a certain extent forced us to act as though it was a business 
that was put in a false situation of competition with other councils.” (Retired 
Chief Rating Officer, Interview 35). 
How budgetary constraints have affected operations on a day-to-day basis was 
outlined by the Head of Revenues at Authority A: 
“As budget cuts start to bite the problem is the politicians and the powers that 
be aren’t going to say, ‘it’s alright we appreciate that …’ they are going to be 
saying, ‘you’ve still got to collect this money and deliver this service, you’ve 
got to do what’s needed’. So, the problem you have got is, ‘how do I get more 
work out of the people I’ve got?’ and that’s where technology will increasingly 
come in, monitoring so staff are working to their best in terms of output and 
increasingly automating entire processes” (Head of Revenues, Authority A, 
Interview 14). 
We can see the effects of Government policy initiatives and financial cuts 
(Thompson, 1990:110) flowing from the critique the public sector privileged the 
interests of the producer over the consumer (Kirkpatrick and Martinez Lucio, 
1995:8), was a drain on the public purse (Thornley et al, 2000:140) and managers 
within the public sector were incapable of  controlling pay or productivity (Gill-
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McLure, 2014:372), may have had the result of forcing local authorities and their 
managers to adopt management practices seen in the private sector as argued by 
Ironside and Seifert, (2001:3).  
The research indicates a change in how authorities, formally subordinate to central 
government (Travers and Esposito, 2003:20), sought to control the labour process 
in terms of intensification of effort brought about by policy initiatives detailed above, 
and the threat of underperforming councils having services removed (Orr, 
2005:377). This can be seen to have led to a shift resulting in a congruence of 
management practices between the public and private sectors (Martinez Lucio and 
MacKenzie, 1999:165). This has resulted from conscious decisions of management 
(Knights and Murray, 1994:16) who, whilst being employed in the public sector must 
enforce any administrative, regulatory or legal requirements (Gill et al, 2003:258).  It 
is the case contracts of employment within the public sector are generally 
indeterminate in nature in terms of the amount of work required (Braverman, 
1998:37; King, 1990:76). As highlighted by Gough (1979:119) with public sector 
workers, and Braverman (1998:248) with non-productive workers, there is no reason 
as to why they cannot perform surplus labour. Therefore, as with the private sector 
where the motivation is not control per se but the maximization of profit (Bain and 
Taylor, 2000:9), the problem for local government employers is providing the same 
service for a reduced amount of money, as highlighted above (Head of Revenues, 
Authority A, Interview 14).  
The problem for managers becomes equivalent to the private sector, in that they 
had to transform labour power into an adequate amount of actual labour (Marx K. 
1990), but in this case as a consequence of central government policy and dwindling 
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resources rather than the profit motive. A Systems Officer (Interview 11) who was 
employed within the private sector prior to being employed at Authority A believed 
that she had seen management practices in terms of control of labour, within local 
government become identical with those she witnessed prior to her employment at 
the authority. As such we see the motivation for the use of ICT in local government 
as not only a means of achieving a more effective and accurate way of working 
concerned with quality and processes (Garson, 1989:208) from a professional 
bureaucratic perspective (Wilson and Game, 2006:96), but also as a means of 
control of the labour process (Wilkinson, 1983:21) to achieve the optimal quantity of 
surplus, and therefore unpaid, labour (Gintis, 1987:69) which, as proposed by 
Gough (1975; 1979) may result in an increased appropriation of surplus labour 
within the capitalist sector and therefore increase profits. In this sense the 
application of technology as a disciplinary tool in this context is confirmed as specific 
to workplace relations (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:164) and is a sufficient 
explanation for the control of workers (Hassard et al, 2001:347), rather than as part 
of a wider disciplinary system as proposed by Foucault (1995). The Head of Benefits 
at Authority A (Interview 1) and Operations and Improvements Manager at Authority 
B (Interview 28), confirmed their recollection that not only prior to computerization 
but also prior to the requirement for performance indicators, there was no individual 
monitoring. As such there appears to be some concurrence between changes in 
government policy and individual performance monitoring. This was also articulated 
by the Head of Revenues at Authority A: 
“My brief used to be about quality and customer service. since all the targets 
and now the cuts have come in, it’s really only about volume. Getting more 
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and more out of less and less. That’s what I’m paid for now” (Head of 
Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14) 
However, in considering these responses the view expressed in Chapter 6 that it is 
potentially problematic in terms of accuracy recalling events from a considerable 
time ago, as highlighted by Patmore (1998:222-223) needs to be borne in mind here, 
particularly as very few of the interviewees were employed in the areas under 
research prior to, or immediately following computerization. Whilst it does appear 
from the evidence individual monitoring did not take place immediately following 
computerization, supervisors were employed who were answerable to more senior 
managers and it is likely therefore, that control of labour was in place as highlighted 
in Chapter 2 (Harvey and Hood, 1958:242; Ironside and Seifert, 2000:37; Webb and 
Webb, 1897:819), albeit using non-technological techniques. It may also be the case 
that any control applied was not necessarily perceived as individual in nature and it 
was only with the advent of ICT systems that the forms of individual monitoring now 
seen could be applied (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1). However, it also 
appears, whilst this level of individual performance monitoring was possible, it was 
not the inherent qualities of the technology that determined whether it would be 
used. 
When both authorities started monitoring individual performance, this was done by 
computerised and manual means. Broadly speaking, computerised monitoring 
involved automated counting items of work completed and comparing this to a 
managerially set target, whilst manual monitoring involved checking the quality, that 
is the correctness or accuracy of work completed, therefore focussing on outputs 
(Seifert, 2018:111). Authority A operates with separate Revenues and Benefits 
departments. Those working in the Revenues department are subject to both 
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computerised and manual monitoring. Those working in the Benefits department are 
not subject to individual computerised monitoring but were subject to individual 
manual monitoring of quality. Authority B operated a combined Revenues and 
Benefits department where staff below Team Leader level in the structure are 
subject to both forms of monitoring.  
We now turn to examining how ICT has become fundamental in delivering 
performance monitoring on the scale we now see (Thornley et al, 2000:152; 
Beynon-Davies and Martin, 2004:217). Both sites employ EDM systems and it has 
been noted how EDM facilitates an aspect of technical control (Edwards, 1979), in 
that it potentially removes discretion individual workers have in selecting what 
pieces of work they undertake. The Operations and Improvement Manager from 
Authority B (Interview 28) recalled letters held in a cardboard box with staff selecting 
items they wanted to deal with and leaving others for someone else. The 
implementation of technical control through EDM systems potentially removes this 
autonomy from the individual worker and places it with the system or manager 
(Button et al, 2003:54-57): 
“There’s no free for all where, ‘I’ll just take this or that bit of work’. It’s either 
allocated to you or it’s the next piece that [automatically] comes from the work 
tray.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1). 
Work allocation is important in how performance monitoring works, particularly at 
Authority A where no separate performance monitoring system has been designed 
or purchased. The element of monitoring dealing with the volume of work completed 
by individuals here is a count of completed items taken from a report from the EDM 
system and compared against a managerially set target (Head of Revenues, 
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Authority A, Interview 14; Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 13). Workers also have 
to electronically clock in and out, and log on and off on the core systems. Should 
less than a full day be worked a proportion of the target is used. There are two 
questionable aspects to this target setting. Firstly, there appears to be no objective 
criteria: 
“There’s no scientific approach. We just looked at historic data and said ‘let’s 
look at a long period of time, six months or whatever, and see what the 
average is [and] let’s just try and bring the weakest performers to average’” 
(Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14). 
A Senior Billing Clerk at Authority A confirmed how she believed the targets were 
set: 
“The way it’s set is if one clerk can produce 50 or 60 items a day … and 
another can produce 30 or 25 items then they get the average from it.” (Senior 
Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 12) 
Another member of staff articulated what employees at her level felt about the nature 
of performance targets: 
 “I personally think they just pluck a figure out of the air. I can’t see where 
they get it from” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 6). 
 In terms of this aspect of monitoring it is problematic where an average figure is 
used as a target, as by its very nature some will be unable to hit it as to calculate an 
average figure dictates some will fall below it. 
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Secondly, the items of work carried out by individuals are not standard. One 
document may be dealt with in a few minutes and another make take considerably 
longer: 
 “[If] we say 25 cases a day you don’t know really whether they’ve got 25 
complicated or easy cases” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1).  
The monitoring of individuals is based on items of work completed. However, this 
does not actually measure the work they may have done to reach this point and 
concurs with the findings in the survey conducted by Marsden and French (1998:9) 
in respect of the nature of the work making accurate measurement problematic: 
“currently it’s five an hour but some days you would struggle to do five all 
morning because pieces of work are not always straight forward. You don’t 
get all the information, so you have to send a letter off and that can be any 
time. There is no set time to do a piece of work, so how can you measure it?” 
(Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 6). 
and: 
“there can be times when you have meetings et cetera and although you get 
standard times set for the day, if you have taken longer than expected, or you 
have systems problems that’s not always taken into account.” (Billing Clerk, 
Authority A, Interview 13) 
 A solution to this has been advanced that if the individual has no control over 
allocation of work achieved by the technical control of the EDM system, randomness 
deals with potential discrepancies over time.  The EDM system incorporates a ‘next’ 
button and when an item of work is completed if this is pressed the system 
automatically allocates the next one: 
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“You can’t cherry pick; you get the next item. In a day you might have the bad 
luck of getting three really nasty ones, so we never look at it in that period of 
time. But over a month it evens out and we look at it historically month on 
month.” (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14). 
Even if this has the effect of evening out the discrepancies between individual items 
of work, this is not what actually happens: 
“A good few years ago we used the ‘next’ button. At the moment I don’t think 
anybody presses it. We haven’t for years because the work put into our trays 
on a daily basis is prioritised, so we don’t get that option anymore unless 
you’ve got nothing in your tray, which doesn’t happen.” (Billing Clerk, 
Authority A, Interview 10) 
This is a clear example of senior management being unaware of what actual working 
practices are. As far as management are concerned, certain pieces of work are 
more urgent than others and as a result of cuts in resources due to financial 
constraints, backlogs occur leading to supervisors prioritising certain items of work 
over others. Therefore, the use of the ‘next’ button has been curtailed as per the 
comment made by the Billing Clerk above, (Interview 10). This means the selection 
of work cannot be made by the individual employee but neither is it random: 
“the Senior or Team Leader looks and sees what needs actioning quickly and 
distributes it that way. They are trying to deal with the most important 
because if you press the ‘next’ button it’s just what’s next in the tray and if 
you did this they would know because you wouldn’t be dealing with the work 
they had prioritized for you.” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 6). 
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The monitoring of individual employees at Authority A is currently being performed 
on employees at the level of clerks and senior Clerks within the Revenues 
Department. This was confirmed in a number of interviews with Authority A 
employees (Billing Clerks, Interviews 6 and 10; Senior Billing Clerk, Interview 12). 
This method of monitoring also used to be carried out within the Benefits 
Department. However, this stopped when the current Head of Benefits took over: 
“I am not a fan of averages, averages can be manipulated and if you’re 
measuring something you should understand why … and what can actually 
influence what you’re measuring.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 
1) 
 “We abolished it because we were counting rubbish really, and documents 
completed in EDM was rubbish.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 5) 
Whilst there is no individual monitoring undertaken within the Benefits Department 
at Authority A, due largely to the Head of Benefits dislike of the lack of objective 
rigour in the monitoring process, it occurs at team level. Benefits administration is 
subject to Government performance indicators and the targets are taken from these: 
“We give teams performance targets now and it’s up to the team leader to 
manage staff how they see fit.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1) 
In essence, we can see whilst the technology allows management to count items of 
work completed by individuals, this does not necessarily mean it is an accurate 
measure of the work they have performed. There is a clear difference between 
managers regarding the desirability of this form of monitoring. However, the 
desirability from management’s perspective will depend on the motivation for 
implementation. If the intention is to intensify the effort of workers, and this may be 
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one of a very limited range of options managers in local government have (Ironside 
and Seifert, 2001:3-4), objectivity may be of little concern. This provides further 
evidence technology is utilized, not in a pre-determined manner, but as a matter of 
choice (Noble, 1979:18-19; Wilkinson, 1983:18), and how it is used may vary 
according to choices from managers and potentially contestations from other actors, 
including within the management group (Hall, 2010:164). 
Authority B operates a single Revenues and Benefits department with a uniform 
monitoring approach that is different from Authority A. Whilst Authority A appears to 
have little objective justification for the way it monitors the actual amount of work 
performed, Authority B has instituted a system that, superficially at least, seeks to 
address the issues of objectivity raised by the methods of Authority A.  
Authority B have designed and implemented their own system for monitoring staff 
output called the ‘Performance Hub’. This system fits the description of a 
performance management system as detailed in Section 7.2.3. It works by 
extracting data on completed work items from EDM for each individual and inputting 
these to a database. Each document is assigned a type when scanned into EDM. 
Where Authority A operates a monitoring regime that simply counts items of work 
completed, Authority B allocates a timing for each type of work: 
“The basis was time and motion. Every function was measured and timed 
and a reasonable average applied which was then fed into this system” 
(Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18) 
“We did a timing exercise on all types of work coming in. We got everybody 
from the slowest worker, who we know is slow, to the fastest, so we get a fair 
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average of how long it takes to do a piece of work.” (Revenues and Benefits 
Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24) 
“We accepted that’s an average and we worked with staff that they accept 
‘well I’ve done that claim and you’re only allowing me 40 minutes but that one 
took me 50’ so we work with staff to say ‘yes but that one only took you 30’, 
so because we are working with averages, over a period of time it should 
work itself out.” (Operations and Improvement Manager, Authority B, 
Interview 28) 
When a piece of work is completed on the core system this is fed into the monitoring 
database and the timing for that type allocated to it. In this way, over a day the 
system is able to calculate the number of items of work completed and the notional 
time this should have taken to complete. There should be no point in individuals 
trying to select easier types of work to increase performance totals, as is the case 
with Authority A, as the timings for these would be less than more difficult types 
(Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27). Working time is also 
monitored by a computerised system, identified in Sections 3.3.2 and 7.2.2, as a 
bureaucratic system, that electronically records when the person arrives at and 
leaves work and also when they log on and off the core systems. 
A number of interviews (24,27,28) at Authority B detailed how the ‘Performance Hub’ 
works. The working day is calculated from the time the worker logs onto the system 
until they log off. This is adjusted for ‘legitimate’ non-productive time staff can input 
when they are engaged in activity not related to the completion of work items, such 
as “non EDM time because [they] were in a meeting or training” (Operations and 
Improvement Manager, Authority B, Interview 28). The system, therefore, has 
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information on the time the employee has as potentially productive time and the 
number of completed items, each of which has a timing applied to it. This data is 
then fed into the Performance Hub which calculates a percentage of notional 
productive time worked from the time logged on to the system and the actual 
completions. These ‘scores’ are then put into a range relating to the acceptability, 
or otherwise, of the individual’s performance. If the number of items of work 
completed equals the time at work this would give a score of 100%. However, 
management accept staff may not be productive 100% of the time and have 
implemented what they refer to as a ‘traffic-light system’. Between 0% and 74% 
productive time is classed as ‘red’ and deemed unacceptable. 75% to 89% is 
classed as ‘amber’ and deemed satisfactory, with ‘green’ being given as optimum 
between 90% and 120%. A figure of over 100% is accepted because some will work 
faster than the set timings, as would be expected when using averages. There is an 
expectation that homeworkers, those who work at home rather than based in the 
office, should produce more due to reduced interruptions, with the red band having 
a higher limit of 84%. According to the Revenues and Benefits Supervisor (Interview 
24) these levels were agreed with the trade unions but the research did not 
corroborate this. 
It appears, superficially at least, Authority B has developed a more objective system 
for performance monitoring. However, it should be noted the timings for work types 
are averages. Therefore, on any day an individual’s performance could be judged 
inadequate as the system cannot accurately measure the work performed. Although 
there may appear to be a greater degree of objectivity applied, neither site can claim 
to operate a genuinely objective performance measurement regime. 
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If the monitoring regimes used at both sites do not accurately measure the amount 
of work done, then a relevant question is what is the motivation behind them? It 
would appear the motivation for this type of monitoring is not that it provides any 
useful information regarding an individual’s performance, as was articulated by the 
Head of Benefits at Authority A (Interview 1), but rather it provides a level of control 
for managers in intensifying the effort of individual workers (Bradley et al, 2000). 
Rosen and Baroudi (1992:217) were of the view, output itself is not the concern of 
management but rather if the correct behaviour is achieved there will be a 
satisfactory level of output. The less than objective manner output is measured at 
the two sites gives some credence to this view. Interestingly the questionnaire 
carried out at the two sites showed a difference in how the staff viewed the real 
reason monitoring was carried out. When given the statement “Performance 
monitoring is not about accuracy, it is about getting us to work harder”, more than 
half (61%) of respondents in Authority B agreed as opposed to just over a quarter 
(28%) at Authority A. However, in terms of whether they would work less hard if 
performance monitoring was not in place, no one at Authority A agreed with this and 
only 9% at Authority B. As to whether staff felt pressure to meet management targets 
61% of respondents at Authority B agreed with this as opposed to 86% of the staff 
in Revenues subject to this in Authority A. Only 20% of Benefits staff at Authority A 
subject to team level monitoring felt this pressure. This and the interviews certainly 
point towards a motivation for individual performance monitoring being for the 
reason of intensifying the effort of individual employees (Bradley et al, 2000:105-
106). Furthermore, regardless of whether employees believe this is the motivation, 
this does appear to be the effect. The next quote is from an employee who admitted 
they would not work as hard without performance monitoring: 
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“I would definitely work at a more reasonable pace if I could, without this.” 
(Benefits Assessor, Authority B, Interview 17) 
It also appears some who feel they would work as hard without performance 
monitoring, nevertheless perceive management motivation as intensification of 
effort: 
“They try and screw more and more work out of us for the same money.” 
(Billing Clerk, Authority B, Interview 22) 
 “I check before I go home and if I am five short or something then I think ‘I’ve 
got to do more tomorrow, I must catch up’, I would stay till six most nights to 
make sure I had done my quota” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 6) 
There did appear to be a somewhat contradictory indication in this area when 
comparing the questionnaire response which indicated almost 90% and 75% of 
workers at Authority A and B respectively would work as hard without monitoring, 
whereas in the interviews, they indicated the worry, stress and pressure they felt to 
achieve targets: 
“I thought, ‘do I need to get away from people and not listen to office banter? 
Just concentrate on my work’. It was once a relaxed office where people were 
relaxed about stopping and having a conversation and now you don’t get that 
because you’ve constantly got work in your tray. You’re constantly worried, 
thinking, ‘if I don’t get this done’, it came to the point where I was counting 
the amount of work I was doing and thinking, ‘Oh God I’m going home soon 




Managers interviewed generally accepted one of the results of this type of 
monitoring by the use of ICT is the intensification of effort and increased output, thus 
concurring with Bradley et al (2000:105-106), Oz et al (1999:168) and the general 
view of interviewees above. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Taylor (1947) believed it 
was natural for workers to shirk and for this to continue was a failure of management 
(Jacobs and Heracleous, 2001:123). A Revenues and Benefits Supervisor from 
Authority B concurred with this view: 
“As soon as we put that Performance Hub in place and started measuring 
performance, you could see over two to three months each member of staff’s 
performance started to increase. Obviously, people knew their performance 
was being monitored, the office was quieter, work started to increase” 
(Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24) 
The Operations and Improvement Manager at Authority B, responded to the 
suggestion that around three quarters of employees responding to the questionnaire 
within Revenues and Benefits at her authority indicated they would work as hard 
without monitoring as follows: 
“That’s rubbish, absolute rubbish. I can honestly say under the system we 
have seen a massive impact in terms of output. If you know you’re being 
checked and your performance is being looked at you are more aware of, ‘oh 
I’d better put my mobile phone away’ for example. ‘I’d better stop this 
conversation’. Don’t manage the mobile phone, manage the performance. It 
took all that micro-managing away because people knew what to expect. 
People work harder if they’re performance managed, undoubtedly.” 
(Operations and Improvement Manager, Authority B, Interview 28) 
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The Head of Revenues at Authority A also concurred that monitoring of this kind 
had the effect of intensifying the effort of employees and needed to happen because 
of reduced resources: 
“the problem I have is, how do I get more work out of people, and that’s where 
technology will increasingly come into it. That’s both better efficiency through 
automation et cetera and making sure staff are working to their best in terms 
of output. Monitoring is a crucial aspect of this.” (Head of Revenues, Authority 
A, Interview 14). 
There is a second element in the monitoring regimes undertaken by both authorities 
in relation to the accuracy of the work carried out. It was pointed out by a number of 
the interviewees there was little point encouraging a high level of output from 
individuals, if that resulted in a high level of errors. Both sites operated a manual 
checking of work from individual workers as it was impossible for these checks to 
be carried out via the system. Both sites had a section whose role was to perform 
quality checking: 
“The quality of work, all the ‘exemptions’ and ‘disregards’ and 10% of other 
work gets checked. Quality is monitored that way.” (Senior Billing Clerk, 
Authority A, Interview 12) 
“We’ve got a new member of staff. He’s only just picking up the job so you 
check 100% until we are happy what he is doing is ok and then we’ll ramp 
that down.” (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27)   
There is a view for this type of monitoring to achieve an intensification of effort, 
workers must be aware of consequences of their failure to achieve the desired level 
of performance (Larson and Callahan, 1990:530), as it is these consequences that 
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ensure the required behavior (Hunton et al, 2008:1555). However, no workers at 
either site had been subject to any formal disciplinary or capability action as a result 
of performance monitoring.  Initially it was considered whether, as any action could 
not be instigated automatically, managers were simply avoiding confrontation 
(Zuboff, 1988:334-335; Hyman, 1987:41). However, the process at both sites was 
to raise informally if output is deemed unsatisfactory: 
“If they get a red the supervisor speaks to them and says “what’s going on?”” 
(Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24). 
“Informal. I may have been told but it’s not really discipline, she just said, 
‘your numbers are a bit awry’” (Scanning and Indexing Clerk, Authority A, 
Interview 4) 
Whilst there is a clear requirement for human intervention in terms of target setting 
and action for failure to attain these (Baldry et al, 1998:173-174), there is some use 
of technology to ensure supervisors are complying with the monitoring procedures 
(Thompson and Bannon, 1985:107). Supervisors at both sites believe they are 
monitored as to whether they raise these issues with members of staff. This is a 
manual form of monitoring as detailed below: 
“My team leader will check to see if I have done what I’m supposed to. What 
we do on the Performance Hub is where we have spoken to a member of 
staff, we put the day we have spoken to them and a brief description of what’s 
happened. So, if my team leader, sees them in red, she will say, ‘What steps 
has he took? I can see, fair enough’” (Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, 
Authority B, Interview 24).  
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Whilst managers at both authorities confirmed no formal disciplinary or capability 
action had been taken against individuals (Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, 
Authority B, Interview 24; Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14), they were 
of the view that normal methods of control, namely disciplinary or capability action, 
would be undertaken if informal aspects of this form of monitoring proved 
unsuccessful: 
“It wasn’t a stick to get people sacked, it was something that identified to us, 
‘this person isn’t performing very well. Work with them, develop them, get 
them into the green.’ Ultimately if we can’t do this it becomes a capability 
issue. Somebody asked me the direct question, ‘could we be sacked because 
of the information the system is showing?’ I said, ‘if after development we still 
couldn’t get you into the amber then yeah you could be. It could be down to 
capability and you’re not capable of doing the job’” (Operations and 
Improvement Manager, Authority B, Interview 28) 
The fact no formal action has been taken has been cited as a reason to believe this 
type of monitoring works due to workers behaving in a way that avoids sanction 
(Hunton et al, 2008:1555) and in this sense, it may be seen as management 
exercising an effective control over the labour force: 
“Because the processes are in place before you get to disciplinary action you 
resolve the issue, so that Big Brother scenario does the deal without having 
to resort to disciplinary action, which is obviously a preferable outcome.” 
(Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14) 
However, ultimately there are other reasons why disciplinary and capability cases 
may not be arising. The Head of Benefits at Authority A (Interview 1) made the point 
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that it was difficult to recruit experienced and qualified Benefits Assessors and even 
within Revenues where recruitment was not problematic (Head of Revenues, 
Authority A, Interview 14), there is a training and replacement cost in having to 
replace workers and this would concur with Batstone’s (1988:223) view around the 
level of control that may be ceded by either side depending on the cost of applying 
sanctions: 
“We’re not using it as a tool to hit somebody over the head [or] as a 
mechanism to get rid of them. Why would we want to do that? We need the 
staffing resource. The last thing I want to do is get rid of somebody and have 
to invest in somebody new and the costs associated with training. I would 
rather the staff already here are performing to adequate levels and we 
haven’t got to go through the cost and resource of replacing them.” 
(Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18). 
This type of monitoring of employees where numbers are taken directly from a 
computerised system has been advanced as an objective form of performance 
measurement. This has also been put forward by managers as fair, as it prevents 
arbitrary sanction by managers without any actual evidence. The performance target 
itself becomes a rule and the basis of authority (Dawson, 1988:120; Edwards, 
1979:131): 
“It could be used to take people through a capability procedure and for me 
that’s better than what we had, which was perception. At least you have got 
hard facts.” (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27) 
 Ultimately this argument is difficult to sustain, as the measurement is only 
superficially objective and fails to accurately measure all work performed. It is also 
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the case there was little, if any, disciplinary or capability action, arbitrary or 
otherwise, taken against individuals regarding performance prior to this form of 
monitoring being implemented (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1; Head of 
Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14; Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, 
Interview 18). In fact, potentially it is now more likely to be used to support action 
taken against individuals on the basis of capability. This was expanded on by the 
UNISON Branch Secretary at Authority B who felt the use of computer-generated 
performance figures did not prevent managers from picking on individuals, albeit the 
examples he was aware of were not in the Revenues and Benefits Department and 
so are only mentioned to illustrate how managers could use data. The basic premise 
articulated was managers can and do target individuals: 
“Individuals have been targeted. They use whatever evidence they have to 
hang somebody and it’s done in such an unfair way” (UNISON Branch 
Secretary, Authority B, Interview 33) 
Whilst the comments above point to perceived unfairness in the way computerised 
monitoring could be used, managers have pointed to what they feel is not just an 
objective way of measuring performance but also action in respect of poor 
performance can be sustained by comparing output between individuals, potentially 
exerting peer-pressure to increase output (Sewell, 1998:420). Both authorities 
organize their workers into teams based on geographical areas and a number of 
interviews highlighted a concern from individuals that they should not let their team 




“I’d love to be able to put some figures in front of you that are verifiable and 
say, “this is what you’ve done during the year and here’s an average for 
everybody else in your team”. All these things are possible.” (Software 
Development Manager, Interview 34) 
The difficulty reliance on supposedly objective evidence can cause for employees 
and their unions was raised: 
“Monitoring definitely makes it more difficult to defend people in capability 
situations. It’s harder to claim a worker is being unfairly targeted if bosses 
have data showing they are performing below par compared to others. 
Before, we might have had a shot at saying, ‘you’re picking on them’.” 
(UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15)    
This would appear to give a greater control over the labour process in as much as 
individuals can potentially be replaced or removed as part of a move to achieve a 
cheaper displacement of labour. However, this potential does not appear to be used 
by management at either of the research sites. In terms of intensification of labour 
however, there is evidence provided in this section to show this has resulted from 
the monitoring undertaken at both sites. 
7.4.2 Monitoring of Attendance and Absence 
We have considered control aspects applied through ICT systems extracting data 
from core and/or bureaucratic systems that, in respect of Authority B feed into a 
separate performance monitoring system creating an overarching network 
establishing a technological system of control for managing performance. We have 
seen up to this point technology used seeking to achieve control whilst the worker 
is at work. This section, however, considers how bureaucratic attendance 
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management systems are used, separately to their role as a component of 
performance management systems, to implement a level of control on another area 
of employee behaviour, absenting themselves from work. This aspect of control has 
a two-fold characteristic. Firstly, it seeks to remove control from workers who may 
use absence as a means of effort-management and escape from managerial control 
(Edwards and Scullion, 1984:553), and secondly it may intensify work by increasing 
the level of attendance with staff attending rather than taking sick leave.  
Both sites use swipe-cards that must be used when staff enter and leave the 
workplace. We have also seen the moment someone logs onto the core system is 
recorded. This combination is used to monitor periods of inactivity where individuals 
may have potentially absented themselves from the workplace and therefore may 
prevent and give management control over unauthorised absences during a working 
day (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1; Operations and Improvement 
Manager, Authority B, Interview 28) which, prior to the use of this technology, may 
have been unseen (Edwards and Scullion, 1984:553).  
An area where management have sought to increase control is around sickness 
absence where, 
 “technology has also started to have an effect not just on monitoring people’s 
work but enforcing attendance.”  (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, 
Interview 15).  
 At both sites an HR management system was implemented within the last decade, 
where sickness absence is logged, triggered by a failure of any employee to clock 
in via a swipe-card. Managers failing to log the absence are reported via the system 
to the central HR department. Parameters are set by corporate policy indicating to 
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managers when absence triggers are hit and a meeting must be held. Unless there 
are any absences that can be discounted due to disability (as defined by the Equality 
Act 2010), pregnancy, or industrial injury, a warning must be issued, including where 
a doctor’s note has been obtained. Further absences within a set period of time 
move the process automatically to the next stage and ultimately a dismissal hearing: 
“When they are monitoring sickness [absence] that’s recorded on the system 
through ‘Yourself’ [the HR management system]. I think that’s a form of 
control, a stick to threaten you with. You can see ‘Yourself’ and when you hit 
a trigger and I think that does put people off from phoning in sick.” (Benefits 
Assessor, Authority A, Interview 9)   
“There’s corporate targets that must be met for sickness, and where they are 
breached it triggers a warning to the manager saying, ‘this person has 
triggered these targets’, they are called in for a meeting and there are various 
stages to that.” (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, Interview 27) 
“The warning is for a failure of attendance and the managers do not take into 
account the nature of the illness. In essence they [HR] want a policy where 
managers get to the capability stage more quickly than if left to their own 
devices” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15)  
When the meeting has been held and a warning issued, the system must be updated 
by the manager indicating this. If the manager chooses to ignore this, it is reported 
via a system generated report and they are challenged as to why this has not been 
done. This is, therefore, a system of monitoring individual managers, subjecting 
them to control with regard to this aspect and who have effectively had discretion in 
this area removed (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:221). As with performance monitoring 
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there is recognition that failure to behave in accordance with managerially set norms 
requires consequences for the worker. Managers at both sites maintained that since 
these systems were implemented, sick leave had significantly reduced (Head of 
Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1; Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14; 
Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18), thus potentially 
achieving an intensification of labour. 
7.4.3 Panoptic Control 
This section examines the view that what we have seen in the previous sections on 
monitoring and surveillance of performance, activity and attendance, including the 
integration of separate ICT systems has, led to a panoptic level of control. To recap, 
originally conceived as an ideal prison, it enabled prisoners in cells to be constantly 
observable from a central vantage point without them being aware of whether they 
were being viewed (Foucault, 1995). It was not deemed necessary to continuously 
view the prisoner as the possibility they were being viewed meant they would 
behave as if they were (Sakolsky, 1992:238). We have seen in previous sections 
how ICT is used to monitor workers performance and attendance. The research 
indicates the integration and concurrent use of systems detailed can be considered 
a panoptic form of control as proposed by Berdayes (2002:35) who saw this 
technology as mimicking the panopticon. 
A development in Revenues and Benefits departments over the last decade, adding 
weight to this view has been the increase in workers who are no longer office based 
but work from home. The introduction of EDM means that, for example, Benefits 
Assessors do not have to access actual paper files to make an assessment as all 
documentation received is scanned and indexed and placed in electronic in-trays 
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(Scanning and Indexing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 4; Revenues and Benefits 
Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24). This technology means employees can now 
work from remote locations (Thompson and Smith, 2010:21): 
“There’s nothing to stop someone on the other side of the world from working 
for us. There’s now the opportunity to totally divorce work from the locality. 
When we started the home work project we did something called a location 
independence test which says are you linked to a workplace because of 
particular filing or machines you need to use, or because you have to see 
face-to-face people? Is there anything that links you to a particular place, and 
with Benefits Assessors it didn’t and therefore it was prime for home working. 
You could do it anywhere.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1). 
 In essence: 
“As all the work is on the computer, people can stay where they are. You can 
send them the work rather than before, they came to the work when it was 
paper.” (Assistant Benefits Officer, Authority A, Interview 3) 
An important aspect of this geographical separation is the panoptic power of the 
technology employed and its effect on the workers subjected to it. The view 
expressed by Foucault (1995) that the concept of the panopticon could be applied 
to the workplace is encapsulated by the following comment: 
 “We know how much work someone is doing because we can see it in EDM 
and there’s all these electronic systems that see when you log in [and] out. 
You don’t necessarily need to monitor people for them to be productive. The 
fact they know you could, makes them work but we don’t sit there all day 
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watching them. The fact we could is the deterrent that stops them” (Head of 
Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1). 
The view of this manager coincides with Sakolsky (1992:238), that it is the potential 
for them to be monitored in this way that ensures they work and means there is 
actually no reason to continually monitor, even when the worker is geographically 
separated from the main workplace. A supervisor at Authority B summed it up as: 
“The way technology works now means managers don’t need to monitor and 
surveillance people to the nth degree because people know it could be done. 
So, I never really know when they are watching me and when they’re not, so 
I’d better behave myself because there’s this audit trail and there’s the 
possibility I’ll be caught.” (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, 
Interview 27) 
As a technique, employing technology with the capability to have this level of 
panoptic quality would, from the perspective of management, go some way to 
ensuring employees work rather than spend paid time in idleness. This form of 
control has undoubtedly been one of the deciding factors in allowing employees to 
work from home but is not exclusive to workers employed remotely. This 
surveillance can be seen as another strand of control sitting alongside the regime 
of monitoring and targets. It is a further means of control which potentially removes 
from workers their ability to manage their own effort. Where targets are set it is 
always possible individuals may rush through the work to enable them to take it 
easier later in the monitoring period. This panoptic control makes this less likely as 
the system can report on spells of time where little or no work is completed: 
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“We have got Citrix [software allowing remote access to a central server] and 
when you log onto the system, that’s your personal log on, so when you use 
our system it knows it’s you and nobody else. I couldn’t log in as you. When 
I log on that’s me and my time sheet. With the EDM system when they touch 
a piece of post it date stamps it with a time as well, up to a second. So, we 
can see when you say you’ve started at eight o clock we can look at the 
Performance Hub and that tells us what the first piece of post that has been 
‘completed’ or ‘pended’. We allow about 15 minutes and say, “well yeah, fair 
enough” but if they said eight o clock and the first piece of post was not 
completed until 10, then questions are asked, ‘what have you been doing for 
two hours?’” (Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24) 
We can see here the level of panoptic capability ICT delivers (Sewell, 1998) with a 
level of integration that not only measures output and ensures rules regarding time-
keeping and attendance are complied with but also surveilles workers with regard 
to their activity, legitimate or otherwise, for example unauthorized internet use 
throughout the working day, or indeed where no activity is seen at all (Oz et al, 
1999:167; Kolb and Aiello, 1996:408). As such we can see an integrated network 
evaluating output against managerially set norms (McNay 1994:95), supported by a 
system that can detect periods of inactivity, unauthorized activity and attendance all 
motivated by management’s desire to intensify effort. In effect this deals with the 
issue as raised in Chapter 2 where the distinction between labour-power and labour 
is raised. The technology here can be seen to be guaranteeing attendance, the 
presence of the labour-power, and actual work, or the transformation of this 
attendance into labour. 
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 This thesis views the panoptic capability of ICT when used as a means of 
intensifying effort to be consistent with a Marxist labour process perspective being 
specific to the workplace relationship in its application and in this it does not need 
to form part of any wider system of control. This is achieved without requirement for 
the simultaneous presence of a supervisor (Zuboff, 1988:322) due to the technology 
itself providing the necessary control (Belanger and Thuderoz, 2010:141). This 
helps alleviate the problem identified by Edwards (1979) of achieving simple control 
within a large organization and subsequent spatial separation meaning remote 
workers can be subject to a managerially appropriate level of control (Baruch, 
2000:38; Castells, 1992:208).  As there is no requirement for the simultaneous 
presence of supervisor and worker it extends the concept of the panopticon from a 
notion where individuals had to behave, as they were never sure whether they were 
being observed (Sakolsky, 1992:238), to one potentially where observation is 
constant and certain (Hunton et al, 2008:1555) regardless of the physical presence 
of supervisors (Zuboff, 1988:322).  Therefore, the requirement for an exponential 
increase in managers in relation to the size of an organization (Edwards, 1979:19), 
can be reversed due to technology assuming some of the control function (Garson, 
1989:223). It therefore also fits in with the requirement to displace labour, as one of 
the few options open to management to achieve required budgetary cuts (Ironside 
and Seifert, 2001:3-4). Both sites reported a reduction in supervisory staff over the 
preceding ten years of around 50% (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14; 
Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18) which can be plausibly 
attributed to the level of panoptic capability and also technical control achieved 




7.5 Control and Skill 
One area potentially linked to the issue of control through technology is that of skill. 
The question considered in this section is whether the removal of skills means 
employers and management may exercise control more effectively and this is why 
deskilling is a central tenet of labour process theory (Elger, 1982:26) and whether 
this applies within the public as well as private sector: 
“If technology deskills, you have greater control over people because it’s 
obviously easier to replace them” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority B, 
Interview 33) 
 Staff who possess skills management no longer require, or skills of a more generic 
nature may be more easily replaced. They are potentially more easily controlled due 
to their reduced ability to rely on any value and scarcity of the skills possessed. This 
raises a number of questions. To what extent is the deployment of technology a 
deliberate attempt to deskill jobs to enable an increased level of control (Braverman, 
1998) and how does the deployment of technology affect skills, does it merely deskill 
jobs or does it introduce new skills? 
A majority of those returning the questionnaire felt the technology currently used 
has had the effect of making the job less skilled. In Authority A, 63% of respondents 
believed the job would require a higher level of skill without the technology used, 
against 25% who disagreed with that position.  The results from Authority B for the 
same question were 53% (but 63% for those specifically identifying as Benefits 
workers) and 29% respectively. A typical response from the interviews was: 
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“The rules and regs are so complicated it would be difficult to do without 
computers. They would have to employ more workers and pay a lot more.”  
(Benefits Assessor, Authority B, Interview 23)  
However, whilst this does indicate deskilling due to the technical control inherent in 
the embedding of rules and regulations, questionnaire responses detail some 
contention as to the extent of this. When given the statement “I feel the technology 
used in Revenues and/or Benefits requires a high level of skill”, 49% and 47% (and 
of those specifically identifying as Benefits workers, this was 58% and 75%) of 
respondents from Authority A and B respectively agreed with this, with 39% and 
29% respectively disagreeing. We can see, therefore, staff may feel whilst 
technology has reduced the level of skill required, there remains a high skill 
requirement.  
In terms of whether we are seeing deskilling or upskilling the research points to an 
uneven effect with some staff seeing the requirement for skills reduced in their role, 
whilst another, apparently smaller, group of workers are required to acquire new 
skills or at least have their skills maintained:  
“You’ve got two types of people, administrators who feed the system and do 
the same thing and that’s most staff, and you’ve got people whose work is 
constantly changing because they’re always at the leading edge of changes” 
(Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 5) 
Whilst highlighting the difficulty of recruiting competent and qualified Benefits 
Assessors, the Head of Benefits at Authority A (Interview 5) confirmed she was 
aware there were moves to develop software to deal with the complexity of this area, 
so deskilling the work of Benefits Assessors. This concurs with the view that whilst 
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initially technology may not deskill and rather, may require upskilling, the tendency 
is for all roles to be deskilled (Thompson, 1989:118; Gorz, 1976:57). The uneven 
effect on skills is a complex area, with no direct causal effect that the ICT used in 
Revenues and Benefits departments has simply caused deskilling. In one sense 
automation can be seen to have reduced the simpler elements of the job: 
“There’s another argument about technology such as telephony systems. In 
effect that takes out easy stuff and the pressure’s now greater because all 
the easier stuff is done and what we get is all the nasty ones” (Head of 
Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14) 
Whilst the above discussion points to a consensus that for the majority of workers 
at the two sites deskilling has occurred it is likely this is not necessarily part of a 
strategy to gain a greater control of workers per se but has largely become about 
shedding staff to save money due to financial constraint, forcing managers to 
change the focus of control from quality to cost: 
“We are talking about more of a self-service approach, as financial pressures 
rise. 15 years ago, it was, ‘no this isn’t about losing staff; it’s about improving 
customer experience’ et cetera. We’re in a different world now. Now it is 
about losing staff because it’s about losing the cost and about 90% of our 
cost is staff. So, you are getting to a point where you’re having to automate 
whole processes.” (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14) 
However, this explanation whilst potentially correct in detailing the prime motivation 
for the implementation of ICT systems does not mean jobs were not lost, even if not 
dealt with by way of redundancy but rather through natural wastage. As detailed in 
Section 6.5, Authority A has seen a staffing reduction since 1990 in the areas of 
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Revenues and Benefits of 47%, with Authority B seeing a 44% reduction over the 
same period with the associated reduction in labour costs.    
In looking at the motivation behind the implementation of technology and its 
relationship to skills we can potentially see two distinct aspects. Firstly, in terms of 
automation, this appears to be driven by financial constraints and a requirement to 
achieve savings, which as discussed was a link made and encouraged by central 
government (Local Government Association, 2014:13) through reducing labour 
costs as a major element of public spending (Ironside and Seifert, 2001:3-4; Gill et 
al, 2003:261-262; Gill-McLure, 2014:370) with a potential result of an increased 
appropriation of surplus labour in the capitalist sector (Gough1975:83). This does 
not deskill as much as remove labour from the process, although it may have the 
result, by elimination of simpler tasks, that the residual tasks are the more complex 
ones. Secondly, there is the implementation of systems that embed rules within 
them thus limiting or curtailing employee discretion and autonomy. This may have 
the result that tasks left to be performed by workers, even if comparatively more 
complex, have a reduced skill element, as indicated by the questionnaire responses. 
It would be likely any new skills required in terms of systems implementation and 
development would not be seen within the Revenues and Benefits staff but would, 
as discussed in Section 7.3, likely be outsourced.  The acquiring of more generic 
skills may not offset the loss of more specific ones (Glenn and Feldberg, 1979:61), 
with the result of an increased level of management control. General IT skills once 
seen as an upskilling rather than deskilling element are now perceived differently: 
 “We introduced EDM about 15 years ago. At that time there was concern 
and an issue about people having basic computer skills. People did use 
computer systems but they were nowhere near as integrated into the 
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workflow and so when we introduced this there were issues we needed to 
address and train people and make sure what people were doing, which 
seems amazing now when you see my nieces and nephews. Even my five-
year-old niece knows her way around a tablet but I remember doing sessions 
on how to maximise and minimize windows, stuff like that. The world has 
shifted on an axis since then. It’s much more endemic. Kids and people who 
join us now have got those skills already. So, there was the technological 
skills required, and that isn’t much of an issue now.” (Head of Revenues, 
Authority A, Interview 14). 
There does seem to be a concurrence of views that the issue of skills has affected 
groups differently. Benefits Assessors are seen as highly skilled and whilst there are 
developments to automate as much of this process as possible, it is currently viewed 
this group do possess, as highlighted in Chapter 5 with recognition of the continuing 
regulatory changes in this area (Harris and Rutledge, 2013:12; Salman, 2001), and 
in comparison with their Revenues counterparts, a skill set that is more resilient than 
those areas in Revenues subject to deskilling: 
“With Revenues you’ve got all this on-line single person discount and change 
of address forms, basically when you do this on-line it loads into the system 
and just gives warnings and all they do is check these. I think that has brought 
a deskill of Revenues Officers, but for Benefits, regulations keep changing. 
From April there’s backdated Benefits discount changing to four weeks, 
there’s changes to tax. These are skills Benefits Officers still need to process 
claims and when they are on the counter we have to do manual calculations. 
But Council Tax regulations are static. You can do more automation like a 
single person discount you fill a form in saying, “I live on my own” that goes 
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into the system, you can see the date, it awards the single person discount 
and it’s done.” (Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24) 
Benefits Assessors are like gold dust, you can’t get trained assessors. We 
went through a recruitment campaign a few years ago and we couldn’t get 
them. Benefits Assessors are rare because of the knowledge of all the rules 
and regulations and decisions you have to apply. On the other side I think 
you could take a Benefits Assessor, give them a Revenues job and they could 
do it, because they are using the [same core] system, the rules are relatively 
simple. Going the other way, Benefits is complicated, and even as the 
manager of Benefits I wouldn’t be able to assess a claim because I don’t have 
that knowledge. (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1) 
However, even given this view, the staff’s perceptions generally do appear to be 
that ICT has reduced the skill required to do the job: 
“It takes away a lot of skills. You can do anything now can’t you, on a 
computer? All that thinking has been taken away, you just press a button, 
your end date is automatically put in for you, but you still have to think in 
terms of your regulations and such.” (Senior Benefits Assessor, Authority A, 
Interview 7) 
It does appear therefore, as highlighted by Grugulis and Lloyd (2010:94) there is a 
polarizing effect ICT has on different groups of workers. From the above it appears 
within the Revenues function, the relatively static and less complex regulatory 
aspects have made automation and the embedding of rules more prevalent than in 
the Benefits environment with its constantly changing, more complex framework of 
regulation. However, it is worth reiterating here the comment made that technology 
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is potentially being developed to automate these aspects too (Head of Benefits, 
Authority A, Interview 1) and so fits with Thompson (1989) and Gorz’s (1976) view 
of the tendential aspect of deskilling and the fact development of technology is 
ongoing (Sivarajah and Irani, 2018:1). It is also worth noting here the link with skill 
and monitoring in that the more a job can be standardized and routinized the more 
calculable it becomes in terms of effort (Lukacs, 1971a:88), thus resolving some of 
the issues relating to objectivity in performance monitoring raised earlier. Whilst 
Negrelli (1988:90) highlighted a possible move away from Taylorist solutions and 
bureaucratic regulations within the productive private sector due to the capability of 
ICT to allow for a more instantaneous response to new demands, this would appear 
to be relevant to the private sector with a desire to open up new product and service 
lines,  and not the areas under research where the administration of Revenues and 
Benefits are driven by bureaucratic rules and regulations and as such, skills lost 
would not be expected or required to be replaced through innovation. 
During the research managers consistently raised the point that monitoring is not 
solely about control but also training and development of individuals and their skills 
(Frenkel et al, 1999:142-143; Zuboff, 1988:317; Sewell, 1998:407): 
“With the element of control, I think it facilitated more performance 
management of the staff involved and I think the nature of that is it increases 
output. Now I’m reasonable, I’ve got a management head on looking at this, 
but there are two elements. One is to make sure everyone is earning their 
corn and two, is highlighting issues where we need to develop people. It’s not 
all about sticks, it’s also about, I suppose, not much of a carrot, but saying, 
‘look what’s the issue here with training requirements’”. (Head of Revenues, 
Authority A, Interview 14) 
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This would appear to be a somewhat problematic view as it does appear the 
implementation of ICT has deskilled, and is deskilling work for the workers being 
monitored. It could conceivably be for the reason that individuals are inputting 
incorrect information into the system or not following the correct procedures in terms 
of data input but the research shows no link with monitoring identifying a deficiency 
in a certain skill and then addressing that. As such a plausible explanation given by 
Chalykoff and Kochan (1989:809) is this is stressed to obscure its use as a coercive 
tool of control. 
7.6 Control by Consent 
One of the central questions in this thesis is whether control of workers has been 
rendered complete by the use of ICT (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Delbridge et al, 
1993). The previous sections have highlighted control applied directly or achieved 
indirectly, however, in answering this question, it would seem pertinent to assess 
whether any form of control is used without recourse to ICT. Should this be present 
it may indicate potential deficiencies within technological control (Grint and Woolgar, 
1997:119). Chapter 2 considered whether control of the labour process required a 
combination of coercion and consent (Gaines and Domagalski, 1996:182). When 
asked in the questionnaire regarding whether they were encouraged to participate 
in deciding how the work was done, this was somewhat inconclusive with 41% and 
47% at Authority A and B respectively agreeing that they did, as opposed to 39% 
and 38% disagreeing. This potentially points to ambiguity within the question itself. 
We have seen in Section 7.2, there was little, if any, worker participation in the 
design of systems used. There was some encouragement for workers to be involved 
in both the selection of the systems used and in Authority B the procedures used in 
performance management as confirmed by the Operations and Improvement 
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Manager (Interview 28). Whilst this involvement may have been motivated by a 
desire to incorporate and make labour complicit in consenting to its own control, the 
research shows only an appearance of choice for workers from among a number of 
managerially acceptable positions (Burawoy, 1979:27) and was clearly not a threat 
to management prerogative as workers were not in a position to influence whether 
systems were used, only which software supplier, and likewise were not consulted 
on whether they accepted monitoring and performance management (Dyer-
Witheford, 1999:224) (Interview 1, Head of Benefits, Authority A; Interview 28, 
Operations and Improvement Manager, Authority B).  
Both sites had in the past used some form of management participation schemes, 
primarily ‘Investors In People’ (IIP). However, staff at both sites confirmed this was 
no longer genuinely pursued and there were no other participation schemes. At 
Authority A it was only of concern when accreditation was due for renewal: 
“when the people from IIP decide whether or not we can carry on having 
accreditation, we set up a staff forum group.”  (Assistant Benefits Officer, 
Authority A, Interview 3). 
At Authority B, a Recovery Officer (Interview 32) said they thought IIP had been 
“knocked on the head” due to lack of resources. A Billing Clerk at Authority A 
believed the only time management paid any attention to IIP is if inspectors were 
attending as part of a re-accreditation exercise when staff would be “coached” as to 
what to tell them (Interview 13). As Sturdy et al (2010:5) believed, coercion was not 
the only way to achieve control, however, a lack of resources in addition to effective 
control via ICT could be reason as to why a coercive approach in itself would be 
utilized. The actual reason for the lack of activity around IIP is unclear. However, it 
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would appear there is no serious attempt to control through consent. This may give 
some weight to the view that if technology can provide an adequate level of control, 
managers may not seek other means (Grint and Woolgar, 1997:119). 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the research findings in respect of how the technology 
used within the Revenues and Benefits departments of the two research sites 
relates to the aspect of management control of workers and the labour process. The 
chapter considered the design and implementation of ICT systems from the 
perspective that the objectives of those who design or commission them will be 
reflected in the process. Three particular types of system were identified. Firstly, 
core systems, consisting of two systems, RBCA and EDM. RBCA systems are 
concerned with the correct, and therefore legal, administration of Revenues and 
Benefits. The initial RBCA system implemented was felt by those who designed it 
to have no control element. However, the fact the system administered Revenues 
and Benefits by way of standardized inputs and outputs means there was clearly an 
element of technical control. An examination of working practices prior to the 
introduction of RBCA systems, showed with the exception of the embedding of rules 
and regulations within the system, the working practices and workflow remained 
largely unchanged by computerization within Revenues and Benefits at both sites.  
A significant change in working practices came with the development of EDM 
systems when an extension of technical control was potentially achieved by system 
allocation of work, meaning ICT could now determine both how and what work was 
carried out, leading to a further reduction of autonomy for workers. These systems 




Individual performance monitoring was a known capability of the initial RBCA core 
system following implementation but was not exploited in any significant manner 
until external pressure from central government was applied by the requirement for 
performance indicators and targets, compulsory competitive tendering, and financial 
constraints with a subsequent shift from a management style of professional 
bureaucracy to one focussed on outputs and people management broadly in line 
with the concept of NPM. Managers interviewed clearly linked the use of technology 
with achieving requirements in performance and labour displacement as a result of 
external pressures. As such changes in how the technology is used in terms of 
control can be seen to be as a result of management objectives rather than any 
technological determinism. 
The second type of system identified were bureaucratic systems monitoring worker 
behaviour in relation to corporate and departmental HR policies and as such can be 
seen to have a clear control motive. The relevant areas here were those of 
timekeeping and attendance. The design of the systems enabled electronic clocking 
in and out, and electronic monitoring of logging on and off the core systems. The 
systems were designed to report worker transgressions automatically to managers 
in respect of attendance and activity. The chapter also noted how a strict sickness 
absence management policy was enforced using these systems. Underpinning this 
was monitoring of managers by more senior managers or the HR section to ensure 
policies were adhered to and the required action taken against transgressors. 
However, this does indicate a continuing requirement for a certain level of human 
intervention and interpretation.  
 The third type of ICT system identified was designed to monitor output performance 
and as such had a clear control objective. This type of system highlights   
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developments in ICT allowing for the integration of separate systems. The extraction 
of data from core and bureaucratic systems into a performance monitoring system 
allows for output to be compared to managerially set targets. The methods 
employed for performance monitoring at both sites are less than objective, a position 
accepted by a senior manager at Authority A, and so we can posit a reason, 
supported by the research, for this regime is to achieve an intensification of effort 
rather than any meaningful data.  
The research has pointed to, with the possible exception of the third system type, a 
lack of worker involvement in the design and implementation of the systems. Even 
where there may be some worker input into design and procurement, this appears 
to be in terms of choices being available within a range of managerially acceptable 
options. The system’s design and utilization can, therefore, be expected to reflect 
the intentions of those who design or commission them, in this case senior 
management, who even when not designing systems, shape the development of 
them through user-group participation and the final decision on procurement. Whilst 
bureaucratic and performance monitoring systems appear to clearly have control of 
performance as an objective, this was less apparent with core systems. Although 
core systems had a technical control element as part of their design, the inherent 
output monitoring potential was not utilized immediately following implementation of 
the RBCA system. We can see therefore, systems can be designed with control as 
an objective, or that control may be an intrinsic potential. Either way, it is clear we 
are not witnessing technological determination but these outcomes are a matter of 
managerial choice potentially mitigated by negotiation and contestation. We can see 
these objectives may change, not necessarily by development of technology, but by 
changes in the material conditions management operate in.  
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A particular concern of the chapter was to consider the extent the concept of the 
panopticon could be applicable to control applied through the integration of ICT 
systems. The conclusion was this level of integration did lead to a form of panoptic 
control with both attendance at work and performance whilst attending, being 
simultaneously subjected to a potentially constant managerial scrutiny. However, 
the research also pointed to support for the view that this is not a simple dichotomy 
of control with management on one side and workers on the other. Rather, we also 
witness managers themselves being subject to the same forms of panoptic control 
applied to those they supervise. There are further supporting factors in the 
proposition that the integration of ICT systems has led to a high level of panoptic 
control. Firstly, staff are now allowed to work from home but are still subject to a 
comprehensive level of monitoring without the requirement for a physical 
supervisory presence. Secondly, we have seen a significant reduction in the number 
of people employed within the supervisory tier. The view that panoptic control could 
be shown to be effective by the lack of disciplinary or capability proceedings was 
felt to be more problematic as there were very few of these prior to the 
implementation of these regimes also. 
The chapter also considered how ICT has affected skills required to perform jobs 
within Revenues and Benefits. This was viewed as particularly pertinent as the 
thesis accepts management control can be more effectively exercised where skill 
levels required to perform work is low or commonly available. A number of factors 
were seen as relevant here. Firstly, the embedding of rules and regulations into core 
systems, ostensibly as a tool to achieve a more effective administration of the 
functions, engendered a level of technical control resulting in a deskilling of the 
roles. Secondly, it was recognized in the research that the roles increasingly 
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required skills that were generic and widely available within the working population. 
However, it was also the case that deskilling should not be seen as uniform in terms 
of its scale. Those working within the Revenues field appeared to be more affected 
by the impact of loss of skills, and within Authority A these workers were the only 
ones subjected to individual performance monitoring. The research, however, did 
support the view of a general tendency towards deskilling in the public as well as 
private sectors. 
The final consideration was to consider the issue of management attempting to elicit 
consent from its workforce as a method of control. There was evidence 
management included workers in the procurement process of new ICT systems. 
However, this needs to be seen in the context of a selection from a number of 
already existing systems, which as we have seen reflect the intentions and 
objectives of management not workers. Authority B, who designed a performance 
monitoring system did have some worker input but this was not in any way a choice 
as to whether they should be monitored and a more plausible explanation is workers 
were placed in a position where they were effectively accepting and being positioned 
as complicit in their subjection to management control. Both sites were nominally 
members of the IIP scheme that should have required some staff participation. 
However, this was not now actively pursued. The possible explanation here could 
be a diminution of resources plus an effective regime of control achieved through 
ICT satisfies management objectives. It can be seen here, workers at the two sites 
have no input in terms of design of any systems and any participation cannot be 
seen to challenge management prerogative and the systems of control in place will 
reflect management prerogatives albeit this will be an outcome of negotiation and 
contestation within the management group.  
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One of the central aims of the thesis is how ICT has been utilized as a tool of labour 
control within the areas researched. In doing this, light has also been shed on 
another central aim of the thesis, namely the motivation for seeking such control 
within the public sector. The initial utilization of computerized systems in these areas 
mirrored the professional bureaucratic approach of local government management 
as detailed by Harris (1998:843) as a “rational administration of bureaucratic 
systems”, prevalent at the time. The motivations of management in respect of labour 
control appear to have shifted due to external pressures from central government 
resulting in a requirement for increased intensification of labour. The link between 
central government policies and this change springs from the findings that although 
the potential for monitoring of performance was present within the initial core 
system, this was not exploited. At no point in the research did managers indicate 
that intensification of labour was a specific goal prior to the external pressures being 
applied. As such the research findings are consistent with a view that the state 
desires a maximization of surplus labour in the public sector and that a combination 
of government policy and ICT development was used to effect a change in 
management behavior. Technology, then can be seen to be used as a tool to 
achieve the objectives of management, including as shaped by external forces, and 








Chapter 8 - Findings 2: Resistance 
8.1 Introduction 
This is the second of the two findings chapters. It follows on from the chapter on 
control, to consider incidences of, and potential for, resistance from workers to 
management control exercised through ICT, the third major theme of the thesis. 
Resistance, as a term used within this chapter, follows the definition arrived at in 
Chapter 4. If management seek control of the labour process as a way of intensifying 
labour and removing discretion in how work is carried out then resistance can be 
any act that would challenge, subvert or prevent this as workers potentially seek to 
resist management control. The issue of resistance is situated within the debate 
around whether ICT has resulted in a totalizing control by eliminating the possibility 
of resistance, as posited by Fernie and Metcalf (1998:9) where the power of the 
supervisor has been “rendered perfect” by computerization, and as Delbridge et al 
(1993:98) advance, “where there is little, if any, room for employees to exercise 
counter-controls over the pace of work and task execution” as a result of 
surveillance via ICT, or whether resistance remains possible (Bain and Taylor, 
2000). Should evidence of actual resistance be found this would give credence to 
the view that technology has not proved capable of preventing all resistance. 
However, in terms of potential it needs to be understood there may be no incidences 
of resistance but that it remains a possibility and this chapter explores this.  
The chapter commences by examining aspects of individual resistance, that is those 
not expressed collectively. It will be seen that any individual resistance will be in 
relation to how systems are utilized and not around implementation itself. Firstly, it 
considers the monitoring of individual performance through the use of ICT and 
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whether in its operation this leaves spaces for resistance to take place. The chapter 
considers the extent to which standardization of work may be important for the 
monitoring of performance (Lukacs, 1971a:88) and how this may affect potential 
gaps in technical control that may be exploited by workers. Related to this is how 
workers may seek to manipulate performance monitoring figures as a means of 
subverting management control. The chapter also considers how management deal 
with those who are detected taking part in this form of resistance. The chapter then 
goes on to examine the monitoring of attendance and absenteeism at the workplace 
in the context of absence being utilized as a means of resistance (Edwards and 
Scullion, 1984). The chapter pays particular attention to the extent ICT systems may 
have curtailed this form of resistance. 
Following on from a consideration of individual resistance by workers, the chapter 
seeks to move from a simplistic binary position where managers control and workers 
resist, to a more nuanced view. The chapter considers the extent to which managers 
may themselves individually be subject to the control of more senior managers 
through ICT systems and so, therefore, may also be motivated to resist control. It is 
worth noting here Braverman’s view that apart from the most senior management, 
managers are analogous to other employees (Braverman, 1998:288-289). The 
chapter particularly considers the extent to which managers’ roles may be 
threatened by control regimes, including the subsuming of supervisory functions 
within the technology itself and how the career structure of management 
progression may have been altered by technology. The chapter examines the view 
that management should not necessarily be treated as a homogenous entity with a 
coherent programme (Wardell, 1990; Hyman, 1987) and whether technology is, 
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therefore, determined as a result of negotiation, contestation and resistance, not just 
between management and workers but also between managers themselves. 
The previous chapter considered the issue of skills from the perspective of 
management control. This chapter considers this from the perspective of how ICT 
may have impacted on the ability for workers, or indeed managers, to resist such 
control, particularly the effect this may have on their capacity to resist control by 
quitting and transferring their labour to another employer. This aspect is considered 
here as the effects of ICT on skills are potentially pertinent to both workers and 
managers in similar ways. 
 Collective resistance, particularly in terms of actions expressing a collective 
response to management behaviour, is the next aspect to be considered. The 
distinction between individual and collective resistance in this thesis is the former 
cannot be identified with the institutions of organized labour (Martinez Lucio and 
Stewart, 1997:74), therefore particular interest here is in resistance as expressed 
through trade unions. The chapter examines the extent to which evidence exists of 
trade unions seeking to influence design and resist implementation or particular 
uses of ICT systems relating to control of the labour process. Consideration is given 
to the extent to which unions’ action in this area is driven by the views and 
responses, or lack of, from their members. The chapter also reflects on the 
distinction between resistance pre and post-implementation of ICT systems and 
examines whether there is a different approach in these phases. The chapter moves 
on to explore how ICT may have affected union organization, chiefly around 
developments in the geographical dispersion of workers as a result of homeworking. 
An aspect of this is the extent to which unions may make use of ICT themselves as 
an organizing tool (Dyer-Witheford,1999:126). 
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In considering the extent to which ICT may have led to management having 
achieved total control by curtailing worker resistance, the chapter considers the 
position equating the lack of any resistance with an increase in the use of ICT 
systems. Other explanations are considered in terms of any absence of resistance. 
These explore the possibility resistance may be absent due to attitudes held by 
individuals, that whilst potentially influenced by technology, may not be as a result 
of the properties of the technology itself and may remain a potential that workers 
may engage in. In particular, the research considered in this chapter addresses 
issues raised in the literature in Chapter 4 around whether workers see control 
regimes initiated by management as fair (Challykoff and Kochan, 1989:811), the 
perception technology is inherently progressive and any resistance is therefore 
backward in nature (Burnes et al, 1988:7), or finally it is fear, particularly of 
unemployment (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:196), and it may be any of these, rather than 
the property of the technology itself, that may be a deciding factor in the absence of 
resistance. 
8.2 Evidence of Resistance 
This section considers the evidence emerging from the research of any actual or 
potential resistance within the Revenues and Benefits departments of the two 
authorities being researched. Firstly, Section 8.2.1 considers individual workers 
carrying out acts that would be clearly resistant to management control. This is 
clearly evidence of its possibility within the ICT facilitated control regimes. Potential 
resistance was examined firstly, where acts that may not have a known meaning, 
for example absence, but that in certain circumstances may well constitute a 
resistant act, and secondly, there is also consideration of the extent to which 
workers may have knowledge of how to act in a resistant manner, thus indicating 
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the potential for resistance, if not its actual occurrence. Section 8.2.2 considers the 
actions of individual managers in resisting more senior managers to extend the 
usual simple binary view where managers control and workers seek to resist. The 
research considers the extent to which managers may not act as a homogenous 
and unified group. The issue of the effect of ICT on skills and its relationship to 
individual resistance is addressed in Section 8.2.3. Finally, Section 8.2.4 examines 
any organised resistance through and from trade unions operating within the 
authorities. 
8.2.1 Individual Worker Resistance 
When researching the incidence of individual worker resistance, what was apparent 
was the lack of this regarding technical control achieved through the embedding of 
rules and regulations within the RBCA systems. The unanimous view of those 
interviewed was that any input outside the parameters of the system would be 
invalid and prevented and that unless no ICT systems were used this was a fact that 
must be accepted. As such, this section largely looks at actual accounts of how 
workers seek to resist one of the main examples of control identified in the research 
detailed in the previous chapter, namely control exercised through monitoring and 
targets (Beirne et al, 1998:157). In terms of what staff might do to subvert this control 
and potentially regulate their own effort levels, a number of themes arose during the 
interviews. Firstly, is an issue staff at both sites referred to as ‘cherry picking’, 
essentially an individual deciding what items of work they wish to do and what they 
did not. This is important as items of work are not necessarily standard and so some 
are easier to deal with than others and effectively would entail staff subverting this 
aspect of technical control (Taylor and Bain, 1999:107). Even types of work 
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appearing superficially the same may have different levels of complexity or require 
investigation to complete: 
“Moves, changes of address aren’t widgets, you could have a chain this long 
or that long. It could be in-borough, out-borough, people all don’t necessarily 
move on the same day and then you have got direct debits to sort out. 
Nothing is straight forward.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 5) 
“Revs and Bens, it’s not like making widgets, is it? Where each thing is 
exactly the same as what you had got in front of you before.” (UNISON 
Branch Secretary, Authority B, Interview 33) 
 It may be useful for an individual in terms of what score they achieve in performance 
monitoring to select easier pieces of work. It may also be the case, regardless of 
performance monitoring, an individual worker may not want to deal with more 
complex cases. Management are keen to prevent this practice and one of the 
reasons for this is it provides some weight to their argument that in terms of 
monitoring, random selection allows for averages to be used over a period of time 
in determining performance (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview14; 
Operations and Improvement Manager, Authority B, Interview 28). 
Officially, management at both sites do not think individual work selection occurs, 
with an example given below. It was accepted this regularly occurred under the 
paper-based systems prior to EDM: 
“Before EDM… work would literally be in a cardboard box and you would 
think ‘oh somebody else can have that one, that looks nice I’ll have that’. I 
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don’t think people can do that now.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 
1) 
However, further down the management structure at Authority A, it is acknowledged 
individual selection may happen but managers could check to see if this was being 
done. There was also the view that to a certain extent the relationship between the 
individual employee and their line manager is one of trust: 
“They can cherry pick but I can monitor [that] because I can look at the trays, 
I can see the oldest piece of work not allocated … within the tray the person’s 
name is next to the item of work, and if further down say there’s one piece of 
work that’s been allocated before the oldest, then that person has gone in 
and took that piece of work themselves but you’ve just got to trust the staff to 
not do that.” (Assistant Benefits Officer, Authority A, Interview 3) 
At grades below the team leaders it appears they are clear it can be done: 
“I could do it, if I wanted to. Instead of taking the oldest piece of work which 
might be horrible, it could be, ‘ooh I really don’t fancy doing this today’. I have 
access to go into the team tray and pick out a load of easy work if I want. I 
don’t know how managers monitor whether that’s happening or whether they 
look at the actual items you have completed and say, ‘hold on, she’s just 
completed 10 cases that are really easy’. Managers should be able to see 
the team tray and see the oldest piece of work and assessors that are 
completing work, they should be able to look at what date work you have 
completed. But yeah, you can go in and just cherry pick your own work 
because the facility is there for you to do it.” (Senior Benefits Assessor, 
Authority A, Interview 7) 
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“You can put work back into the generic tray but we know that is normally 
monitored by the supervisors. So, if anybody does that they will say, ‘why 
have you done it?’ and then the supervisor then deals with it if there is a 
problem. We’re told not to do it but there’s no restrictions on our access levels 
for distributing work.” (Benefits Officer, Authority B, Interview 31)  
We saw in the previous chapter, part of management’s defence of the validity of this 
type of monitoring, in essence the counting of completed items, rested on the 
assumption that any variations in the timings of individual pieces of work would even 
out over time. It can be seen, therefore, why they would not want individual 
employees to have control over work allocation. However, it is clear workers have 
this capability even though none admitted to doing this. However, this may be one 
of the potential situations where no admission may not equate to absence of the 
behaviour due to it being deemed unacceptable to management (Taylor and Walton, 
1971:220; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:3). One reason this capability exists is 
work items are not standard (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 5; UNISON 
Branch Secretary, Authority B, Interview 33) and there needs to be a possibility for 
prioritization leading to potential gaps in the functioning of the system that may be 
exploited by workers, as highlighted by Bain and Taylor (2000:13). In a backlog 
situation there may be a decision to prioritize certain types of work over others due 
to a difference in relative importance. Although the technology has the capability of 
automatically allocating work, in practice this would not be practical in all situations. 
Therefore, this element cannot be subject to total technical control due to a 
requirement for human intervention (Taylor and Bain, 1999:107). The interviews 
highlighted concerns individuals have that they may be caught if they seek to 
subvert this technical control due to the presence of audit trails acting as a panoptic 
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tool allowing for a simple form of control, that is the potential to be spotted by a 
supervisor, thus discouraging this (Berdayes, 2002:35): 
“You could move it from your box to somebody else’s but there’s an audit trail 
so you can see who’s moved that document. So, if somebody’s moved it from 
their tray to somebody else’s you can see that. I think somebody would 
question it anytime that happened.” (Recovery Officer, Authority B, Interview 
32) 
Staff in the Revenues Department at Authority A identified management rather than 
system allocation due to prioritization as a particular problem. In this department the 
allocation of work is the responsibility of the Senior Clerks who are also subject to 
performance monitoring themselves: 
 “I don’t agree with how it’s done because the Senior Clerks are performance 
monitored …  they can influence their figures because they have access to 
the work and they can pick all the easy stuff, whereas a clerk can’t and I feel 
the Senior Clerks seem to be performing a lot better because they can cherry-
pick work but we can’t. I’ve noticed these clerks have friends and when they 
allocate work, they are the ones that get easier work, whereas someone who 
doesn’t fit in [with them] will be left with harder items. Some Senior Clerks are 
allocating things to keep certain people happy” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, 
Interview 10) 
At Authority A certain groups of workers have the authority to allocate work due to 
the prioritization criteria within the department. Again, this highlights a potential gap 
in the systems operation and the consistency of management behaviour that may 
be exploited (Bain and Taylor, 2000:13). If this is the case, it does mean there is the 
263 
 
opportunity for some groups or individuals to have a greater chance to manipulate 
work allocation to ensure they select and allocate easier work and therefore 
increase their own and other favoured staff’s performance scores. As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, senior management believe the process is either random or 
fairly allocated and does not allow ‘cherry picking’. This appears not to be the case 
at the level of Senior Clerks who have a role in prioritizing and allocating work to the 
clerks.  This highlights the potential for an act of resistance from this group as they 
are acting contrary to management policy, even though in this aspect they are 
assuming a management role. This issue of the unity of the management function 
is discussed more fully in Section 8.2.2. In theory this situation is not relevant at 
Authority B where, because work items are weighted, no advantage would be 
accrued by doing this. However, the previous chapter also highlighted the lack of 
objectivity in this method and the questionnaire results from Authority B indicated 
only 29% of respondents felt the way they were monitored was fair, perhaps adding 
credence to this view. 
An aspect of resistance brought up by the research was the subverting of 
management control of the labour process by deliberate cheating in respect of the 
performance scores as has been highlighted by Edwards (1988:190) and Knights 
and McCabe (1998:183) as a means of workers regulating effort. This takes place 
at both sites and appears to concur with the view of Taylor and Walton (1971:242) 
and Thompson and Smith (2010:16) that workers will find sophisticated ways to 
subvert management systems of control, and as we shall see in the discussion 
below, managers seem to be aware of this. The following comments show some of 
the deliberate falsification of data that appears possible: 
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 “Staff can easily manipulate these figures. I don’t believe management look 
into them on a detailed basis, so staff can continue manipulating the data. I 
know how to manipulate performance monitoring figures, but choose not to. 
It’s easily corrupted” (Benefits Assessor, Authority B, Interview 20) 
“I know how the figures can be … shall we say tweaked if you need to. Not 
saying I do though [laughs]” (Billing Clerk, Authority B, Interview 21) 
“What you could do … because a ‘complete’ counts as a case … you could 
actually go through one day, if you’ve got 80 items in your tray you could go 
through and ‘complete’ one thing off each one and then the next day do 
another thing off each one. Yeah, you could fiddle it. You can send a memo 
to yourself saying, ‘don’t forget to change the PIN number on this tomorrow’ 
or whatever. You could fiddle it and I have done on occasions when I’ve been 
monitored and had a particularly tricky case and thought this is going to look 
bad today, so I’ll go in and send myself a few memos, complete them and it’ll 
look good.” (Benefits Assessor, Authority A, Interview 8) 
“I always think there will be stuff you will find out that management don’t know 
about straight away … or if they do find out about it at all. There’s always 
something. When managers find out about something, they might close that 
loophole and staff will already have found another loophole, there’ll always 
be a way round it. There may be ways around by completing extra stuff and 
then not actioning it. You show it being completed when it isn’t” (Billing Clerk, 
Authority A, Interview 13) 
“We can change the document type. We know what will give you the higher 
timings, so we can change post to that. But the supervisors sometimes look 
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at what we call ‘re-indexing’. They look at a report sometimes and ask why 
these documents have been changed.” (Benefits Officer, Authority B, 
Interview 31) 
It is fair to say most staff interviewed felt there were ways they could manipulate the 
performance monitoring figures, concurring with a paper by Knights and McCabe 
(1998:183), including as the last quote above mentions, altering the weighting of 
individual pieces of work. These ‘fiddles’ would appear to give individuals some level 
of control over specific situations arising in terms of their performance (Taylor and 
Walton, 1971:234-235). A relevant question to be considered is to what extent 
management are aware of these manipulations. The core systems have inbuilt 
facilities within them for allowing aspects such as re-indexing document types and 
importing of memos, as there may be a requirement to use these facilities 
legitimately. However, some staff appear to either use this as a means to subvert 
performance monitoring or know how this can be done to improve performance 
scores. Managers may then seek to close these loopholes, which does not 
necessarily mean staff cannot find others and could be seen as evidence of a 
continually shifting and fluid frontier of control (Goodrich, 1975; Hyman, 1975b:viii) 
relevant within the public as well as private sectors. The above comments would 
appear to give credence to the view advanced by Collinson (1994:34-35) and Ditton 
(1979:162-163) that workers knowledge of the day-to-day processes is often 
superior to managers and gives them an advantage in this respect. The 
questionnaire showed 24% and 21% at Authority A and B respectively believed they 
had a better working knowledge of the technology than their managers did. Around 
half of questionnaires returned from both authorities offered no opinion in this 
respect. It has been suggested there may be some form of collusion between staff 
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and management at certain levels who know these practices take place. A manager 
at Authority B, when asked whether there were any ways staff could fiddle the 
numbers on the system to show they had done more work than they had, 
commented: 
“I know a couple and I think staff have found out as well. We found out staff 
could ‘pend’ a claim for one day. The next day it’s ‘expired’, ‘oh it’s expired 
but the reply hasn’t come back, I’ll ‘pend’ it’ and they get a timing for it. 
They’ve done nothing, they’ve just ‘re-pended’ it. We picked that up. They 
think, ‘oh right, I’m being crafty here’ so we run a report to say ‘give us a list 
of all these claims that have been ‘pend’ to ‘pend’ for more than one day’ and 
as soon as the staff knew we picked up on it, it stopped. That’s the main 
example but I think there are staff here who try to manipulate it. You have to 
think like them [laughs] you do.” (Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, 
Authority B, Interview 24) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Benefits Department at Authority A have 
stopped individual monitoring and one of the reasons this decision was taken was 
due to the knowledge staff will find ways to fiddle the figures: 
“I think if staff know how they are being performance managed they will fiddle 
them. They will always find how to fiddle it. One of the performance 
management things I’ve stopped is we used to measure document 
completions on EDM. You get a document, you complete it. You can create 
your own documents and put them in your own tray so you know if you’re 
working on a claim you can say ‘I wrote a letter’ or ‘you need to refer that 
back to me to check something and I’ll complete it tomorrow’. You can 
267 
 
manipulate it so we don’t do that anymore because if the staff know, ‘oh I can 
manipulate that and I can have the best productivity of anybody’, why bother 
counting it if it’s useless?” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1) 
Whilst the previous chapter discussed the possibility the true motivation behind this 
form of monitoring was not the validity and usefulness of the data but rather a 
method of control geared towards intensification of worker effort (Bradley et al, 
2000:105-106), the view expressed by the Head of Benefits at Authority A, shows 
management accept this form of monitoring can be resisted by way of falsification 
of data. However, as mentioned in interviews at both sites, one of the properties of 
these systems is they have an electronic audit trail for anything, right down to 
individual key strokes and managers can run system generated reports that may 
highlight where staff have been manipulating the system in the ways detailed (Head 
of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1; Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, 
Interview 27; Operations and Improvement Manager, Authority B, Interview 28). This 
panoptic capability (Berdayes, 2002:35) may have the effect of limiting, but not 
eliminating, activities of this kind as several of the interviews above have recognized 
management’s ability to monitor certain actions should they decide. 
Whilst management acknowledge the presence of this deliberate deception by staff, 
there was no evidence this is treated as a serious offence: 
“I’ve made this clear to the supervisors, if you see it and you know it’s 
happening deal with it informally. That’s a quick chat, ‘I can see you’re doing 
this [so] stop it. I’ll be checking you over the next couple of months and if it 
happens again it’ll go to a formal stage 1’ that’s the message we give staff” 
(Operations and Improvement Manager, Authority B, Interview 28). 
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In short, at Authority B, staff are informed if they try cheating and are caught, only a 
further infringement will result in formal action. We can see here a dynamic playing 
out where some staff find ways of manipulating the data and use this to subvert 
management monitoring until management find out. None of the managers at either 
site could recall any disciplinary action having been taken in respect of any 
manipulation. This would appear to introduce some doubt as to the efficacy of this 
method of control as transgressions are not usually accompanied by formal 
management action (Larson and Callahan, 1990:530). In essence, management 
know it happens, they then attempt to prevent this manipulation and staff may then 
find other ways to manipulate the figures or continue to use other ways of 
manipulating the output data management are unaware of. 
It is also possible those operating at the management level of supervisors may 
consciously turn a blind eye to these activities. They themselves are under some 
form of scrutiny from their managers. It may be then, as long as managers above 
them are satisfied with the figures being produced it is not in the supervisor’s 
interests, which as Ackroyd and Thompson (1999:80) pointed out, may be distinct 
from their superiors, to highlight staff deliberately using techniques to falsify the 
performance figures: 
“[Supervisors] won’t do anything about it because if things look ok to the 
bosses they’re not going to rock the boat.” (Benefits Officer, Authority B, 
Interview 19) 
The findings above can be seen to relate to actual resistance. We now turn to what 
could be seen as potential resistance to the extent that whilst individual actions may 
be difficult to definitively categorize as so, in certain circumstances this would be the 
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case. The first of these researched was the extent to which employees could attempt 
to make justifications to management for what could be considered poor 
performance figures. This could be a genuine explanation or an attempt to subvert 
the monitoring process by fabricating excuses to avert management action. The 
questionnaire response in Authority A from the Revenues Department where this 
type of monitoring is carried out, when given the statement, “Managers take 
personal circumstances into account when looking into performance figures”, not a 
single respondent agreed with this statement. Likewise, with the statement, “I can 
always make up a plausible excuse if my performance figures are too low”, again 
no one in Revenues at Authority A agreed with this statement. No interviewees felt 
managers would take any personal circumstances into account, genuine or 
otherwise, should performance not meet managerially set levels. One interviewee 
explained that you would only get the chance annually to discuss any reasons for 
scores considered sub-standard: 
“I don’t think it’s [discussing any personal issues that may affect performance] 
really done in practice. You don’t get the chance to do it unless it’s PRD but 
they are yearly” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 13). 
Authority B responses to the questionnaire showed 36% of respondents agreed that 
“Managers take personal circumstances into account when looking into 
performance figures” but only 9% felt that “I can always make up a plausible excuse 
if my performance figures are too low”. This may indicate managers at Authority B 
may take personal circumstances into account when looking at performance figures 
if they are believed to be genuine. Management here have stated personal 
circumstances are considered as part of the monitoring process: 
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“If they’re always in the green and suddenly they’re in the red you take them 
to one side, you have all the stats ready and say, ‘is there anything you want 
to bring to my attention, are you ok at home?’ They might tell you and you 
would say, ‘fair enough, let’s disregard that day and hopefully your 
performance will be back to where it was’. It does affect what decisions we 
make.” (Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24)   
Where managers accept mitigating circumstances as an explanation for poor 
performance, as appears to be the case at Authority B, then there is an obvious 
potential to subvert this method of control, albeit on an infrequent basis. Whilst some 
interviewees at this Authority confirmed they had raised personal issues as an 
explanation, there were no admissions this was used as a means to subvert 
performance monitoring, hence placing it as a potential rather than actual 
occurrence of resistance.  However, Authority A Revenues staff appear to believe 
their personal circumstances are not considered. Although disputed by the Deputy 
Revenues Manager at Authority A (Interview 2) who maintained “relevant” personal 
circumstances would be taken into account, no interviewee indicated this was 
something they felt they could use to circumvent management control in this area. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, managers are potentially performance 
managed themselves (Edwards, 2010:34) to ensure they are acting where 
performance is below set norms, rather than falsifying or failing to carry out action 
so as to avoid a conflictual situation that may result in formal action (Zuboff, 
1988:334-335).  
A further act that has been advanced as a potential act of resistance is for 
employees to absent themselves from the workplace (Edwards and Scullion, 1984). 
Whilst managers from both sites felt implementation of core systems had not 
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resulted in any increase in absenteeism (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 
14; Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18), this area of 
resistance is one where technology is being employed in a bureaucratic form to 
curtail it as detailed in the previous chapter in Section 7.4.2 (Head of Benefits, 
Authority A, Interview 1; Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14; Revenues 
and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18). Curtailing management discretion 
(Hyman, 1987:28) and forcing them to take action when corporately decided trigger 
points are hit may have the effect of lessening this behaviour as a form of resistance. 
Interviewees expressing an opinion felt it did not prevent non-genuine sickness 
absence from taking place but it would put a strict limit on this that they could not 
get past. In effect what we are seeing is potential form of resistance to simple direct, 
and technical forms of control being potentially restricted, if not eliminated, by an 
ICT facilitated bureaucratic form. We are seeing here how ICT is being used to 
facilitate an integrated panoptic system combining a number of control approaches 
(Hall, 2010:171). When considering a central concern of the thesis, the possibility 
ICT has rendered management control absolute, we can see that unless 
management impose the ultimate sanction of dismissal for all transgressions, space 
for absence as a form of resistance remains. However, again we see ICT severely 
curtailing workers’ ability to resist management control.  
A further potential way absence could be used as a form of resistance is by workers 
absenting themselves during the working day without authorization. Again, this was 




“You could pop out for 10 minutes and you might not be missed. Any longer 
and the Team Leader might notice and then if you’re not on your lunch-break 
they could pick it up” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 13) 
“I wouldn’t risk it. I’m not sure they would check as a matter of course but 
they might. I do pop out occasionally if there is a test match on to check the 
score. But only for a few minutes” (Recovery Officer, Authority B, Interview 
32) 
Both sites claim to have had a significant reduction in recorded absence since the 
introduction of the bureaucratic control systems ensuring rigid compliance with 
sickness absence policies (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1; Revenues 
and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18). The quotes above would also 
appear to indicate unauthorised absence within the working day, which by its nature 
is unrecorded, would be detectable by management through the reporting facilities 
of the ICT systems which would detect the worker as being present but no work 
carried out and highlight the discrepancy (Taylor and Bain, 1999:107). As such it 
would appear as a form of resistance this also has been significantly constrained. 
Again, however, the extent of its constraint is determined by managerially set norms 
in respect of the length of time a worker may be inactive.  
In short, this section shows individuals do actually subvert management control 
regimes by deliberately manipulating, falsifying and cheating the performance 
management regimes. In terms of the potential acts of resistance such as making 
up excuses for poor performance and absenting themselves from the workplace the 
evidence would point to ICT as not eliminating but having severely curtailed the 
potential for these actions. 
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8.2.2 Resistance from Individual Managers 
This section considers whether managers may be seen as a homogenous, or 
alternatively, fragmented group, with separate interests not only to the staff they are 
employed to manage, but also their own managers, and who, therefore, may also 
carry out acts that may be seen as resistant to corporate control strategies. The 
distinction here between individual managers and workers is whilst managers may 
be seen as employees and wage workers (Braverman, 1998:220) they are 
employed to control the work of others and this is the criteria by which they are 
performance managed by more senior managers (Edwards, 2010:34).  As such 
could it be the case management are not a homogenous group, and certain levels 
have been impacted on by structural changes and the technology used in local 
government, leading to a greater propensity for them as individuals to seek to resist 
control emanating from more senior management? The research has, therefore, 
sought to go beyond the usual binary division of management and workers. It is of 
interest to examine the extent to which technology used as a tool of control by 
management and employers has changed the dynamic and perception of managers 
and supervisors who may have provided control through their physical presence 
prior to implementation of these systems, that may now be a declining requirement 
(Zuboff, 1988:322). In particular, the issue concerns whether managers at certain 
levels are also threatened by this technology and who, therefore, may seek to resist 
in their own interests (Wilkinson, 1983:19; Hyman, 1987:28), or may now identify 
with those they manage as both sellers of labour subject to control from more senior 
managers (Braverman, 1998:290; Wardell, 1990:157). In short, are all managers 
part of a homogenous group, or has the use of this technology fragmented them, 
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including by subjecting them to monitoring and surveillance as well as workers, and 
therefore, who may themselves engage in resistance?  
As technology appears to have taken over a significant amount of the monitoring 
aspect of a supervisor’s role, there is a potential they may no longer identify with 
more senior managers (Wardell, 1990:157). The reduction in the supervisory 
content of the role can be accepted as factual as workers at both authorities are 
allowed to work from home with no direct physical supervision. Chapter 5 highlighted 
a shift in the role of management in local government, from that of a professional 
bureaucrat to a managerial function as highlighted by Ironside and Seifert (2001:10), 
commencing with the increasing size of departments due to both internal and 
external restructuring imposed by central government (Wilson and Game, 2006), 
and possibly facilitated by the embedding of rules and complex regulations in the 
ICT systems meaning that the professional expertise has increasingly been 
employed in the private sector software supplier industry. This was agreed with by 
the interviewee below: 
“[There has been a] shift away from having a practitioner in charge. We in the 
IRRV [The Institute of Revenues, Rating and Valuation] have noticed this and 
increasingly so now that the IRRV qualification is less and less relevant for 
senior people because practitioners are not being promoted into positions of 
responsibility. If you want to get on as a practitioner now you would have to 
do what I did and go and work for a software supplier. I don’t really know 
about the technical aspects but I can tell the developers how it has to work.”   
(Retired Chief Rating Officer, Interview 35)  
275 
 
It was also confirmed by a Revenues and Benefits Supervisor at Authority B 
(Interview 24) and from an Assistant Benefits Officer at Authority A (Interview 3) that 
the numbers of supervisors had decreased and would continue to decrease as a 
result of the technology being implemented. With ICT leading to fewer supervisors 
there is the potential to reverse the problem identified in Chapter 3 with simple forms 
of control and large organizations. We can, therefore, see a potential deskilling of 
the role coupled with a reduction in posts at this level of management. This may well 
have affected how these staff identify as a tier of officers that at one time may have 
seen a career path to more senior positions by way of practitioner qualifications. 
This was certainly posited as a possibility by the following interviewees: 
“I think managers at supervisor level are getting worried. There’s definitely 
been a reduction in their numbers. What do you need them for? If the 
computer has all the information about the worker’s performance why do you 
need a supervisor to make sure they are working. Just press the button and 
off comes the report. In some ways I think this group is now the most 
insecure.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15) 
“They are using technology to implement processes that are breaking things 
down to their component parts and therefore you have workers who do just 
part of the component rather than the whole. It challenges the balance of 
power, I think it forces people to identify more with the workers rather than 
the gaffers because they are no longer in complete control.” (UNISON Branch 
Secretary, Authority B, Interview 33) 
These comments would appear to concur with Braverman’s (1998:289) view that 
these managers are actually analogous to workers. However, resistance stemming 
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from an identification with those they are supposed to control may have been 
curtailed by the use of technology. One potential area of management resistance to 
this regime of control was whether supervisors may not explicitly refuse to carry out 
this form of monitoring but may just choose to ignore any system-generated report 
of unsatisfactory performance. The research highlighted the technology was 
designed to allow scrutiny from managers at a higher level (Software Development 
Manager, Interview 34) and this surveillance means managers may not choose to 
resist by simply failing to comply (Thompson and Bannon, 1985:107). This was also 
raised during the previous chapter when considering whether technology is also 
used to control managers responsible for performance management and was 
confirmed by a Revenues and Benefits Supervisor at Authority B (Interview 24). As 
in the previous chapter on control, the issue of the panoptic effect is relevant here. 
Even if managers are not actually monitored to check if they are actively monitoring 
and warning their staff, they may well comply with the expected norms of the role as 
it is never known to them when they may be being observed by senior managers, 
thus meeting the conditions discussed as a form of panoptic control (Jacobs and 
Heracleous, 2001:126; Zuboff, 1988:321). No managers interviewed with this 
responsibility admitted to failing to carry out their control function and were aware of 
the potential for more senior management observation: 
 “[I don’t have to report] on a daily basis because they’re visible to my line 
manager. They can access reports.” (Assistant Benefits Officer, Authority A, 
Interview 3) 
There is a role in the Revenues Division at Authority A of Senior Clerk, that appears 
to have aspects of management, in that they are responsible for work allocation to 
the clerks. This role apart from this aspect is identical to that of a clerk. An aspect 
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of this was considered around the perception of fairness in that the clerks felt this 
group of workers unfairly distributed work, keeping the easier items for themselves 
and their friends and thus boosting their performance figures relative to the other 
clerks: 
“What I have got an issue with is the Senior Clerks who are also on 
performance monitoring who have got this ability to dish out work and to 
‘cherry pick’ coz they could go through a day’s post and pick [the easier 
items].” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 10) 
What we are seeing here is the ability of certain people who have some 
management responsibility to potentially subvert and resist the process to their own 
ends or to protect the interests of other privileged workers. This adds further support 
to the view that the management function is fragmented, with individuals and groups 
within it acting in their own, rather than corporate, interests, thus potentially 
undermining the control regime (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999:80). 
There is also evidence at Authority A to show more senior managers may also not 
act as a homogenous group when it comes to performance monitoring. The situation 
at Authority A at the time of research was that Revenues was individually 
performance managed and Benefits was not. This could be viewed as a result of 
conflicting management styles leading to a refusal by the Head of Benefits to 
institute this type of monitoring for her staff. This fits with the view of Hall (2010:173) 
that the use of technology can be the result of struggles within factions of the 
management group: 
“Not everybody has my views. My boss, [the Assistant Director of Finance], 
isn’t of that view. He wants everybody performance managed, be able to 
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compare x with y and I fight that battle regularly. It’s a personality thing. 
Revenues are different to Benefits. Revenues have more of my boss’s 
management style.”  (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 1) 
It was certainly put forward by the Head of Revenues at Authority A that it was 
management that determined the use of technology and as a group they were not 
necessarily consistent: 
“Revs and Bens have got very different management styles and there are 
advantages and disadvantages to both. But I think the management style to 
a large extent dictates how technology is used.” (Head of Revenues, 
Authority A, Interview 14) 
Authority A is not pursuing a consistent control strategy as different approaches are 
present resulting from contestation within the management group (Friedman, 
1990:182) and as such, the research points towards resistance potentially arising 
from individual managers.  
8.2.3 Individual Resistance and Skills 
The previous chapter considered the issue of skill and how ICT may have affected 
this in relation to management control. This section approaches the issue from the 
perspective of the employee and how technology and its effect on skills may 
influence the degree of resistance they may engage in, particularly around their 
potential to end the existing employment relationship and transfer their labour to a 
new employer (Edwards and Scullion, 1984:562). Knights and Willmott (1990:11) 
citing Braverman (1974) saw a link between the possession of skills and a worker’s 
capacity for resistance. However, this section points to a complex relationship 
between technology, skills, and the labour market in relation to resistance.  
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Of particular relevance when considering skills and their relationship to resistance 
as highlighted in the research, is the extent to which they are required by employers 
and how common their possession is within the working population. It needs to be 
made clear in terms of skills that the job is deskilled and not the worker (Lee, 
1982:148). The skills and knowledge possessed are not necessarily lost but, in this 
circumstance, the possession of the skills affords the employee no leverage with the 
management as the employer no longer has any requirement for them. 
The previous chapter contained a detailed discussion on whether skills that had 
been lost as a result of ICT had been compensated for by new skills required. The 
research indicated a potentially uneven impact in terms of the effect ICT has had on 
skills between different groups (Wilkinson, 1983:8) but supported the position of a 
general tendency towards deskilling. The Head of Revenues, Authority A (Interview 
14) highlighted a requirement for more generic IT skills, identified as a consequence 
of technological change for both groups being researched. These generic skills are 
transferable within a wider area but paradoxically their commonality may mean it is 
not so easy for a worker to transfer their labour to another employer due to an 
abundant supply in the labour market. The Head of Benefits at Authority A (Interview 
1) confirmed these ICT skills are now a requirement for most jobs, both within her 
department and also widely externally: 
“technology skills are transferable and in this day and age there isn’t many 
jobs where you don’t need them.” (Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 
1). 
We can now turn to any difference between the two groups, firstly considering those 
who administer the Revenues function. Whilst being in possession of basic 
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technology skills is a requirement for many jobs, if they are commonly held then 
would not be seen as a particularly strong advantage in a competitive situation for 
an individual seeking new employment: 
“It’s not about whether you know the regs it’s about whether you can operate 
the computer and let’s face it, kids coming out of school can.” (Billing Clerk, 
Authority A, Interview 6) 
In terms of new skills required by employers as a result of the implementation of 
technology, it is the absence of specificity and the fact they are widely held that 
appears to result in a lack of leverage that can be applied by workers when using 
them. It is this factor that appears to have impacted particularly on those workers 
within the Revenues function: 
 “There’s a big book of legislation but now you have rules programmed into 
the system… at one time the decision would have been taken by a person 
but because the system does it for you the knowledge of how to do it manually 
disappears.” (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14) 
As such it would be expected the skills required by the employer to administer the 
Revenues function are now the more commonly possessed generic computer skills 
and not the more specific skills associated with professional knowledge of that area 
of work. In essence this would point to a reduced ability among this group to resist 
management control by quitting and transferring their labour to another employer 
(Edwards, 1979:126). Almost a third of staff completing the questionnaire within the 
Revenues Section at Authority A are seeking new employment. Among these, a 
common theme expressed at the interviews was the difficulty in finding new 
employment either within other Revenues departments or in other lines of work: 
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“I’m looking but there’s not much out there. No councils are hiring because 
of the cuts. I could think about other types of work but what have I got to offer. 
I know my way round a computer but so what. That’s expected nowadays 
isn’t it? Nothing special.” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 10) 
The situation within the Benefits Department at Authority A was somewhat different. 
The scarcity of trained Assessors and their ability to leave Authority A for a 
neighbouring authority has been highlighted and what appears to make the skills 
valuable in terms of this group is their specific rather than generic nature. As 
highlighted, Benefits administration is seen to be a dynamic environment, where 
regulatory and legislative changes have meant a certain level of complexity has 
been maintained (politics.co.uk, 2018), meaning constant software changes and 
more difficulty in achieving automation (Salman, 2001; Head of Benefits, Authority 
A, Interview 1; Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, Authority B, Interview 24). As 
such, they appear less disempowered by the codifying of knowledge into a 
computerized system (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:228). A member of staff at 
Authority A did believe this scarcity of Assessors combined with their specific skills 
did mean the employer would not be “too draconian” with them as a group: 
“I could say, ‘you know what, get somebody else to do this job’. As an 
experienced and trained Assessor, I’d find another job. There are companies 
now who employ assessors to go into councils to do the work. As a group we 
have some clout.” (Benefits Assessor, Authority A, Interview 8) 
The Head of Benefits at Authority A was not of the view that any power Benefits 
Assessors possessed resultant from these specific skills was the reason individual 
monitoring had ceased (Interview 5) and there may well be some weight to this view 
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as Benefits Assessors are still individually monitored at Authority B, and had been 
at Authority A until her appointment. However, the above does highlight a potentially 
different attitude in terms of the two groups. Whilst the foregoing discussion would 
point to the potential for those administering the Benefits function to be able to more 
effectively engage in resistance by transferring their labour to other employers, 
managers at both authorities (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14; 
Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18) indicated at the time of 
research there was very little staff turnover in either function, both agreeing the 
current financial constraints within councils had led to a significant reduction in 
recruitment. 
The research points to a complex relationship between skill, technology and the 
labour market. Whilst there has clearly been deskilling in both groups, the overall 
impact has differed. Those administering Benefits can be seen to have retained 
more of the specific skills associated with this area, but this has largely been due to 
the continual changes in welfare and benefits policy from central government 
(Salman, 2001). Revenues, on the other hand have, due to the largely static 
regulatory framework, seen more of their specific Revenues related skills subsumed 
within the ICT systems by embedding of rules, and increasingly, automation. 
However, the interviews at both sites did not indicate any significant difference in 
the groups in terms of their inclination to resist management control. The research 
indicated no resistance against the utilization of systems that embed rules and 
regulations and the requirement for standardized inputs makes it difficult to see how 
this could be achieved at the level of the individual. It should be recognized whilst 
the skills Benefits staff have, appear to be more resilient at the current time, 
developments in ICT or potential changes in government policy may make this less 
283 
 
so over time. This coupled with the situation that authorities are not recruiting in any 
significant numbers may provide some explanation in this area. In short, resisting 
management control by transferring employment to another employer is still 
possible, although ICT may make it more problematic for certain groups in terms of 
its effects on skills and the labour market.  
8.2.4 Collective Resistance 
This section moves on from individual forms of resistance to examine evidence that 
resistance to management control using ICT, may be exercised collectively, 
particularly through trade unions. As the previous section on individual resistance 
indicated the potential for this, there is the possibility this may be organized into 
collective action (Taylor and Bain, 1999:112-113), although the research would 
indicate unions would not sanction the transgressive types of individual action 
detailed in 8.2.1. However, some individual resistance relating to performance 
monitoring, particularly around the falsification of performance figures, appears to 
have a collective element to it (Taylor and Bain, 1999:112). As a Benefits Assessor 
at Authority A (Interview 8) said in relation to this, “the word gets around”.  It is also 
the case, and will be more fully considered in Section 8.3, that individual 
considerations have an effect on the incidence, or otherwise, of collective action 
(Collinson, 1994:55). However, the research shows little evidence of unions, either 
locally or nationally, engaging in any form of resistance to try and prevent 
implementation of ICT or monitoring of staff, which concurs with Garson’s 
(1989:219) view regarding unions’ general failure to resist this type of control. 
Involvement of unions appears to be post-implementation rather than at the point of 
design or implementation (Noble, 1979:45) and is concerned with the way the 
systems are used and the impact this may have on members (Robins and Webster, 
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1985:29). At no stage, however, have they appeared to challenge management’s 
prerogative in carrying out monitoring of workers, mirroring the view of Thompson 
and Bannon (1985:130-131) that this is rarely seen. Indeed, at the stage prior to 
implementation, the UNISON Branch Secretary at Authority B (Interview 33), 
confirmed there had been no consultation with unions and these monitoring systems 
were implemented without dialogue. The problem for the unions appears to follow 
Noble’s view (1979:49) that to effectively challenge the implementation of 
technology for the purposes of monitoring would require prior knowledge. The 
Branch Secretary at Authority A concurred with the view regarding the lack of 
consultation and bargaining structures (Scott, 2004:3): 
“We don’t get consulted over technology or how it’s used unless it results in 
restructures or job losses. Sometimes if it causes issues for a member, we’re 
called in.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15) 
The research, in examining unions’ responses in relation to technology, considered 
how members may wish them to respond to its implementation and use. The 
UNISON Branch Secretary at Authority B (Interview 33) described it as seeming 
“illogical” to try and oppose the use of this technology. However, this view was not 
universally accepted in terms of how the technology should be used. The 
questionnaire gave the following statement, “Trade unions should try and prevent 
performance monitoring”, 10% of respondents at Authority A and 13% at Authority 
B agreed with this statement. 
“The unions should have stopped this before it started, now it’s too late” 
(Benefits Clerk, Authority B, Interview 17) 
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“I’ve raised these concerns with management and the union. Managers …  
it’s like talking to a brick wall and the unions, they listen but can’t really do 
anything.” (Billing Clerk, Authority B, Interview 21) 
From the comments above we can see some feel unions should have done more to 
prevent the use of performance monitoring through ICT. There was a view among 
some individuals that unions are not able to achieve this or they have left it too late. 
However, among the majority of the staff at both authorities there is the view unions 
should not try and stop it: and there appears to be very few individuals who raise 
any issues concerning performance monitoring with a trade union. Only 3% of 
respondents at Authority A and 6% at Authority B had raised any issue concerning 
performance monitoring with unions. This may potentially explain unions’ apparent 
lack of activity in this area (Tullney, 2010:43). 
Neither of the union branch secretaries interviewed were of the view that industrial 
action was considered regarding the implementation of technology or its use as a 
tool of control. The UNISON Branch Secretary at Authority A did explain how, 
whereas ICT used to be seen as positive in terms of industrial action, as workers 
could paralyze whole functions and make the employers vulnerable to this form of 
action (Shaiken, 1985: 247-248), it was now the case developments in ICT and 
legislation on industrial action had made this much less likely. Expensive mainframe 
computers have been replaced with web-server technology located remotely from 
the authorities: 
“It used to be that if we went on strike in these areas, we could cut the money 
supply off. No bills sent out, no payments dealt with, no direct debits called 
for. This was a real concern for bosses. This made it more likely that strikes 
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could succeed for all groups of workers because of the damage one group 
could do. The technology used now with remote servers means all these 
system jobs are set up a year in advance so bills go out, direct debits are 
called for whether we are at work or not. With phone banking and stuff like 
that money still flows in. I suppose we could delete all future work before 
taking any action but that would be tantamount to sabotage and God knows 
what the legal sanctions would be. And of course, you have to give them 
notice and have ballots so they can prepare.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, 
Authority A, Interview 15) 
However, even given the legislative changes which were part of central 
government’s strategy for the required changes in the public sector (Ironside and 
Seifert, 2001:4), both Branch Secretaries concurred that industrial action was not 
an impossibility and indeed had taken place, as detailed in Chapter 5, both in 
individual authorities and nationally. However, concerns around union strategy were 
identified by both branch secretaries. The following comment sums this position up: 
“Technology is the same as with cuts and of course it’s all linked. We have 
been left to it. Where is the national strategy? Individual branches have been 
left to get on with it on their own.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, 
Interview 15) 
 It would appear it is the case that to make a simple correlation of reduction in 
industrial action with an increase in the use of ICT is erroneous (Hyman, 1988:55). 
However, it is also clear whilst technology in itself does not prevent industrial action 
being taken it may affect the effectiveness according to the extent ICT has impacted 
on the labour process.  
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The research did consider the plausibility of collective sabotage, in terms of the 
destruction of the employer’s property (Edwards and Scullion, 1982:154) as a 
means of resisting management control through ICT. Historically there have been 
examples of sabotage in response to technological changes in the workplace, most 
notably the rise of Luddism as discussed in Chapter 4 (Thompson, 1980). The 
feeling at both sites was any such proposition would be difficult to give credence to. 
Both authorities no longer operate a mainframe computer and all the systems used 
operate on a remote web-based server. There is, therefore, no single physical entity 
to render inoperable. There is potentially the destruction of individual computers but 
this would only mean a temporary disruption to service. The Branch Secretary at 
Authority B (Interview 33) was incredulous at the suggestion that sabotage may be 
a means of resistance, saying at best it would be “nuisance value” and at worst, 
“dangerous for any organization or individual” carrying it out. Both authorities also 
confirmed the presence of Disaster Recovery Plans would mean alternative facilities 
would be found should any catastrophic situation occur (Head of Benefits, Authority 
A, Interview 1; Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 18). As such, 
Landes’s view (2003:498) that strategies are what are available and appropriate at 
the time seem pertinent here.   
The research appears to indicate unions have largely accepted ICT will be 
introduced and used in the workplace and this aspect of management prerogative 
around design and implementation is something they have not and cannot challenge 
(Thompson and Bannon, 1985:132; Wilkinson, 1983:85). Both Branch Secretaries 
felt they and the union organization as a whole had insufficient expertise to be 
involved with, or influence the design of, ICT systems (Bamber, 1988:216). It is the 
impact on working practices where they feel able to get involved: 
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“Usually what happens with ICT is it can change working practices. So, it 
would be [those] that get negotiated rather than the technology. People 
expect technology to change quickly. So, when someone says we’re having 
a new system it’s not seen as ‘not in a million years’, the response is ‘we’ll 
have to learn the new system.’ Immediately you’re into the detail of 
implementation, rather than saying ‘no way’. The pace of technology has 
changed so quickly, it almost feels illogical for us to say, ‘no you can’t do that’. 
Immediately we’re into ‘what difference is that going to make, what is going 
to happen to x,y,z’. It’s that kind of discussion.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, 
Authority B, Interview 33) 
“I think we have had to focus on issues that might crop up in how they use it 
rather than ‘we won’t work with it’. It almost sounds ridiculous now thinking 
that we might prevent implementation of ICT.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, 
Authority A, Interview 15) 
The issue here appears to be technology is ubiquitous in the workplace and society 
in general (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:222) and to challenge its use would now be 
unthinkable for trade unions given its perceived links with progress has essentially 
detached it from its organizational impacts (Burnes et al, 1988:7) and this is 
something more fully considered in Section 8.3.2. The aspect of it challenged is 
how, rather than whether, it is used: 
“We were concerned that with no paper and everything being done 
electronically, people would have to spend more time on computers. We tried 
to negotiate set break times, but in the end agreed with management that 
staff could have breaks whenever needed. In hindsight we got that wrong 
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because of the pressure of monitoring they just keep working and I don’t think 
it’s good for them mentally or physically.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, 
Authority A, Interview 15) 
There was a challenge here but in hindsight the agreement reached at Authority A 
was felt to offer little protection against the intensification of labour discussed in the 
previous chapter. Of those who responded to the questionnaire 20% from Authority 
A and 15% from Authority B, felt they did not take a break when they needed one, 
which adds some weight to the concerns the union have expressed.  
One management initiative resisted by union involvement in Authority A was around 
the dissemination of performance scores to staff. In the Revenues Department this 
was done by informing staff not just of their own performance scores but also those 
of others: 
“We were always pretty well organised in Revenues and Benefits and I think 
there was always a ‘don’t mess with us because we can stand up for 
ourselves’ culture. So, when managers published individual scores … there 
was a lot of anger and the rep argued and brought in Health and Safety 
because of the stress being caused … raised it as a health and safety issue. 
Central Health and Safety instructed management to pack it in. Managers 
were gutted about that because they knew people would work harder to avoid 
being seen as the worst on the team.”  (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority 
A, Interview 15) 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter, team working was indeed seen by 
management as a way of intensifying effort and enforcing a level of control through 
peer pressure (Sewell, 1998:420) and the self-policing of the staff team members 
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themselves (Head of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14). So, we are seeing here 
an example of resistance to management control through the collective organization 
of the workers, post-hoc by using Health and Safety regulations to influence how 
the monitoring regime is carried out (Taylor and Bain, 1999:114). There were no 
specific examples of resistance to technology at Authority B. However, it appears 
no performance data was ever shared across the staff group as a whole. The 
example above links the level of union organization, not necessarily density, and the 
ability to resist. The UNISON Branch Secretary at Authority B highlighted the issue 
of union organization within the sections where the technology is used to illustrate 
how the knowledge of the people working with it is important if practices are to be 
challenged: 
“[In terms of challenging how technology is used] it comes down to sectional 
organization because it’s only when you know the detail of what you and your 
colleagues do, that you’re in a position to try and implement measures to 
control what’s going on. I see it as the role of stewards on the ground in their 
day to day dialogue with their colleagues that if, for example, there was a 
move from 35 to 40 items being processed per day and that was out of order,  
that local steward should pick it up and have that argument locally and if there 
was no resolution then it goes up the consultative tree, at which point we pick 
it up and say, ‘this ain’t on.’” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority B, 
Interview 33) 
One area unions have expressed difficulty with around technology is how it can be 
used by managers as evidence particularly in disciplinary and capability situations. 
This may also have an impact in staff being willing to engage in behaviour to resist 
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management control due to the increased likelihood of evidence being seen as 
irrefutable due to its technological source, being used against them: 
“We’ve had some issues with staff, mainly being called in for meetings 
regarding performance. We’ve tended to get this dealt with, particularly where 
we can identify some underlying health issue. The problem is though, 
management can arm themselves with so much data about what the 
‘average’ worker does and that our member is ‘way below this’. It’s almost 
like, ‘it’s not just me saying this, look at the figures’. This can make it difficult 
and if it ever got to disciplinary or performance dismissal hearings they would 
use this.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15) 
However, it is clear unions would represent their members in respect of capability 
and disciplinary procedures (Taylor, 2013:71) and in this sense do offer some 
resistance to management action. Indeed, the vast array of data referred to in the 
quote above would point to a management insecure in its position within the frontier 
of control (Bain and Taylor, 2000:12). There is also the possibility the presence of 
this evidence may be used to resist attacks on members by the arbitrary actions of 
management (Findlay and McKinlay, 2003:306). Of course, preventing action may 
not be visible and so this type of resistance may be overlooked. As a Billing Clerk 
and UNISON member from Authority A articulated: 
 “I don’t care whether the boss likes me or not, if my figures are ok, they can’t 
touch me” (Interview 13). 
We have seen in the previous chapter that ICT has facilitated the spatial separation 
of work thus allowing homeworking (Thompson and Smith, 2010:21). It is highly 
unlikely this form of working would be encouraged (Baruch, 2000:38) without 
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management being able to exercise control over the individual through the available 
technology (Castells, 1992:208). We have seen in the previous chapter, the 
panoptic effect in the way individual homeworkers are monitored and surveilled and 
how this is used as an instrument of managerial control, solving the problem from a 
management point of view of supervising a dispersed workforce (Bradley et al, 
2000:105). A further aspect of this form of remote working is the effect it can have 
on trade union organisation and collective resistance, potentially reversing the 
process of constructing a mass worker (Murray, 1989:40). In Authority A 29% of 
workers within the Revenues and Benefits function work from home (Head of 
Revenues, Interview 14). At Authority B, the figure is 25% (Revenues and Benefits 
Manager, Interview 18). There is a view that the dispersal and fragmentation of the 
workforce from one that had been centralised in a single place has led to difficulties 
for unions in terms of organisation. Unions at both authorities recognized this could 
cause problems in terms of industrial action (Orlikowski,1988:33) and at both sites 
a protocol was agreed with the respective employers:  
“It’s [homeworking] caused some potential issues in terms of organising. We 
realised if we’re on strike these staff would be able to work on that day and 
we wouldn’t know. The Council agreed if there was ever official strike action 
that home workers would have to either come into the office or declare 
themselves on strike.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15) 
“One thing we negotiated corporately was for industrial action days, any 
home worker would have to report to their base at work, they couldn’t just 
stay at home. So, it’s a clear expectation that on days of industrial action, if 
they want to work, they’ve still got to cross a picket line.” (UNISON Branch 
Secretary, Authority B, Interview 33) 
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However, in terms of day to day communication, this form of working may cause 
problems for unions: 
“Communication is difficult … they’re rarely in the office, you can’t have those 
chats around the water cooler and get them involved that way, but they still 
get emails I send out. It’s a mixed picture but it’s not ideal.” (UNISON 
Workplace Steward, Authority A, Interview 16) 
“In terms of organising people, it’s an issue, because the reps can’t easily 
speak with people. One of our reps is a homeworker so that’s problematic 
from both sides.” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority B, Interview 33) 
Whilst the issue of members working away from the workplace causes problems in 
terms of organisation for unions (Orlikowski,1988:33), a number of the members of 
the unions actually prefer this form of working and see it as an advantage to them: 
“It works better for me with my children and the flexible working around taking 
them to school or nursery, or if I’ve got a doctor’s appointment I just log off, 
have half an hour off, come back and carry on working. The role I do needs 
a lot of concentration. I like it to be quiet and to get into my work and it’s 
easier to do that at home because I haven’t got the disruptions I have in the 
office.” (Senior Benefits Assessor, Authority A, Interview 7) 
“I love working from home because I’m just allowed to get on, instead of being 
harassed constantly by the phone and people asking questions. If you are on 
your own you can just get on with it.” (Benefits Assessor, Authority A, 
Interview 8) 
Due to the popularity of homeworking and the fact no member of staff is compelled 
to work from home at either site, unions appear to be in a difficult situation in that it 
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causes issues around organisation and therefore the potential for effectively 
resisting management action. There was a move at Authority A to introduce a clause 
into contracts allowing managers to designate certain jobs as home based. UNISON 
resisted this and any homeworker does this voluntarily and could, if they wished, 
return to an office-based location: 
“Homeworking is voluntary and we have an agreement with HR that no jobs 
can be [compulsorily designated] homeworking. They wanted to designate 
employees in certain jobs as homeworkers in their contracts. We got them to 
back off from that as we thought it may have a number of potentially 
discriminatory elements. Having said that, a lot of the people working from 
home love it and would be really against it if they had to come into work.” 
(UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority A, Interview 15) 
It can be seen the technology facilitates this type of remote working. No paper files 
have to be transported and as highlighted in the previous chapter, managers feel 
this group of workers can be controlled at remote locations due to the monitoring 
capabilities of the technology. However, in examining this particular aspect of 
potential worker resistance, it is the dispersed nature of the workforce rather than 
the technology itself that causes organizational problems for unions. In short, the 
research points to a dual aspect unions have to contend with. Firstly, the 
geographical dispersal of workers related to this use of technology has potentially 
negative impacts in respect of organization and secondly, many of the union 
members appear to prefer this way of working meaning unions may only seek to 
deal with some of the issues relating to homeworking, for example its effects on 
industrial action, rather than attempt to resist its use completely. 
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The research considered so far in this section relates to unions resisting 
management control as exercised through technology and the problems for unions 
changes to workplace structures can have for effective organization. We can now 
turn to a potential solution to the problematic aspects of union organization resulting 
from ICT use by utilizing technology itself, such as websites and social media as an 
organizing tool as suggested by Dyer-Witheford (1999:126), including as a potential 
solution for a dispersed or remote workforce. The questionnaire responses were not 
very positive in this area. When asked the question whether they “use social network 
sites to keep in touch with trade unions”, only 5% of respondents at Authority A who 
were union members, and 9% at Authority B answered affirmatively. Not a single 
non-union member at either site answered affirmatively to this. When asked whether 
they “use social network sites to keep in touch with political parties, groups or 
campaigns”, 10% of respondents at Authority A and 12% at Authority B answered 
affirmatively. When questioned about whether they would be interested in using 
them as a means of communication with trade unions, this resulted in 3% at 
Authority A and 6% at Authority B saying they would. The same question but in 
respect of political parties, groups and campaigns showed 8% for both authorities. 
The general view expressed was outside of work employees use social media but 
do not want to use it for anything related to work. 
The use of the internet is a feature of the working day for many of the employees 
within the Revenues and Benefits departments at both sites. It is used to check 
various items such as post codes, business addresses and land registry records. 
Management sanction the use of the internet for what they consider legitimate 
reasons or whilst on breaks: 
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“Internet access is while you’re at lunch or breaks, unless it’s connected with 
work. [For example] if [a member of the public says] they’re doing their best 
to sell a property and we doubt whether they are, I would have no problem 
with somebody Googling that address and checking if it’s up for sale with an 
estate agent. It’s on a trust basis … visually we’ve got sight of people round 
the office, but we’ve got people who are home based workers so it’s 
absolutely based on trust. If you have somebody spending hours a day on 
the internet it would flag up through IT Services that they’re on the internet 
for x amount of hours. We could also see from the system that they weren’t 
doing any work.” (Deputy Revenues Manager, Authority A, Interview 2) 
The use of the internet on works computers can be monitored by the employer in 
terms of the amount of time spent and sites visited and as such may prevent 
employees using it for non-work-related reasons, including union activities, due to 
the panoptic capabilities the technology affords managers (Sewell, 1998:404). 
“They say it’s monitored and obviously we haven’t got access to certain 
websites. I think they can see what you’ve looked at. I’m sure they can, but 
I’ve never been pulled up over that and I’ve never known anyone that has. 
We know people could be checked” (Recovery Officer, Authority B, Interview 
32) 
“Some sites are blocked and that’s a corporate thing across the Council 
because our internet through our corporate servers have got a specific block 
on some sites and there are methods where they can trace websites you’ve 
been on during work’s time.” (Benefits Officer, Authority B, Interview 31) 
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 Many employees are now in possession of mobile phones with internet access and 
so could use these in works time and do not have to solely rely on the employer’s 
computer equipment. However, this may be limited as an employee’s output and 
non-productive time may be monitored, as detailed in the previous chapter and in 
the quote from the Deputy Revenues Manager (Authority A, Interview 2) above: 
“Your performance might go down if you are browsing something or maybe 
ICT have their ways viewing what I’m browsing but I don’t know. I think people 
do have concern but nowadays if you’re looking for something quickly on your 
phone no one’s going to know.  If you want to do it you can but you can’t do 
it on the computer because ICT would have a tap on it.” (Senior Billing Clerk, 
Authority A, Interview 12) 
 In summary, we can see the potential for ICT to be used for union activities. This 
may be considered a potential rather than actual form of resistance, indicating the 
possibility the very technology used as a tool of control can also be used as a 
communicative tool of resistance (Greenbaum,1998:139). The research appears to 
indicate there is some work for unions to do at these sites if there is to be any 
exploitation of ICT as a means to organize collective resistance, although there are 
examples of this being done elsewhere, as detailed by Dyer-Witheford (2015:156). 
It is the case the use of technology as a tool of resistance does not necessarily have 
to be utilized in works time and we have already seen the ubiquitous nature of 
technology in the home and not just the workplace. 
This section in discussing the evidence around collective resistance has again 
pointed to its possibility and posits the view that ICT has not been able to make 
management control absolute in this respect. However, it is also true to say ICT 
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does appear to make aspects of collective resistance problematic. Firstly, it can be 
seen to have been developed in ways that potentially lessen the impact of industrial 
action when engaged in by these workers. Secondly, as it leads to an increasingly 
dispersed workforce, there is evidence it is causing some organizational issues for 
unions. The section also points to a lack of pressure exerted on unions from their 
own membership in relation to engaging in collective forms of resistance, possibly 
down to individual attitudes of workers and this is discussed in the next section. 
8.3 Worker Attitudes and Relationship to Resistance 
This section focuses on the attitude individual employees may have towards  
management control exercised through the ICT systems. When considering the 
extent to which the technology used either prevents or restricts the level of 
resistance employees can engage in, there may be a tendency to assume the 
absence of resistance equates to an inability to resist resulting from essential 
properties of the technology. This may be fallacious as the absence of, or level of 
resistance, may result from employees actively choosing not to engage in it given 
the circumstances at a given time (Dundon and Dobbins, 2015:2) rather than being 
prevented from doing so by the intrinsic properties of the technology itself. It is the 
case that individual attitudes may have an effect on the level of collective action as 
detailed in 8.2.4 if workers are not seeking action collectively, particularly through 
their trade unions. As such the attitudes of individuals may not only be relevant to 
resistance carried out at an individual level. One such reason, for an absence of 
resistance could be that workers agree with the performance management carried 
out via technology, or at least that it ensures consistent treatment. The research 
also considered the ubiquitous nature of ICT and the general view held that it is 
progressive and therefore it should not be hindered, and may have the result of 
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making resistance to its use more unlikely. A further potential reason researched in 
examining an absence of resistance to management control through ICT is the fear 
individuals have of loss of employment and the financial implications as a 
consequence of this. Given the points raised here the research was keen to 
establish whether any lack of resistance may not be due to impossibility or difficulty 
as a result of the technology employed, but rather the attitude some members of 
staff have in respect of ICT or its effects. This is important when considering the 
potential technology has in terms of it affecting workers ability to resist management 
control, either positively or negatively, and therefore, how it affects the frontier of 
control. It would be clear only if resistance from employees has become impossible 
(Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Delbridge et al, 1993) could the frontier of control be 
irreversibly settled (Batstone, 1988:228). 
8.3.1 Perceptions of Fairness 
It cannot be assumed individual employees are necessarily opposed to 
management control, particularly of performance or attendance through monitoring 
via ICT. The position does appear to have been taken by some employees that they 
work hard and performance management ensures others work hard too and is, 
therefore, something they agree with as necessary (Challykoff and Kochan, 
1989:811) as it ensures fairness: 
 “I agree with performance monitoring as it shows who the poor performers 
are. Something can be done about it then. I have to earn my money so 
everyone else should too.” (Benefits Assessor, Authority B, Interview 30) 
 “Yes [it is fair], because that is what they are paying you for, so they’ve got 
to put the squeezers on you somewhere, ain’t they? Or you would have some 
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people who would take liberties.” (Benefits Assessor, Authority A, Interview 
8) 
In the questionnaire the statement “Performance monitoring is good because it 
identifies poor performers” was agreed with by just over half of respondents at both 
sites. 
Management at both sites felt workers preferred to be monitored, precisely because 
it was seen to ensure others were giving the same amount of effort they were. This 
was even a view put forward by the Head of Benefits at Authority A (Interview 1), 
who had ended individual monitoring in their department. The position was 
articulated by a manager at Authority B: 
“The number of staff that said that was unbelievable. So, whilst I think people 
might not like having their performance managed, I genuinely think they do 
because they hate the fact that they could be sitting next to somebody who 
is constantly not performing and ‘I’m doing a good day’s work every day. 
What are you doing about Joe Bloggs who’s doing nothing?’” (Operations 
and Improvement Officer, Authority B, Interview 28) 
This was not a unanimous view, however, with the response to the questionnaire 
indicating 15% of respondents at Authority A and 32% at Authority B did not agree 
with the statement “Performance monitoring is good because it identifies poor 
performers”. One employee, who incidentally had also said they knew how to 
manipulate the performance monitoring figures put it this way: 
“I don’t agree with performance monitoring. You’re not measuring whether 
people try are you? Just because I can’t run as fast as someone else doesn’t 
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mean I’m not running as fast as I can does it? It’s not fair like that.” (Billing 
Clerk, Authority B, Interview 21) 
“It’s not really fair, I always reach the targets but not everyone is as good. 
They might be doing their best, so what’s the good of continually hassling 
them.” (Billing Clerk, Authority B, Interview 29) 
The above comments would suggest some see performance management through 
monitoring as unfair per se, others object because they are subjected to it but others 
are not, so do not necessarily see it as unfair in itself but rather it is inconsistently 
applied. This was certainly raised as an issue at Authority A but not at Authority B: 
“I don’t think [it’s fair] for us. On our floor there is only us that’s performance 
monitored. It’s not fair, if the whole of the Council warrants it where you are 
dealing with people’s incomes and such like. It was down to the managers 
concerned because apparently it was the Head of Revenues’ baby, that we 
were performance monitored and that’s how it came about. I think it’s a good 
thing if I’m honest. If it’s done fairly because that way it will stop a lot of 
complaints.” (Billing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 6) 
“If you are going to do it then why keep an eye on just Clerks and Seniors? 
Why not Deputies and Team Leaders … and managers? Performance should 
be at all levels not just the bottom two” (Senior Billing Clerk, Authority A, 
Interview 12) 
An aspect of monitoring raised by managers and staff relates to how system 
generated figures are seen as fair by removing the arbitrary nature of management 
action against individuals by providing workers with objective evidence and as such 
may be supported (Findlay and McKinlay, 2003:306) as discussed in 8.2.4, although 
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in this section unions also pointed to the difficulty potentially caused for them 
because of the perceived objectivity of the performance figures produced through 
the system and how this may play out in disciplinary and capability situations. This 
is so, notwithstanding the criticisms made in this thesis regarding the lack of 
objectivity in the data produced and for some would appear to concur with the view 
that workers may prefer the monitoring to come from an ICT system rather than a 
manager who may not be impartial (Marx G.T., 1990:13): 
“I think it’s fairer. Whether a manager likes me or not, they can’t argue with 
the figures.” (Benefits Officer, Authority B, Interview 19) 
What this discussion on perceived fairness of monitoring is pointing to is a significant 
number of employees feel it is fair managers carry it out as long as it is applied 
accurately and consistently. However, the research indicated this assumption needs 
to be treated with some caution. The questionnaire shows a marked difference 
between the two sites with responses to the statement “the way my performance is 
monitored is fair”. Almost two thirds of respondents from Authority A agreed with 
this, with around one in ten disagreeing, opposed to less than one third agreeing 
and nearly half disagreeing at Authority B. This is particularly interesting as Authority 
B appears, if only superficially as detailed in Section 7.4.1, to have a more objective 
monitoring regime. There is a possibility here the term ‘fair’ may have an element of 
ambiguity as some respondents may have equated consistency with fairness 
whereas others may see the form of monitoring as inherently unfair regardless of 
being consistent or otherwise. The interviews, as detailed above, show this split 
among workers regarding this aspect. A lack of resistance from workers that accept 
the fairness of this form of monitoring would seem to be a plausible result (Stanton, 
2000:132; Challykoff and Kochan, 1989:812). 
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A related issue to that of fairness as discussed above that is worth noting is 29% of 
workers at Authority A and 25% at Authority B work from home (Head of Revenues, 
Authority A, Interview 14; Revenues and Benefits Manager, Authority B, Interview 
18). Neither authority impose this form of working which is currently voluntary. All 
the homeworkers who were interviewed explicitly valued this form of working and 
are, therefore, unlikely to resist any monitoring process managers see as facilitating 
this. 
Kidwell and Achey-Kidwell (1996:9) posited where monitoring was performed to 
enable management to identify training needs and may therefore be seen as non-
coercive, as partially concurred with by the Head of Revenues at Authority A 
(Interview 14) and noted in 7.5, may result in a situation where workers were more 
likely to accept than resist. However, no interviewees believed monitoring was 
carried out for this purpose and accepted a coercive nature to this form of 
monitoring. As such the possibility resistance may be absent due to a non-coercive 
application of monitoring was discounted at these sites. 
We can see here some workers have a general perception of fairness and 
worthwhileness in respect of monitoring performance through ICT and in this 
example, it provides an explanation as to why individual resistance may not be 
present and also why pressure does not appear to be commonly applied to unions 
to formally resist the use of ICT as a control tool. This would also be true of the next 
perception, that of ICT being seen as essentially progressive. 
8.3.2 Perceptions of Progress 
There is a strand running through the research findings that ICT is now so pervasive 
in all aspects of life that to resist it would be illogical and would be tantamount to 
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standing in the way of progress (Burnes et al, 1988:7) and this was highlighted also 
in the section of collective resistance, 8.2.4. This has echoes of the discussion on 
Luddism in Chapter 4 and how the term ‘Luddite’ has become pejorative (Bamber, 
1988:204). It is also the case, workers in the public sector will have been through 
the same educational system as their private sector counterparts and so have been 
subject to a process designed to endow them with skills required by the capitalist 
class (Carnoy, 1984:94) and to develop a level of consent to the general direction 
desired by the dominant group (Hyman, 1975a:127): 
“I don’t think there’s many people who are technophobes by instinct and I’m 
wondering if it’s because it’s become,  ‘it’s a fact of life, it’s not something we 
either can or should be doing anything about’, because it’s not just in the 
workplace, now it’s so pervasive it’s, ‘well you couldn’t do anything about it 
or turn the tide with this thing’” (UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority B, 
Interview 33) 
“I think in years past people could fight change. Now I think it’s accepted your 
job’s never going to stay the same and you shouldn’t stand in the way of 
progress. It’s expected nothing’s going to stand still so you don’t fight it.” 
(Head of Benefits, Authority A, Interview 5) 
A number of interviewees expressed the view that unions should not try and prevent 
the use of ICT and accepted the view of its essentially progressive nature (Burnes 
et al, 1988:7) or that it provides a better way to carry out the work (Garson, 
1989:208) in terms of administration of the services: 
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“Unions shouldn’t try and stop it. It’s progress. Would you really want to go 
back to working things out on paper? I wouldn’t.” (Benefits Assessor, 
Authority B, Interview 25) 
The questionnaire responses would also point to a positive view of ICT. When given 
the statement “I enjoy working with new technology”, 80% of respondents at 
Authority A agreed along with 74% at Authority B.  
As with perceiving the use of ICT as a tool of control as fair, this section also points 
to a position where the positive view of ICT may be posited as a reason for a lack 
of both individual or collective resistance, and it is the attitude of individual workers 
rather than the properties of the technology as such that explains this. 
8.3.3 Fear 
A further aspect of why people may choose to accept rather than resist management 
control is fear of the consequences of such resistance, particularly the loss of 
employment (Kidwell and Sprague, 2009:197; Jaros, 2001:35) with no other means 
of subsistence (Braverman, 1998:36). This should also be understood in the context 
of employment being contingent on central government being the arbiter of what 
services are provided and in what manner (Travers and Esposito, 2003:31; Coffey 
and Thornley, 2014:204). The questionnaire gave the statement, “My family and/or 
myself depend on the money I earn”. 93% of those responding in both Authority A 
and Authority B agreed with this statement. This was articulated by one of the 
interviewees at Authority A: 
“There isn’t much resistance, because they are frightened, they have other 
responsibilities, mortgage and things, so people feel afraid if you speak up, 
you’ll get targeted and if redundancy comes their job will go. They will 
306 
 
possibly go first because of questioning more than others.” (Senior Billing 
Clerk, Authority A, Interview 12) 
The research has attempted to ascertain to what extent this financial dependence 
on employment may have had in terms of discouraging resistance and what role, if 
any, the ICT systems have played in this. Local government has been subject to a 
sharp reduction in funding (Wilks-Heeg, 2011:636) and one of the ways they have 
dealt with this is through restructuring and redundancy. As labour costs are such a 
high proportion of a local authority’s budget, labour displacement, partially facilitated 
by ICT, has become an increasingly important part of management strategy (Head 
of Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14). It is clear from the interviews staff were 
conscious of the potential for job losses across local government (for example 
Authority A, Interviews 4,9,12; Authority B, Interviews 24,26,32) and the perception 
of the conditions of the labour market, as highlighted by Edwards (1979:126) may 
impact on any decisions they take relating to resistance. The deskilling of jobs, as 
discussed in Section 8.2.3, may also be relevant here in terms of workers having 
the confidence alternative employment could be secured, as articulated by a Billing 
Clerk at Authority A (Interview 10), who clearly linked the issue of skills with the 
difficulty of gaining alternative employment.  As such the research considered the 
extent to which the fear of this may have curtailed any resistance employees may 
have engaged in: 
“People might not be misbehaving and causing trouble because of the fact 
jobs could be going and they are thinking “when the next lot go, I don’t want 
it to be me that’s on this list, I’m going to make sure I’m not doing anything to 
make them want to get rid of me”. (Revenues and Benefits Supervisor, 
Authority B, Interview 24) 
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“They want a good reputation so they can keep their jobs. They think if you’re 
a trouble maker or you’re not working fast enough they’ve got an excuse to 
get rid of you.” (Scanning and Indexing Clerk, Authority A, Interview 4) 
Some interviewees specifically mentioned the relationship between performance 
monitoring and redundancy selection. We can see here how the performance 
monitoring carried out via the technology and the perceived threat of job loss and 
the fear this generates, combine to make it less likely for those individuals who fear 
such a loss of employment to resist and more likely they will comply with 
management requirements: 
“I think part of why people try and improve performance is fear. You are only 
as good as the last results. If your performance drops there’s a potential you 
will go. You could be out.” (Council Tax Billing Team Leader, Authority B, 
Interview 27) 
 “[Performance monitoring] turns into a competition, if jobs are going it will be 
those at the bottom of the pile that go. Can’t do anything to put my job at risk, 
so have to play ball” (Billing Clerk, Authority B, Interview 26) 
The relationship between technology and fear can be seen to be the role ICT has 
played in facilitating the loss of posts within these departments and resulted in a 
decrease in job security and a corresponding reluctance to engage in resistance 
(Edwards, 1979:126): 
“Why people behave themselves might be to do with the technology, because 
they can be replaced, but it’s not the technology in itself, it’s the psychological 
effect it has in terms of thinking, ‘I’d better behave myself because I might be 
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out the door’. Technology is related to it but it’s not a direct link.” (Head of 
Benefits, Authority A, Interview 5) 
 The reduction in labour is not, in itself, determined by the technology, rather the 
technology has allowed employers to respond to the reduction in financial resources 
local authorities are subject to, as detailed in Chapter 5. As such this should not be 
seen as technological determinism where the use of the technology is determined 
by the technology itself, but rather it is the choice of management and employers 
(Noble, 1979:18-19; Wilkinson, 1983:18): 
“I think the only way the job was secure would be if the Council didn’t have 
as many cuts to make. I don’t think the changes we have now would have 
happened because there wouldn’t have been the need, there wouldn’t be the 
pressure to make those changes.” (Benefits Assessor, Authority A, Interview 
9) 
However, related to the issue of fear of job loss is the previously considered aspect 
of workers agreeing with the management monitoring regime. The questionnaire 
asked respondents to judge the following statement, “If there are job losses, I feel it 
is right that performance monitoring data should be used as a factor to decide who 
is made redundant”. At Authority A 59% agreed and 24% disagreed, whilst at 
Authority B the response was 44% for both agreement and disagreement. The 
questionnaire also asked whether as an individual their performance was usually 
rated as good, 80% at Authority A and 73% at Authority B agreed with this, with the 
remainder expressing no opinion. For workers who perceive themselves as good 
performers, performance monitoring may be felt to be beneficial in that they may 
view it as a means of defending their employment. An issue to take into account 
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when considering this, is workers who may not be rated as good may have been 
less inclined to complete the questionnaire and would not have been interviewed, is 
that their views are not reflected here. However, the number of workers who would 
be deemed to be consistently operating at an unsatisfactory level is likely to be 
minimal due to the lack of formal action taken by management in this area (Head of 
Revenues, Authority A, Interview 14; Operations and Improvement Manager, 
Authority B, Interview 28). 
This section has pointed to a fear of consequences being a contributory factor in 
why workers may not seek to, or admit to, resist management control. Whilst this 
fear is not generated as an inherent property of the technology, ICT clearly affects 
this by facilitating an increased level of management surveillance and deskilling and 
therefore increasing the options managers have in terms of labour displacement. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has followed on from the examination of the research findings around 
management control of workers to consider how the use of ICT has impacted on 
any forms of resistance to this. Resistance, as explained in Chapter 4, for the 
purposes of this thesis, is any act that challenges, subverts or constrains 
management’s attempts to achieve control of the labour process in seeking to 
intensify effort and achieve a maximization of surplus labour or determine how work 
must be performed. The assumption here is evidence of any actual resistance 
shows, currently at least, the use of ICT has not been capable of perfecting 
management control by eliminating the possibility of resistance. However, the 
chapter in detailing the findings, has made the distinction between resistance in 
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terms of the implementation of ICT and resistance in respect of how the technology 
is used following this, with resistance not being seen in respect of the former. The 
chapter has also made the distinction between actual and potential resistance, with 
the latter being acts that may in certain circumstances be seen as resistant, for 
example absence from the workplace. In this respect evidence of such an act being 
able to be carried out, even where no evidence can be seen to definitively 
characterize it as such, is indicative of the possibility of resistance. It is also the case 
that where knowledge exists of how a resistant act may be performed also reveals 
its potential. 
Previous chapters have detailed how technical control has been achieved in how 
work items are executed via the embedding of rules and regulations within the core 
RBCA system. However, this chapter, in detailing individual worker resistance, has 
detailed the non-standard nature of the work and, due to this, how technical forms 
of control have not been totally achieved. Due to a requirement for flexibility in 
prioritizing when certain types of work are performed, gaps are present in the core 
systems that appear to allow workers to discover spaces that can be exploited to 
subvert management control. The idea that workers have work allocated to them, 
therefore eliminating any autonomy that they have in work selection is potentially 
capable of subversion by workers. Linked to this appears to be workers’ ability to 
cheat or manipulate performance data. The chapter has seen examples of workers 
who claim to know how to do this whilst not admitting to actually doing it. This would 
normally be treated with caution as evidence, but in this instance the fact some 
interviewees detailed how they do this, would point to its occurrence, even though, 
as with much individual resistance is by nature covert. Maintaining some control 
over work allocation and subverting performance data would point to a potential 
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resistance to management control in as much as workers are still exercising a 
certain regulation over effort expended. Whilst no evidence of management 
collusion with this manipulation could be identified, no disciplinary action appears to 
have ever been taken in respect of this activity. Where these occurrences are 
detected, as appears possible through the technology, it seems to be dealt with 
informally and management close the loop-holes they become aware of whilst 
workers find other ones. In this we can see a continually shifting frontier of control. 
The chapter also considered a potential act of resistance, that of workers absenting 
themselves from the workplace. Whilst this form of resistance had not been totally 
prevented by the use of technology, the bureaucratic control systems in place had 
certainly appeared to reduce the incidence. The panoptic qualities of the ICT 
systems and their integration would make unauthorized absences during the 
working day difficult to go undetected, even for those working remotely. This coupled 
with sickness absence monitoring that utilizes ICT systems to ensure management 
enforcement of corporate policies make this a more problematic form of resistance 
from the workers’ perspective. This aspect led to a consideration of the management 
role within this and whether they necessarily act as a homogenous group with a 
coherent control strategy. In both performance and absence monitoring, managers 
may themselves be subject to scrutiny by ICT. The technology has also had the 
effect of reducing the supervisory requirement and this coupled with a noted shift 
away from professional bureaucrats and practitioners has also seen a disruption to 
a once clear career path. Whilst the effects of technology on certain managerial staff 
at supervisory levels appears to give them a clearer identification with those they 
supervise and also threatens their employment and status, this could not be 
established by the research to lead to any resistance. It is also the case that no 
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manager at this level interviewed admitted to any deviation from corporate policy. 
However, at a more senior management level there was one example of a Head of 
Department refusing to carry out individual monitoring, which in itself can be seen 
as an act of resistance against more senior managers and an example of 
contestation affecting the outcome of how technology is used. 
As we have seen in this discussion, a potentially fragmented management group, 
with the possibility managers themselves may engage in potentially resistant acts, 
the issue of how technology may affect skills and resistance will be pertinent to this 
group as well as workers. It would appear to be the case for those in the supervisory 
tier that technology has indeed subsumed some of their roles and removed a great 
deal of discretion and autonomy.  Within the groups of workers, research indicates 
computer technology has resulted in an increased requirement for generic ICT skills 
but that technical control, by way of embedding rules and regulations, and 
automation has had the effect of reducing specific skills relating to the particular 
area of work. This however, does not appear to be uniform and the reduction in the 
requirement for specific skills does not appear to have had as great an impact with 
Benefits staff as with Revenues. However, the view of this thesis is there is a 
tendential aspect of deskilling that will potentially affect Benefits workers in the same 
way. The research would point to deskilling occurring not for control purposes per 
se but resulting from management choices, initially a desire for a more effective and 
accurate administration of the services and more latterly around cuts in financial 
resources. The resultant reduction in recruitment, loss of specific skills and new 
skills being of a more widely possessed generic nature point to resistance by 
transferring labour to a new employer being less of an option for both Revenues and 
Benefits staff, but with a greater impact for the former. 
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Any form of collective resistance would be expected to be more often than not overt. 
The research has shown no evidence of collective resistance or challenge to 
management prerogative through trade unions at the stages of design and 
implementation of any of the ICT systems utilized. The research pointed to a 
majority of workers taking the position that this was something unions should not be 
trying to stop. If we accept union activity may be in response to workers raising 
issues with them, this inactivity may be understood. The research did point to 
unions, sometimes successfully, challenging management around the use of ICT 
post-implementation. However, the research indicated developments in ICT in this 
area potentially lessening the effectiveness of industrial action. Having said this, 
Chapter 5, provided examples of recent industrial action within local government at 
both national and local levels and so it is clear that as a potential form of resistance, 
this has not been rendered unachievable. 
 Further problematic aspects of ICT use for unions was raised in terms of 
representation in disciplinary and capability situations due to the perceived 
objectivity of data relating to individuals. However, this was also seen as a double-
edged sword in as much as there was a possibility this perceived objectivity could 
be seen to encourage, challenge or prevent arbitrary management sanction against 
workers. Technology was seen to create problems for union organization in terms 
of the increasing incidence of spatial separation. The research considered a 
potential response to this in the form of using the very technology used in control as 
a means of communicating with, and organizing workers. Whilst there was seen to 
be some potential here, it would appear workers are currently not enthusiastic in 
respect of this. 
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The foregoing discussion has indicated management control has not been rendered 
absolute by the use of ICT due to the evidence that workers seem to have 
knowledge of how certain aspects of this may be subverted and elements of covert 
resistance do appear to take place. This is particularly the case where gaps are 
found in core systems used for certain aspects around technical control and where 
these feed into performance monitoring systems. However, ICT systems used to 
apply bureaucratic control over attendance and activity, whilst not totally preventing 
all resistance in these areas, do appear to have severely constrained it by enabling 
an increased level of management scrutiny. The research was also keen to examine 
whether an absence of resistance could be equated with an increased use of ICT 
by examining some potential alternative explanations for this. The first aspect to be 
considered, and one that found some agreement, was workers actually agree with 
how ICT is used. This was certainly not a unanimous view but did appear to be the 
majority perspective with over half of questionnaire respondents from both sites 
indicating they perceived performance monitoring as good because it identifies poor 
performance. Secondly, there was a view expressed in a number of interviews that 
technology is essentially progressive and any opposition would be considered 
backward or irrational. Finally, it can be seen that resistance may not take place due 
to fear among workers, particularly around loss of employment. Whilst this last 
reason can be linked to ICT and its effects on monitoring and potential labour 
displacement, it cannot be seen to be due to an inherent property of the technology 
itself but rather as an outcome of management choice and contestation. As such, 
the essential properties of technology may not in themselves be seen to be wholly 
preventative in terms of individual resistance and in certain circumstances may 
leave gaps for workers to subvert aspects of management control. However, it is 
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also the case that ICT, as utilized, has had the effect of curtailing resistance. 
Likewise, collective resistance is still possible and the technology in itself cannot 
prevent collective responses such as industrial action. However, the findings do 
point to the use of ICT resulting in organizational issues for unions and the potential 





Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis and draws on the literature and the material 
gained through the research conducted in arriving at and presenting a final view. 
The central aim of the thesis has been to investigate the control of the labour 
process through the use of ICT as exercised within Revenues and Benefits 
departments of local government. This central aim has three distinct strands. Firstly, 
the thesis has been concerned with why, when no profit motive can be established, 
management seek to control the labour process in the public sector, and whether 
this has changed over time. The second strand seeks to explore how ICT is 
developed and utilized in seeking to gain such control, whilst taking into account 
potentially changing management objectives, and finally, given the use of this 
technology the impact on workers’ ability or inclination to engage in resistance 
against management control techniques. 
The research process allowed for the gathering of a significant amount of relevant 
and valuable information in addressing the central thesis aim. The questionnaire 
exercise provided some valuable insight into workers views and feelings in relation 
to management control through ICT and attitude to work in general. The 
questionnaire process also provided a means of identifying workers who were 
prepared to be interviewed, allowing their views and insights to be more fully 
expressed. The interview process, consisting of interviews with workers, managers, 
a retired officer responsible for the design and implementation of the first 
computerized system of its kind within the areas researched, and a senior manager 
from a software supplier, ensured a rich and well-rounded perspective could be 
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achieved by the research. Whilst it was recognized, particularly when discussing 
resistant or transgressive acts, participants may not be willing to admit or discuss 
this aspect of their employment (Taylor and Walton, 1971:220; Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1999:3), in practice a number of interviewees not only admitted such 
acts but also provided details as to how they do this.  
There has been a recognition of the limitations of the research project. One of the 
first ones is the time constraints imposed by the thesis process. This means the 
research could only be conducted over two sites resulting in a narrower focus than 
could have been the case with greater time resources. The questionnaire process 
was also felt to have a constrained scope in terms of the relatively few surveys 
issued and returned. However, the researcher is clear that some useful information 
was obtained by this method. It is also the case that the main reason for its inclusion 
as a method was to provide a means of identifying subjects for the interview process. 
From this perspective it was very successful. Any limitations and how they have 
been addressed are more fully discussed in Chapter 6 on methodology. It is 
recognized further research may be possible for some of the strands of enquiry and 
this along with a consideration of the contribution this thesis makes in the study of 
ICT and the labour process, particularly within the public sector, is considered within 
this chapter. 
9.2 Key Findings 
The thesis commenced by exploring the motivation for control of the labour process 
from a Marxist perspective by initially considering the capitalist mode of production. 
Within this mode, profit was identified as the prime driver for control. The human 
capability for the separation of conception from execution of tasks (Marx K., 
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1990:284) was highlighted as allowing the formation of an employment relationship 
to be established. The thesis went on to explain the view that what an employer 
purchased in a capitalist employment relationship was labour power, or the potential 
for labour, as distinct from actual labour (Marx K., 1990:310; Braverman, 1998:37). 
Following this, a distinction was made between necessary labour, that is the time 
required to produce the goods consumed by the worker and their family for a day, 
and surplus labour being the element of the working day the worker continues to 
work over and above necessary labour time (Marx K. 1990:300). This is possible 
due to the indeterminate nature of the contract of employment which is not settled 
by the wage nexus (King, 1990:76; Burawoy, 1979:139). 
The thesis highlighted the Marxist view as seen in Marx K. (1990), King (1990) and 
Braverman (1998) that only necessary labour time is paid for by the employer, 
meaning surplus labour and the value created during this time belong to them and 
not the worker (Marx K., 1990:325; Thompson 1989:40). This is not only the basis 
of profit but also, due to diverging interests, an antagonistic class relationship. It is 
clear from this explanation that by increasing the amount of surplus labour, either 
by intensifying any labour performed or extending the working day, potentially the 
greater profit may be realized by the employer but also the greater the amount of 
unpaid labour will be performed by the worker (Marx K., 1990:429; King, 1990:82). 
Herein lies the struggle for control of the labour process with managers seeking to 
intensify effort and workers seeking to resist this. 
Whilst this explanation for the motivation of control within the capitalist labour 
process is coherent and the basis of much of the literature examined, the thesis is 
researching employment within the public sector. The thesis, therefore, went on to 
explore this motivation for control of the labour process within the public sector. 
319 
 
Whilst this sector is outside of the capitalist mode of production, it operates as a 
component of, and not just as a separate sector within, a capitalist system (Gough, 
1979:1-3) in which the state actively supports the interests of the capitalist class 
(Miliband, 1969). It is posited the capitalist class benefits from increasing 
productivity within the public sector due to the resulting potential for greater 
appropriation of surplus value within the private sector (Gough, 1975:82-83; Gough, 
1979:117-119), thus providing a clear explanation of why the labour process within 
this sector is controlled. It is also true to say the displacement of labour from the 
public as well as private sectors discharges labour into other areas, depressing 
wages and thus potentially increasing capital accumulation (Braverman, 1998:265). 
As the state is seen to act to further the interests of the capitalist class there is clearly 
a motive for it to achieve control of the labour process within the public sector. This 
motivation for control will be expected to be reflected in the design, implementation 
and use of ICT (Greenbaum, 1998:124) within local government as an institution of 
the public sector. 
Central government exercises considerable power over local authorities, including 
the services that can and must be provided and how these are to be delivered and 
managed (Wilson and Game, 2006:3; Wollmann, 2000:34). This is important to bear 
in mind as this means local government, though the employer of workers, may be 
required to act in a way contrary to their wishes as an employer. The thesis 
dismisses the position that local government could ever be seen as a model 
employer given the requirement for control as detailed above and has given 
examples of historical struggles over pay, grading and status to point to an ongoing 
level of antagonism between local and central government and workers (Coffey and 
Thornley, 2014;2009). However, much literature, such as Ironside and Seifert (2000) 
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and Gill-McLure (2014) indicates a shift in how labour management was delivered 
following the election of the 1979 Conservative government. Prior to this event, 
evidence in the literature and the research would point to a management tier of 
professional bureaucrats largely employed for their skills as practitioners rather than 
as managers of labour (Harris, 1998:843). Notwithstanding this, a critique developed 
regarding public services and their alleged inefficiency and privileging of producer 
over consumer interests that formed part of a government programme to solve these 
perceived issues (Kirkpatrick and Martinez Lucio, 1995:8). The literature points to a 
view that local government managers were seen by government as part of the 
problems highlighted above and consequently a change of managerial approach 
was required (Gill-McLure, 2014:372). 
Both the literature and the research would point to a change in how managers 
managed the labour process, shifting towards an increased focus on outputs (Pollitt, 
2007:110; Gill-McLure, 2014:373). This shift from a professional bureaucratic 
towards a more managerial style, often referred to as NPM, as seen in the private 
sector, with its attention to profit, was influenced by central government-imposed 
restructure of local government in the mid-1970s (Gill-McLure, 2014:370), resulting 
in an increase in the size of employment units and accelerated by a raft of policy 
initiatives from the 1980s onwards. The policies of CCT that have either resulted in 
actual privatization or specific trading conditions being enforced on successful in-
house bids (Wilson and Game, 2006:355), a regime of performance indicators and 
central government targets (Kurunmaki and Miller, 2006:97; Martinez Lucio and 
MacKenzie, 1999:164-165), and finally an increasingly severe contraction of local 
authority budgets (Wilks-Heeg, 2011:636) leading to a requirement for displacement 
of labour where services are still required. These central government policies, which 
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local government as a subordinate body has little choice but to implement, have 
seen a widespread importation of private sector management techniques (Ironside 
and Seifert, 2001). The use of technology, specifically ICT, has been central in 
facilitating this shift (Thornley et al, 2000:152) and has been actively encouraged by 
central government initiatives (Local Government Association, 2014:13). 
Following on from establishing an imperative for control of the labour process within 
the public sector, an examination was made utilizing Edwards’ (1979) conceptual 
model of types of control. However, whilst this conceptual model is useful for 
explanatory purposes, the thesis rejects an evolutionary view of methods of control, 
highlighting that there are incidences of supposedly more developed forms and 
examples of different control types existing simultaneously.  The types identified by 
Edwards (1979) were as follows. Simple control as a direct form delivered by owners 
of firms or managers acting on their behalf. This was seen as problematic, as the 
size of organizations increased so would the managerial requirement in terms of 
numbers. The result of this from Edwards’ (1979) view, was the development of 
structural forms of control, initially a technical form applied via modern technology 
(Dawson, 1988:120) assuming a central role in the labour process and work 
organization (Hall, 2010:171). In essence, technical control can be seen to be where 
technology sets the pace and directs the labour process (Edwards, 1979:113; Littler, 
1990:60) with a resultant potential for skill to be removed from the process due to 
technology assuming control over processes that would once have been the domain 
of the worker. 
Technical control, however, was only seen as appropriate to production jobs and as 
such Edwards (1979) posited that a form of bureaucratic control was developed to 
provide control for non-production roles.  Bureaucratic control is “a form of structural 
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control achieved through bureaucratic means” (Dawson, 1988:140n1), such as rules 
and procedures formally governing employee conduct within an organization. The 
thesis disputes the view that the development of bureaucratic control can be seen 
as a chronological development. In actuality, forms of control have not necessarily 
been exclusive, with all the forms so far discussed being seen used concurrently 
(Hall, 2010:171; Thompson, 1989:152). A final type of control was considered, 
namely the employer seeking to gain consent of workers (Burawoy, 1979). The 
research was keen to examine this in the context of the effectiveness of control 
being exercised through ICT, inasmuch as whether an absolute form applied 
through technology (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Delbridge et al, 1993) would result in 
no non-technological types of control being required (Grint and Woolgar, 1997:119). 
The research considered the use of ICT systems within the Revenues and Benefits 
functions with the conceptual model of types of control as proposed by Edwards 
(1979) providing a framework. The initial core (RBCA) ICT system implemented 
within the departments being considered was designed with the intention of 
providing a system to administer the Revenues and Benefits functions in terms of 
the correctness and legality of the billing and recovery of General Rates, and the 
awarding of benefit entitlement in relation to this tax. This was achieved by designing 
a system, implemented in the late 1970s, that would embed the rules and 
regulations for the two functions within it. Following standardized input from workers 
of relevant information, these rules and regulations were applied to administer the 
functions (Hall, 2010:172-173). The research indicated a system designed to apply 
technical control inasmuch as the autonomy and discretion of workers was curtailed 
by the requirements and parameters of the system. The system could not, however, 
determine work allocation or pace. However, it could be seen in certain aspects to 
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provide a level of technical control for non-production staff as had been proposed 
by Braverman (1998). An important point is that this system did have the capability 
to monitor the amount of work completed by individuals as an inherent property 
(Robins and Webster, 1985:37), but interviews indicated that this was not utilized by 
management at the time of implementation and did not occur until the CCT regime 
was implemented by government. This would indicate that control in the 
employment relationship is about the requirements of the employer and not part of 
any generalized system as proposed by Foucault (1995). The implementation of 
EDM as a further core system occurred later than the application of performance 
monitoring and was ostensibly motivated by a more effective way of dealing with 
correspondence. It did allow for the automatic allocation of work to individuals, 
potentially removing their autonomy in terms of self-selection and adding another 
facet of technical control.     
ICT systems designed for the purpose of bureaucratic control, the second of 
Edwards’ (1979) structural forms, have been implemented at both sites. These 
govern rules and policies with the particular aspects of interest here being 
concerned with timekeeping, attendance and absence. These systems can be seen 
to curtail managerial discretion in dealing with any transgressions regarding the 
behaviours listed above, as failure to deal with workers transgressing policy is 
electronically reported to the central HR department. We can see therefore 
diminution of managerial autonomy (Grugulis and Lloyd, 2010:105). The research 
concurs with the view expressed in the literature (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992:215) 
that ICT has proved a potent tool in delivering bureaucratic control. 
We have seen how individual performance monitoring and surveillance was not 
carried out until the requirement for performance indicators and CCT impacted on 
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the services being researched. As such the thesis posits that the development and 
utilization of ICT can be seen to have been shaped by the changing objectives and 
requirements of management. These developments have become more 
sophisticated over time, as witnessed at Authority B, by the development of 
performance monitoring systems that extract information from the core and 
bureaucratic systems and calculate superficially objective performance scores. 
Authority A monitored performance without recourse to any sophisticated use of 
data extraction, instead relying on objectivity being achieved by the random nature 
of system allocated work to even out any differences in work allocation over time. 
The research concluded that neither method was objective in operation and 
implementation was to achieve an intensification of effort (Bradley et al, 2000:105-
106) as a response to central government policies, rather than the provision of any 
objectively useful data. This conclusion was confirmed by a number of interviewees 
during the research. What could be seen from the use of the ICT systems was how 
they can be integrated and combined to establish an overarching level of control 
that could be seen to be panoptic in its operation, in that every aspect of a worker’s 
behaviour was subjected to constant scrutiny recognized by the workers, in a 
computerized system of simple control. Having different forms of control operating 
concurrently is not new, but the level of integration now seen would not have been 
possible without the specific properties of ICT. In essence ICT provided a level of 
scrutiny comparable with having a supervisor for every worker (Garson, 1989:223). 
Indeed, the physical presence of a supervisor is no longer necessary (Zuboff, 
1988:322) as witnessed by workers being allowed to work from home. 
When considering the design and implementation of these systems the research 
was clear neither workers nor their representatives were involved to any meaningful 
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extent in design, which is now largely contracted to external suppliers. 
Implementation of ICT therefore, could be expected to reflect the potentially shifting 
interests and objectives of management and so is in no way neutral (Dyer-Witheford, 
2015:29). This is equally as true in how the systems are used. The research 
concurred with the view that there can be an inherent quality within ICT systems 
that can be used to control and monitor the work of individuals (Robins and Webster, 
1985:37). However, initially it was clear management, although aware of the 
monitoring capacity, chose not to use it. The technical control element, although not 
recognized as such by managers interviewed, achieved through the embedding of 
rules and regulations was highlighted in the research as specifically part of the 
design objective. The result of this can be seen to be a sharper division between 
conception and execution (Beirne et al 1998:146) with those carrying out the work 
having no input into the former.  
The research, therefore, concluded that the use of ICT systems in terms of control 
of the labour process is not technologically deterministic but is rather a result of 
management choice in application or design to achieve their objectives at that 
particular time (Hall, 2010:164) and that this can be seen to change, particularly as 
a result of external pressures applied from central government. The method of 
technical control applied via embedding of rules and regulations can be seen to be 
consistent with a requirement for a system of professional bureaucracy based on 
processes. Whilst the research could find no specific evidence of such a motivation, 
the implementation of ICT from the outset, resulted inevitably in a level of deskilling 
(Grugulis and Lloyd, 2010:91), albeit unevenly impacting on different groups 
(Wilkinson, 1983:8), with interviews indicating workers in Benefits currently due to a 
more fluid regulatory framework having a more resilient skill-set.  Following the 
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policy changes from central government highlighted, we can see a change in both 
how the technology is used and designed to achieve the objective of intensifying the 
effort of labour. Increasingly, as detailed particularly in the interview with the Head 
of Revenues at Authority A (Interview 14) we are also seeing development of ICT 
that removes labour from the process altogether by automating whole processes. 
When combined we can see the cheapening and displacement of labour as a result 
of a reduced requirement in respect of skill and automation, coupled with an 
intensification of effort of those remaining. However, again it needs to be stressed 
this is as a result of management choice, albeit in response to external pressure, 
and not a predetermined property of ICT. 
Management seeking to control the labour process by eliciting consent from workers 
was considered as a potential alternative or complement to control exercised 
through technology. The research did highlight some form of participation from 
workers in two areas. Firstly, both sites were accredited IIP employers. The 
research, however, pointed to this not being an active component of either 
authority’s activity. The research was unable to distinguish the reason for this, which 
was seen to be either due to more effective control facilitated by ICT, as suggested 
by Grint and Woolgar (1997:19), or lack of resources, or potentially a combination 
of both. The second aspect was participation in the procurement of the core 
systems, and in respect of Authority B the development of the performance 
monitoring system. However, in terms of this participation, the choices workers were 
allowed to make were all within a range of what would be considered managerially 
acceptable outcomes (Price, 1988:256). At no stage did workers participate in any 
manner that could have resulted in ICT not being implemented or used for the 
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purposes of control of the labour process. Workers, therefore, were unable to 
intervene in a resistant manner prior to implementation of ICT systems. 
The main area of research examined in evaluating the effectiveness of the control 
regimes implemented by management via ICT systems considered the extent to 
which they could be resisted individually or collectively. As such the thesis 
considered whether a frontier of control exists within the areas researched as well 
as being an integral component of the capitalist labour process. The thesis first 
sought to arrive at a working definition of resistance and concluded that this was 
any act that either prevented or subverted management’s attempt to control the 
labour process to achieve intensification of labour or remove worker discretion in 
how work can be carried out through the use of ICT systems. A problem was 
acknowledged in terms of whether an act could be considered resistant as it will not 
necessarily be known whether resistance can be imputed without knowing the 
reason the worker attaches to such acts. The thesis, however, in seeking to 
determine the extent to which ICT has prevented worker resistance to management 
control, was less concerned with the meaning of a specific individual act than 
whether it could, in certain circumstances, be used as a means of resistance. The 
example of worker absence is useful in illustrating this point. Absence could either 
be as a result of a genuine debilitating illness or as an act to remove the worker from 
management control. If ICT does not prevent absence then this form of resistance 
will still be potentially available to workers. 
The first area to be considered in terms of resistance were individual acts, although 
it was recognized these may have a collective element to them. A number of acts 
were identified that could be seen as a way of workers resisting management 
attempts to control the effort expended by labour. The research clearly pointed to 
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management accepting performance monitoring had the effect of intensification of 
labour (Bradley et al, 2000:105-106), including an implication by The Operations 
and Improvement Manager at Authority B (Interview 28) and concurring with Taylor 
(1947) that without this form of control workers would be naturally lazy. However, 
the research also pointed to a knowledge among workers of how to falsify the data 
making it appear they had performed more work than they actually had. A number 
of interviewees freely admitted they engaged in this form of behaviour, giving 
examples of how it could be achieved. The research indicated technical control 
could not be fully realized due to the non-standard nature of the work being 
completed and provided a clear account of the operation of a frontier of control with 
management closing loopholes and workers creatively seeking to discover new 
ones (Thompson and Smith 2010:16; Taylor and Walton, 1971:242). 
The second area the research considered in terms of resistance was of workers 
absenting themselves from the workplace (Edwards and Scullion, 1984). The 
research pointed to this being curtailed by the use of ICT systems in the following 
ways. Firstly, it was recognized staff may absent themselves from the workplace 
citing illness. As discussed, in this thesis it is enough to identify the potential for the 
act to be an act of resistance to recognize its possibility. The bureaucratic systems 
in place at both sites reflect the corporate policy on absence. This consists of trigger 
points where absence in excess of this results in managers being instructed to hold 
meetings and issue warnings to the worker concerned. The managers themselves 
are subject to monitoring to ensure they comply with this requirement and are not 
allowed to exercise discretion. The research, whilst not totally excluding absence as 
an option for resistance and a means of effort control on behalf of the worker, did 
point to the use of such systems resulting in a significant reduction, but not 
329 
 
elimination, of absence. This reduction is at least partially resulting from workers 
who are ill attending work and therefore reducing sickness absence, whether as a 
result of genuine illness or not, potentially achieving an intensification of labour that 
may not otherwise have occurred. Another type of absence identified was where 
workers absent themselves without authorization for part of the working day. The 
research pointed to this virtually being eliminated due to the panoptic qualities 
possessed by the integrated systems that could detect periods of inactivity. This 
also means workers who are geographically dispersed can be monitored in terms 
of their activity without the need for a physical supervisor (Zuboff, 1988:322). 
In terms of individual resistance then, the research has shown at least some workers 
are still able to resist management control in terms of intensification of labour by 
manipulating performance figures. This points to limitations within technical control 
when requirements for flexibility and non-standard items of work exist that workers 
can and do exploit. However, in terms of the technical control applied through 
embedded rules and regulations, no evidence was found that this could be resisted. 
The research indicated workers absenting themselves and citing illness as a reason 
is still possible but has been severely curtailed. Unauthorized and unrecorded 
absence during the working day has been largely prevented due to the panoptic 
combination of core and bureaucratic systems. In short, a key finding is ICT has not 
entirely eliminated the potential for individual resistance but it has clearly imposed 
limitations on it. As much individual behaviour that could be classed as resistant is 
covert by nature, we can see why ICT with its capability to exercise a panoptic form 




The research went beyond the usual binary relationship of managers controlling and 
workers resisting, which may be the case if a unity of purpose in delivering a 
coherent strategy of control could be demonstrated (Friedman, 1990:182). 
However, the research indicates managers themselves can be subject to 
monitoring. The research also points to a decline in the number of managers, 
particularly within the supervisory tier due to the technical and panoptic qualities of 
the ICT systems used. As such it may be the management group should not be 
perceived as homogenous (Wardell, 1990; Hyman, 1987) and certain members of 
the group may have more in common with those they manage than more senior 
managers. The research found a senior manager at Authority A who had 
successfully resisted implementing individual performance monitoring within her 
department thus pointing to a heterogenous potential among the management 
group. However, the research failed to identify any other instances of managers 
deviating from required behaviour and so could not establish any concurrence of 
interests between managers and workers. However, it needs to be recognized when 
considering this, as Braverman (1998:290) highlighted, these managers are also 
employees who may be unwilling to divulge their transgressions. 
Collective resistance, particularly through the actions of trade unions, was 
considered. The research largely concurred with the view advanced by Garson 
(1989:219) that unions lacked policy on, and failed to resist control exercised 
through electronic monitoring. It was also seen unions tended not to resist at the 
stages of design and implementation, potentially due to a lack of technical 
knowledge (Bamber, 1988:216). The research highlighted a general view that the 
members themselves did not wish to see unions resisting the implementation of ICT 
and there was scant evidence of members raising issues with unions around this. 
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This may explain unions’ lack of activity at these stages. There was, however, at 
Authority A evidence of unions collectivizing a grievance (Taylor, 2013:74) to resist 
how management sought to use ICT following implementation and this concurred 
with the view that unions tend to challenge how, rather than if, technology is used 
(Taylor and Bain, 1999:114) and unions at both sites also recognized this was where 
union resistance may have to occur.  
The research pointed to some difficulties potentially arising in terms of collective 
resistance due to developments in ICT removing some of the ways industrial action 
could previously paralyze systems (Shaiken, 1985:247-248). It is the case with 
systems now being hosted on remote servers and many processes running 
automatically will limit the effectiveness of industrial action. Workers in Revenues 
would no longer be able to cut off an important money supply to their employers as 
once they were able to do. Other aspects, outside of the area of ICT have hindered 
union organization and resistance, in particular central government anti-union 
legislation (Ironside and Seifert, 2000) and a tendency for industrial relations to have 
been decentred due to the effects of CCT and BV (Gill et al, 2003:261) and these 
need to be factored into any analysis regarding the impact of ICT and the occurrence 
of resistance. However, whilst no industrial action has been taken at either of the 
two sites in respect of implementation and use of ICT, national strikes have taken 
place around pay and pensions and other authorities have seen strike action over a 
variety of issues and so withdrawal of labour can still occur (for example, Coffey and 
Thornley, 2014:203; Lyddon, 2015:738; UNISON, 2016). As such the thesis rejects 
a simple causal effect of increasing ICT use and a reduction in collective worker 
resistance to management initiatives.  
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 A further problem for unions, in terms of organization caused by ICT was the 
increase in remote working, facilitated by more effective control, as highlighted by 
Zuboff (1988), leading to a geographical dispersion of workers and issues around 
communication. The research indicated the possibility of unions using ICT as a tool 
of organization but this appears to be a potential rather than an achieved situation. 
Simply equating a lack of union resistance with the properties, effects and increasing 
use of ICT is, in the view of this thesis, overstating its impact (Hyman, 1988:55).  
We can see in terms of resistance whilst ICT does appear to have the effect of 
curtailing certain acts of resistance, there is still evidence of its potential or 
occurrence. We can say therefore, ICT has intensified but not perfected 
management control. The research also examined whether any absence of 
resistance could necessarily be attributed to ICT per se and sought to identify other 
potential reasons externally that may explain its absence. The first aspect related to 
a view highlighted in the literature and research findings that ICT is seen as a 
progressive force and it would be backward to resist its use (Bamber, 1988). This is 
also connected to the view given that trade unions should not attempt to prevent its 
utilization. The second aspect considered was workers are fearful of the 
consequences of such action and therefore comply with management. Whilst this 
aspect cannot be seen to spring from some inherent property of the technology, it 
is clear the effect ICT has on labour displacement and skills has made workers 
perceive their employment to be less secure (Dyer-Witheford, 1999:196). The 
research also indicated a perception among many workers that the control 
exercised, particularly through performance monitoring, is fair, objective, 
notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, and beneficial thus making any resistance 
to it less likely (Marx G.T., 1990:13). As such the reasons discussed mean it is 
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erroneous to simply equate a lack of resistance with an increase in the use of ICT 
and whilst the technology may have implications for resistance this does not stem 
from essential qualities of the technology itself but rather the choices made in its 
design and utilization (Noble, 1979:18-19; Wilkinson, 1983:18). It also needs to be 
seen in the context of the relative power between workers and management as 
influenced by the labour market conditions, skill, union organization and action, all 
of which may be influenced by, and shape the use of, technology. 
9.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
The thesis draws much of its inspiration from Marx K. (1990) and Braverman (1998) 
in detailing the imperative for control within the capitalist labour process and seeks 
to extend this into the public sector by using the work of Gough (1975;1979) to 
understand why the labour process is controlled within local government. The thesis 
highlights the literature, such as Ironside and Seifert (2000) and Gill-McLure (2014) 
that demonstrates changes in the management of the labour process within local 
government in response to the changing priorities, policies and legislation 
emanating from central government from the 1980s to date. However, the thesis 
does not see this as a disjuncture in moving from local government as a model 
employer (Coffey and Thornley, 2009;2014) but rather should be seen as a 
continuous but fluid process due to its operation within, and as a component of, a 
capitalist system, where surplus labour generated within the public sector can be 
seen to be of value to the capitalist sector (Gough, 1975;1979). A contribution of the 
thesis is the linking of these changes in labour management shaped by central 
government policy, the increasing use and development of ICT, the objectives and 
interests of local government and managers and how this has been reacted to by 
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workers and their organizations. In this sense a more complex dynamic can be seen 
between these elements than in a straightforward control and resistance model. 
Much of the literature in this area of control stems from a Marxist analysis of the 
capitalist labour process and its motivation in its drive to increase profit (Marx K. 
1990; Braverman, 1998). It is also the case much of the literature, as regards ICT 
as a tool of control within the non-productive labour sector, focusses on the 
phenomenon of call-centre work, examples are Fernie and Metcalf (1998) and Bain 
and Taylor (2000). This thesis examines the labour process within local government 
and particularly in Revenues and Benefits departments with their focus on the 
administration of specific local authority provided public services. This extends the 
research of the labour process into this area, with much of the labour being 
administrative and clerical in nature and employing much of the same technology. 
The thesis has attempted to relate how changes in central government policies and 
legislation have resulted in changing priorities for local authorities and managers 
within local government and how this has shaped the design, implementation and 
use of ICT as a potential tool of control. The examination of these links allows 
consideration of the extent to which ICT is used in a technologically determinist way, 
or alternatively as a result of choice and contestation among the various actors 
involved. 
The thesis links Edwards’ (1979) conceptualization of the types of control with the 
ICT used within the areas researched and demonstrates how they are identifiable 
within the separate systems utilized and how these have been developed using the 
capacity for integration by combination into an overarching panoptic network. The 
thesis examined the view this panoptic quality had ended the possibility of any 
worker resistance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998). The thesis, therefore, contributes to 
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the debate on the continuing possibility of management control being resisted in a 
significantly unionized environment by examining the forms, potentially novel and 
covert, any such resistance may take. As such it supports the view that even though 
technology may have curtailed resistance, the frontier of control still exists and has 
not been definitively settled. Furthermore, the thesis has extended the debate 
around resistance into the area of management itself, arguing management should 
not necessarily be seen as a homogenous group with a coherent and unified 
strategy (Wardell, 1990; Hyman, 1987). The thesis contributes the views and 
perspectives of managers and workers and therefore relates the working experience 
of those employed within this environment to the theoretical aspects found in the 
literature. 
It is accepted there are limitations to the thesis and how definitive any conclusions 
may be. It is the case the study was relatively narrow with only two out of hundreds 
of local authorities being researched. It is also the case the two authorities in the 
study were geographically relatively close. They were also of similar size. Whilst this 
has value in itself with the thesis not being a comparative study as such, this does 
leave some scope for further research. Aspects such as regional variances and 
changes in approach for authorities of different size may provide an interesting point 
of investigation, as would the development of, and motivation for, government policy 
and its relationship to the development of ICT in the public sector. It is also the case 
this study, concentrating as it did, on local government within the public sector, did 
not research those Revenues and Benefits departments transferred to the private 
sector. This would also provide an interesting point of comparison as it would place 
the same function within a sector where the profit motive was present. A further 
limitation in the study could be seen to be the historical perspective, with the first 
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computerised systems being implemented in these areas almost four decades ago. 
As such many people taking part in the research did not have experience around 
the whole period being researched. The research did, however, have access to a 
number of people who had the length of service required or who were present and 
involved prior to and following the implementation of the first computerized systems 
in this area. Whilst the thesis, in examining the use of ICT, necessarily focused on 
the period immediately prior to, and then developments following implementation, 
there is a recognition this occurred in the context of a much longer historical period. 
Overall this thesis extends an examination of control of the labour process into the 
public sector where there is no profit motive. It, therefore, considers the motivation 
in this area for controlling labour. It also widens the debate from a position where 
the employer’s motivations would be constant and consistent, such as the 
production and maximization of profit, to one where the motivations of the employer 
are influenced and shaped, potentially in an unwelcome manner, by central 
government acting in the overall interests of the capitalist class. Within this 
examination the role of technology in general and ICT in particular is of central 
importance. 
9.4 Conclusion 
There is clear evidence labour was intensified within the areas of local government 
studied, from the election of the Thatcher government in 1979 and also successor 
administrations (Ironside and Seifert, 2000; Gill-McLure, 2014). This can be seen to 
be consistent with the view advanced in this thesis that surplus labour performed 
within the public sector can benefit the capitalist class and therefore the state, in its 
role as a promoter and defender of the interests of the said class, has a motivation 
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in controlling the labour process within local government to maximise this (Gough, 
1975;1979). As such it is not only the profit motivated private sector (Marx K., 1990; 
Braverman, 1998) that witnesses management attempts to control and intensify the 
labour process. The thesis is clear ICT has had a central role in this intensification 
(Thornley et al, 2000). However, what cannot be definitively demonstrated is the 
changes in managerial control highlighted and facilitated by the specific type of 
utilization of technology were carried out consciously by managers within local 
government to attain such intensification for the reasons given per se and it would 
seem more likely such actions were reactions to the conditions created by external 
pressures. This certainly should not be read that control of the labour process was 
not seen until the 1980s, indeed supervisors were employed, but is more the case 
ICT gave managers the tool to tighten control and intensify labour in response to 
external pressures. Further cuts appear to be planned and this may result in further 
technological facilitation particularly in terms of displacing labour as recognized by 
managers within the interviews. 
 The evidence from the research, particularly with interviews from managers, points 
more towards a situation where the full range of control capabilities of the initial 
systems were known but not fully utilized. What appears to have caused 
management to adopt such control systems, most notably through monitoring and 
surveillance, was the policies and legislation emanating from central government 
around performance indicators, CCT and increasingly severe financial constraints 
(Ironside and Seifert,2000;2001). Following these central government initiatives, it 
can clearly be shown existing ICT systems became used as a tool of monitoring 
workers in addition to the inherent technical control element that must be a factor of 
the original core system with its embedding of rules and regulations (Robins and 
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Webster, 1985:37), and that future ICT systems designed had a more unequivocal 
control imperative. The above points to a position where the way technology is 
designed and used is a matter of choice and not a matter of technological 
determinism (Edwards, 1979). This can also be seen in the different control 
strategies employed by Revenues and Benefits at Authority A. 
The thesis used the types of control as conceptualized by Edwards (1979) to draw 
attention to how the various ICT systems utilized operated. However, the thesis 
posits what makes these systems qualitatively different from forms of control 
proposed by Edwards (1979), which had been seen prior to the advent of 
computerization, is the development in this technology to integrate discrete systems 
(Berdayes, 2002:35). The thesis concludes this has led to what can be seen as a 
panoptic form of control with the capability of extending the initial concept of the 
panopticon as proposed by Foucault (1995) by means of its certainty of application. 
The thesis concludes this view of a panoptic form of control is consistent with a 
Marxist LPT view due to the evidence from the research clearly pointing to its 
utilization within the workplace for the purpose of intensifying labour. 
The thesis was concerned to examine if the points raised above has led to the 
creation of a powerful management control tool and to what extent this can be seen 
to have curtailed or removed the potential for individual worker resistance. In 
general, the thesis concludes resistance from workers has been made more 
problematic, but not impossible, by the implementation and utilization of the ICT 
systems as an instrument of control. The evidence clearly shows workers 
individually do not intervene at the points of design or implementation. As such there 
is no resistance or challenge to the management objectives reflected in the ICT 
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systems as designed and utilized (Greenbaum, 1998:124). This means any 
resistance is only currently seen post implementation.  
Following implementation, and particularly integration, of the various ICT systems 
considered, it would appear to be safe to say there has been a strengthening of 
management control of the labour process leading to an intensification of labour. 
However, there is evidence of some resistance by way of falsification and 
manipulation of performance data showing a clear motivation to violate the 
expectations of management (Robinson and Bennett, 1995:556) and so 
management control cannot be said to be total. Other acts of potential resistance 
such as absenteeism (Edwards and Scullion, 1984), have been reduced but remain 
possible, albeit at a lesser frequency. Individual resistance has also been shown to 
not be exclusive to workers but managers as employees also, and also subjected 
to control via ICT systems, are not necessarily a homogenous group with a coherent 
strategy (Wardell, 1990; Hyman, 1987). As such the thesis concludes it is not 
necessarily accurate to pose the control and resistance dynamic in the simple terms 
of management versus workers. 
The thesis has also noted problems in terms of collective resistance through trade 
unions resulting from the use of ICT systems within the areas researched. As with 
individual resistance there has been no involvement or challenge by unions at the 
stages of design and implementation, so any resistance will necessarily be post-hoc 
(Noble, 1979:45). However, there was some evidence of unions being able to 
collectivize grievances in how management were utilizing the systems and 
successfully resist specific practices (Taylor, 2013:74). Whilst the research indicates 
no industrial action taken at the two research sites in respect of ICT and its use, 
there has been national strike action taken by local government unions and also 
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strike action involving groups of workers at individual authorities (for example, 
Coffey and Thornley, 2014:203; Lyddon, 2015:738; UNISON, 2016). As such, it 
would appear somewhat premature to assume ICT will necessarily prevent such 
action. However, it does need to be pointed out that ICT as it has developed, 
particularly in the area of automation, will have reduced the specific effectiveness of 
strike action for the particular groups concerned in this study. Other groups within 
local government less dependent on technology may not be impacted in a negative 
way in terms of the effectiveness of industrial action. The ICT facilitation of 
geographic dispersal of workers also creates challenges for union organization and 
so may have a detrimental effect on collective action. 
The question as to whether ICT is directly, due to its inherent properties, responsible 
for any reduction or curtailing of resistance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Delbridge et 
al, 1993) requires a more nuanced answer. The thesis has provided evidence that 
a proportion of workers actually agree with management control techniques applied 
(Challykoff and Kochan, 1989:811), whilst some point to the perceived progressive 
qualities of technology and posit this as a reason why workers should not obstruct 
it (Burnes et al, 1988:7). As such, technology can be seen to have a role in the 
potential reduction in occurrence of resistance but is not the direct cause. Likewise, 
a number of interviewees discussed the fear they have around the loss of 
employment as a reason why no resistance is undertaken (Dyer-Witheford, 
1999:196). The link with technology in facilitating choices in terms of the 
displacement of labour has been shown, but this does not indicate this being an 
inherent quality of the technology but rather a management choice. 
The overall conclusion of the thesis is that within the public sector, as a component 
of a capitalist system, there is a motive for controlling the labour process to achieve 
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an intensification of effort. Whilst control has always been present within the public 
sector, the policies of central government, as implemented by local government 
employers and managers and facilitated by the use of ICT, do appear to have 
intensified management control and labour within the areas researched. 
Resistance, whilst still evident does seem to have been rendered an option that has 
become increasingly problematic for employees. As such, the researcher would 
state ICT has shifted the frontier of control in management’s favour but that it cannot 
be said to be finally settled.     
There is a recognition of the relatively narrow field of focus in respect of this thesis 
and some recommendations for future research clearly emerge from this in respect 
of control and resistance and the relationship these aspects have with technology. 
Firstly, the close geographical proximity and similar size of the research sites means 
that it may be interesting from a comparative view to investigate authorities from the 
perspective of a more clearly differentiated location and size. Secondly, the thesis 
is concerned with the discipline of revenues and benefits within local authorities. 
This is one of a number of functions carried out and a similar study of other functions 
would indicate how general the trends identified here may have become within local 
government. A further recommended route of investigation that may also be fruitful 
is of identical functions that operate across sectors as will be seen when functions 
are privatized. Finally, this thesis can only take us to the present point in time and 
given the final comment in the preceding paragraph, shifts within the frontier of 
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Appendix 1: Revenues and Benefits Staff Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is looking at the use of technology in your workplace. It is up to you whether you 
complete the questionnaire and all questions are optional. Any information provided is confidential 
and your employers will not get to see any individual responses. Should you choose, the 
questionnaire can be completed anonymously. However, a space is left for your name and this will 
be required should you be willing to take part in any follow up interviews. I would like to take this 
opportunity to thank you for any participation in this research.  
By returning this questionnaire it is assumed that you are consenting to take part in this 
research. 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study and have 




Section 1: Personal information. 
 
Male                 Female            
Would you consider yourself a member of an ethnic minority?   Yes               No             Prefer not to say    
Full-time    Part-time    
Age………………… 
In what year did you start your current job?……………………. 
 
What is your current salary?…………………….. 
 
Do you work in:   Revenues             Benefits               Combined Revenues and Benefits Division              Other          (please state)………………… 
 
Do you ever work from home?       Always             Sometimes              Never                               
Do you work as part of a team?   Yes                No              Don’t know                                                                                                     
Are you a member of a trade union?  Yes           No  
If yes, which one?.............................................. 
Section 2: The following questions are about your attitude and motivation in your job. You will 
be given a series of statements. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
strongly disagree or have no opinion by marking the relevant box. 
 
     Strongly            Strongly 
       Agree           Agree         No opinion         Disagree         Disagree 
My family and/or myself depend                                                                    
 on the money I earn 
The salary I receive is fair for the performance                                                           
 expected of me 
I find my job interesting  
The social aspect of work is important to me 
 x 
x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x            
x 
                       
x 
           
x 
           
x 
           
x 
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            





I feel my job is secure  
Staff are encouraged to participate in   
 deciding how work is carried out 
       Strongly            Strongly 
       Agree           Agree         No opinion         Disagree         Disagree 
  
 
Senior managers are always prepared to      
listen to the views of staff  
 
My line manager is always prepared to    
listen to the views of staff  
 
I am actively looking for a job outside 
my current area of work 
 
                                                                                      
If I could, I would take early retirement 
or voluntary redundancy                         
             
I would be happy to spend the rest of  
my career in my current area of work  
 
Section 3: The following questions are about how you are managed and how your work is 
controlled and monitored. You will be given a series of statements. Please indicate whether you 
strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree or have no opinion by marking the relevant box. 
         Strongly        Agree       No opinion       Disagree        Strongly 
        Agree           Disagree 
 
I am subject to performance monitoring 
 
If my performance was not monitored I 
would not work as hard 
 
I feel pressured to keep my performance figures 
at a level that management require  
 
The way my performance is monitored is fair 
 
Performance monitoring is good because it 
identifies poor performers 
 
Colleagues are aware of each other’s  
performance figures 
 
If I know my colleagues’ performance figures 
I will work harder 
 
Being monitored makes me less willing to  
help my colleagues 
 
I take a break whenever I need to 
 
 
Being performance monitored causes me 
 stress  
 
 
I know how to manipulate performance 
monitoring figures 
 
Managers take personal circumstances into 
account when looking at performance figures 
 
I can always make up a plausible excuse if 
my performance figures are too low  
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                       
x 
         
x 
           
x 





Being monitored undermines my morale 
 
        Strongly        Agree       No opinion          Disagree           Strongly 
        Agree              Disagree 
 
If there are job losses, I feel it is right that  
performance monitoring data should be used 
as a factor to decide who is made redundant 
 
Performance monitoring is not about accuracy, 
it is about getting us to work harder 
 
Being monitored means I am less likely to 
 help management  
 
                                                               
My performance is usually rated as good  
 
      
Section 4: The following questions are about concerns you may have with work and how these 
are dealt with. You will be given a series of statements. Some questions require a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
answer. On all others please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly 
disagree or have no opinion by marking the relevant box. 
 
I have raised concerns about performance 
monitoring with management            Yes           No 
 
I have raised concerns about performance           
monitoring with a trade union                                Yes                             No 
 
     
        Strongly        Agree      No opinion           Disagree           Strongly 




Any concerns about performance monitoring 
I have raised with management have been 
taken seriously and acted upon 
 
I work longer than I would like as a result 
of performance monitoring 
 
 
Any concerns I have raised with a trade union    
have been taken seriously and acted upon 
 
Trade unions should try and prevent 
performance monitoring 
 
Trade unions are forceful in their dealings  
with management 
 
I am active in a trade union  
 
 
      
Section 5: The following questions are about how you feel about working with new technology. 
You will be given a series of statements. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly disagree or have no opinion by marking the relevant box. 
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      Strongly        Agree        No opinion        Disagree              Strongly 
       Agree                 Disagree 
          
I enjoy working with new technology 




Changes in technology never benefit staff 
                                                                                                            
 
I feel the technology used in Revenues and/or 
Benefits requires a high level of skill 
 
The job would require a higher level of 
skills without the use of computerized systems 
 
A high level of training is required to do my job 
 
 
The skills I have gained by using the  
computerized  systems in Revenues 
 and/or Benefits would be  useful  
in other jobs  
 
Management set strict rules on the use of 
technology   
 
I always follow the rules regarding technology 
set by management  
 
I can adapt the computerized systems to suit 
my own ways of working   
 
Management encourage staff to adapt the 
computerized systems to their  
own way of working 
 
I have a better working knowledge  
of the technology used than my managers  
 
 
Section 6: The following questions are about how you use technology outside of work. You will 
be given a series of statements. Please indicate your response by marking the relevant box. 
 
I use social network sites (e.g. Facebook) Yes   No       
I use social network sites to keep  Yes                                  No 
in touch with trade unions 
 
I use social network sites to keep in 
 touch with political parties, groups                 Yes                                  No 
 or campaigns 
  
 
           Strongly        Agree        No opinion        Disagree  Strongly 




I am interested in using social network 
 sites to keep in touch with trade unions  
 
 
              Strongly        Agree        No opinion        Disagree  Strongly 
      Agree     Disagree 
                                                            
                                                            
                                                
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                      
                                                            
                                                            
            
                        
                        





I am interested in using social network  
sites to keep in touch with political  




Please use this section to make any comments you would like regarding this questionnaire and 





I would like to thank you for completing the questionnaire and taking part in this research. It may 
be useful in some cases to do some follow up interviews. If you would be interested in doing this 
please complete the section below with your preferred contact details. All details will be treated in 
the strictest confidence.  
 









              ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..  
 






Appendix 2: Questionnaire Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Information Sheet:Questionnaires  
Study Title: Technology and workplace control: A study of the use of new technology in Local 
Government Revenues and Benefits departments. 
 
 
Aims of the Research 
 
The aim of the research is to investigate the use of new technology in the workplace in terms of 
how it may be used as a tool for exercising control over workers. The study will be carried out over 
a number of Revenues and Benefits sites. The research will seek to determine who chooses to 
implement technology and why and also how it is used once implemented.  This will include how 
technology may be used to monitor staff and how it may be used as a tool of surveillance. The 
research will also consider how workers may seek to accommodate, adapt or resist technology and 




You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study “Technology and workplace 
control”.  This project is being undertaken by Andrew Maybury as part of his doctoral studies at 
Keele University, supervised by Professor Carole Thornley. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why 
this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information carefully 
and discuss it with friends and relatives if you wish.  Please feel free to ask me if there is anything 
that is unclear or if you would like more information.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen to take part in this study because your employment involves working within 
a Revenues and/or Benefits Division. As such your experience will provide a high level of insight into 




Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not. You are free to withdraw from this 
study at any time and without giving reasons. There will be no consequences for you should you 
decide not to take part. 
 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire compiled by Andrew Maybury. The questionnaire 
will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. All questions are optional and questions can be 
left out should you wish to do so. The questionnaire can be completed anonymously. However, 
there is a place for you to put your name. This will be required should you be willing to take part in 
any follow-up interviews. Your anonymity will be guaranteed. 
 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
The questionnaire will allow you to give your views on aspects of the use of technology within the 
Revenues and Benefits divisions. A prepaid, addressed envelope will be provided for you to return 
the questionnaire.  
 
 
What are the benefits (if any) of taking part? 
You will be participating in a piece of research that will look at the use of technology within the 
workplace from the perspective of those who work with it. 
 
What are the risks (if any) of taking part? 
There are no risks to those agreeing to participate in this questionnaire. 
 
How will information about me be used? 
The data will be collected and presented qualitatively. Returned questionnaires will be used in the 
completion of a PhD thesis and may be used in future research where completed anonymously. All 
personal information held on paper will be kept by the researcher in a lockable cabinet. All 
information and data held on computers and portable storage devices will be password protected. 
Questionnaires that identify individuals will be destroyed after the completion of the thesis unless 
consent is given by the individual for its retention.  
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
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The data collected for this study will only be accessed by the researcher, Andrew Maybury, and his 
supervisor, Professor Carole Thornley. This means that the researcher will protect your identity as 
a participant by ensuring that you remain unidentifiable in the research. Only the researcher, 
Andrew Maybury, and his supervisor, Professor Carole Thornley, will have access to the personal 
data you may disclose in the questionnaire. Any personal data will, therefore, remain confidential. 
If discussed in the research you and your organization will be given a false name so that you will be 
unidentifiable. The data from this study will be securely stored by the principal researcher, Andrew 
Maybury, until completion of the PhD at which time it will be destroyed, unless consent for its 
retention is gained from the participant concerned. All information will be held in compliance with 
the Data Protection Act 1998. 
    
Who is funding and organising the research? 
This research is independent and has no third party funding. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the researcher who 
will do his best to answer your questions.  You should contact Andrew Maybury on 
a.d.maybury@keele.ac.uk. .  Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher you may 
contact Professor Carole Thornley, Keele Management School, Darwin Building, Keele University, 
Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, or via email at c.r.thornley@keele.ac.uk. If you remain unhappy about the 
research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the way that you have been 
approached or treated during the course of the study please write to Nicola Leighton who is the 
University’s contact for complaints regarding research at the following address:- 
 
Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 






Appendix 3: Interviews Conducted 
Interview Number Authority Job 
1 A Head of Benefits 
2 A Deputy Revenues Manager 
3 A Assistant Benefits Officer 
4 A Scanning and Indexing Clerk 
5 A Head of Benefit 
6 A Billing Clerk 
7 A Senior Benefits Assessor 
8 A Benefits Assessor 
9 A Benefits Assessor 
10 A Billing Clerk 
11 A Systems Officer 
12 A Senior Billing Clerk 
13 A Billing Clerk 
14 A Head of Revenues 
15 A UNISON Branch Secretary 
16 A UNISON Workplace Steward 
17 B Benefits Clerk 
18 B Revenues and Benefits Manager 
19 B Benefits Officer 
20 B Benefits Assessor 
21 B Billing Clerk 
22 B Benefits Assessor 
23 B Billing Clerk 
24 B Revenues and Benefits Supervisor 
25 B Benefits Assessor 
26 B Billing Clerk 
27 B Council Tax Billing Team Leader 
28 B Operations and Improvement 
Manager 
29 B Billing Clerk 
30 B Benefits Assessor 
31 B Benefits Officer 
32 B Recovery Officer 
33 B UNISON Branch Secretary 
34  External Software Development 
Manager 




Appendix 4: Indicative Interview Schedule 
Senior Managers/Directors 
• How long have you been in your current post? 
• Where did you work prior to this? 
o In what capacity 
• What changes have you seen in Revenues and Benefits? 
• Can you tell me how technology has developed in these areas? 
• What IT Systems are used in Revenues and Benefits, both core and 
peripheral? 
• Can you tell me whether the systems were bought in or whether they were 
designed in-house, and why this decision was made? 
• Can you talk me through the procurement process and the reasons the 
particular systems were chosen? 
• Has the technology been modified since implementation, and if so why? 
• Can you explain to me the organizational structure of Revenues and Benefits 
and how work is allocated to staff? 
o Has this changed since the implantation of the core systems? 
• How have staff numbers changed since the implementation of these systems, 
and do you know why? 
• Has staff absenteeism increased or decreased since implementation of core 
systems and do you know why? 
• What is the purpose of IT? 
• Can you explain any staff consultation process prior to procurement of the 
systems? 
• Can you explain whether or not these systems are used to control staff in any 
way, e.g. monitoring, surveillance, recording, and why?  
• Are staff always aware that monitoring or surveillance is being carried out? 
• Can you tell me whether and how the use of technology by staff prescribed?  
• Do any staff work from home?  
o If yes, does the monitoring or surveillance capability of the technology 
have any benefits for this type of work, and was it important in deciding 
to follow this type of working arrangement? 
• Apart from the use of the core computer systems in what other ways are staff 
controlled? 
• How is an acceptable level of performance calculated or set?  
• What happens with any performance data generated? 
• Has information from these systems supported disciplinary action against 
any staff?  
• Can you explain how you feel technology used in Revenues and Benefits has 
affected the skills required to do the job? 
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• Are the skills required to do the job transferable outside Revenues and 
Benefits?   
• Can you explain any staff consultation process that took place prior to 
instigating any monitoring or surveillance procedures? 
• In terms of monitoring their work, are staff entitled to any privacy? 
o Why (not)? 
• Are you a member of a trade union, and why did you make the decision to 







• How long have you been in your current post? 
• Where did you work prior to this? 
o In what capacity 
• What changes have you seen in Revenues and Benefits? 
• Can you tell me how technology has developed in these areas? 
• What IT Systems are used in Revenues and Benefits, both core and 
peripheral? 
• Can you tell me whether the systems were bought in or whether they were 
designed in-house, and why this decision was made? 
• Can you talk me through the procurement process and the reasons the 
particular systems were chosen? 
• Has the technology been modified since implementation, and if so why? 
• Can you explain to me the organizational structure of Revenues and Benefits 
and how work is allocated to staff? 
o Has this changed since the implantation of the core systems? 
• How have staff numbers changed since the implementation of these systems, 
and do you know why? 
• Has staff absenteeism increased or decreased since implementation of core 
systems and do you know why? 
• What is the purpose of IT? 
• Can you explain any staff consultation process prior to procurement of the 
systems? 
• Can you explain whether or not these systems are used to control staff in any 
way, e.g. monitoring, surveillance, recording, and why?  
• Are staff always aware that monitoring or surveillance is being carried out? 
• Can you tell me whether and how the use of technology by staff prescribed?  
• Do any staff work from home?  
o If yes, does the monitoring or surveillance capability of the technology 
have any benefits for this type of work, and was it important in deciding 
to follow this type of working arrangement? 
• Apart from the use of the core computer systems in what other ways are staff 
controlled? 
• How is an acceptable level of performance calculated or set?  
• What happens with any performance data generated? 
• Has information from these systems supported disciplinary action against 
any staff?  
• Can you explain how you feel technology used in Revenues and Benefits has 
affected the skills required to do the job? 
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• Are the skills required to do the job transferable outside Revenues and 
Benefits?   
• Can you explain any staff consultation process that took place prior to 
instigating any monitoring or surveillance procedures? 
• What are your views on whether staff are entitled to privacy whilst at work? 
• Are you a member of a trade union, and why did you make the decision to 






• How long have you been in your current post? 
• What was your job prior to this? 
• Have you seen major changes in Revenues and/or Benefits? 
• Can you explain your role as a supervisor/team leader?  
• Are staff organized in teams?  
o Why? 
• How is work allocated?  
• Have the number of staff you supervise increased or decreased over time? 
• Can you tell me about any staff participation schemes (e.g. IIP, suggestion 
schemes, staff forums)?  
• What is the purpose of IT? 
• Is the use of technology by staff strictly prescribed? 
• Are the skills required to do the job transferable?  
• How do you feel the use of technology has affected the skills required to do 
the job?  
• What do you feel about the monitoring and/or surveillance of workers?  
• How is technology used to monitor or check up on staff?  
• How do you feel about the level of monitoring and/or surveillance you are 
asked to perform on staff?  
• Are staff always aware that monitoring or surveillance is being carried out?  
• In what ways, if any, do you monitor or check on staff without using 
technology?  
• Do you have to pass monitoring information or statistics onto any more senior 
managers?  
• When monitoring are any checks done to ensure data accuracy?  
• How are the results of any monitoring presented to the staff?  
• How is an acceptable level of performance calculated or set?  
• What happens if workers performance is deemed to be unsatisfactory i.e. 
what do you do? 
• Are you subject to monitoring or surveillance?  
o Is this fair? 
o How does this make you feel towards your managers? 
• Have unions raised any issues with you about monitoring or surveillance of 
staff? 
o If yes, what happened and what was the outcome? 
o How did you feel about this? 
• Are you a member of a trade union, and why did you make the decision to 
join or not to join? 
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Workers (certain questions may not be asked as workers will have been asked to 
complete a questionnaire prior to the interview) 
• How long have you worked in your current job? 
• Where have you worked before working here? 
• Do you work in teams?  
o If yes, do you know how the members of your team perform? 
o If yes, how do you know this? 
o How does this make you feel? 
• Do you ever work from home?  
o How do you feel about this? 
• Can you explain how is work allocated to you?  
• As the employer is paying you to work, do you that it is fair to continuously 
monitor you whilst at work? 
• How do you feel about your workload and how you cope with it?  
• Can you tell me what you feel about the future security of your job?  
• Do you feel this is in affected by new technology? 
• Have you had any say in how the technology is used?  
• How has using this technology affected the skills you use in your job? 
• What do you think about staff participation schemes (e.g. IIP, suggestion 
schemes, staff forums)?  
• Can you adapt the technology to allow you to work in different ways? 
• Do you have access to the internet at work (officially or unofficially)?  
• Have you ever been disciplined because of your use of the internet at work?  
• Can you explain how your work is checked and monitored?  
• Do you feel it is important for managers to monitor your work and 
performance?  
o Why? 
• If you have work targets set, how does this affect the way you work?  
• How are the results of monitoring your work communicated to you?  
• Do you feel the information used in your monitoring/targets is accurate? 
• Have you ever been disciplined as a result of performance issues?  
• Can you tell me about any effect that monitoring of your work has on you and 
how you deal with it? 
• Do you know what your colleagues performance scores are and do they know 
yours?  
o How do you feel about this? 
• Are you a member of a trade union?  
• If yes, have you taken any issues up with them about workloads, monitoring 
or performance?  
o If yes, what was their response? 




• Can you tell me what systems you provide for Revenues and Benefits? 
• In terms of the market, what sort of market share does your company have? 
• Can you explain the design process for the system?  
• Do customers have any input into the design?  
• What is the main purpose of the system? 
• Are aspects of the system concerning staff monitoring and/or surveillance 
important for customers?  
o If yes, are they specifically requested or specified? OR is this 
something that has been developed as a selling point? 
o Why are they important? 
o Can you explain how these aspects work? 
o Are they embedded in the system or are there separate bolt on 
systems? 
• Can the system be modified by the user after implementation – particularly in 
the area of performance management? 
• Are any software updates inclusive of performance management aspects? 
• Have the requirements for performance management systems increased 
over time? 
• What do you think the purpose of performance management is? 
• Do you know of any ways that end users can manipulate the system to adapt 
it to the way they work? 
• Do you know of any ways that the end user can manipulate performance 






Trade Union Officers 
• Can you tell me about your background in the union and your current 
position? 
• If there are any homeworkers in Revenues and Benefits, how has this 
affected organizing workers?  
• Can you tell me about the union density in Revenues and Benefits, and 
whether it has changed over time?  
• Does Revenues and Benefits have any work place stewards or 
representatives? 
• Can you explain about any procedures that exist for consultation concerning 
implementation of technology? 
• Can you give me the details of any agreements negotiated with the employer 
regarding the implementation and use of technology?  
• Are members coming to the union with issues around the use of technology 
and if so, what are they and how do you deal with them?  
• Can you give me the details of any disputes between the union and 
management arisen over the use of technology? 
• Have the union been consulted over the use of surveillance and monitoring?  
o If yes, what happened? 
• Can you detail any agreements you have made with the employer regarding 
the surveillance of staff? 
• Can you detail any agreements you have made with the employer regarding 
the surveillance of staff? 
• Have any of your members come to the union with issues around the use of 
performance monitoring?  
o What were these and what did the union do? 
o What was the outcome? 
• Have any of your members come to the union with issues around the use of 
surveillance?  
o What were these and what did the union do? 
o What was the outcome? 
• Can you tell me about any disciplinary or grievance issues that have arisen 
as the result of performance monitoring or surveillance of staff? 
• Have any disputes between the union and management arisen over the use 
of performance monitoring? 
o If yes, what happened and what was the outcome? 
• What options do you feel you have in terms of action you can take regarding 





Appendix 5: Interviewee Information Sheet 
 
 
Information Sheet:Interviews  
Study Title: Technology and workplace control: A study of the use of new technology in Local 
Government Revenues and Benefits departments. 
 
 
Aims of the Research 
 
The aim of the research is to investigate the use of new technology in the workplace in terms of 
how it may be used as a tool for exercising control over workers. The study will be carried out over 
a number of Revenues and Benefits sites. The research will seek to determine who chooses to 
implement technology and why and also how it is used once implemented.  This will include how 
technology may be used to monitor staff and how it may be used as a tool of surveillance. The 
research will also consider how workers may seek to accommodate, adapt or resist technology and 




You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study “Technology and workplace 
control”.  This project is being undertaken by Andrew Maybury as part of his doctoral studies at 
Keele University, supervised by Professor Carole Thornley. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why 
this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information carefully 
and discuss it with friends and relatives if you wish.  Please feel free to ask me if there is anything 
that is unclear or if you would like more information.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen to take part in this study because your employment involves working within 
a Revenues and/or Benefits Division. As such your experience will provide a high level of insight into 
the work of this division and the technology used within it. 
  
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part you will 
be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for our records. You are 
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free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons. There will be no 
consequences for you should you decide not to take part. 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
You will be asked to take part in an interview conducted by Andrew Maybury. The interview will be 
expected to last approximately one to one and a half hours. You may be invited to participate in 
follow up interviews in due course. Your anonymity will be guaranteed. 
 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
If you take part you will be asked to sign a consent form before the interview commences. The 
interview will allow you to give your views on aspects of the use of technology within the Revenues 
and Benefits divisions. You will be free to stop the interview at any stage should anything pressing 
crop up, or indeed for any reason that you wish. As a one to one interview may give rise to issues 
around lone working it would be of benefit if the interview could be conducted at your workplace. 
However, if an alternative venue would be preferred, this can be accommodated and arrangements 
discussed prior to it taking place. 
 
What are the benefits (if any) of taking part? 
You will be participating in a piece of research that will look at the use of technology within the 
workplace from the perspective of those who work with it. 
 
What are the risks (if any) of taking part? 
There are no risks to those agreeing to participate in these interviews. 
 
How will information about me be used? 
The data will be collected and presented qualitatively. Interviews will be used in the completion of 
a PhD thesis and will not be used for any future research projects without your consent. A box is 
included for this purpose, on the consent form you will be asked to complete prior to the interview. 
Interviews will only be recorded with the consent of the participant and any recordings will be 
destroyed after the completion of the thesis should you wish. All personal information held on 
paper or on voice recording equipment will be kept by the researcher in a lockable cabinet. All 
information and data held on computers and portable storage devices will be password protected. 
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
The data collected for this study will only be accessed by the researcher, Andrew Maybury, and his 
supervisor, Professor Carole Thornley. This means that the researcher will protect your identity as 
a participant by ensuring that you remain unidentifiable in the PhD thesis and any resulting 
publications. Only the researcher, Andrew Maybury, and his supervisor, Professor Carole Thornley, 
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will have access to the personal information you discuss in the interview. Any personal data will, 
therefore, remain confidential. When discussed in the research you and your organization will be 
given a false name so that you will be unidentifiable and will remain anonymous. The data from this 
study will be securely stored by the principal researcher, Andrew Maybury, until completion of the 
PhD at which time it will be destroyed, unless consent for its retention is gained from the participant 
concerned. All information will be held in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
    
Who is funding and organising the research? 
This research is independent and has no third party funding. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the researcher who 
will do his best to answer your questions.  You should contact Andrew Maybury on 
a.d.maybury@keele.ac.uk. .  Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher you may 
contact Professor Carole Thornley, Keele Management School, Darwin Building, Keele University, 
Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, or via email at c.r.thornley@keele.ac.uk. If you remain unhappy about the 
research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the way that you have been 
approached or treated during the course of the study please write to Nicola Leighton who is the 
University’s contact for complaints regarding research at the following address:- 
 
Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 









CONSENT FORM: Interviews 
 
Title of Project:  Technology and workplace control: A study of the use of new technology in 
Local Government Revenues and Benefits departments. 
 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: Andrew Maybury, Research Institute for Social 
Sciences, Room CM0.18, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG 
Telephone:  
Email: a.d.maybury@keele.ac.uk  
 
 
Please tick box if you  
agree with the statement 
 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have 
had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time. 
 
3 I agree to take part in this study. 
 
4 I understand that data collected about me during this study will be anonymised before it is 












I agree to the interview being tape recorded 
 
 




















































 Appendix 7: Consent Form for Quotations                                      
 
 
CONSENT FORM: Interviews and Questionnaires 





Title of Project:  Technology and workplace control: A study of the use of new technology in 
Local Government Revenues and Benefits departments. 
 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: Andrew Maybury, Research Institute for Social 
Sciences, Room CM0.18, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG 
Telephone:  
Email: a.d.maybury@keele.ac.uk  
 
 
Please tick box if you  









2 I do not agree for any quotes to be used 
 
 





























Appendix 8 – Ethical Clearance Confirmation Letter 
 
RESEARCH AND ENTERPRISE SERVICES  
               
  
  
20th December 2013  
  
Andrew Maybury  
 
Dear Andrew,  
  
Re: Technology and control of workers: A case study of Revenues and Benefits departments in 
local government  
  
Thank you for submitting your application for review.  I am pleased to inform you that your 
application has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel.  The following documents have been 
reviewed and approved by the panel as follows:  
  
Document  Version  Date  
Summary of Proposal  2  11/12/13  
Letters of Invitation  2  11/12/13  
Information Sheets  2  11/12/13  
Consent Forms  3  11/12/13  
Questionnaire  2  11/12/13  
Interview Schedule  1  23/09/13  
  
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, you must notify the Ethical Review 
Panel via the ERP administrator at uso.erps@keele.ac.uk stating ERP1 in the subject line of the 
email.  
  
If there are any other amendments to your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ 
form to the ERP administrator stating ERP1 in the subject line of the e-mail.  This form is available 
via http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/  
  
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 
uso.erps@keele.ac.uk   stating ERP1 in the subject line of the e-mail.  
  




Dr Jackie Waterfield  
Chair – Ethical Review Panel  
  
Research and Enterprise Services, Keele University, Staffordshire, 
ST5 5BG, UK  
Telephone: + 44 (0)1782 734466   Fax: + 44 (0)1782 733740  
  
RESEARCH AND ENTERPRISE SERVICES  
               
CC   RI Manager  
